RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
International scientific meeting almanac

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CHANGES IN THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF THE RELIGIOUS COLLECTIVITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA THROUGH THE PRISM OF THEIR LEADERSHIP

Abstract: Religion as a societal phenomenon, although founded on a set of dogmas, which seemingly refers to apparent "staticity", its significant part is subject to a constant change. The well-known sociologist Norbert Elias speaks about the natural changeability of the human as a social constant. In that context, the atomized comprehension of the very religious community indicates a constant of changeable individuals. Focusing on the determinant of "societal alterations with long-term and relatively important consequences (Abu-Lughod, 2000)", refers to the dynamicity of the religious life that is conditioned by both the internal state of affairs within the religious communities and the influences exerted by the closer and wider surroundings.

This paper would analyze the change of the religious life of the communities on empirical basis which is provided through interviews with the leadership of the religious communities, as well as with a part of the intellectual elite thereof. By using cross-sectional research design and qualitative strategy (e-interviews) the key points of the change of the religious life in the Macedonian religious collectivities would be addressed.

Key words: change, religious collectivity, public religion, leadership, cross-sectional research design, e-interviews.

Introduction

Things do not change, we change.
Henry David Thoreau

Social change in the sociology is infallible part of the curriculum in general sociology. The dynamics of the social life reflected through the separate study of the changes points to the complexity, significance and specifics of the very concept. However, when it is about linkage between the social change and the religion, theorist have divided opinions. On one hand, it is

discussed about the religion and religious organization structures which tend to keep or, simply preserve the states as these are. On other hand, the other course of theorists is crystallized who consider the religion to support and give its important contribution to the social life or change of the social states.

Significant part of the modern sociological thought regarding the changes and the religion tend to occupy the space between these two opposing opinions given above in ideal-type format. However, when linking the social change and the religion it is unavoidable to take into account the specifics of the social constellation, characteristics of each individual culture with regard to the religion, as well as the specific characteristics related to the very religion and the manner of its adaptation and existence.

Changes happen at macro level, mezzo level as well as micro level. This paper is intended first of all to analyze the changes within one institution or religious collectivity which can have from hundreds of believers or followers to a minor number. However, the changes in the collectivity are discussed through the prism or from the perspective of the religious leadership. In addition, the leadership includes believers who hold either high (first of all, managerial) positions within the religious collectivity or believers who belong to the intellectual elite of the very collectivity (such as faculty professors, coaches at seminars, assistants or persons in charge of education in the very religious collectivities). This approach was adopted in order to place my focus on their perception or self-perception of the changes and the way or possibilities to control them, that is, to introduce them, to guide them and to direct them.

1. Theoretical background

Progress is impossible without change, and those who cannot change their minds cannot change anything.
George Bernard Shaw

The concept of *change* in the sociological science is present for a long time. The functionalist and evolutionist theories in the sociology speak about historical development of the society, pointing out that "every day in every way, things get better and better"[1]. Herbert Spencer argues that the societies transit from phase of homogeneity to phase of heterogeneity. In addition, Emil Durkheim elaborates the changeable character of the societies through the famous syntagma for mechanical and organic solidarity. Unidimensional theories of social changes trace one way or direction through all societies pass. However, multidimensional evolutionary theory, especially Lensky, "gives a central role to technology, arguing that technological advances are

[1] Shepard, J., Sociology, 2012, Cengage Advantage: Sociology, 11th Edition, page 540.

significantly (through not wholly) responsible for other changes, such as alterations in religious preference, the nature of law, the form of government, and relations between races and genders."[2]

The conflict theory in the sociology assigns the key role to the economy, as well. According to the conflict theory "the primary cause of social change is economic conflict between social classes", that is, "social change can correct social injustices and inequalities". Ralph Dahrendorf "sees conflict among groups at all levels of society"[3]. The advocates of Modernization theory emphasize that "global development is a worldwide process including nearly all societies affected by technological change."[4] In this context, the process of homogenization would tend to changes which would be modeled according to *Western nations that had modernized first*. Namely, the societies become increasingly homogenous as a result of technical and technological changes. However, it is fact that the Western European countries and the USA are not the only countries which guide the technological globalization.[5]

In sociology, the change is basically determined as "any significant alteration over time in behavior patterns and cultural values and norms"[6]. In addition, it is underlined that by ***significant*** alteration, sociologists mean changes yielding profound social consequences. That is, "the term social change is used to indicate the changes that take place in human interactions and interrelations. Society is a web of social relationships and hence social change means change in the system of social relationships. These are understood in terms of social processes and social interactions and social organization."[7]

The lucidity of the review of the pubic sociology of Michael Burawoy significantly considers the role of the sociological science when studying the historical changes.[8] Giddens alleges that the recognition of the social changes means that the degree of change in the basic structure of each phenomenon or state of affairs in particular time period should be determined. The sociological narration about religion as a complex social phenomenon inevitably begins with the historical development of the religion, listing all of its developing stadiums. Particular stadiums are characterized by faster and

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[2] Anderson, L.M., Taylor, F.H., Sociology, The Essentials, Seventh Edition, Wadsworth Cengage Learning, Belmont, USA, 2013, page 402.

[3] Shepard, J., Sociology, 2012, Cengage Advantage: Sociology, 11th Edition, page 545.

[4] Anderson, L.M., Taylor, F.H., Sociology, The Essentials, Seventh Edition, Wadsworth Cengage Learning, Belmont, USA, 2013, page 404.

[5] McCords points out the important role of Japan, Taiwan, North Korea which they have in the process of modernization.

[6] https://www.cliffsnotes.com/study-guides/sociology/social-change-and-movements/social-change-defined, Accessed on 12.03.2017.

[7] http://www.sociologyguide.com/social-change/index.php, Accessed on 14.03.2017.

[8] Burawoj, M., University of California – Berkeley, 2004, Presidential Address, For Public Sociology, American Sociological Review, 2005, VOL. 70 (February: 4–28).

major changes, while changes in other stadiums can be slower or minor. In that context, focusing on the determinant of "societal alterations with long-term and relatively important consequences (Abu-Lughod, 2000)", refers to the dynamicity of the religious life that is conditioned by both the internal state of affairs within the religious communities and the influences exerted by the closer and wider surroundings[9]. For example, in the sociological circles increasingly frequent is the syntagma about "the changeable nature of the European religion".[10] However, we should not miss the fact that the different phases of the development of religion and the different types of religious organizations indicate the specifics which each religion acquires in a particular social environment or context.

Piotr Sztompka indicates that "change is a fundamental property of society".[11] Norbert Elias speaks about the natural changeability of the human as a social constant.[12] In that context, the atomized comprehension of the very religious community indicates a constant of changeable individuals. Piotr Sztompka separates various types of social change which can be also applied in study of the changes in religion: "a change in composition; a change in structure; a change of functions; a change of boundaries with other fields and a change of environment".[13]

During the study of the modern religious changes in Macedonian context, we make certain cross-cut and we speak about the period before and after this state has gained independence. Accordingly, each period has its own specificities. Characteristic features of the religion in the period after the independence or post-communism are the process of revitalization[14], which includes the revitalization and strengthening of the position of the religious entities, first of all, the historically present, majority collectivities, which process can be followed at a level of religious collectivity, on one side, and at individual level, through the religious convictions and individual practice. Deprivatization of the religion, that is, penetration of the religion

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[9] Shepard, J., Sociology, 2012, Cengage Advantage: Sociology, 11th Edition, page 530.

[10] Davie, G., Religion in Modern Europe, A Memory mutates, Oxford University Press, 2001. The very concept of mutation inserted in the title of the book emphasizes the adaptability of the religion to the changes which happen in different societies.

[11] Sztompka, P., Change and Development, in the book SOCIOLOGY – The Key Concepts, by John Scot, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, London and New York, page 20.

[12] Elias, N., Sto je sociologija, Antibarbarus, Zagreb, 2007, 85–91.

[13] Ibid. page 21.

[14] In the constitutive act of the Republic of Macedonia, the churches, religious communities and religious groups are part of non-profit sector. They have possibility to establish religious schools, as well as to act in the sphere of the social policy through initiating social and charitable institutions. The Constitution cites the Macedonian Orthodox Church, Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia, Catholic Church, the United Methodist Church and the Jewish Community.

at the public sphere is reflected directly and very clear through its increased presence in the media; then, the activities and the large space they occupy on the social media; aspirations to the "religious education" and adaptation to the changeable social states of affairs; taking certain activities in the sphere of the social policy; claiming confiscated property; elaborating their own positions regarding various issues of interest of the community, etc.[15] The characteristic is "a high rate of specified nominal religious population, but a low rate of religious practice. Revitalization of religion in Macedonian society, particularly clearly shaped the structuring of believers in the population in certain periods of very high rates of nominal believers, but of traditionalism in religious practice"[16]. Empirical evidence determines the religious population by the personal religious identification as highly religious. The individual religious determination is not "prolonged" by the religious practice. Namely, concerning the practice, the Macedonian believers are determined as predominantly "common", followed through practicing the most significant religious holidays, (which become non-working days), as well as celebrating the major events of their life.

The postulate of the modern Macedonian religious configuration is established in the period since the independence of the Republic of Macedonia (1991). In addition, we should take into account that the key changes of the social structure contribute to significant changes in positioning of the religion within it. Namely, "the changing of the social structure contributed to Macedonian citizens, somehow overnight, becoming ***more aware*** of religion, trying to catch up with current events"[17]. From the time when Macedonia became independent until presence the number of religious collectivities is increased, obvious changes are noticed in their composition or structure, and in part of the religious collectivities significant imprint is made by internal divisions and divergences. There is also noticeable missionary activity and creation of own cores of religious collectivities which do not have tradition on this territory or, which are simple determined as new religions and new religious movements.

Of special importance for the changes in the religious collectivities is the role of the leadership which can animate the believers, to unite them, to lead them or direct them toward progress, cooperation with the social community, etc. In order to view the religious leadership, we take into account ideally-typed determinant of the religious leadership founded in the

[15] Cacanoska, R., Religious Polarization in Contemporary Macedonian Society, VIII Chapter in the book, The Role of Religion during the Yugoslav State Crisis, Editor Branislav Radeljic, Lexington Books, 2015, 121–123.

[16] Ibid. page 125.

[17] Cacanoska, R., Religious Changes in Macedonian Society, Facta Universitatis, Series: Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History, Vol. 15, No 1, 2016, http://casopisi.junis.ni.ac.rs/index.php/FUPhilSocPsyHist/article/view/1703/1288, Accessed on 12.03.2017.

theoretic bases of Max Weber "as refinement or critique of typological differences between the notion of prophet, one who founds a new religion altogether, and of priest, one who holds leadership status by virtue of office in the religious community, functionally maintaining religious tradition through interpretation and control of its authoritative body of scripture or custom"[18]. This paper views the role of the leadership through the self-perception of the representatives of religious collectivities, wherein special indicators of example for organizational culture, management and satisfaction thereof are missing. In this paper the leadership is only partially analyzed from the aspect of assistance, guidance or focusing on the changes.

The public role of the religion addresses two important issues related to the modern Macedonian religious life, engagement in the sphere of moral, and the social sphere. Often in public discourse a connection is made between religion and morality, suggesting that religion should be a "source" of moral behavior and should help overcome the present crisis of values. Modern religious polarization of morality is based on the concept of public religion, suggesting that religion should provide adequate support to individual and public morality in society.[19] In his review of the crisis in the Church, Professor Grozdanovski states that "this crisis should make the Church more resistant, more spiritual, more moral and should strengthen the faith within, in its leadership, clergy and Eminence, then within the believers and finally before unbelievers… So, it should establish moral, ethical values and not as a theological-scientific or theological-educational knowledge, but concrete, practical life knowledge – faith and morality shown and proven in life". He indicates that the church must practically demonstrate nurturing moral values…"[20].

Followed through the general history, the important role of the religious collectivities in the social sphere is characteristic. The pragmatic issue which is usually imposed is whether the vulnerability of particular categories of population is of key significance for them to join and remain in particular religious collectivity. However, this paper only initiates the issue of the total engagement of the religious collectivities for assistance to the marginalized and social categories in the society in terms of the public role of the religion. In fact, it is added to Casanova's argument that the religious organizations

[18] Swatos, H. W., Jr. Editor, Encyclopedia of Religion and Society, Leadership, Hartford Institute for Religion Research – Hartford Seminary, http://hirr.hartsem.edu/ency/leadership.htm, Accessed on 12.03.2017.

[19] Cacanoska, R., Religious Changes in Macedonian Society, Facta Universitatis, Series: Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History, Vol. 15, No 1, 2016, http://casopisi.junis.ni.ac.rs/index.php/FUPhilSocPsyHist/article/view/1703/1288, Accessed on 12.03.2017.

[20] Grozdanovski R. "Secularism and secularisation", lecture at a one-day forum, with leading professors and scholar, on 25 June 2007, in Skopje, http://www.rrgrozdanovski.mk/index2php?option=com_content&tas. Accessed on 21 February 2013.

of all types are not only able but they should act in public, among other, in the part of the social policy. In that sense, the religious collectivities being faith-based organizations appear as very important factors which participate in the social policy. In that regard, Beckford[21] argument is also taken into account, who seeks in the religion for solution of social problems in the society.

Change can be observed, explained and supported both by qualitative and quantitative indicators. However, for the purposes of this paper we asked the representatives of the religious collectivities holding managerial positions or being part of their intellectual elite to thoroughly describe and explain in this interview the changes in their religious collectivity in the manner they perceive and understand them. Changes are due to both the changes in the external social environment and the happenings or conditions which come from the very collectivity. For that reason the interviewees were informed or simply notified on the events which have had major or key impact in the modern Macedonian society. In addition, we should emphasize that the term religious collectivity includes each form of religious organization which is registered or entered in the Macedonian social community according to the latest Law on the Legal Status of Churches, Religious Communities and Religious Groups, applied from 01.05.2008.[22]

2. Methodological framework

> *I want to understand the world from your point of view. I want to know what you know in the way you know it. I want to understand the meaning of your experience, to walk in your shoes, to feel things as you feel them, to explain things as you explain them. Will you become my teacher and help me understand?*
>
> James P. Spradley

The subject of this paper is the contextual awareness of the perception and understanding of the appropriate change in the religious collectivities, but from a perspective or through the prism of their leadership.

Based on the inspection into the available secondary database (from various sources) and the review of the relevant literature, the following

[21] Beckford, J., 1990, The Sociology of Religion and Social Problems, Sociological Analysis, 51 (1): 1–14.

[22] Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Religious Groups, http://www.kovz.gov.mk/?ItemID=625A03A44FFB9A479DA77DF1C5CD4E3E. In the Register of churches, religious communities and religious groups there are 16 churches, 9 religious communities and 8 religious groups in total. Accessed on 14.03.2017.

research questions were formulated which serve as a guidance for collecting primary data:

1. What is the perception of the representatives of part of the leadership of the religious collectivities regarding the changes in their own and in the other religious collectivities?
2. How the representatives of the religious collectivities explain (interpret) the causes for the changes in the religious collectivity, which are consequences thereof?™
3. What is, according to the representatives of a part of the leadership of the religious collectivities, the role of the leadership of the religious collectivity regarding their role in the changes within their respective religious collectivity?
4. What is, according to the representatives of a part of the leadership of the religious collectivities, the public role of the religion in the modern Macedonian society?

The research design in this paper is cross-sectional[23], because the collection of empiric evidence is performed in precisely determined time interval (14–28 March, 2017). The collected empiric evidence makes the creation of "relevant notion in depth" of the perception and explanation of the changes by the researched population possible.[24] However, in this study we should also take into account the longitudinal dimension which is primarily incorporated in the part of the questions directed toward perceiving and explaining the changes for the period when Macedonia gained independence, i.e. from 1991 until today.

The method which was used is this paper for collecting empirical data was on-line individual interview. The sample is purposive stratified and respondents from religious collectivities are persons holding particular leader position in the collectivity or those being part of religious collectivity's intellectual elite.[25] The sample is composed of 25 respondents, at age range from 35–68 years, citizens of the Republic of Macedonia. The interview was sent to 35 representatives of religious collectivities. Within the determined time interval only 25 interviews were completed, that is, the response rate was 71%. Only two women of the sample were interviewed, although interviews were sent to 11 women. Out of the interviewees, 22 have completed higher education, two of them have completed secondary education and

[23] Bryman, A. 2012, Social Research Methods, Oxford University Press, page. 59.

[24] Newman, W. L., Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Pearson New International Edition, Seventh Edition, Pearson Education Limited 2014, page. 44.

[25] Working population for the sample is taken from the list of churches, religious communities and religious group, posted on the website of the State Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Groups, http://www.kovz.gov.mk/?ItemID=625A03A44FFB9A479DA77DF1C5CD4E3E. Accessed on 4.03.2017.

more than two trainings for preacher, while one respondent did not indicate his education.[26] According to the place of living, two interviewees live in a village, 22 in a city, and one interview did not answer the question. Verbal informative consent from the interviewees was previously obtained. The anonymity of all interviewed persons was guaranteed, as well as adequate protection of the obtained information and its keeping, processing and interpretation, that is, presentation.

Concerning the epistemology we should emphasize that the aim of this paper is contextual knowledge and understanding[27] of the main topics (categories) from the research questions. Analysis of the qualitative database was focused on the perceptions and interpretations, that is, interviewees' experiences with regard to the defined categories in the research questions. During the interpretation and presentation of the qualitative empirical database the author, at his own discretion, has synthetized certain questions and presented them as synthetic indicators, while other ***points*** derived from interviewees' answers has cited in their original format (as indicated). The interviewees' quotations were used as an evidence of their position, illustration, opportunity for better understanding of the key concept of change, and those are in function of the findings and concluding remarks of the very paper. However, we should have in mind that the answers are characterized by diversity, i.e. оргиналноста in the used vocabulary and way of presentation of their positions or experiences. However, in order to keep the anonymity of the interviewees, the author made some correction during the presentation of the data. In particular topics (categories) there are saturation or higher degree of their repetition, while in other topics (categories) the degree is lower, which is noticed during the нијансирањето of the answers.

3. Empirical results and discussion

3.1. Perception of the changes in the religious collectivities

Things do not change, we change.
Henry David Thoreau

The first thematic block of the interview is dedicated to the interviewees' perception of the changes from the period of gaining independence of Macedonia until today. This period introduces many changes in the Macedonian society, which has its impact on the positioning and acting of the religious collectivities. In that sense we should have in mind the independence of the Republic of Macedonia (1991), the ethnic conflict in 2001, changes of the legal framework (2001), adoption of the Law on the Legal Position of a Church, Religious Community and Religious Group (2008), the migrants'

[26] Five interviewees are PhDs.

[27] Ibid. 28–31.

crisis, as well as the recent long-lasting political crisis (2015–2017). These are, among others, the major moments which have marked the 26-year existence of the Macedonian state, but we should also take into account the fact that we have also asked the respondents to give their opinions regarding other events which they considered to be of key importance, but were not mentioned.

Based on the processed answers we can notice that a major number of the interviewees using different vocabulary but aimed to the same or similar point, point out that of key importance for positioning of the religious collectivities is the change of the socio-political system. Part of the interviewees give much smaller place to the other events as a reason for changes in their religious collectivity.

Transition from the socialist one-party system to multiparty system, "at the same time means an opportunity for the religious collectivities to feel free to perform their mission, but not to be a target of ridicule by their ideological opponents, the atheists", indicated the oldest interviewee. Another interviewee views the changes from the aspect of democratization of the religious freedoms and rights, which as he explained "experience evolution in direction of more freely acting… the laws become more liberal". Third interviewee has answered that since the independence: "my religious collectivity is in a relatively stable, but passive condition which is due to the previous restriction of the religious acting which is performed within the allowed minimal involvement in the social living. …The leaders are во поодминати години, and accordingly the religious collectivity is moving with a dynamics relevant to their age. Beginning from 1999 we can notice the change with regard to all segments, from the internal organization of the religious collectivity to the external edification of the religious objects and insignia". Fourth interviewee spoke about the quantitative and qualitative increase of his religious collectivity which counts several hundreds of believers, has multiethnic character and is equipped with a staff "composed of tens graduated theologians, holders of master's degree and PhD students", which constitutes the foundation for establishing its own institute of theology. As a significant change in his religious collectivity, one interview also indicated the renovation of the monastics, which "not only provides new impulse in the development of the spiritual life… but also provides quality resources for the new leadership". Regarding the changes, this respondent also explained that "the changes in the Islamic Religious Community, the Catholic Church, the United Methodist Church and the Jewish Community are partially due to the new status they gained with the amendments to the Constitutions of the Republic of Macedonia in 2001, which are explicitly mentioned together with the Macedonian Orthodox Church… except regular privilege there are no radical changes, except in the Islamic Religious Community where the number of religious objects and believers – trainees is permanently increased, wherein the short Friday preacher

strengthens the feeling of religious and political community; all of these is also manifested by increasingly frequent emphasizing of the faith through the religious dress code".

After becoming independent the two interviewed women and other two respondents emphasized the general "revitalization of the religion" or "religization of the society", in which it becomes quite normal previous atheists to be now very religious and even, "as one younger respondent indicated, "to testify for the persecution of believers" by the atheists. Three respondents with irony, but using a different vocabulary, came to the following point: "as we exaggerated in the communism when we all wanted to be atheists because the state propagated it, so now we all want… to compete… to pride ourselves on the religious matters…[28] "It became popular that many people, including those with less suspicious morality to emphasize their faith", with a great sarcasm and several impressive illustrations, one declared orthodox Christian answered the question about the changes. Some of the interviewees, when mentioning the changes, point to the greater presence of the religious topic, first of all, in traditional media, exploitation of religious topics in the schools, the large number of religious holidays and their proclamation for non-working days.

"For me, independence is associated with my return to Macedonia and the registration of my church as a new one", wrote another interviewee. "Later, I kept trying to by a site or a house for a church, but I could not", examined the same interviewee, adding that they registered humanitarian organizations, contacted many donors who wanted to help them to establish social institutions, but it ended without success. In the period after their independence, two interviewees emphasized that it was more than striking that they could far more freely to seek and fight for their religious freedoms and rights. Other two interviewees wrote: "with the change of the system, my high schoolmates and I started to go often to the nearest church, and we dreamed of joining the theological faculty. Only I seriously advanced, while others joined Protestants".

"Most tragic for me was in… 2001, when we were ready to destroy the opponent's religious objects to the ground", wrote one interviewee. "One was going to fight with the blessing of the first man of the large religious collectivities", another senior interviewee described the situation. "I also remember the historical persecution of the priests, but I do not remember any burning of religious objects", wrote another interviewee with regret. "We, as representatives of the non-majority communities, went from one camp to another… in each conversation the opponent was blamed and the

[28] The interviewed senior female respondent, a member of a traditionally present religious collectivity, identified the following: "My close friends, whom I know very well… convinced me that they had always respected the religious tradition, that they prayed vigorously… I wonder what happened that suddenly THEY became very, very religious…

behavior of their fellow believer was justified… I did not notice any desire, neither in one part nor in the other part to resolve the situation… then… I saw where human hatred goes" explained one interviewee.

Four respondents have a specific view of the changes. One of them, a representative of the majority religious collectivity, at the age of 60, wrote: "I do not see any essential changes… even more, I see a kind of greater primitiveness in many respects: cultural, religious, and political". The societal change as a category increasingly represents equivalent to the modern "dynamic and stressful life", indicated one interviewed representative of the intellectual elite of a church registered since Macedonia's independence. "I definitely think that nothing is equal to the last moment, to something that happened just a moment ago", and he explains that he has bitterly reacted to the inability of major part of his religious collectivity to adapt to the new conditions. "I think that all of us as believers in Macedonia, are just extras for the quick change and everything that is happening around us", and the third said, "we are all swaying behind the changes and we cannot take a step in any way, nor to lead the process of change". The fourth interviewee believes that "both the Islamic and Christian religious collectivities are not modernizing to a sufficient extent".

A third of the representatives of religious collectivities described the changes in religious collectivities arising from the migrant crisis in a similar way. Striking is their view that "the invasion of migrants has literally caught us… and when we have already started to react to it, it was over… it has passed the peak." Furthermore, they note the uncertainty and threats of it's repetition, which as they say "creates a pressing… everything starts from the social media… there is often mentioned the lack of hospitality on our part… we traded with them… we received warning messages from some of our fellow citizens from Western Europa". In the context of the explanation of the migrant crisis and the response of religious collectivities, two representatives of the same religious collectivity presented their journey through Europe, as well as the reaction of their fellow citizens from European cities… One of them states that his fellow believers were not even hospitable towards him during his journey through Europe, and that was the reason that, when he returned to Macedonia, he decided to passivize himself in his religious collectivity. Regarding the refugee crisis, one interviewee states that "the crisis brought with it new field of activities by our communities, both humanitarian and reaching the gospel of those who found themselves in the refugee route in Macedonia".

During this period of rapid change, all happenings in society are reflected in the life of religious collectivities. Some of them know how to bear with the changes and developments in the contemporary Macedonian society know how to deal with the changes and developments in the contemporary Macedonian society with a smaller, and part with greater capability, but also wider with the regional and global trends. The following is a summary of

the answers of three respondents about the changes, the problems and the way of dealing with them: "I am bothered that ***everybody is a believer***, but they are somehow not completely expressed, disheartened, separated… I think the leaders of my religious collectivity should unite membership, unify religious practice and to take care of religious education… more seminars should be organized on various religious topics, as well as more programs on television, radio and social media… in order the believers to really get knowledge on their faith and to know how to behave". Other few respondents see the changes and consequences of them as follows: "The contemporary crisis scares me because both religious collectivities, in particular religious leaders fail to weigh off their position… and how to engage… the impression is that it's hard for them… they behave disoriented… and many of us are afraid that they can bring their collectivity into great uncertainty."

Regarding the perception of the changes in other religious collectivities, some of the interviewees in describing the changes in their own collectivity, partly pointed out to the changes in other religious collectivities, or simply thought of changes in the realm of religion in general. I only note a few impressive entries in this section. An interviewed representative of a minority religious community underlined that "the number of believers is growing… because of… the increased openness of young people towards the more relevant religious activity of our churches, and at the same time disappointment with the irrelevance of traditional religious communities." Another interviewed from a majority religious collectivity writes: "A growing number of believers, more income, but also more discord in the very collectivities." "In other religious collectivities I see many foreigners who come and hang out with believers… but their believers also go abroad," note two respondents. "Some believers, even their leaders in the last ten years, are very much encouraged… and behave as if they possess the whole truth of this world," concluded another interviewee.

On the basis of the responses to this research question, I would point out the diversity of perceptions among the representatives of the religious collectivities, which generally take the change of the social-political system as the main framework or as one interviewed concluded, "we as believers could not do much for ourselves, if the social environment was not changed and we were not given the opportunity to act more freely". Other changes were significant, but nevertheless, crucial, according to the answers of the majority of the respondents, was the changed social context.

3.2. Nonreligious reasons as a basis for changes in religious collectivity

Neither the life of an individual nor the history of a society
can be understood without understanding both.
C. Wright Mills

Generally speaking, according to the answers of representatives of the religious collectivities about the reasons that encourage and support changes in their collectiveivities, it is noticeable the dominance of the answer[29] that key social changes caused important changes in the structure and functioning of religious collectivity. In fact, the root cause of the changes in the religious collectivities is the so-called non-religious reasons. However, the consequences of the changes contribute to better positioning of the religious collectivities on the social scene and to tend to changes that will mean their progress and gain a more significant role in the society as a whole. Although the process of penetrating of the religious collectivities on the social scene is determined as gradual, as a process that goes more in the direction of increasing the influence of the religious subjects, it is still characteristic that certain changes, of a smaller or larger scale in the religious collectivity itself, according to the answers of the interviewed, are often late, or inadequate, and often they are simply missing, they are gone. But, it is also notable the presence of responses, which view the changes not only as external influences, but also place a significant primacy to the influence of a religious character, that is, the influence of the collectivity itself. In this section, more emphasis will be put on presenting the attitudes of the interviewees based on changes for religious reasons. This is because the interviewees in their responses in which they underline the nonreligious reasons as the basis for change are fairly uniform and are mostly synthetized.

One interviewee says that "the long-decades period of religious life outside the mainstream of society… has left great traces… my collectivity was less surprised by the changes, and at the beginning we could not capture the true picture." Друг интервјуиран има слично искуство: "…промената јас и моето семејство ја почувствувавме… како крај на исмејувањето на некои колеги, крај на приказните дека јас во одредени денови нема потреба да земам годишен одмор за да одам на молитва или богослужба". Another interviewee has a similar experience: "…I felt my change and my family… as an end to the mockery of some colleagues, the end of the stories that on certain days I do not need to take an annual leave to go to prayer or worship". Then the same interviewee explains: "although we no longer had to constantly justify what we do, how we pray, by inertia… we acted (as we did), as if nothing had happened."

"Changes in my collectivity occurred as a reflection of certain changes in the society, but this meant at the same time, the release of the hoop regarding the work of foreign missionaries who were essential for changes in my collectivity," wrote the interviewed leader of a religious collectivity. He further explains that in those years, some missionaries encouraged and showed them some guidance and ways in order to help the development

[29] About 20 interviewed, in their answers, significantly accentuate the primacy of the changes that have non-religious character.

of their collectivity. Namely, the changes from the outside, the interviewee noted, stimulated the internal regroupings, and thus the improvements of the situation in the whole collectivity. "For me, the most important thing is that my collectivity has begun to become more affirmed and to try to respond to the challenges of the modern dynamic and stressful life," wrote his fellow believer. Another interviewed speaks of changes in his collectivity, but says that "they derive from the needs of the life of believers and the circumstances dictated by contemporary social and political circumstances."

A third interviewee states that "despite the partial external influences that always more or less affect the changes, they occur either as a result of the natural course of the (religious) events or are almost exclusively related to religious collectivity. The influence of state institutions is extremely minimized… The status quo regarding the status of my collectivity is for purely non-religious reasons and is fully politically conditional". A fourth interviewee explains that "although they have a wide range of partner entities, however, internal reasons are the main driver of changes in his collectivity". But, he notes, "the changes and progress are due to developments from within, but its main features are rapid reaction and restructuring according to the purpose such is addressing crises of national (2001 conflict), regional (Kosovo crisis) and global character (migrant crisis)". In addition, he emphasizes that "as long as people perceive the transformation as a fruit of their faith and life with God, the church will continue to grow." The leader of another religious collectivity emphasizes that "new people have already come from inside who have grown up in faith for years and have fully accepted the vision of my collectivity… I think that the events from the outside now have no crucial meaning, neither from the closer nor from the more distant environment… the migrant crisis only accelerated some activities in a positive direction".

A primate to the religious reasons is also given by another respondent, and he says that "they are based primarily on long-term planning, which means a result of an active, not just a proactive job." In addition to the religious reasons for the changes in religious collectivity, "there are also other influences… political ones, for example… voluntarily or unwillingly, they are imposed," explains another interviewee.

An experienced leader noted that people generally lose hope in politics, religion, the economy and turn to more stable values. This turn to religious values and communities can be also seen historically, where it can be seen that "the greater the pressure from outside, the greater the determination to follow the biblical values…". Another interviewed in a similar style indicates that in his religious collectivity, believers increasingly emphasize the disappointment in earthly values and the need to devote much more to the good in collectivity and how to help in its development. Another interviewee also agrees on the primacy of the religious grounds, which expressed in

figures, 80% are religious grounds for changes in religious collectivity, and only 20% are non-religious ones.

As a certain summary of this topic, we can distinguish the dominance of attitudes that external nonreligious reasons or changes in the social environment contribute to profile and strengthen the changes in religious collectivity. But over time, the "inner creative forces of the religious collectivity" are further animated, and it is more actively shaping the changes according to its perceptions."

3.3. The role of leadership in changse

Modernity is a qualitative, not a chronological, category.
Theodor Adorno

In this thematic unit responses were asked from the interviewees about the role of the leadership in the changes. Namely, is this a key factor, i.e., creator and implementer of the changes, i.e. what is their auto-perception of the role of leadership in terms of encouraging, devising and directing the very changes.

Most of the interviewees declare that basically they, as leaders or part of the leadership of the religious collectivities, according to their personal experience, were relatively little able to foresee or recognize the changes, especially those that are more conditioned by non-religious reasons[30]. "We somehow increasingly deal with ourselves, from the inside… we somehow did not look at things from that perspective," observed one interviewee. Things went slowly, but I think that our adaptation went even slower… the institutions that regulate our work are difficult to change… "explains another interviewee, who for two decades had different positions in the leadership of his religious collectivity. A few interviewees stated with a similar vocabulary that they needed a certain period after the independence of Macedonia, simply to see things as they are and to feel that things have changed.

One interviewed rhetorically thinks: "Religious leadership is very responsible, but the question is whether we have such leadership… according to faith and believers – we do not have, because it is under the umbrella of various ministries in the state, it serves more to other *interests*. Just consider the speech of the religious guidance – it's sad. "Another interviewee wrote: "We, as believers, were not really desirable in the society, we who were more active believers lived somehow by the side, so instead of actively engaging in the changes, we waited, we waited someone to give us something, not

[30] The same interviewee describes the situation as follows: "…these were questions that were not dependent on us, but depended on many factors, both in the state and in the region… we solved some problems more easily and quickly through the engagement of foreign representatives…"

to fight for it." A representative of the intellectual elite of one majority religious collectivity responded like this: "after the changes will happen, then we will then *loudly* take an attitude and decide how to act".

In the responses of the interviewees, a gradation of leadership's responsibility is noticeable when it comes to changes of smaller scope, i.e., those who directly refer to the religious work of the very collectivities. Here "much more responsible are the religious leaders themselves," underlined three experienced leaders of the same religious collectivity. The leadership "needs to find an appropriate way to achieve its commitment, first of all, among its believers, and then more widely…", considered part of the respondents. "The preparation of plans and programs should be based on real numbers and conditions," said one respondent who explained that what is ideal and unfeasible should not be part of the dream of the religious leaders.

For the active leadership of religious collectivities, some of the interviewees consider in the following way: "leadership in us is a key factor in evaluating the state of unity, devising positive changes and implementing them." The same interviewee explains: "the management is accomplished through the active participation of each leader in the discussions about the state of the church… first I discuss the situation and the weakest link where changes need to be made… we have our vision, values and according to them a program is being made that can be short-term and long-term." For a representative of a minority religious community, and for the role of leadership he says that "it is key to development… it is the body that devises, implements and evaluates the work in collusion and feedback of its believers… the program was prepared as early as in 1989… it provides guidance on the priorities and ways of acting in the field of church and mission work". For another experienced member of the leadership of a religious collectivity, "the continuous working meetings of the leadership, both locally and at the state level", are important.

Regarding the personnel solutions in the leadership or strategies, almost more than a half of the respondents consider that in some cases a change should occur. "If no real results are achieved, the leadership should be changed," categorically claims an interviewed junior representative of the intellectual elite. Another interviewee explains that in his religious collectivity, change is not a taboo topic. "If there are no results… the change of leadership is not excluded… it is a normal measure when there is no quality leadership and results… the statute addresses exactly this issue." A third interviewee stresses that this is a complex issue. He also explains that the leadership should strive for change for better (results) and that leadership should be responsible to the community. The fourth interviewed wrote: "The changes are mainly part of the plan of current leadership, but these are also inevitably… a result of the socio-political developments".

Other leaders of religious collectivities are also committed to the active role of leadership, and one of them points to the need for interactivity and

innovation: "we are constantly looking for new methods, ways and changes that will positively influence… the believers… the key activity is the spiritual building of believers, their inspiration for self-initiative and creative involvement in religious and out-religious activities."

A slightly different tone is present in the answer of an elderly intellectual: "…for years the believers are waiting for major changes… but they are missing, because they have always been under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior (I have no argument for this, but so it is). It is known that a few years ago we had elections, and a leader was appointed with a support and coordination of the Ministry of Interior, wherein the members of the Assembly of the religious collectivity were invited one by one to attend the meeting, when they voted for the only candidate, and the meeting was held in the municipal building".

However, for a certain number of religious collectivities the change is impossible or there are no opportunities for such a change. One representative of a traditionally present religious collectivity says that the change is not "viable… members of the leadership are elected without a mandate until the end of their life."

In the function of the final summary of this thematic unit, I would point out that, according to the self-perception, a significant part of the representatives of religious collectivities claim to be able to influence the changes in their own collectivities. Representatives of religious collectivities hold that in their collectivity they can influence the changes, especially those related to their (missionary) work. They are here able to actively participate and often to shape it according to their needs. Also, part of their activities result in the development of a strategy, and later in its evaluation. Part of the leadership is susceptible to changes, which are based on the results they have achieved or failed to achieve.

3.4. The public role of the religion

> *Religion in the 1980s "went public" in a dual sense. It entered the "public sphere" and gained, thereby, "publicity". Various "publics" – the mass media, social scientists, professional politicians, and the "public at large" – suddenly began to pay attention to religion. The unexpected public interest derived from the fact that religion, leaving its assigned place in the private sphere, had thrust itself into the public arena of moral and political contestation.*
>
> Hose Casanova

The public role of religion in this paper is covered by questions in an interview about the role of religion in public morality and the sphere of social policy. When it comes to morality in general, it is pointed to the need for religion to give its own support, its foundations and of course to take care

to embody them. Often, when linking the religion and morality, it is suggested that religion should be a "source" of moral behavior and help overcome the contemporary crisis of the values. But from the empirical basis on this topic from other ISPJR projects, it is shown that in this role, religion has relatively small results[31]. In this paper, the representatives of religious leadership speak about the engagement of their communities in this field. Predominant are the responses which, by the way, are characterized by lucidity and even dramaticness, underlining that religion should be support to the morals, but in reality this does not happen. At times, the very critical tone of the interviewees is striking, which significantly nuances the answers to the questions that are related to morality, and somewhat less to the social policy.

An interviewee clearly points to the general sense of "loss of the morals," stating that "no religion is lost only from outside, but from inside, when the norms on which it rests are ruined." Another interviewee wrote: "We are living in an environment in which immoral sells morals, then what remains to be said?!?" Three respondents on the role of religion in shaping and implementing the morale in society express great skepticism. While two respondents, among other things, point out: "I think that we should show greater zeal and sanction immorality, to show how it should… not like this… our religion must through its example (which for now does not exist…) to demonstrate its morality, in particular through its leadership… and believers, in order to show how religion can affect morals." The leader of one religious collectivity points out: "we are trying and one of our goals is that morality is at the highest level in every believer's life… we instruct the believers, but we think that the greatest influence has the personal example of the leadership and of each believer individually".

"Moral engineering, which we sometimes use in our work, brings us more harm than benefit," critically commented an elderly leader of a religious collectivity. "We have more harm from immoral *believers* in the forefront of our religious collectivities, especially on the biggest holidays," another representative of a religious collectivity also gave a critical answer. Third interviewed described the complexity of the relation of religion and morality in the following way: "It is our responsibility to engage in creating and preserving public morality… first we begin with ourselves, the next stop is the family and the marital morale, then the friends, at school, at faculty, then at work. Of course, this is not popular because we swim contrary to the flow of the river, but it is still worthwhile because some will be touched and altered. Одговорни сме да бидеме погласни, не во напаѓање на грешници, туку напаѓање на гревот и неговите последици". We are responsible to

[31] Cacanoska, R., Religious Changes in Macedonian Society, Facta Universitatis, Series: Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History, Vol. 15, No 1, 2016, http://casopisi.junis.ni.ac.rs/index.php/FUPhilSocPsyHist/article/view/1703/1288, Accessed on 12.03.2017.

be louder, not in attacking sinners, but by attacking sin and its consequences. A fourth interviewer says that for moral standards based on the church teaching of the religious collectivity, all possible means available to them can be used. He continues by pointing out that "engagement in this domain is noticeable during every address through the media, public address with festive messages, participation in radio and television shows, blogs and websites, as well as regular instruction in divine sermons (at weekly sermons, words for various family occasions, etc.)".

Generally speaking, the most persistent is the attitude in the interviews that moral values should derive from the religious resources of the religious collectivities. However, most of the interviewees point out that the teaching of moral norms, and especially the personal example of the leaders, should be crucial for the moral education of the religious communities themselves. Unfortunately, a significant part of the interviewees holds that today the moral leadership of religious collectivities has its own failings. Representatives of smaller religious collectivities point to the possibility of sanctioning the immoral behavior of their members, but in the majority religious collectivities it is impossible. The attitude that "we should not forget what kind of society we live in", is present in almost a quarter of the interviewees.

Regarding the role of the religious collectivities in the field of social policy, almost all respondents agreed that it is very important. Almost half of the respondents in the interviews indicated that the results regarding the engagement in the field of social policy are more than modest. In this context, an interviewee wrote that the contribution of his religious collectivity to social activities was "terribly small, although they have a desire to contribute more." Another interviewee wrote: "An inseparable part of the gospel is the social activity, helping the vulnerable categories, helping orphans and widows… good deeds are not a condition for salvation, but the consequences of true salvation are good deeds." The same interviewee concluded: "Unfortunately, in Macedonia it is still not possible for churches to open orphanages, homes for elderly people, etc., but I believe that it will change…". A third interviewed suggests that their religious collectivity has established several charitable organizations, and their services maintain lists of poor families and have their own help boxes. A fourth interviewer wrote that "local services have been lately engaged" to have on the list those who need help. And also "their services in cooperation with other non-governmental organizations were active in providing assistance to flood victims, then migrants, etc."

One leader of a minority religious collectivity says that his collectivity "according to its vision and capacities, gives a concrete and meaningful contribution to helping vulnerable and marginalized groups and individuals… he considers it as a key fruit and an essential obligation for everyone who names himself as a "Christian", i.e., as a follower of the teaching of Jesus Christ." Another interviewee emphasizes that "this is part of his practical

faith and we are involved in many ways in the implementation of these activities… in dealing with migrants, helping socially endangered families and individuals, opening up public kitchens, working with drug addicts, and other kind of addicts…". A third interviewee believes that "there is always room for even greater activity in the social field, because people in need… expect to be helped." A fourth representative of a religious collectivity says that the role of his religious collectivity is "extremely disproportionate in relation to the number of believers." Our role is significant, long-lasting and concrete, "concluded the same interviewee.

It is interesting to single out the responses of five respondents who see social activity as integral with morality in the family, religious collectivity as well as in the society. "It's incomprehensible for me to be a good father, husband… and to think about myself only… I teach my little children to set apart a part of their pocket money for the Red Cross, to help the children at school." Two interviewees write: "We can not be good and not worry about the good of all…". "There is no individual happiness without a collective happiness… we are happy when we all celebrate together… but all of us were in a situation when they needed help… always think of the others and all that is your surplus share with others, whether they are from our church or not," recommends one of the five interviewed. "It is not my goal that my fellow believers to be only good believers, but also good neighbors, relatives, colleagues… only in that way, with a personal example we will show who we are… only in that way we will spread the truth…".

More than half interviewees mention that they have a significant volume of activities in the humanitarian organizations established by their religious collectivities. "Last year during the flood in Skopje, we were the first who in the flooded places," notes one interviewee. "Thanks to our contacts and sincere cooperation with many Christian humanitarian organizations, we also reacted very quickly to the migration crisis," notes another interviewed. Two respondents in a similar style are saying, "All interviewed, as leaders must… encourage and motivate… their believers to engage themselves MUCH more actively and help socially disadvantaged people." The second interviewed inter alia says: "Only in this way we will become true Christians… we will show how the true believers should live and help."

As a resume of the analyzed answers regarding the role of the religious collectivities in taking activities in the social sphere we could note that the respondents consider it to be exceptionally important socil sphere, but speaking through real numbers, their previous final result or contribution is relatively modest.

4. Concluding remarks

The focus of this paper is placed on the religious changes which are researched from the perspective of the representatives eighter of the leadership

or the intellectual elite of the religious collectivities in the Republic of Macedonia. Forf that purpose, starting from the concept of change as a theoretical framework, a cross-sectional research design was prepares and the empirical data was collected by using qualitative strategy.

Analysis of the qualitative database was directed toward the contextual knowledge and understanding of the key thematic wholes incorporated in the research questions. The concluding remarks refer to the population researched. In the research sample, during the time interval of twp weeks only two women out of 11 completed the interview. In addition, we should note that the raw empirical information was characterized by diversity, i.e. the interviewees used origibal vocabulary and way of presentation of their positions or experiences. During the presentation of the research findings, the similar answers were given as synthetic indicators, while other were presented through particular ***points*** derived from the answers or those were cited in their orifinal format. Higher degree of repetition (saturation) can be noticed in the topic or categories.

From the inspection into the empirical data we can notice predominance of a clear perception in the representatives of the religious collectivities regarding the changes in the religious collectivities, as well as the influence of the social context. Based on the analysis of the empirical database of this paper, we must emphasize that basically the interviewed representatives of the religious collectivities point out the key impact of the social environment on the financing and acting of the very religious collectivities. In that sense, we can also distinguish the dominance of the positions in the interviewees' answers regarding the issue that the ecternal non-religious causes or the changes of the social ambience contribute to the profilization and strengthening of the changes in the religious collectivity. But these also point out that by the time *the internal creative powers of the religious collectivity* are additional animated and it increasingly *shapes the changes* according to its needs and strategies.

According to the self-perception, important part of the representatives of the religious collectivities argue that they can control, that is, introduce and direct the changes in their collectivities, but they are limited to the domain of missionary activity. Regarding the public role of the religion, the interviewees underline that moral values should come from the religious resources of the religious collectivities. But, unfortunately, reality is a kind of different. With regard to the role of the religious collectivities in the assuming engagement in the social sphere, the position that it is exceptionally important sphere is провејува, but in the reality, the contribution of the religious collectivities is relatively modest.

Taking into account the *limitations* appeared during the preparation of this paper, we hope that this research can give a small contribution to both the ongoing discussion on religion changes and conception of the future research. This paper emphasizes the importance of the category of change

within the very religious collectivities, and it also refers to the need of its continual study and monitoring, both internally and externally.

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THE SELF-PROCLAIMED MONTENEGRIN ORTHODOX CHURCH – A PAPER TIGER OR A RESURGENT CHURCH?

Abstract: During the early nineties, a so-called nationalized and traditional Orthodox community has been revived in the republic of Montenegro. This community calls itself the Montenegrin Orthodox Church and claims to be the representative of a resurgent form of the traditional Orthodox Church in Montenegro, which according to themselves vanished in the formation of Yugoslavia in 1918. Since 1993 they have therefore tried to claim local traditions, customs and places as part of their revitalized "Montenegrin" version of Eastern Orthodoxy.

Up until now the research on this community has been limited and has only focused on the – often violent – struggle between this community and the Serbian Orthodox Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral. It is difficult to grasp the reach and extent of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church in these studies – is the community a paper tiger or an actual existing and thriving church? This study will focus on a selection of religio-sociological key findings on this community in order to provide a more nuanced description of them. The emphasis will be on this community's existence and a discussion about the degree to which the transformation of Montenegrin society and the independence of the Montenegrin state at large have contributed to the formation of this organization.

Key words: Montenegro, religion in Montenegro, Orthodox Church, nationalization on religion, religion post-communisme.

Society and religion in Montenegro

During the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia and the subsequent civil wars in the late eighties and nineties, the religious and social landscape in the republic of Montenegro changed. This change was first and foremost visible in the ethnic composition of the majority of the Slavic speaking population.[1] Until the early nineties, the majority of the Slavic speaking popula-

[1] In the following article "ethnicity" and "nationality" will be used as translations of the Serbian word "narod". This is a simplification, because the meaning of "narod" is much wider and more fluid, see Kolstø, 2014.

tion identified themselves as being Montenegrins and only small minority saw themselves as either Serbs or Yugoslavs. This changed during the nineties as a significant proportion of Montenegrin citizens began to identify themselves as Serbs while the self-identification as Yugoslav slowly vanished. This change was not due to any major migration or other sort of external changes in the country's demographical composition, but was rather a sign of the political turmoil and change in the republic.

Table 1: Percentage of total population of Montenegro identifying themselves as Montenegrins, Serbs and Yugoslavs

	1981	1991	2003	2011
Montenegrins	68.50%	61.86%	43.16%	44.98%
Serbians	3.32%	9.34%	31.99%	28.73%
Yugoslavs	6.46%	4.25%	0.00%	-

Source: Montestat

The period from 1986 to 1999 when dissolution and civil wars shaped new states in the Balkans a distinct Montenegrin nationalist movement began to rise. This movement found fertile ground in the Montenegrin society in the early nineties – as other nationalistic movements did throughout the Balkans. The national movement's primary objective was a detachment of the former Socialist Republic of Montenegro from the Serbian state. The independence of the Montenegrin state was crucial, according to this movement, in order to preserve the distinct Montenegrin national identity from its Serbian counterpart. At the same time, the rise of Serbian nationalism also influenced Montenegrin society. Several Serbian nationalists argued that the Montenegrin majority population and the Orthodox population were Serbs, thereby denying that the Montenegrin identity was something more than a mere *toponym* (referring to the name of a place). A large group of Slavic-speaking Montenegrin citizens therefore began to identify themselves as Serbs rather than Montenegrins. These two-opposite movements heavily politicised the question of Slavic-speaking Montenegrin citizens' ethnic identity (Morrison 2010, Džankić 2013, 2016).

During the same period, as several social scientists remarked, religion once more became a central hallmark and sign of a national identity (Lampe 2010). The question of national identity therefore also became a question of religious belonging. This manifested itself in the intertwinement between the Serbian nationalist movements and the Serbian Orthodox Church, which Klaus Buchenau aptly describes as a "sacralisation of the nation" (2012). Montenegrin nationalists therefore identified the local branch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, known as the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral, from hereon the MML, as the main opponent of Montenegrin independence. The Montenegrin nationalists accused the MML of being

the stronghold of Serbian nationalism in Montenegro.[2] A key point in the Montenegrin nationalist political program therefore became to counter the influence of the MML in Montenegro. A step towards this goal was the formation (or the so-called revival) of a Montenegrin Orthodox Church (mng.: "Crnogroska Pravoslavne Crkve", from hereon CPC) in 1993. The Liberal party played a major role in the formation of this church according to themselves and most external observers (Morrison 2009). Until 2000, the CPC was registered as a non-governmental organization and simply called the "The Religious Community of Montenegrins of Eastern Orthodox Confession" (mng.: "Vjerska zajednica Crnogoraca istočnopravoslavne vjeroipovesti"). Along with the formation of this organisation, the Liberals also helped to establish a whole branch of Montenegrin political and cultural institutions, such as "The Cradle of Montenegro" (founded in 1993, mng.: "Matica Crnagorska") and the Dukljan Academy of Science and Arts (founded in 1999, mng.: "Dukljanska Akademija Nauka I Umjetnosti"). The formation of these "pro-Montenegrin" organizations coincided with a watershed in Montenegrin politics in 1996–97. The former monolithic socialist party split into two groups, one pro-Montenegrin and the other pro-Serbian. The pro-Montenegrin party was formed under leadership of then Prime Minister Milo Đukanović, and has remained in control of the government since 1996 (Morrison 2009). Đukanović and his government endorsed the pro-Montenegrin organization, including the CPC, as part of his campaign for Montenegrin independence that culminated in a referendum in 2006 after which Montenegro became an independent republic.

These political and cultural transformations in the Montenegrin republic were also noticeable in its religious demographics as table 2 shows.

Table 2: Religious communities in Montenegro (adherents as a percentage of the total population)

Religious community	1953	1991	2003	2011
Orthodox	45.84	69.12	74.23	72.07
Islam*	17.65	19.18	17.74	19.11
Roman Catholic	4.81	4.41	3.54	3.44
Atheist	31.46	1.6	0.96	1.24

Source: Bakrac 2012, p. 116

[2] The Montenegrin territory is at the present time part of two other Serbian eparchies as well, but the MML is the dominant voice for the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro – and hence the MML will be used as a label for the Serbian Orthodox Church within Montenegro.

* Originally the category of Islam and Muslims were separated in the official census, but the Islamic Community strongly rejected this division and their reaction resulted in the merging of the categories and an official apology from the Statistics Agency.

Montenegro's religious demographics changed remarkably from the eighties until the last census in 2011. The major change was that the largely secular and non-religious majority population became mostly religious within a few years, which was a trend throughout the Yugoslav republics. According to a study, only 45% of the total population in all Yugoslav republics in 1984 declared that they were religious believers (Perica 2002). Seven years later in 1991 this number had risen to 91.6% in Montenegro (Montestat). The change is mainly due to the close connection between religion and national identity which is characteristic of the post-Yugoslav period in the Balkans (Bakrač 2012). The revival of religion in Montenegro was similar to the changes seen in Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia (Bakrač & Blagojević 2013, Morrison 2009, Buchenau 2012). The CPC was born out of this religious revival process and it is regarded to have been at an early stage in the nineties as a manifestation of growing national self-awareness amongst Montenegrins (see Bieber 2003, Šistek 2010, Kube 2012, Jelena Džankić 2014 & 2016).

Studies of the CPC

The CPC has been studied in a few social scientific articles (Morrison 2009, Šistek 2010, Kube 2012, Jelena Džankić 2013 & 2014a & 2014b & 2016 and Troch 2014). The main findings throughout these studies are that the CPC is – in various wording – a Montenegrin nationalist organization that promotes the idea that Montenegro has a separate culture, language, ethnicity and religion. Most of the studies are based on newspapers and online articles and a few site visits. All of the mentioned studies do not deal with the concrete social-religious formation of the organization in detail. This is mostly because it is not the subject of their studies, but it nevertheless leaves a blind spot. A second noticeable thing in these studies is that they deal with the CPC as a homogenous organization that has remained unchanged throughout the post-Yugoslav period. Finally the focus of most of the studies is on the time before and during the crucial stages of the Montenegrin way to independence. The has left the period after 2006 unexamined. In the following, the CPC will be described differently and hopefully this will provide a more nuanced picture of it. The first and foremost aspect that needs to be dealt with in order to determine the CPC's social-religious role in Montenegrin society is the determination of a few basic structures of the organization. These structures are basic things such as the location of the churches, the demographics of the community, the major events and conflicts the CPC has been involved in and what the community thinks of itself. This will provide a point of departure into a discussion of the CPC's place in Montenegrin society.

This study is mainly based on my own field-work, interviews and site visits in 2011, 2013 and 2014, combined with the CPC's own publications,

such as its constitution and its ecclesial magazine *Lučindan*. To some extent, other materials such as articles from the Magazine *Matica Crnagorskam* and data from local NGOs and scientific papers will also be used to support the observations.

The foundation of the CPC

The CPC was founded in Cetinje in 1993 in the days around St. Luke's day (18. October) and St Petar's death day (31 October). The foundation of the CPC took place in Cetinje and not in the capital of Podgorica, because Cetinje is the cultural capital of "Old" Montenegro and was, until the fall of the Montenegrin Kingdom in 1918, the city where its royal family resided. The city was originally founded by the noblemen Ivan Crnojević around a monastery where the Orthodox Metropolitan of Zeta (later Montenegro) took residence after the Ottoman invasion in the 16th century. The region around Cetinje (called Katunska nahija) is, according to the 2011 census, inhabited to a large extent by people who identify themselves as belonging to the Montenegrin ethnicity and who vote for the parties that support Montenegrin independence. The CPC is claimed to be a revival of the Orthodox Church organization that existed in the historical Kingdom/Principality of Montenegro until it was absorbed into the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1920 after Montenegro became a part of the new Kingdom for Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in 1918. The dismantling of the Montenegrin Kingdom and church is a highly controversial subject in Montenegro, where pro-Montenegrins claim that both things were done illegally by the Belgrade government and its army (see Sekulović 2010). During the period of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro (from 1945 to roughly 1989), there were a few instances where the Orthodox clergy in Montenegro expressed the wish to form a local Montenegrin Orthodox Church as the case was in Macedonia. The Serbian Orthodox Church continually denounced these claims and argued that the wish had been nurtured by anti-Orthodox attitudes from the communist regime (Alexander p. 169, 180). The wish to form an independent (called autocephaly) Montenegrin Orthodox church is therefore not a new invention.

The CPC's churches and religious sites

According to various sources, the CPC has an estimated 10–15 churches and at least one monastery in Old Montenegro. The sources range from the CPC's Wikipedia page, their magazine Lučindan, my own fieldwork and Jelna Džankić's studies (2016). It is estimated that there are between 571 and 650 Orthodox churches in Montenegro and the MML owns the rest as well as at least 60 monasteries in the Montenegrin territory (Džankić 2015, p.

123, Buchenau 2003, p. 110). Most of the CPC's churches are found around the village of Njeguši near Cetinje. Njeguši is the birthplace for the clan of Petrović-Njegoš, who ruled Montenegro from the 17th century until 1918. The precise number of churches and monasteries is uncertain because the CPC frequently use ordinary houses (and refers to them as churches) or open fields as places for religious services (Buchenau 2003). A few of the churches are old religious buildings, said to belong to the clans of Njeguši or Cetinje, while others are converted or restored buildings.

Until now the CPC has only built one new church, which is found in Cetinje and named after Ivan Crnojević. The CPC does, however, lay claim to a number of buildings currently owned by the MML, and have tried on several occasions to forcefully take possession of them. Most of these disputed buildings are in Old Montenegro and especially in the city of Cetinje. The CPC has also, without any confrontation so far, laid at least a cultural claim to an Islamic and a Roman Catholic site. The Catholic site in question is the man-made island and the church on it devoted to the Lady of the Lake (mng.: "Gospa od Skrpjela") in the bay of Kotor. This site is devoted to a local holy woman and she is venerated in a ritual performed by the local inhabitants of the bay. The Islamic site in question is the shrine on the mountain Rumija devoted to a saint venerated by several Orthodox churches as well as the local Catholics and Muslims. Each year a local ritual is performed by all communities in order to venerate the saint. The CPC sees these two sites, along with the historical persons and the ritual connected with them, as genuinely Montenegrin and therefore a part of the CPC.

The CPC's clergy and ecclesial organization

According to the CPC itself, its clergy consists of three *vladikas*, ten priests and one deacon (mng.: "trojicu vladika, deset svještenika i jednog đakona", Lucindan 2009, p. 77). Compared to this the MML had at least an estimated 60 priests and 160 other forms of ecclesial personnel in 2003 (Buchenau 2003) and the numbers have probably risen since then. However, it should be remarked that Alexander Stella (1979) reports that in 1979 the total numbers of MML priest (18) was equal to the number of CPC clergy today.

Noticeably, the CPC calls its bishops *vladikas* and not *episkop* or *metropolitans* in its more informal texts. The title of *vladika* means ruler and is often translated to bishop-prince. The Metropolitan of Cetinje from around the 16th century used the title to designate the double nature of his office as both a secular and religious leader. The title of vladika is only used loosely and in the official "constitution" of the CPC (Ustav Crnogorske Pravoslavne Crkve, 2009) the religious "leader" of the CPC is referred to as the Archbishop of Cetinje and the Metropolitan of Montenegro (mng.: "Arhiepiskop Cetinjski i Mitropolit Crnogorski", Paragraph 9, 2009). This title is very similar to the head of the MML. The CPC's hierarchical order begins

with the Metropolitan and has six additional levels ranging from the bishop's council to parish councils. Beside the hierarchy of the clergy, the line of management from the council of the Metropolitan down to each parish church is also established (Paragraph 7, 2009). The constitution of the CPC explains in details the scope of the church's works. It ranges from what could be characterized as traditional Christian work, such as formal procedures of election of bishops (Paragraph 16.17–18, 2009) and more general Christian work, such as "*keep and defend the purity of Christian Orthodox teachings on faith and morals*" (mng.: "Čuva i brani čistotu hrišćanskoga pravoslavnoga učenja o vjeri i moralu", Paragraph 16.6, 2009) and maintaining internal unity (Paragraph 16.3). In addition to this traditional Christian service, the CPC also defines its work as preserving, protecting and devoting attention to the Montenegrin ecclesial and historical materials, saints, texts etc. (Paragraphs 16.8, 17.23–24, 18.2–5, 2009). The CPC is divided up into the following dioceses/episcopates (mng.: "episkopije", Paragraph 23):

- The Archbishopric of Cetinje, consisting of the Katunska nahija.
- The Episcopate of Duklja, consisting of the capital of Podgorica, the city of Danilograd and the ruins of the city of Duklja.
- The Coastal episcopate, centered in the city of Kotor and entailing all of Montenegro's coastland (the Littoral).
- The Episcopate of Ostroški – Niksic, centered in the city of Niksic and its upland. The episcopate lays claim to the monastery of Ostrog, which is currently owned by the MML.
- The Episcopate of Bjelopoljska, centered in Bijelo Polje and including the northern Montenegrin municipalities.
- The Diaspora Episcopate.

One can see that the CPC's internal division follow the borderline of the republic of Montenegro and most of the episcopates are built around the division of municipalities of Montenegro. This is in grave contrast with the MML, which only covers Old Montenegro and the coastland (the Littoral). The northern and western parts of Montenegro are included into other Serbian eparchies (episcopates) – namely the "Mileševska" and the "Budmilje and Niksic" eparchies, which also include territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia. The Budmilje and Niksic eparchy was restored in 2001 and the Mileševska eparchy in 1999 (Džankić 2016, p. 143).

Furthermore, the constitution of the CPC also contains a section on the criteria one has to fulfill in order to become a bishop. This indicates the ideal form a senior member of the CPC clergy should be like. The constitution states that a bishop in the CPC needs to be at least 30, have a higher theological education and be devoted to the church and the people/nation (mng.: "crkve I naroda", Paragraph 24.5). He needs to be born in Montenegro and be a citizen (this does not apply to a bishop of the diaspora). The

episcopal office is thus reserved for Montenegrin citizens who are devoted to serving the people/nation.

Who are the members?

There are no official records nor a standardized national census providing a precise estimate of the number of members or Orthodox believers that adhere to the CPC. One could assume that there is a close correlation between being a member of the CPC and identifying oneself as a Montenegrin (Džankić 2014). The members of the CPC could therefore be limited to the group of people in Montenegro that identify themselves as Montenegrins. This is 45% of the total population, which is roughly 300,000 persons according to the 2011 census (Montestat 2011). This is the absolute maximum number of persons that the CPC could appeal to within Montenegro.

A qualified estimate of the total number of members could be found in the empirical research on the poltical landscape of Montenegro conducted by the Montenegrin Center for Democracy and Human Rights (Centar za demokratiju i ljudska prava, shortened to CEDEM). Over the past decade, CEDEM has continuously conducted two to three minor polls each year. These polls include from time to time questions regarding the religiousty of Montenegrin citizens. Two of their polls, from 2009 and 2015, show the percentage of Montenegrin citizens that identify themselves as members of the either the CPC or the MML (see table 3, CEDEM).

Table 3: Percentage of respondents that belong to the MML or the CPC

	MML	CPC
2009	52.20%	21.70%
2015	52.30%	15.60%

Source: Centar za demokratiju i ljudska prava, Montenegro

These two polls indicate that the Orthodox Christians in Montenegro, which make up 72% of the total population according to the 2011 census, are divided between the MML and the CPC. The majority of the population (52–53%) which is roughly two thirds of all Orthodox believers, attest that they belong to the MML, while the remaining minority, which is between 16–22% of the total population and aproximately a third of Orthodox believers in Montenegro, belongs to the CPC. If these polls are crossed with the 2011 census, they thereby indicate that almost 50% of those Montenegrin citizens that identify themselves as ethnic Montenegrins, do not support the CPC but the MML. This information suggests that half of Montenegrins connect their national identity with their religious affiliation, while the other half doesn't. The two polls indicate therefore that aproximately 150,000 Montenegrins in Montenegro are members of the CPC. This number

seems, however, to be an overestimation considering the size of the clergy and the number of churches belonging to the CPC. This overetsimation could be based on the fact that the respondents had to choose between the CPC and the MML, which forced them to take a stand that they might not have taken otherwise. The polls were also conducted with a minor group of respondents (aprox. 1,000 persons) and might therefore not precisely reflect the scale of the CPC. Furthermore, the polls might not show the actual number of members but rather the size of the population that passively supports the CPC without actively engaging in CPC activity.

This estimation flickers a bit further when one takes another line of observation from CEDEM into account. CEDEM has also asked on a regular basis if Montenegrin citizens "trust" in specific institutions, such as the parliament, the military, the MML and the CPC. This provides a long series of observation displayed in figure 1.

Figure 1: Percentage of respondents that "trust" in the MML and the CPC from 2010 to 2016



Source: Centar za demokratiju i ljudska prava, Montenegro

The median is 52.7% for the MML and 27.6% for the CPC for all observations from 2010 to 2016. The median reveals that, statiscally speaking, 27.6% of the total population "trust" the CPC as an institution. This could be interpreted as support. This percentage of supporters is not far from the estimation of the number of members in CEDEM's other polls. This underlines perhaps that table 3 shows the percentage of passive supporters of the CPC rather than its actual members.

A correlation to CEDEM's polls is another poll from 2011 which was designed by a research group (Kolstø 2016). This 2011 poll indicates a somewhat different picture. In this poll, less than ca. 16% of the ethnic Montenegrin population identify themselves with the CPC. This is far less than the estimation from CEDEM. In contrast to this small group, the majority of ethnic Montenegrins, which is 58%, would rather describe themselves with the rather bland label of "Eastern Orthodox". The 58% thereby signal that they belong to neither the MML nor the CPC. This 2011 poll therefore estimates the total number of CPC members around ca. 47,000, if it is crossed with the 2011 census. A conservative estimate may therefore be that ca. 47,000

persons are firm and loyal members of the CPC, while at least 150,000 people in Montenegro sympathize with the CPC on some level.

A further correlation to these numbers is found in the budget of the CPC from 2009. Here, the CPC's treasury informs that 4,265 payments have been made to the CPC. (Lucindan 2009, p. 69): 2,800 from legal entities and 1,465 from physical persons (mng.: "2.800 pravna lica i 1.465 fizička lica"). It is not made explicit what those two labels cover, but a qualified guess is that *fizička lica* is literally a single person donating and that *pravna lica* covers families, clans, villages or organizations of some sort. This provides enough information to assume that at least 4,265 persons have made the choice to donate money to the CPC. This group – combined with the clergy and other officials – could be considered as the core base of believers for the CPC.

In total, the sources mentioned above could be used to estimate the total size of the CPC. First and foremost there seems to be a base of firm and active believers comprising approximately 5,000 individuals. Secondly, there is a group of ca. 47,000 persons that belong to the CPC, which is 16% of all ethnic Montenegrins. Thirdly, around ca. 150,000 persons in Montenegro somewhat sympathize with the CPC. The size of this last group is perhaps the most difficult one to determine. The polls from CEDEM suggest that the group is between 16 and 30% of the total population. Finally, there are ca. 300,000 persons in Montenegro to whom the CPC could appeal to. The numbers mentioned above are estimations based on the demographics of Montenegro. It should be noted that the number of firm believers might have been higher during the formation of the CPC. Morrison reports that 15,000 people showed up to the foundational celebration of the CPC in Cetinje in 1993 (2009, p. 131). These 15.000 must have been strong supporters of the CPC and could be characterized as the core members of the early CPC.

Figure 2: Demographics of the CPC



Key: 1: The firm believers; 2: Those that identify themselves with the CPC; 3: Those that sympathize with the CPC; 4: Those that the CPC can appeal to

The recent history of the CPC

The CPC was formally founded in 1993, but has existed roughly since the All-Montenegrin National Synod in 1991 and functioned as an NGO until its official recognition in 2000. Below is a list of the most significant events in the recent history of the CPC.

Table 5: List of events relating to the CPC 1991–2013

Year	Event
2013	October: Celebration of Njegoš
2010	20 January: Clash at Church of St. John the Baptist in Bajice
2008	October: Meeting with the Ukrainian, Bulgarian and Moldavian non-recognized churches
2007	18 April: Clash between CPC and MML supporters at Cetinje monastery
2005	May: The MML build the controversial Rumija church
2000	Easter: The CPC receives greetings from the Prime Minister of Montenegro.
	January: Official recognition by the Montenegrin state
	17 January: Clash between CPC and MML supporters at Donji Kraj church
1997/98	The election and elevation of vladika Dedic/Mihailo
1996	The death of the first vladika, Abramovich
1993	31 October: The founding of the CPC on St. Petar's death day
1991	12 July: Clash between CPC supporters and a Serbian armed militia on St. Petar's day in Cetinje
	6 January: The All-Montenegrin National Synod
	January: The first badjnak

The recent history of the CPC is centered around two crucial periods. The first one is the early nineties (1991–1993) where the CPC became established as a spearhead for the Liberals and Montenegrin nationalists in their reaction towards the MML. A central event was the bloody St Petar's day, where a Serbian armed militia started shooting at a Montenegrin demonstration in Cetinje. This event convinced many locals in Cetinje that the MML stood in the way of the Montenegrin nationalist movement and that consequently the CPC needed to be founded in order to counter the MML (Morrison 2009). Following its foundation in 1993, the CPC struggled to become an established community and put its organization into place. A significant amount of energy was expended to secure the transferal of the office of Metropolitan from the first vladika Abramovich to the second vladika Mihailo.

The second crucial period for the CPC began in 2000 when the confrontation between the MML and CPC was put to the test. The recognition of the CPC in that year became a point of departure for a CPC-lead

campaign which sought to take back all Montenegrin shrines built before 1920. This period culminated in 2007 shortly after the referendum without the CPC being able to overtake any shrines owned by the MML. The CPC leadership seemed to have hoped that Montenegrin independence would pave the way for their control over the central churches and monasteries in Montenegro. Instead of being welcomed by the Montenegrin authorities, they were, in stark contrast to their expectations, confronted by a Montenegrin police force protecting the MML on 18 April 2007. Following 2007, the CPC has been stabilized and institutionalized with a new constitution, the rebuilding of churches and a continual presence at official state events, such as the celebration of Njegoš in 2013.

This timeline is to a large extent reflected in the writings of the church and their supporters. The majority of texts defending the church in pro-Montenegrin magazines, such as the *Matica crnogorska* or the CPC's own publication *Lučindan*, are dated from around 2000 and up until a few years after the 2006 referendum.

The cultic and ritual praxis of the CPC

In general, the CPC invokes Christian language, holidays and rituals as part of the clergy's praxis which is described in details in the magazine *Lučindan*, such as Metropolitan Mihailo's greeting to the CPC at Easter (Lučindan 2013). To the extent that is visible in its outlet, the CPC should be characterized as a Christian community. There is, however, often a paucity when it comes to biblical references, which is perhaps more due the lack of deep theological training than an expression of a theological stand. It is hard to determine if this form of Christianity is a deep commitment to the Christian faith or simply a structural and cultural garment for the community.

Beside the traditional Christian structures, rituals and holidays, the CPC's praxis is based on a revivalist interpretation of what Montenegrin Christendom should be like. An example of this is the use of the title *vladika* rather than the title of bishop or metropolitan. Vladika invokes a local tradition of Christian rule, rather than the long episcopal succession expressed in the title of bishop.

The CPC's main national characteristic is also found in the so-called "sainted Montenegrin cult" (mng.: култу Црногорославља), which consist of a list of saints that the CPC venerates in particular. These saints are especially bond to the history of the Montenegrin lands and the former medieval states of Duklja and Zeta. However, two of the saints are also venerated by the MML and other Orthodox churches. The CPC describes the essences of these saints as the fight for (Montenegrin) freedom and they are used as ideal-figures exemplifying the Montenegrin's right to an independent state (Lučindan 2009, p. 37). The five most central are as follows:

Table 6: List of national saints

Name of cult	Historical person	Historical period	Known for
Vladimiroslavlja	Jovan or Ivan Vladimir, unkown family – perhaps Vojislavljević	Early medieval 990–1016	First ruler of the Montenegrin area. First locally known saint.
Vasilioslavlja	Vojislavljević – A line of rulers, the best known of which are Stefan, Mihailo I and Constantine Bodin	Early medieval 1034–1186	The ruling dynasty of independent Duklja. First local Slavic independent royal house – ousted by the Serbian house of Nemanjić.
Stefanoslavlja	Probably Stefan Piperski	Ottoman period Unknown birth – 20/21 May 1697	Local Montenegrin saint – founded the Ćelija piperska monastery in Brda outside Podgorica.
Ivanoslavlja	Ivan Crnojević	Late medieval 1465–1490	Lord of the Zeta – Montenegrin state, founder of Cetinje and the Cetinje monastery.
Petroslavlja	Petar I Petrović-Njegoš	1748–1830	Sainted vladika of the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty of Montenegro. Modernized Montenegro and known as Petar of Cetinje.

Source: "Uloga Svještenstva", Lučindan 33, 2010, p. 83

This national characteristic of the CPC is also found in their calendar of religious celebrations. According to the CPC, their church celebrates most of the Christian and Eastern Orthodox holidays, such as Christmas, the Epiphany (19 January), the prayer to the Theokotos (14 October) and so on. The special CPC holidays are the following:

Table 6: List of specific national holidays

Name	Date (Julian/ Gregorian)	Refers to	Celebrated at
St. Basil of Ostrog	12 May / 29 April	The venerated founder of the monastery of Ostrog (near Danilograd)	Ostrog monastery
Holy Stefan Piperski	2 June / 20 May	The venerated founder of the monastery of Piperski (near Podgorica)	Piperski monastery

Holy martyr Vladimir of Duklja	4 June / 22 May	Jovan or Ivan Vladimir	Mount Rumija and city of Bar
Holy and just Ivana Crnojevića	4 July / 21 June	Ivan Crnojević	Cetinje monastery and churches
St. Peter from Cetinje, the Wonderworker	31 October (calender unknown)	Petar I Petrović-Njegoš	Cetinje monastery
Lučindan	18 October (calender unknown)	Luke's day	
Badjnak	Christmas (Julian calendar)		Cetinje main square
Petrovodan	29 June (calender unknown)	St. Petar I Petrović-Njegoš' birthday	Cetinje monastery

Source: "Praznici", Lucindan 37, 2010, p. 50

Noticeably, four of the local Montenegrin cults are turned into holidays and another one is added. One central feature of all the celebrated holidays is that the person venerated is bound to a very specific geographical and often physical space (e.g. a monastery). Most of these places are today controlled by the MML. The CPC underline, through their veneration, their claim on Montenegro's physical heritage through a spiritual argument (Saggau 2017a). One of the most central holidays and rituals is the badjnak. The badjnak is a local ritual – used throughout Eastern Europe. It is centered on the burning of a large Yule log (or sometimes just a bonfire) at Christmas Eve. Every year the MML and the CPC each hold a badjnak only a few hundred meters apart. The MML burns its logs in front of the monastery in Cetinje, while the CPC burns its logs in front of the last Petrovich-Njegoš palace in a central square in Cetinje. During the badjnak, nationalist songs are sung by both crowds and they wave Serbian or Montenegrin national flags. The reason the CPC continues to hold on to the date of the Badjnak is not only just a yearly provocation towards the MML. Christmas has a cultural history of its own in Montenegro. Three key historical events occurred at Christmas in Montenegro that made the holiday into a national and cultural event that transgresses the limited symbolism of Christianity.[3]

[3] The holiday is the center of Petar II Petrovich-Njegoš' (1813–1851) epic about his forefather vladika Danilo Petrovich-Njegoš. In the epic, Danilo leads Montenegrin Orthodox believers as they slaughter the Montenegrin Muslims that refuse to convert on Christmas. The so-called "cleansing" of Montenegro is a mythological (or some argue real) tale of Montenegrin freedom from the Muslim. In addition to this tale, the Montenegrins have on two other occasions risen to arms during Christmas. First and foremost in a Montenegrin national uprising during the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 in a so-called civil war. The second occasion was during Montenegro's occupation by Italian forces during the Second World War.

A religio-social mapping of the CPC

So far this article has dealt with the basic structure of the CPC which provides some insights into the organization. In the following paragraph, these findings will be supplemented with a religio-social mapping of the CPC within Montenegrin society. Such mapping is based on a country's legal norms and its political discourse, which constructs structures through which the religious organizations can act. Such structures could be described as belonging to specific models describing the relationship between church and state. Silvio Ferrari, a professor of law and religion, maps such structures into three governing models. The first model is that of a *separation system*, where the state and religious communities are separated from each other – such as in the French laicity system. The second is called a *concordat system*, which is built on explicit agreements between state and church, such as in Spain. And the third system is called a *national church system* with established national churches, such as in Denmark or England (Ferrari 2002).

In the Montenegrin context, the relationship between the state and religious communities is not well described and there isn't a comprehensive legal framework in place. Various parties and religious communities strongly disagree on the matter and thus no new laws pertaining to religion have been passed since independence in 2006 despite a few failed attempts. The relationship between the state and the religious communities is therefore rather loose and only vaguely prescribed in the constitution and some minor by-laws on religious education, culture etc.

Montenegro's constitution (Ustav Crne Gore 2007) from 2007 is based on a Western model. Article 46 states that there is freedom of religion in Montenegro and that all "religious communities shall be separated from the state" (article 14). Article 14 explicitly declares the state to be secular. This is to some extent softened in other paragraphs where the constitution allows religious communities and individuals to exercise and express their religion as well as establish religious organizations with the support of the state. Religious organizations are also allowed to maintain contact with other religious organizations outside of Montenegro, such as the papal church. The by-laws on religion require that the religious communities register at a local police office, which will inform the Ministry of Interior about the registration. Being registered entitles organizations to own property, hold bank accounts and receive a tax exemption. There are twenty registered religious communities at the present time (International Religious Freedom Report 2015).

The Montenegrin state could, according to Ferrari's models, best be characterized as a separation system on a general level, where church and state have nothing to do with each other. However, the content of the some of the constitution's articles, some of the Montenegrin by-laws and the agreements between the state and some of the religious communities, points to the fact

that in practice the Montenegrin state formulates explicit agreements with religious communities.[4] This suggest that on a practical level, the Montenegrin church-state relationship is rather a concordat system according to Ferrari's models. This mixture of models seems partly to be the unintended side-effect caused by the lack of a comprehensive legal system for religion.

To further qualify the characterization of the relationship between church and state, Ferrari also introduces a "pyramid of priority" (see fig 3). The pyramid depicts the degrees of relations to and cooperation with the state. It reveals a compartmentalisation of religious communities in a religious landscape. The basic logic of the pyramid is that religious communities can increase their cooperation with the state, which in turn will increase their influence and positional power while at the same time subdue them to greater state control (Vinding 2013).

Figur 3: The Silvio Ferrari pyramid of priority of selective state co-operation



Source: Vinding, 2013, p. 44

The pyramid could be applied to the Montenegrin context to shed some light on the positions of the various religious communities in relation to the state. Close to the state are in fact the Muslim, Roman Catholic and Jewish

[4] See for example *The General Law on Education* (*Opšti zakon o obrazovanju i vaspitanju* 2013) and the formal agreement between the Roman Catholic Church and the Montenegrin state (*Catholics Temeljni ugovor Crne Gore i Svete Stolice* 2011). See Saggau, Pacariz & Bakrač, 2017.

communities in Montenegro. They inhabit the third level of the pyramid. These three communities have been able to form a direct agreement with the state about their rights, responsibilities and the resources that are available to them. Each of them is a minority religion and this status has perhaps provided them with the close link to the state. The Montenegrin government has been keen on preserving and protecting minorities in order to qualify for inclusion in the EU, and also as the government has heavily relied on the (non-Serbian) minority parties in parliament for support. The relation to the (non-Serbian) minorities has not been a major or controversial issue in Montenegro. The state's relationship to these minority religions must be understood to have undergone a process of general formalization after independence.

Most of Montenegro's other religious organizations including the CPC are to be classified in the second level of the pyramid. These organizations are registered and are allowed to own land and practise their religion, but none of them have a formal agreement with the state. Finally, the MML could be described as being between the second and the first level of the pyramid: on the one hand the MML are registered and exist under the same laws as the CPC, but on the other hand there are several unclear relations, especially when it comes to for example the right to property, religious education and the movements of clergy members between the former republics of Yugoslavia. Several high profiled cases, a series of lawsuits and accusations have, since the early 2000s, tainted the relationship between the current government and the MML (Morrison 2009, Radio Slobodan Evropa 2016). The degree of cooperation between the state and the MML could at best be described as minor and, likewise, the MML is only to a minor degree governed by the Montenegrin state. The MML is, however, subordinate to the Serbian Orthodox Church and therefore partly governed by the Serbian state in matters such as the education of priests etc. (Metropolitante 2013). Montenegro is still a young state and its legal framework is therefore still dynamic. The current government under the leadership of the Democratic Party of Socialists (mng.: Demokratska partija socijalista – hereon DPS) and the Montenegrin state are very much overlapping. Many state officials are party members. The individual relationship between various religious communities and high-ranking members of the DPS therefore forms the pyramid. This is unlike other states where these relations are much more formalized. The relations between the state and the communities – especially when it comes to the MML and the CPC – would very much change, if the opposition came into power.

In order to understand the CPC's place in Montenegrin society, one has to recall the two major religio-social characteristic of the CPC. They have first of all since their foundation been narrowly identified with the Montenegrin nationalist movement in all its aspects. The base of members is in Old Montenegro and this base only covers those that identify themselves

as "ethnic Montenegrins", that is to say between 16 and 50% of all Montenegrins. Secondly, the CPC is therefore connected to pro-Montenegrin nationalist parties, such as the Liberals or the Social Democratic Party (mng.: Socijaldemokratska partija), and not directly to the DPS. This position partly explains why they inhabit the second level rather than the third in the pyramid of priorities. The CPC is not close enough to the DPS in order to obtain a status as a national church, and the DPS are very well aware that a substantial part of the electoral base (mainly moderate Montenegrins) are not members of the CPC. On the other hand, the DPS needs to recognize the CPC on some level because the DPS has historically relied on the Liberals and the Social Democratic Party to remain in power (Morrison 2009, p. 141). In contrast, the MML is identified as a branch of a Serbian cultural organization, which according to the DPS is alien to the Montenegrin state. This links the MML to the various Serbian-based opposition parties, which the DPS regards as its opponents. The MML and the DPS thus don't fully cooperate, which was put to the point in the discussion over the Lovćen site during the Njegoš jubilee in 2013 (Saggau 2017b).

This pyramid and state-models could be used to illustrate the dynamics in concrete situations like. The controversial Easter greetings to both the MML and the CPC by the DPS prime minister Đukanović in 2000. Traditionally, the head of the state would only greet the MML on Easter in the same manner as greetings are sent to the Muslim or Roman Catholic communities during their religious festivities. The seasonal greeting in 2000 was in contrast sent to both communities and was the first official greeting from a head of state to the CPC (Buchennau 2003). Shortly afterwards, it was followed by the official recognition of the CPC. The MML reacted harshly over this positive treatment of the CPC (Šistek 2010, p. 127). This event illustrates how the CPC moved up in the pyramid from the first to the second level expressed in the greeting and the recognition. They moved from being an unrecognized NGO into being a regulated religious community. The CPC became – on a social-religious and juridical-state level – an equal to the MML. The MML's harsh reaction was against the state's endorsing of the CPC rather that the greeting itself. It was against the juridical and societal equalization. The MML was not removed from the list of greetings, but kept their position in the pyramid. However, they were forced to share this position with the CPC and their positional power in the Montenegrin society became threatened.

The institutional form of the CPC

The CPC's place and role in Montenegrin society is partly determined by how its members, its supporters and its opponents view the organization. In the following paragraph, these perspectives on the CPC will be treated.

The core believers and most ardent supports view the CPC as an ecclesial organization characterized by Christian liturgy, priests, worships and canon laws. Several writings, such as in Goran Sekulović article "*Crnogorska identitetska prava i slobode*" (2010), argue that the CPC is an Eastern Orthodox Church and that it is a natural prolongation of the "Mother" church of Montenegro from before 1920. Their main arguments and their implications in a theological sense are treated elsewhere (Saggau 2014), but they leave very little doubt about their view on the CPC. Likewise the views of the MML and other pro-Serbian organizations, newspapers etc. on the CPC are quite clear. In short the MML views the CPC as a tool for the Montenegrin nationalist movement used in order to challenge the MML's status in Montenegro. The metropolitan of the MML, Amfilohije Radović, has written a short text called "*The Church as the Pillar and Stronghold of the Truth – The Question of Autocephaly and the Church*", which expounded this position on a theological level. Remarkably, most studies of the CPC reach the same conclusion as the MML (see Morrison 2009, Šistek 2010, Kube 2012, Jelena Džankić 2013 & 2014a & 2014b & 2016, and Troch 2014).

Booth perspectives on the CPC reveal elements of its form. Its members and close supporters treat the organization as a church in a religio-sociological sense. On the other hand, as the mapping showed, the CPC plays a cultural-political role for the Montenegrin nationalist movement that the MML criticizes the CPC for. However, these two views on the CPC do not reveal all of its features because they are crafted either in positive support or a negative response.

In contrast it might be more fruitful to understand the CPC organization religio-sociologically as a "new" revivalist religion. This does not mean that their content is new, but rather that they are a new religious organization and therefore act as such. Eileen Barker, a religio-sociologist, points out that adolescent religious organizations act almost in similar patterns, because they are both religious and new (2013). The most noticeable characteristics are that they are small in numbers, that their interactions are on a face-to-face level and that they are centered around one leader (often charismatic). They are highly unpredictable and their core members are (as many first-generation religious) very enthusiastic (Barker 2013, p. 14). The CPC holds all these traits, positions and attitudes that are characteristic for new religious movements. The CPC is small, centered around one leader and its members are very enthusiastic. Its members often argue in a traditionalist, a nationalist or a revivalist pattern, which are often bound together and inseparable.

With Barker's point in mind, it makes therefore perhaps much better sense to describe the CPC as a religious organization characterized as both new and revivalist. On one hand, its "newness" defines its size, its form of organization and its core members. On the other hand, its "revivalism"

defines the reuse of Montenegrin cultural and religious heritage, which appeals to Montenegrin citizens characterized as nationalist or traditionalist.

A paper tiger or a resurgent church?

As the above socio-religious description and discussions point out, the CPC exists and enjoys to some extent the backing of the parts of the Montenegrin population. The CPC is still a minor community with only few churches, a minimum of ecclesial organization and clergy as well as a few faithful believers. It is hard to determine the extent of the impact of the community on the life of everyday Montenegrins, but it's safe to say that the CPC is very much embedded into the social life of Old Montenegro, the heartland of Montenegrin nationalism. Alice Forbess (2013) and Aleksander Zdravkovski and Kenneth Morrison (2014) note that especially in the period after the referendum in 2006 there has been a blooming of Montenegrin cultural awareness in Old Montenegro. The use of Montenegrin symbols, flags and songs has been predominant at social events. In that sense the CPC is part of a resurgent cultural and religious praxis for this group and in that area – which partly explains why its churches and claims to churches are limited to this area. Its place in this resurgent cultural movement is the background for its revivalist form of Eastern Orthodox Christianity.

The CPC has to some degree been successful in claiming a religious role in the new state. This role is secured through a status as a religious community in Montenegro, but this position does at the same time not really challenge the MML. Therefore the CPC's threat to the MML is still just a paper tiger, because physically, demographically and financially the MML overshadows the CPC. It is only on paper that the CPC can challenge the MML without the full backing from the DPS and subsequently the state. Such backing would require overwhelming support from the Montenegrin majority to the CPC, and that seems highly unlikely according to the polls. The DPS is therefore not interested in challenging the MML seriously on behalf of the CPC, because it is too risky both financially, politically and could endanger the peaceful coexistence between Serbs and Montenegrins in the state. The DPS favors to maintain the status-quo. Most analysts have labeled the CPC as a nationalist agent rather than a church (Šistek 2010) and have called the community "ein Elitenprojekt" (Kube 2012, p. 130). This is true in that sense that the CPC only appeals to an elite group of Montenegrin nationalists, but, as the demographics show, a larger group of Montenegrins do sympathize with the project. The CPC's religious praxis appeal to a small but key group of Montenegrins that shape the large frame through which Montenegrins interpret their culture, history, language, religion and ethnicity. This does not mean that the large group of Montenegrins would in the long run becomes members of the CPC, but rather that they live and understand themselves in relation to the supporters of the CPC. It is one-sided

to only portray the CPC as nationalistic, because it also contains traits of being a revivalist, new and even traditional form of religion. The CPC contains all of these features due to the cultural and religious context it draws on. The CPC is a nationalist organization, which its cultic praxis points towards, but this is not the whole picture. The veneration of national saints and holidays reveals both the nationalism, the revivalism and the traditionalism at play when Montenegrin culture, places and historical persons take prominence in the CPC.

Interestingly, the recent history of the CPC mirrors the social and political changes Montenegro has been through since the collapse of Yugoslavia. The birth of the CPC out of the turmoil of the civil war in 1991–1995 foreshadowed the watershed in Montenegrin politics in 1996, where the DPS elite set out on the road towards independence. The point of no return politically and religiously came in 2000, when the DPS leader both renounced the union with Serbia and greeted the CPC as an equal to the MML. The road towards independence was paved. And finally, the period since the declaration of independence has been used on stabilization of the Montenegrin state and the CPC.

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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GENDER AND RELIGIOSITY – THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGES

Abstract: The differences between male and female gender in relation to (non-) religiosity are considered and analyzed in this paper. The humankind began with divine creation of male and female, and Erich Fromm claims that the need for religion is rooted in the basic conditions of humankind. We can notice more frequent religiosity of the females in relation to the males by following the periodicity of (non-)religiosity in relation to gender differences. Starting from some psycho-sociological theories, we find a kind of explanation for female domination in religiosity. The second part of the paper is based on the results of a study conducted in Montenegro. The state of gender religiosity is compared in this republic in the period from 1989 to 2010. We were interested in whether there are any changes in the dynamics of religiosity of men and women, and in what direction they are going. The comparative analysis suggests that gender religiosity is extremely high and stable, although some chronological differences are evident. An important result of the comparative analysis is an insight into dynamics of the changes of gender and religiosity. Accordingly, we can detect an increase in the proportion of men, and a slight decrease in the proportion of women in religiosity.

Key words: gender, gender differences, religiosity, secularization, desecularization, revitalization of religion.

Introduction

This paper is about extensive and qualitative studies that measured the level of religiosity in Montenegro. Since the certain part of the space in the studies is devoted to the indicators concerning religion, it has served to detect some changes in religiosity at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century. Certainly, this comparative analysis has some weaknesses. Namely, the analysis of religiosity rests on the foundations of common, but also reducing variables such as a self-assessment of religiosity, belief in God and life after death. Therefore, the main comparative orientation of this paper is conditioned by the form of a questionnaire which dictates its structure and its realization.

The starting point is to comparatively review sociological indicators of religiosity in the studies from 1989 to 2013, that is, to detect and isolate possible changes. Certainly, the analysis of the results will be based on testing the significance of differences in the basic indicators of religiosity in the aforementioned studies. In the analysis, we will limit ourselves to an independent variable concerning the gender of the respondents, as well as crossing this variable with some indicators of religiosity. In fact, it is about the indicators that we classify into qualitative indicators of religiosity: religious self-assessment of respondents, belief in God, and an indicator concerning the belief in life after death. The next aim of the paper is to interpret the results independently of whether or not the differences are noticed. Generally speaking, the possibilities that are in circulation are the following: the increase in the religiosity of men and women, the decline in religiosity, the stability of religiosity, and it is possible that there will also be a change of scenario in relation to gender and religiosity depending on the variables.

The obtained data will be interpreted through the analysis of comparative research, as well as contemporary theoretical knowledge from the Sociology of Religion. The structure of the paper is conceived as follows: the theoretical introduction shaped by psycho-sociological theories and the concept of secularization and desecularization is followed by a short methodological framework, and the results of a comparative analysis of the population's gender are presented as an independent variable with some qualitative indicators of religiosity.

Socio-Psychological Overview of Gender Differences

Many societies are characterized by more frequent religiosity of the females in relation to the males. The studies, criticized by feminist movements, were focused on women and their experiences of marginalization and constant inferiority in almost all religions in the middle and at the end of the twentieth century. In this context, we should also include traditionalism or traditional theory which includes religious writings and prophecies. Traditional beliefs are slowly changing, so the gender, conceptually accepted in social sciences, had difficulties to fit into theology and dogmatism. Simone de Beauvoir would say "In a human adventure, she was never the subject, but at least an excuse or an initiator; her destiny is different in a moody or important direction" (Beauvoir 1987:105).

The approaches by which religious differences are interpreted on the basis of biological differences, which are the gender differences, are not only a characteristic of theological, but also a characteristic of sociological point of view. The essence lies in the opinion that there are differences between men and women in some psychological characteristics and abilities that are related to one or the other sex. It is, in fact, about somewhat stereotypical opinion which is connected with some "female characteristics" such as:

emotionality, sensitivity, intuition, care, while so-called male characteristics are rationality, aggressiveness, independence. Men are more focused on the intellectual professions and sport, and women are oriented towards culture, art, etc. Traditional and to some extent anachronistic theories associate woman with giving birth and upbringing of children, which settled the woman into private sphere, isolated from public life. Therefore, it is about essential difference that there is an ontological difference between gender differences which is manifested in different physical, mental, and spiritual characteristics.

When talking about the gender difference in religiosity, Sergej Flere refers to "conception of monotheistic God, who is powerful lord for boys, and a figure of trust for women, to whom they express confidence and with whom they can be in an intimate contact and can have a dialogue, as well as that boys more often pray for a specific purpose in order to get a specific role and answer, but mere dialogue with God is a value for girls, their aim is a mere contact[1]" (Flere, 2002). Thus, the differences in religiosity, on the basis of gender, are mostly based on psychological explanations, type of personality, etc.

When it comes to religion, dominant theoretical framework is the framework which has its roots in the concept of modernization, and that primarily involves the theory of secularization. In many theoretical debates about secularization, dominant theory is the theory which is based on industrialization, urbanization, and even individualization. This concept affects the reduction of religiosity in the society. Individualization as a mediator between secularization on the one hand and religiosity on the other hand, is a product of economic situation, urbanization, as well as the influence of secular education on development of the individual (Halman & Patterson, 2006). Some theoreticians like Inglehart (1997) believe that the reduction of religiosity is conditioned by an increase in social and economic stability in a post-modern society; therefore a certain decline in religiosity can be expected in these societies. The level of religiosity will reduce as the society moves from material to post-material. However, Wilson directs his theoretical attention to Western societies and he states that secularization develops in the historical context when secular but not religious institutions receive primacy (Wilson, 1998).

Regardless the fact that religion is losing the race at macro level, the religion survives at micro level and in the sphere of privacy. Berger's assertion that religiosity survives as it has always survived, with the exceptions of a certain part of the world, is very interesting, while for Grace Davie religiosity

[1] Justifying his thesis about greater religiosity of women, Sergej Flere states as an argument the fact that a woman is often faced with a feeling of guilt. Religious practice and confessional self-determination are more quantitative indicators of religiosity.

is more oriented towards individual basis, where the idea "believing without belonging" arises (Davie, 2002).

Accordingly, not so small number of theoreticians believes that the theory of secularization can be questioned, thus the secularization is a kind of fiction or a myth for them. The basic theoretical starting point concerned the fact that Postmodernization did not leave a special mark on religiosity of the individual, although they admitted that the institutional form of religiosity declined to some extent. The example of the USA is stated as a highly industrialized and postmodern country where the level of religiosity is still very high (Finke & Stark, 1992). We speak in this paper about the return of religion, or desecularization. The term desecularization is something that encounters rather ambivalent analyses among theoreticians and sociologists of religion. Namely, the term desecularization should mean a "revival" of religion in the modern world, on the assumption that we agree with the theory that secularization existed, so a new "rise of faith" in public life is in force. At the same time, however, there is a group of theoreticians who claim that the world (with the possible exception of Western Europe) has never been secularized. Yet some theoreticians (Habermas, 2008, Dillon, 2010, Brus, 2011) agree that the term desecularization can be a much more useful term than the term "post-secularity".

Analyzing the effects of secularization in different societies, we come to a brief conclusion that theoretical scope moves from the concept of secularization which is dependent on religious tradition, via socio-economic consequences of separation of the individual from the church, towards all social communities where there is still a very strong connection between the state and the church. When it comes to the former Yugoslav countries, religiosity and even the position of religious institutions in real socialism was rather unenviable. The basic ideological postulate of real socialism was Marxism, which, in the opinion of ideologists of that time, sharply opposed the church and religion. This is the place where we should critically approach the problem! Marks and Marxism were not for a society that would persecute religion, but for a society where the religion would not be necessary. The period of transition, which also affected the former Yugoslav republics, was followed by economic crises, unconsolidated democracy, growth of nationalism and ethno-phyletism, war events and religious illiteracy. Therefore, after disintegration of a quasi-religious system in the style of real socialism, the other form of a quasi religion in the style of nationalistic ideology appeared, followed by rapid growth of traditional religiosity (more in Vukomanovic, 2001). The return of religiosity appears in the late eighties and early nineties of the twentieth century. It can be explained by the collapse of real socialism, but, in our opinion, we should not neglect the fact that a very difficult situation in economic and social terms contributed to it. The eroded influence of social state and the transition period, which is neither short nor straightforward in Montenegro and shaped by the ideal of

neoliberal economy, could have an effect on desecularization and return of religion into the public sphere. Certainly, there is a revitalization of religion in the modern Montenegrin society in the late eighties and early nineties, which is evidenced by epistemological verifications of religiosity.

A Brief Comparative Overview of Gender and Religiosity

While researching the religiosity, especially religious orthodoxy and orthopraxy, the gender differences differentiated. Namely, almost all previous studies have shown differences in religiosity on the gender basis. Alan Miller directs us to some of these studies, informing us of a higher percentage of women's religiosity, i.e. greater women's interest for religion, greater women's devotion to religion, women go to the church (liturgy or mass) more often, they pray and read Bible more frequently than men. The author informs us that religious distance on the gender basis is constantly retained throughout life.

On the other hand, some relevant studies warn us that there is no statistically significant distance in religiosity on the basis of gender – men are almost equally religious as women, and that questions the hypothesis that the gender distance in religiosity is constant throughout the life. Grace Davie directs us, for example, towards the study where men's care for children rises them to the women's level of religiosity (Toni Walter & Grace Davie, 1998).

The situation is similar with the other so-called "hard" indicators which are typical of the sociological methodology of study on religiosity. Consequently, some studies that examined the religiosity on the basis of the indicator which refers to the faith in God, come to the conclusion that on the basis of these indicators there is no significant difference between men and women (R. Bassett, S. Miller, K. Anstey, 1990: 73–81).

According to the studies of the Franciscan Institute for Culture in Croatia, on the overall population (Anic, 2008), and according to the indicator of self-assessment of religiosity, 84.9% of women and 70.1% of men declared religious, while accordingly, more men than women considered themselves non-religious: 25.7% to 12.3% of women, and 4.2% of men and 2.8% of women declared themselves self-assured atheists. According to the same study, women daily pray outside religious services more than men. 48.1% of women and 26.0% of men take part in Sunday prayer, and 16.3% of women and 10.5% of men pray more than once a week. The conclusion of this research is that it is possible to determine the statistical difference between men and women[2] within the scope of religiosity, but sex differences as a prerequisite for the differences in religiosity are not a stable constant, since the differenc-

[2] Some studies in Croatia show a higher level of religiosity between men and women, giving priority to female gender in religiosity (Zrinscak, Crpic, 2000; Crpic, Kusar, 2003; Marinovic – Jerolimov, 2004).

es on the basis of gender disappear in some situations. According to some studies in Croatia, there is almost no difference between men and women aged from 18 to 24 when we talk about going to Mass, while that difference slightly increases in the older generation (Crpic, Biscan, 2000).

When it comes to Serbia, according to the studies (Djordjevic, 1984) we have selected the following indicators of religiosity: self-declaration of religiosity, faith in God, going to church and liturgy. We will connect these indicators with the variables which are related to the gender (sex of the respondents). According to the above mentioned study, 30% of all female respondents and about 17% of male respondents declared religious. When it comes to variables which are related to the faith in God, according to Djordjevic's research, 23% of all female respondents and 12% of male respondents express faith in God. Visiting the church and Sunday service are a religious duty, the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church especially insist on that. According to the same research, the frequency of going to church was less than 1, thus the author did not consider it, with a statement that the respondent who regularly went to church was female, elderly, illiterate, etc. When it comes to liturgy, women are more regular than men, 8.8% of women in relation to 4.5% of men.

The study from 2008 (European Values Study) indicates that now we can talk about the revitalization of religion. The studies show that even the gender distance has been reduced in terms of religiosity. Hence, two and a half decades later, religious situation is quite different, gender differences tend to equalization. If we have seen from the previous research that the women bear the greatest burden of religiosity, it is very difficult to differentiate who is more religious – men or women in the modern period. Of all female respondents included in a sample from 2008, 89% of women declared religious, while that result is 81% when it comes to male respondents. By a careful analysis we can see that the result of women's religiosity is almost three times higher, and the result of men's religiosity almost five times higher. The consensus about confessional religiosity of the population is almost equally distributed between both genders.

When it comes to the indicators which are related to belief in God, according to the studies from 2008, the result varies in relation 89%:80% in favour of the women. On the basis of the indicator of going to church and according to the above mentioned study, religiosity situation is quite different from the study in 1984. Namely, the frequency of going to church is almost equal both for men and women.

Research Strategy

The indicators of religiosity, in the narrow sense of the word, such as religious self-identification, faith in God, belief in life after biological death, are considered more reliable indicators of religiosity than confessional

identification or confessional practice. Indicators that relate to religious self-identification and belief in some eschatological postulates should reveal a special relationship with religion. On the other hand, confessional identification and orthopraxy (attending religious ceremonies) could be more socially determined and conformistically conditioned indicators of religiosity[3]. Our research strategy is to cross the population's gender structure with some qualitative indicators which conditions a comparative analysis of religiosity. Firstly, we will try to create an insight into whether there was erosion or increase in religiosity of the population's gender structure in the period from 1989 to 2013, taking into account the process of social transition that was going on at that time at different levels and intensity. Secondly, we will try to detect and isolate the possibility of coming to an increase or erosion of the gender distance when it comes to religiosity. Thirdly, our intention is to determine whether there is an increase, decrease or stabilization of religiosity on the basis of the population's gender structure.

The first study was carried out within the project *Social Structure and Quality of Life in 1989*. The sample was created by a multistage cluster design, starting from municipalities, settlements and households. 958 respondents represented the sample in Montenegro. Out of that, 686 of the respondents were male and 272 female. The next study was carried out in 2003 within the project South East European Social Survey (SEESSP). The sample included 1849 respondents from the area of Montenegro. Furthermore, the study from 2000, related to the study of religiosity on the territory of Montenegro, was presented by Milos Besic and Borislav Djukanovic in the book *Gods and People*. The study covered 646 respondents. The ratio between men and women in the sample is 51%:49%, which is considered entirely relevant for the analysis. Finally, the study from 2013 was carried out on youth population aged 16–27, also on the territory of Montenegro. The study included 558 respondents.

The Results of Comparative Analysis

Religious Self-Assessment as an Indicator of Religiosity

The assessment of religiosity on the basis of religious self-assessment is quite general and synthetic indicator. Empirical evidence often records a high score of religious persons, when it comes to this indicator (Бакрач; Благоевич, 2016). When it comes to religiosity, the respondent can also consider some elements which are not strictly the elements of a religious content. Certainly, a cautious and systematic approach is necessary! The measurement of religiosity on the basis of religious self-identification belongs to a group of the most used indicators in sociological studies of religiosity.

[3] http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199588961.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199588961-e-013

Table 1. **Religious self-identification**

Variables	Convinced believer	Religious	Uncertain	Indifferent	Non-religious	Opponent of religion	Total
Social structure and quality of life 1989 in %							
Male	2,2	12,4	10,5	19,1	48,4	6,9	100,0
Female	5,5	22,4	11,4	16,5	38,6	5,5	100,0
χ^2= 26,8; df= 6; p =,000							
South East European Social Survey (SEESSP) 2003 in %							
Male	35,4	19,6	19,2	7,0	18,0	1,1	100,0
Female	41,4	19,3	22,3	3,2	13,4	0,6	100,0
χ^2=16,3; df = 5; p =,006							

The obtained results unambiguously refer to the statement that religious self-identification, as a qualitative indicator of religiosity in two measurements which were carried out, is quite ambivalent. Also, these indicators refer to a gradual consistency, i.e. reducing the difference between the values of these two unchangeable variables. In both of these studies, women are more religious than men, but it is expected that in some further studies gender differences would be reduced. Certainly, it is necessary for the data analysis, to emphasize that the first research was carried out in Socialist Montenegro. Here, in fact, it is about the period where the traces of systematically directed atheization of the population are still maintained alive. We should not neglect the fact that statistical significance is noticeable in both studies. The level of significance is $p < 0.01$ in both studies. In the study from 1989, regarding the question of religious self-identification, 14.6% of men and 27.9% of women considered themselves religious. In this study, the distance between men and women who declared to be religious is 13.3%, although it still remains significant to a certain extent. In the study from 2003, 55.0% of religious men and 60.7% of religious women were registered. The significance is still present, but the distance in religiosity is reduced to 5.7%. We can draw a similar conclusion in the group non-religious, where we can detect a reduction in distance in the comparative analysis of these two studies. The difference in relation to non-religiosity slowly ranges from 11.2% to 5.1%.

The study, which was carried out in 2000, also detects an increase in religiosity compared to 1989, as well as a reduction in distance between the males and females.

Table 2. **Religiosity from 2000**

	Low level	Medium level	High level	Total
Male	19,9	58,6	21,5	50,9
Female	21,7	55,4	22,9	49,1

Besic and Djukanovic, 2000.

From table 2 we can see that there are no significant deviations when it comes to gender of the respondents, concerning the level of religiosity. The difference in a high level of religiosity of 1.4% in favour of women cannot be considered significant. However, this study records a reduced gender distance at the level of about 2%.

The research that we present in table 3 shows a quite egalitarian distribution of religiosity in relation to the population's gender structure.

Table 3. **Religious self-identification from 2013**

Gender	Religious	Indifferent	Non-religious	Subsample
Male	82,4	12,8	4,9	49,0
Female	80,7	9,8	9,5	51,0
χ^2=13,246; df=5; p=,021				

Bakrac, 2013.

The level of significance in self-assessment of religiosity is $p < 0.02$. A higher percentage of male religiosity in relation to female is detected, but the percentage is almost equalized which can be analyzed as a kind of a trend in the world, and the crisis of everyday life equally affects both genders. The turning point in religiosity represents a kind of surprise. Namely, the previous studies give priority to female population in relation to male population concerning religiosity and the distance changed over time. By this study we obtained the data that the difference does not only disappear, but men have a slight advantage over women, at least when it comes to self-assessment of religiosity.

Belief in God as a Qualitative Indicator of Religiosity

Belief in God is, in our opinion, an important indicator of religiosity, as well as the dynamics of the movement of religion in society. Some other indicators of religiosity can be problematized, but the indicators concerning belief in God cannot. How could we imagine the religiosity of an individual or social group without believing in God? The intellectual dimension of religiosity is expressed through religious beliefs or dogmatic essence of faith. To visit the church, to perform religious ceremonies, and not to believe in dogmatic postulates, is belief without essence, and to believe in God without

visiting the church concerns the subjective way of belief. Thus, Cornell is not far from the truth when he says: "Faith, as well as speech, is a social and individual matter" (Cornell, 2002:122).

The primary aim of this paper is to comparatively analyze the belief in God of the male and female gender, and to determine whether there are variations in religiosity on the basis of this indicator. Also, it would be interesting if there is a gender distance based on the belief in this dogmatic postulate.

Table 4. **Belief in God in %**

Variables	I do not believe	I doubt	I believe
Social structure and quality of life from 1989			
Male	57,3	20,4	21,6
Female	43,0	24,6	31,6
χ^2=17,106; df=3; p=,001			
South East European Social Survey (SEESSP) from 2003			
Male	11,6	17,7	70,7
Female	4,6	17,9	77,4
χ^2=18,216; df=2; p=,000			
The study from 2013			
Male	1,9	6,6%	91,6
Female	4,2	4,2	91,6
χ^2=6,639; df=4; p=,156			

According to the above studies, the belief in God and its existence among the genders in Montenegro is very ambivalent and unexpected to some extent. The first study shows that men and women in Montenegro have a rather positive score when it comes to this dogmatic postulate. 21.6% of men and 31.6% of women responded positively to the question *Do you believe in God*, although the gender difference is at level of 10.0%, while the statistical significance is at level p <0.01. Among atheists, the male gender has advantage over the female, 57.3% in relation to 43.0%, while the gender distance is at level of 13.3%. The study from 2003, testifies to the trend of desecularization and revitalization of religion, when it comes to belief in God. 70.7% of men and 77.4% of women responded positively (they believe) to the question *Do you believe, have doubts about or do not believe in the existence of God*. These are quite expected indicators, since it is about the advanced desecularization of Montenegrin society. Although the statistical significance is at level p<0.00, this study shows a greater attachment to God of the female gender in relation to the male. In this study, the comparative analysis detects gender distance at level of 7% in two measurements which were carried out, when it comes to belief and non-belief in God. Thus, the female gender is still more religious than the male, but the distance is reduced to a lower level in comparison with the study from 1989. The third study shows

that belief in God is no longer a typical female category. This study gives evidence that the gender distance completely disappeared, so the score of men and women who believe in this dogmatic postulate is completely identical (91.6%), while the gender distance of those who do not believe or have doubts about God's existence, is at a statistically insignificant level p<0.156.

Belief in the Afterlife

Faith in the afterlife is one of the basic dogmas in monotheistic religions. Here, religion is a powerful stronghold, because one is given meaning and significance in spiritual and mental difficulties. Belief in life after death (paradise, hell), as eschatological categories, primarily have compensatory functions: the position in the other world depends on the behaviour in this life. We fully agree with the statement of Peter Berger, who claims that religiosity, in fact, implies belief in life after death and life destructions, which, as we are aware of, do not affect only the individual, but all of us. Therefore, such questions are interesting for all of us, for the entire humankind and universe. It is reasonable to say that perhaps someone does not believe in this postulate, but it is less reasonable to say that someone is not interested in it. Religion is the reality that gives significance to human insignificance. According to Berger, this is quite a powerful thought that humankind has ever had (Berger, 2004).

This is the indicator where the dissolution of dogmatic belief is quite well clarified. Namely, the score of religiosity for this type of question is always lower than for the self-assessment of religiosity and belief in God. The indicators closer to eschatology often record lower score of religiosity.

Table 5. **Belief in life after death in %**

	I do not believe	I doubt	I believe
Social structure and quality of life in 1989			
Male	81,5	11,2	6,6
Female	80,5	12,9	5,9
χ^2=0,613; df=3; p=,893			
South East European Social Survey (SEESSP) from 2003			
Male	31,2	21,2	47,6
Female	29,2	27,5	43,4
χ^2=5,906; df=2; p=,052			

The table 5 shows the religiosity of respondents on the basis of indicators concerning the belief in life after death. The study from 1989 registers a very high percentage of the respondents (both genders) who do not believe in this dogmatic postulate. It is interesting that men and women showed egalitarian proportion of belief in afterlife: 6.6%:5.9%. Statistical significance is at

level p <0.893. However, later studies show a considerably different condition. Namely, the study from 2003 detects significantly plausible religiosity of men and women when it comes to belief in the afterlife. This study records 47.6% of men and 43.4% of women who declared themselves to believe in life after death, while the male gender showed as slightly more religious than women, the statistical significance is at level p <0.052. In a superficial analysis, we can note that in both studies, men and women showed quite consistent attitude towards the afterlife.

In the study from 2013, we detected the egalitarian attitude of the gender towards this eschatological postulate. Namely, 36.0% of men and 32.0% of women believe in life after death. Here, we can notice a slight distance between the genders, so it can be concluded that belief in life after death is no longer a typical female category. The distance at level of 4% gives a slight advantage to the male population. Also, the previous two studies did not show a significant gender distance when it comes to belief in life after biological death.

Conclusion

In this paper based on the studies from 1989 to 2003, we wanted to show the results of the research, but also to check what direction does the religiosity of the population's gender structure in former Yugoslav republics take. Besides, we set up three specific hypotheses that we wanted to examine in this comparative analysis. We discuss some empirical indicators, not pretending that we said everything about the gender's religiosity. "We can never encompass everything in one glance. Only if you are God" (Maalouf, 2013), and Saul Bellow continues: "I am a great believer in the power of an unfinished work to keep you alive" (Bellow, 2001).

As for the first question, we consider that it is impossible to precisely determine the dynamics of religiosity of the respondents' gender structure on the basis of several sociological indicators of religiosity. The used indicators detect the fact that it came to plausible increase in religiosity, especially in comparison with the study from 1989. Although some indicators oriented in an eschatological manner (life after death) and some studies (2003) have statistically significant values. The overall impression leads to the fact that it came to an increase in religiosity of men and women in all the republics. With the risk of excessive glorifying the obvious trend, for now we are more inclined to conclusion that the dynamics of religiosity of the male and female gender is in effect. A general conclusion would be that religiosity on the basis of the population's gender structure went through different phases, but men and women are now at a high level of religiosity, that is, a lower level of secularization.

The study from 1989, regarding the religiosity and gender distance, gives evidence that depending on the indicators, the gender distance is about 15%.

However, the transition period made later studies detect insignificant differences between men and women. How to explain the increase, stability, and trend of the egalitarian religious condition in these periods? In our opinion, there are several reasons for this. Primarily, it is about an area that suffered a collapse of the social state, followed by the material insecurity, which in our opinion affected both genders. We should not ignore the fact that some republics were affected by war, which, of course, caused the increase in religiosity, especially of the male population. Ethno-nationalism, ethnophyletism, combined with the population's religious illiteracy, additionally emphasized the sense of belonging to one's own religion, which could lead to an increase in religiosity. Finally, the breakdown of socialism, as a kind of civil religion, could cause a tendency or the return of population to traditional religions. Therefore, the difference in religiosity of men and women moves towards egalitarianism. We can conclude that the egalitarian trend of religiosity of the population's gender structure is in force. In this comparative review, we conclude that the gender differences in religiosity from 1989 become an exception in comparison with the later studies that detect the erosion of gender distance, which is common in sociological studies of religiosity in the European countries (Davie, 2005, 93).

Finally, the comparative analysis shows that it came to an increase in religiosity, and that certain stability is currently in effect. This is supported by the experimental data from 2003.

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DESECULARITZATION, NATIONAL STATE AND THE RISE OF RIGHT OF POLITICAL MOVEMENT

Abstract: Desecularization is the multilayered and the multifaceted concept. Around his determination created substantial differences exist, both among researchers and religion among people who are religious or atheists. In the most general sense, it means a return to religion (and religion) and its increasing importance to the individual, social collectivities, institutions and the state. One of the more general attitudes is that desecularization not uniform, unambiguous and reversible process. It is influenced by numerous political, historical, cultural and other factors. The paper analyzes the relationship between secularization, the nation and the nation-state in Europe today. In this way, explains the essence of the social, political, cultural and religious climate in which they arise, and strengthen right political movements. The conditions for their operation are different in some religious communities, and they themselves often use religious issues such values for that fight (or they oppose). The author, in a nutshell, is the essence of the ideology of the social movements, their relationship to the nation-state and European integration. The emphasis is on the political right compared to the dominant religions and confessions, as well as new forms of expression of religious fundamentalism and political intolerance. The conclusion is that religious exclusivity encourages the rise of the right, and it was further strengthened.

Key words: desecularization, Europe, the nation-state, the political right, conflicts.

Introduction

At the center of sociological analysis is the social, cultural and historical climate in which the processes of return to religion and religion, the decline of the national state (state-nation) and the rise and strengthening of the right political movements in today's Europe are taking place. These processes are interconnected, and here, in brief, they describe and explain their most important dimensions. Processes of return to religion and religion are important for understanding the diversity of forms of religious practice of citizens, which under current conditions are exposed to many global and local influences. Among them, the globalization of economics, cultures and societies in general is of particular importance, with all the

consequences for the life of the individual and social groups. One of the most important trends is the conflict of globalization and regionalization with national and local, which results in changes in the functions of the national state and religion in general.

The relationship between them is very complex, so it is necessary to take into account all the specificities of the environment in which processes of desecuelization, globalization and. weakening national state. The paper makes an effort to point out the basic social, historical and cultural causes that have contributed, among other things, to the strengthening of the right political movements and parties. In everyday life, this is reflected in all the existing xenophobia, intolerance, Islamophobia, racism and violence among members of different religions, confessions and religious communities (and atheists). The current global economic crisis and the migrant crisis all complicated it further and gave their seal. The author starts from the view that it is necessary to have a better knowledge of different religions and cultures in order to understand and tolerate the attitudes and behavior of Christians, Muslims, members of other religions and citizens who do not have them differently. On the case of Europe, the most important problems that they encounter can be noticed.

1. Desecularization in Europe

There are many definitions of the term desecularization. Researchers of religion, but also ordinary citizens, under this term, mean different contents. They are often contradictory, and sometimes under the same term, the same content is implied. Of course, there is also diversity in terms that denote the essence of desecularization. Let's just mention the return of religion (and religion), the revival of religion, the work of art and others. This is where the ideas of some of the most influential authors in this field are missing.

Disagreements over the assessment of the start, dynamics, and dimensions of this concept have not yet been seriously resolved. The consequence is that the return to religion is linked to different periods of social and economic development, although there are cases when it relates to the beginning of the 1990s. (Vrcan 1999; Blagojević 2005). This also depends on what the main attention of the researchers is focused on and on what space. The result is that there are desecularization studies in Europe, but also in other regions of the world (Berger 2008). Some of them relate to religion in general, as a form of social consciousness and an element of culture. The other deal with only some elements of religion, ranging from church institutions to specific religious practice of individuals and social groups. There are those who are trying to synthesize theoretical and empirical analyses in this field in a fruitful way. It is rarer than it prevails among authors who study religion, religious practice, and even desecularization.

It is important to note that there are disagreements among the researchers of religion about whether the secularization process is irreversible, or not.[1] Authors who dealt with changes since 1989 emphasized that there are clear tendencies of returning religion and religion and the "world". Those who study religion in other environments (as in the United States) have pointed to the revival of religion in other forms, that is, in the emergence and spread of new religious movements. In any case, it can be said that there is a diversity of the manifestation of religious practice, but also the conclusions were drawn by those who study it. In this work, the polarization refers to the return to religion and religious practice that takes different forms in different environments and which are not once and for all given. This is influenced, inter alia, by numerous historical, cultural, social, political and specific religious factors. One of the most general and most influential processes that contribute to and changes in this area is the process of globalization. Moreover, a review of de-education in Europe makes it easier for the researcher to better understand the social and cultural climate in which other social processes take place. Among them, there is an increasingly significant strengthening and the rise of the right political movements.

On the basis of the above, it follows that it is necessary to be careful in every research of religion, i. it is important that in the analysis the author devotes himself to the general and special characteristics of this phenomenon in the context of the humble environment in which it exists. One is researching the same processes in regions and countries that have undergone modernization processes (Western type, for example). It is completely different when it comes to societies that have developed in other models of development, or belong to other cultures and civilizations. It is precisely Europe that differs considerably from patterns of socio-economic development and religious processes from others, such as regions dominated by Islam, for example. Any overlooking of their specificity and the difference leads to unilateral conclusions about the characteristics of social and religious opportunities in them.

Europe is characterized by, among other things, the fact that, since the French Revolution (1789), it has entered the path of secession of the church and state and the definition of secularism or laicism. This is particularly dominant in France. In the Constitution of 1905, it has legalized the independence of the church from the state and vice versa. These provisions and dans apply. In everyday practice, there are many examples when the state reached for measures that are contrary to those provisions of the constitution. This seems, among other things, through the education system, but also by strengthening repression and applying physical force to citizens

[1] See more about the conceptualization of the secularization as uncertin, variable and reversible process in the papers of the following authors: Blagojević M. (2005; 2015), Vrcan S. (1999), Radisavljević-Ćiparizović D. (2006; 2016).

belonging to certain ethnic and religious groups. In other countries of Europe, the church-state relationship is different. They are diverse in a religious sense. According to the model he proposed, there can be different groups of states, which differ in each other from the degree of widespreadness of certain religions and confessions (Davie 2005). In any case, it is important to bear in mind that Europe inherits both the Christian, dominating, and Islamic religious tradition and practice. Any attempt to analyze a religion that does not take this into account leads to unilateral conclusions about actual processes and events in specific environments.

2. Globalization and the national state

The nation-state has lost a significant number of roles during the contemporary (neoliberal) globalization of capitalism. This is completely opposite to the international system established by the Westphalian Treaty (1648). According to him, the rightness of the nation-states, their independence, sovereignty, the right of nations to self-determination, is recognized, All national states are All national states are sovereign, equal, irrespective of the size and degree of economic and social National state is the main bearer of the sovereignty of nations, protection of citizens in a certain territory, where he applies laws and uses military force. Since then, the foundations of this system have been violated, and many countries have become victims of its collapse. Clearly, "strong" and "weak" countries can be distinguished. SURVEY The inequalities between in economic, political and military power, they are more pronounced today than ever before. While the former has the power to impose their rules on sovereignty (economic, political, monetary, territorial…) and protect their "national" interests, others have mentioned the sovereignty and rights of preserving vital interests severely compromised by the former. For such a functioning of modern capitalism, there are different justifications, which are often quite opposite to most of the adopted international and national laws and rules.

Globalization itself is against the nation-state, because capital is ruining and endangering its foundations and boundaries. Only if a "strong" national state stands behind it is a means of realizing the interests of the most powerful states and supranational communities, institutions and associations. These are the states of the capitalist center, with all their economic, political and military power. When they decide to protect their interests, they do not hesitate either from military interventions, violent changes of power in other countries, and ignore the most important provisions of international law. Victims are almost powerless to resist it more seriously, and when they do so, they are often forced to renounce part of their national sovereignty and identity. All this is followed by the growth of inequality in and between states and regions, in particular social fragmentation in weak states of the capitalist periphery. They are fueled by ethnic and religious conflicts,

which further create the focuses of the social and political crisis. This often leads to the disintegration of society and the state, the creation of zones of long-term conflicts of warring parties, some of which are supported from the outside by the most powerful capitalist countries. There are numerous local and "indirect" wars, and the price of which is mostly paid to the citizens of the state who is the victim of such actions.

In essence, wars are just one of the harshest means of protecting the interests of the capitalist class, and without them, processes of desuverenization of weak national states are carried out on a daily basis in various areas. The likelihood that ethnic, religious and class conflicts will take place is greater if the position of the state is more important in the geostrategic distribution of military, political and economic power. Therefore, the biggest wars and conflicts are now taking place in areas rich in raw materials and minerals, or are important for domination and control on the strategic routes of transport of the most important fuels and raw materials. In the 21st century, control of water resources has become increasingly important, and this is also an important factor in the emergence of new conflicts and wars. Some of them are also "indirect", i.e. In addition to the local causes of the conflict, the warring parties are directly encouraged by powerful forces from outside. These are "indirect wars", involving powerful states, international institutions, and organizations, supranational and regional economic and military alliances.

In all this, multinational companies play a major role, as their interests have merged with the interests of the capitalist class at the national and supranational level of decision-making. Transnational companies (TNC) control most of the world's trade, imports and exports, high-tech products, and (un) legally and (un) legitimately finance political campaigns in the most powerful countries in the world. These interests could not be realized that large capital has no control over the most important institutions of the world monetary system and important international decision-making institutions (IMF, WTO, OECD, UN, G-20, and others). The collapse of the sovereignty of national states is preceded by numerous actions, among which the economic and financial weakening of the state is emphasized. Under the control of private interests and the aforementioned TNCs, the most important lenders, such as the IMF and SB, impose their interests and capital gains virtually lead the state to debt slavery.

To justify this, a neoliberal ideology serves, which is essentially the so-called. Washington consensus. Its basis is the withdrawal of the state from economic life, deregulation, liberalization, reduction of customs barriers, free flow of goods and capital, reduction of the public sector and accelerated privatization. This recipe was used by the IMF and the World Bank, in the same way, producing new areas and regions dependent on financial institutions and the most developed capitalist countries. This, as a rule, resulted in the rise in unemployment, poverty and inequality among citizens.

Deindustrialization itself meant destroying the material basis of society and the working class, greater dependence on foreign investment, loss of economic sovereignty. In Serbia: "deindustrialization has led to the collapse of the largest part of the working class, as workers have lost their jobs. Poverty, mass unemployment, greater exploitation and social inequalities have come to them" (Новаковић 2016: 749). It led to: Demodernization of the society and weaking of all social movements, including the trade union movement, occurred as consequnces of deindustrialization (Obradović, Novaković 2015:274). Dejan Mirovic's findings on the changes in the economic and social structure in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that joined the EU after 1989 have shown that they all increased external debt, unemployment, poverty, and reduced the population and material basis for the adoption of a national development policy. (Mirović 2013).

Research by world-renowned economists has proven that most of the economies that have been rapidly evolving over the course of 25 years have escaped such a fate. They have avoided the services of these institutions, renounced the excessive market freedom and more used domestic financing. They did not resort to deregulation, liberalization and quick and general privatization, especially public goods. Moreover, these countries underestimated the domestic currency, protected their economy with higher customs, invested more in public services (education, health, science) and had a nationally loyal and dedicated ruling elite. By contrast, most transition countries and "weak" national states did not escape the influence of pseudo-financial institutions. In the region, only Hungary seriously opposed the services of the IMF, and the resistance of Slovenia lasted only until 2004. Members of the Commission for Growth and Development concluded that there is no single recipe for accelerated economic development, and the fastest growing economies of the world did not apply the most important elements of a neo-liberal doctrine (Душанић 2011).

Among the most important consequences of the neoliberal globalization of capitalism the growth of economic and social inequalities, mass unemployment and poverty of citizens. According to Branko Milanovic's research, economic inequalities in the world today are higher than before the global crisis, both among the most developed countries and underdeveloped countries, and within each of them. The place of birth determines with two weights the income of an individual and only 20% of the class and family affiliation of the family. Jozef Stiglic emphasized the causes and dimensions of the growth of inequality in the United States: "One percent of the richest Americans account for a quarter of the national income. If instead of income we consider wealth, one percent of the richest people control 40 percent of total wealth" (Stiglic, 2015: 93). The average salary of workers is at the level of thirty years ago. Therefore Stiglic called that capitalism "surrogate capitalism" because it socializes debts while privatizing the profit (Stiglic 2015:98, 99). Toma Piketty pointed to trends in inequality

in the long run on the example of the US, France and the United Kingdom. The increase in income from labor was in favor of the growth of income inequities in favor of the richest, while the purchasing power of employee salaries grew slower by 2010. (Piketi 264, 269, 312, 313). The said countries are important for making the most important decisions in the EU, but also in NATO and the world. Recent Eurostat data confirm the trend of inequality in the distribution of income in the EU. Namely, inequality of income is wider, and the top 20% of the top income pyramid has a 5.9-fold higher income than the 20% of the poorest in the EU. In Serbia, this ratio is even higher, amounting to 9.2: 1! (*Vreme*, 19 June 2015). There remains an open question for further analysis of the extent to which these inequalities in Serbia are due to the "crowning" of national sovereignty and the influence of the "international community", especially the functioning of financial institutions (IMF, WB) and the dynamics of government borrowing.

Of course, financial borrowing is just one dimension of the weakening of the nation-state. It is preceded or followed by political, military, cultural, religious, and ethnic "desuverenization", which often leads to the loss of identity of individuals, social groups and wider collectivities. Serbia is an example of a country whose ruling elites highlight the goal of joining the EU. It is therefore important to point out the most important dimensions of the crisis of the European Union itself, which is a natural consequence of the neoliberal globalization of capitalism.

For the emergence of the EU, not only were the important economic interests of the founder countries, but also the needs and interests of the strongest capitalist power of the world (USA) to strengthen its political, economic and military influence in Europe and the world after the Second World War. Therefore, they strongly encouraged its creation, but also control it all the time in the most important aspects of development (especially military through NATO). The general direction of the development of the EU over the past six decades has been a sign of globalization at the regional level and the neoliberal development of the last few decades. This means that in the structure of this community, the principle of protecting the interests of the most powerful states of the Center is realized at the expense of less developed countries, especially those on its semi-product. At the time of the global crisis of capitalism, this is expressed every day as a conflict of vital interests of powerful and powerless members, centers and peripheries, the north and south, the developed west and the poor East, financially powerful states and indebted states. Monetary policy is in the center of conflict of interest, both in the euro-zone and in other EU member states. Subsequently, conflicts of interest are compounded at the level of fiscal, economic and regional development policies, institution building and management systems, and all decisions in the field of national and regional security policy. These problems are deepened after 2008. The EU has been "influenced by globalization and the global economic crisis by the influence of the IMF, WB and

USA" (Новаковић 2016: 279). The current intercontinental migrant crisis has contributed to this. One of the consequences is the rise and strengthening of the right political movements

On the socio-political map of the EU, the most developed and powerful countries are distinguished, such as Germany and Great Britain. The first is the importance of the geopolitical and historical circumstances of the Second World War for the United States, in all its ways, as a "piot state", SOURCE important for the preservation of the interests of the most powerful force in the world. The other, as the former colonial power, remained an important factor in world politics, but also one of the most important allies of the United States. It got the same role as Germany. They are at the same time the most developed EU member states. Through them, the interests of the global capital of the less developed countries in and outside of this regional community are imposed. The most plausible example of this is Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, which are directed by policies and measures of European and world financial institutions. These countries are the biggest victims of the EU's neoliberal development and its institutional, legitimacy, democratic, demographic, political, moral and security crisis. They are at the periphery of the EU, the role of which is further impoverished, with the aim of further strengthening the power and wealth of the countries of the center of the region and the world. They are still in a difficult situation with countries aiming to join the European Union. This is also indicated by the processes of deepening economic and social inequalities in the center and at the periphery of the EU, but also unemployment and poverty. It is precisely this proof that this is a "globalization of poverty" as a logical consequence of neoliberal capitalist globalization (Despotović, Đurić 2016: 85).

Every effort to create a single EU in the economic, political, social, cultural and security sense faces systemic obstacles. They are in the foundations of the EU, the way this regional community emerged. Moreover, it is characterized by a profound contradiction between the foundations on which it is based, the goals it is dedicated to, or proclaimed by them, and the actual way of functioning. On the one hand, unity, democratic decision-making, multiculturalism, protection of human rights, harmonization of the interests of all members have been proclaimed, while on the other there is a deficit of legitimacy and democracy, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious diversity that is seriously undermined. Namely, a multitude of national, religious, political, territorial, collective and individual identities are increasingly confronting and revealing the systemic crisis of the EU. This crisis is only one form of manifesting the crisis of the capitalist system as such.

The most important decisions in the EU are not brought to the central institutions, but through (un) formal decision-making in the strongest states, among which the first place is occupied by Germany. These interests are essentially aligned with the interests of the US and NATO, so deciding in the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Council

is more protocol and formal than real. The relationship between these institutions is often incompatible, and the legitimacy and democratic nature of the decisions they make are controversial. Namely, at the EU level, there is no institution of decision-making directly and democratically elected by EU citizens. Decision making is indirect, at a national level, displaced to a regional one. Hence its illegitimacy and undemocratic nature. In addition, there is a pronounced disparity in the influence and decision-making rights between big and small countries, old and newcomers. The principle of "one citizen is one voice" is not applied, but it is a formal and real imposition of the interests of the most populous and powerful countries to others. The work is "indirect democracy" or "façade democracy", in which the worst are "weak states".

The self-proclaimed value of the EU peace project is drastically denied by military and other interventions on the soil of Europe and the world, involving EU members (in particular Germany, France, Holland and Britain). The EU is against all forms of discrimination, and in everyday practice it behaves quite the opposite. It also cares little about the solidarity within this regional community. The best proof of this is the conflicting interests between the indebted countries and those who are not, and are the fate of the first (Greece and Germany for example). Pledge for a strong social state has long been a dead letter on paper. In Europe, the EU and the world, for many decades, the so-called "welfare state". With the global economic crisis, the unified capitalist class makes it all the more difficult and in various ways. In addition, the EU is incapable of ensuring the security of its citizens, and by participating in NATO actions illegally and permanently violates the security and national sovereignty of many countries in the world. Some researchers link the EU crisis with events known as the "Arab Spring" (Gajić 2016: 79).

There is also an internal process of "crowning" the sovereignty of a nation-state. It manifests itself, among other things, in lowering decision-making to lower local and regional as well as cross-border levels of decision-making. They are multi-national imposed by the "Brussels administration" and the world's financial and political organizations (STO, WB, UN). There are more than 50,000 classic bureaucrats in Brussels, who lobby for the interests of a large world, primarily financial, capital, on a daily basis. They do this in various ways, but mostly in favor of globalized capital. Even the UN officially and formally agreed that multinational companies have the right to influence beyond the borders of the nationalized countries of globalized capital. Behind them stands the national state, economically and militarily strong, making it easier for them to act on the world market or affecting them so that they can maximally exploit the dependent economies of the periphery of the system. Justification is always found, even if it was the protection of national interests of strong states and the defense of democracy and human rights.

The ideology of human rights, as well as multiculturalism, serve to justify the existing power relations and protect the interests of the richest countries in the world and even in the European Union. In the name of this, the applicable international norms are violated, and all nations and regions are subjugated. Events in North Africa, the Middle East of Syria and Central Asia have been largely created and assisted by the most influential NATO and EU members. In the interests of profit and large capital, "humanitarian" military interventions, promote ethnic, religious, regional and other conflicts. This is not foreign either to Europe, which by the bombing of the FR of Yugoslavia in 1999 violated the most basic principles of international law and basic human rights, and helped the processes of further fragmentation and disintegration of this country. What followed in other parts of the world is just a continuation of such a policy, largely created by the United States, with its most powerful allies in Europe, Britain and Germany.

In the majority of members of this regional community, the right, as well as extreme, political movements and parties have come to an end. Even before the onset of the global crisis, they existed, but they strengthened it, and some just formed. Some of them have had a long history that dates back to World War II (the National Front in France). Others were created later. There are those who formed a few years ago (PEGIDA or Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Western world in Germany, created in 2014). In many cases, such movements have become more extreme, as has been shown in the current migration crisis. They all acted and acted at a certain stage of their development inside and outside the institutions of the system. The rise in the political scene after 2012 is visible, both at the national and European level of decision-making. Such a thing would not have been possible, at least in such proportions, that the European left did not collapse for decades. The causes of this are both national and regional and global.[2]

3. The rise and consequences of the functioning of the right political movements in Europe

The rise of the right political movements in the world has facilitated several systemic and structural factors. More systemic and structural factors that facilitated the rise and rise of right political movements and parties. In Europe, the global economic crisis of capitalism and related inequalities and poverty, the changed attitude of the power of the main players to the geostrategic map of the world, and the crisis of the national state in the EU and beyond are highlighted by importance. These are the basic incentives

[2] According to Neven Cvetićanin: "… in France, Britain and Germany the left-wing left-wing situation against the right, and there is a visible conflict between the center and the margin, which begins to dominate the political field." In: Cvetićanin N. (2008), *Epoha s one strane levice i desnice*, Služeni glasnik & Institut društvenih nauka. Beograd: 509, 510

for reviving right-wing ideas and increasing right-wing movements. Many of them changed the tactics and forms of their actions, adapted to the new social conditions. Others emerged during the global economic crisis and experienced rapid success. The current migrant crisis has further strengthened them in this endeavor, and they are all more solid and more inclined to perform together. This is seen by the most important attitudes of their ideology, as well as everyday performances at the local, regional and European level of action. Here are the most basic elements of their ideology, i.e. the values they are fighting for. Then, briefly, the most influential political genuine movements in some European countries are clarified. Finally, the characteristics of the social groups to which they are addressing are more and more. They also point to the way in which they work in and outside the national states, the means they serve in order to achieve their goals and the most important political and social consequences of their ascent.

The basic values at the center of political programs and the actual functioning of the right political movements are the following: anti-globalism and Euroscepticism, return to national state and security, racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, the preservation of Christian faith and European culture, against migrants and all other minorities and ethnicities. There are also special requirements arising from specific national and local environments, which in the new conditions are highlighted in the foreground. Of course, it is illusory to expect the existence of a unique and consistent political program of the right political movements. As a rule, they adapt to newly emerging opportunities, and change or mitigate the radical goals of their parties, in order to formulate similarly, and sometimes even more radical ones, in new circumstances. On this occasion, we will focus on the most influential right political movements in Europe.

The National Front in France has existed for decades. Its founder and a man who for decades was his leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, put the party in the foundations of the party for extremely conservative values such as. His daughter, and the current leader, Marine Le Pen, changed some of the basic goals and in time adjusted the tactics of action at the national and European levels. Among her demands are, among others, advocacy for return to decision-making at the national level, the abolition of EU institutions, the ban on the arrival of migrants, and especially Muslims. Hence her commitment to return to national culture and values. In the heat of political struggle to win the best possible position in the structure of political power, Marine Le Pen stated: My goal is to destroy the European Union – not Europe." (*Vestinet*, 21 December, 2015). Regarding her efforts to occupy a better place in the political system, the argument for migrants does not have enough jobs for the French. The National Socialist Party's biggest success was achieved in local elections in France in 2014 when it won 25% of voters' votes. (Stojiljković 2014: 144). The rise in the political power rank continued with the entry of the National Front into the European Parliament.

There, a group of right-wing movements of the EU became the largest political group. At the French National Front, the National Front took a high place, and Marine Le Pen won every fourth vote of elected voters in the presidential election.

Viktor Orban is Hungary's prime minister and leader of the right-wing Fides party. In addition, there is an extreme right-wing party (Jobik, the leader is Gabor Vona) with radical racist and professorial attitudes. During the migration crisis, Orban clearly stressed the need to prevent the arrival of migrants from the Middle East, North Africa and Asia. He pointed to the greatest weaknesses of the EU: the absence of democratic decision-making, the power of informal decision-making by Germany and France, the inability to protect its own members of the community and its citizens, and the great dependence of the EU on the decisions of powerful states of the world. Their concrete decisions during the migrant crisis, the need to protect national interests, Christianity, European culture and Europe in general. His statements and political moves came across different echoes. The most influential EU leaders condemned him, and a significant number of new EU members (the so-called Visegrad Group) supported him and approved his behavior. The great dissatisfaction of European leaders caused Viktor Orban's decision to organize a referendum on migrants (early October 2016). Out of all voters, 39.9% came out of the referendum, and 98.2 out of 98 voted against the migrants. For the success of the referendum, it was necessary to have 50% plus one voter at the polls. Although no positive decision was made, the referendum showed that the Hungarian society was deeply divided and a relatively large influence (B92 October 2, 2016).

Right political movements and parties in Austria have a long tradition. On the one hand, those who originated from the second world war. On the other, younger parties and political groups, who have become more active in the social and political scene of Austria in recent years. Particularly interesting is that, at the beginning of the migrant crisis, Austria had a benevolent attitude towards the newcomers. Public and massive welcome rallies, all in the name of humanism and respect for human rights. As migrations became more massive, and Orban's policy sharper and more exclusive to them, the position of the official representatives of Austria changed. Foreign ministers' councils (Christian Kurz) have come to the conclusion that migrants are not allowed to enter the European mainland and that reception centers for migrants are created in northern Africa (Libya). Like Hungary and Austria, Schengen has suffered and some of the EU's basic values (freedom of movement for people, for example). On the political scene in Austria, the most conservative views were made by the Austrian Liberal Party leader Hans Christian Strahan. He advocated the abolition of the EU and the return to the values of the national state. It is interesting that the influence of the right movements is relatively high, such that the symbolic

majority in the presidential election of 2016 won their opponent's candidacy (Norbert Hofer and Van der Belen).

Among the right-wing parties, Freedom is the most influential in the Netherlands, and the leader is Gert Wilders. In the first place, he emphasized anti-migrant attitudes, xenophobia and Islamophobia. The sign of the right-wing movements and parties is not exhausted. In Norway and Sweden, their influence is relatively small, and there are little representation in the parliament. ISOUS and Names All they have used the existing EU problems to emphasize the need for its abandonment and antimigrant behavior. He thinks that the UKIP UK (the UK Independent Party, Nigel Faraga's leader) has been overwhelmingly convinced that he has contributed decisively to "Brexit SOURCE. He, along with many other factors, contributed to such a result of the referendum in the UK. A special interest is that the anti-immigrant and right-wing movements in the most indebted EU members are relatively weak. In this way, they deny the belief that high indebtedness, unemployment and poverty lead directly to the strengthening of the right political movements.

Right-wing movements in Europe and right-wing leaders address most of the citizens who are disappointed with the policies of national and European elites, job losers during the global economic crisis, unemployed citizens and groups affected by austerity. If the unemployment rate is high, it focuses on the unemployed. It then emphasizes the bad attitudes of the arrival of migrants, but also of the existence of the euro as a currency. There are also other social groups who are sympathizers or right-wing voters. These are those who are against minority groups (Roma, foreigners, members of other people, ethnicity, religion and culture).

In short, the global crisis, changes in the geopolitical map of the world and the multiple crises of the European Union are the dominant incentive factors for the rise of right-wing movements and parties in Europe. They have achieved significant results at the local, national and European levels. In some countries, they entered parliament in 2012, and in 2014 they became the largest group in the European Parliament (Stojiljković 2014: 139). A significant contribution has been made by populism, used both in its day-to-day operations and in the political institutions of its countries and the European Union.

Conclusion

The text summarizes the basic interpretations of the concept of desecalization as a process that has been happening in the last few years in Europe and the world. It was pointed out the most important differences in the estimates of this process by the most influential authors. Then it was pointed out the connection between religious and other conflicts with the processes of globalization in Europe, especially in the European Union. It

was emphasized that these processes are not one-way and unambiguous and that it is necessary to take into consideration numerous determinants, from historical, cultural, religious to specific national and local. The desiccation trend in Europe is mentioned and briefly described, which has long since emphasized that the church is separated from the state. In the case of France, it has been clarified that there are significant contradictions and conflicts between the state and the church, and that the authorities use many areas and resources (from the education system to the public order and security authority) to impose their interests. In other countries, the situation is different, especially in the central and eastern European countries of the EU. Their leaders, during the current global economic crisis and mass migration to Europe, have clearly opted for racism, Euroscepticism, Islamophobia, and the strengthening of security structures at the national level.

The central part of the text is dedicated to the attitude of the globalization and national state. Then, on the example of the EU and its systemic crisis, it is shown on concrete examples. In the end, the basic social values that the right political movements and the social groups to which they are addressing are advocated. It was concluded that the rise of the right political movements was backed by the crisis of the neo-liberal model of capitalism, the altered relations of forces on the geopolitical map of the world and Europe, and mass migrations from North Africa, the Middle East, Syria, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Old and new right political parties are represented as rescuers of the most vulnerable social groups, defenders of the national state and sovereignty, protectors of Christian values and a factor that will give citizens greater prosperity than the ruling national and European elites do. Populism is the most frequently used means of persuading its own membership and potential supporters. They do it outside and through the institutional system, but now everything is more solid and more persistent. The same processes are characteristic, but to a lesser extent, in the developed Scandinavian countries, which are one of the most desirable places for the current migrants to move.

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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND RELIGIONS IN JAPAN[1]

Abstract: The official religion in Japan is Shinto (Shintoism), a specifically Japanese religion, although in this country there is a lot of influence of Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism. The largest percentage of the Japanese population belongs to the ancient Shinto religion that is oriented towards respecting nature and ancestors. It influenced the way of life, homes and gardens arrangement of the Japanese people. It has also influenced the work ethics, transferring to enterprises through loyalty, harmony, peace and silence that are desirable as the production process unfolds. In Japan, more than any other country, everything is subordinate to man, so human resources are the most significant. Great investments in human capital through education, job training and the entire philosophy of work have contributed to making Japan one of the most economically developed countries in the world and the most technologically advanced countries in the world. At the same time as it followed the path of industrial development, it encouraged the preservation of the continuity of one's own tradition, culture and belief, and thus became one of the most influential countries.

Key words: shintoism, Japan, buddhism, shrines, customs.

All we know we learned from each other.

Japanese saying

1. Shintoism – Japanese religion

Since ancient times there has been an interest among researchers (and seafarers) for Japanese history, culture and religion, and the most important sources used have been archaeological artifacts, Japanese (and Chinese) written sources, and more often than not, mythology. Research related to religion also has the aforementioned sources, but many Buddhist temples and sanctuaries in Japan are a testament to their religion. Namely, Japan has

[1] The research paper is the result of project on the Modeling Development and Integration of Serbia in the World Flows in the light of economic, social and political movements, number 179038, funded by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia (2010–2017).

about 127 million people, belonging to one of the most densely populated countries in the world. It represents the ninth country by number of inhabitants, and the most populous is the local population of Yamato (Jamato) nation (Maksimović, 2014 p. 6). Only slightly below 45% of the population is located in three major areas of Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka[2]. Today, the largest percentage of the Japanese population belongs to the ancient Shinto religion, about 106 million Japanese, although there are many influences of Buddhism (India) and Confucianism and Taoism (China), together having about one million members. In real life, the two most common religions are Shintoism and Buddhism, and it is not uncommon to combine the practices of these two religions and Christianity.[3] Islam, though it has a large number of members in the world, is not so much represented in Japan.

What is Shintoism? Shintoism is the official, autochthonous religion in Japan[4]. As Shinto, the ancient religion, is oriented towards the respect of nature and ancestors, their deities (gallstones) are ghosts of natural forces. Hence, kami are sometimes translated into the meaning of God, and sometimes into meaning of soul. The word shinto consists of two Chinese words of the shin – the divine and the tao – the way, two words that in the translation into Japanese mean the path of the gods or the path of God. The term "religion" has been used since the nineteenth century, and until then the religious thought has been shown as a path i.e. dō (Butsudō – Buddha's path), tō (shintō – the path of the gods) or michi (kami no michi – the way of the kami). Japanese religiousness is characterized by the interweaving of various religious beliefs, which manifests itself in the maintenance of numerous festivities, the importance of the rite, but also the influence of the religious on the aesthetic. For centuries, there was a belief in the divine origin of the emperor, back when there was a connection between faith and the country. This religion has no basis in its official religious book, such as in the Christian Bible or in the Hebrew Torah. Shinto religion relies on books Nihon Shoki and Kojiki. These are actually the two oldest written documents that make up the history of the country. They say how the ancestors lived. Among other sources are Kogushui (stories of ancient events) from 807. and the later sources from Jina Shotoki (Chronicles of the Real Generations of the Divine Emperors) from the 14th century, but they are less known. In Japan, there is no better way to build a future than by studying

[2] www.yu-emb-japan.go.jp/srpski_verzija/ambasada.html, Date of Availability 21. jun 2010.

[3] http://www.yu.emb-japan.go.jp/srpski_verzija/japan.html, Date of Availability 30.3.2017.

[4] Over the centuries there have been many attempts to define religion and religiousness from various aspects. In summary, it is true that "…religion and religiousness are extremely complex and dynamic socio-psychological, spiritual phenomena, but there are also few researchers who agree in the unique definition of the concept of religion and religiousness" (Blagojević, 2005. s. 36).

the past. Therefore, the content of these two ancient books is an inspiration for manyIn Japan and it is deeply rooted in the culture and way of life of the present Japanese people[5].

Nihonshoki (日本書紀, *The Nihon Shoki* – Japan Chronicles) somewhere mentioned as the Chronicle or the Notes on Japan, is a very old book. Started in 697. and ended in 720., it contains ancient historical records of Japan. It is written in the classical Chinese language and has thirty volumes describing the life of Japanese emperors and the time of their ruling[6]. In fact, Nihon Shoki is the oldest imperial-scientific and historical document that describes events from the Mythological Age of Gods until the eighth month of Eleventh Year of Jito's rule (645–702, 686–697). This chronicle on life at the imperial palace has many copies, and the earliest editions are labeled as national treasures. It is considered that the original version is the one without any punctuation marks[7]. Nihon Shoki contains detailed elaborate written texts and is considered to be the most complete historical record for many areheologists and historians. It begins with the myth of creation, explains the origin of the world and the first seven generations of divine beings, and then other myths until the 8th century. It describes the details of governance, virtues of Japanese rulers, but also mistakes of bad rulers. The book is about the mythological epoch and Japanese diplomatic contacts with other countries[8]. According to Nihon Shoki, Buddhism was brought to Japan at around 550. (552.). The tribe of Sogo removed its rivals from the Mononobe tribe and thus removed the obstacle to the acceptance of Buddhism at the palace. The same tribe, with the representative of Soga no Umako, started the construction of the temple of Asukadera in 588., the first Buddhist temple in the form of pagoda – a building in Japan. Other temples, Shitennoji, Ikarugadera, came right after. Accordingly, Buddhism was established as a religion in the palace and the state, at the start of the Nara period (710–794), and the temple of Todaiji was built in 743., in which the Big Buddha is located. Buddhism dominated, but about 760 years later, the government began to introduce Confucianism and religion began accepting its outlines (History of Japan, 2003, pp. 33–35).

Kojiki (古事記, *The Kojiki*) – records of ancient events, represents a collection of records from ancient times, i.e. the oldest literary work written in the Japanese language in the VIII century, more precisely 712. It was written by Ō no Yasumaro, a Japanese nobleman, a bureaucrat and a chronicler,

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5 http://www.kcpwindowonjapan.com/2015/12/the-kojiki-and-nihon-shoki-of-japan/, datum dostupnosti 20.4.2017.

6 http://eos.kokugakuin.ac.jp/modules/xwords/entry.php?entryID=1243, Date of Availability 18.4.2017.

7 http://www. narahaku.go.jp/english/collection/1190-0.html, Date of Availability 20.4.2017.

8 http://www.kcpwindowonjapan.com/2015/12/the-kojiki-and-nihon-shoki-of-japan/, Date of Availability 20.4.2017.

at the request of Emperor Gemmei. The book compiles the origin of myths of the four main islands of Japan and Camia (the ghosts they worshiped in Shintoism), i.e. mythical stories and various songs[9]. It talks about how the gods descended from heaven and created today's Japan. The descendant of the celestial deity of the Sun became the first emperor of this country. This piece, apart from testifying to that time, also proves the continuity of the dynasty of the Emperors in Japan, as well as the continuity of statehood. Namely, the "Koğiki" is a mythological book on the departure of Japan, containing descriptions of historical events, stories of Emperors, and poems. Within mythology, it describes events from the beginning of the world, and historical records come from the 7th century AD. With these records, the oral literature in Japan ceased.

Original and preserved copies from the XIV century are a kind of a source of all the latter Japanese literary works. The text is composed of three books. The first book consists of the mythology of the years of the kami (*The Age of Kami*) i.e. establishing the order of the universe. The second and third books deal with the imperial line and the events of the imperial family, i.e. the establishment of the order of humanity and the establishment of the order of history. Kojiki is the opposite of the oral tradition of the past, which consisted of the mythology of epic narration and oral poems-stories. There is restraint from commenting on Buddhism and is therefore considered a Shinto classic[10],[11].

Kojiki – records of ancient events, begins this way:

> "Now when chaos had begun to condense, but force and form were not yer manifest, and there was nought named, nought done, who could know its shape? Nevertheless, Heaven and Earth first parted, and the Three Deities (Ame no Minakanuši, Takami Musuhi and Kamu Musuhi) performed the commencement of creation; the Passive and Active Essences then developed (god Izanaki and godess Izanami) became the ancestors of all things. Therefore did he enter obscurit[12] and emerge into light, and the Sun and Moon (godess of Sun Amaterasu and god of Moon Cukujomi) were revealed by the washing of his eyes; he floated on and plunged into the sea-water, and Heavenly and Earthly Deities appeared through

[9] http://www.kcpwindowonjapan.com/2015/12/the-kojiki-and-nihon-shoki-of-japan/, Date of Availability 20.4.2017.

[10] http://eos.kokugakuin.ac.jp/modules/xwords/entry.php?entryID=1243, Date of Availability 18.4.2017.

[11] Each Japanese is referred to this book from childhood, learns from it, so it's considered a "national book". "Kojiki" contains a map of the old Japan, because the present places do not correspond to places from that time. Jamasaki – Vukelic, Hiroshima, Japan through myth and teachings, Politiccs, www.politika.rs/rubrike/kultura/Japan-kroz-mit-i- predanja-.lt.html, Date of Availability 12.01.2014.

[12] Bog Izanaki occasionally goes to visit his late wife Izanami on the other world, which is conceived as the underground world of darkness.

ablutions of his person. Son in dimness of the great commencement, we, by relying on the original teaching, learn the time of the conception of the earth and of the birth of islands; in the remoteness of the original beginning, we, by trusting the former sages, perceive the era of the genesis of Deities and of the establishment og men[13]." (Kojiki, s. 9)

Example I The myth of the coming of the earth, the gods and the religious symbols

Ilustracija 1. The myth of Izanaga and Izanama

According to the legend, all the other gods descended from goddess Izanami, the goddess of seduction and god Izanagi, the god of seduction, who according to the record is considered deities. They created the land and the Japanese islands combining the ocean with a "celestial spear of jewels". The first ruler of the island was the grandson of the goddess of sun – Amateras, and all the following emperors, according to tradition, are her offspring. Thus the Japanese emperors had a divine origin, but this understanding ceased to exist after World War II. The God of Izanaki and the goddess Izanami are brother and sister who, besides the gods, also produced Japanese islands. They created the first island by storming the celestial spear, sealed with jewels, while they were standing on a floating heavenly bridge, and stirring up a sound that sounded like the sound of boiling water. When the spear was pulled out, the salty droplets from its end fell and collected and thus formed the land. This was the island of Onogoro, a fictitious island, because its name meant Selfindulgent[14]. Then they formed the island of Ava, and after that the island of Avaji no Honosavake (there is a sanctuary dedicated to the god Izanaki[15]), and after that the island of Ijo no Futana (Shikoku island). It had one body and four heads, so the land of Ijo was named Ehime – the current prefecture of Ehime, the land Sanuki named Iijorihiko – the current prefecture of Kagawa, the land of Ava named Oogecuhima – the current prefecture of Tokushima and the land of Tose named Takjorivake – the current prefecture of Kochi. Other islands such as the island of Oki no Micugo (the island of Oki) and the island of Cukuši (island of Kyushu) settled afterwards. Then these two deities gave birth to other islands and prefectures in Japan. When the country was born, the

[13] According to Kojiki, Eight is a sacred number, because Japan is considered to be the country of eight islands, and this number signifies multitude. The very expression of eight hands, according to Japanese claims, means "very long". (Kojiki, 2008. s. 42)

[14] It is assumed that the story described the method of salt production by boiling sea water in a boiler. This way of making salt was applied by the Ama people on the Amadi Island.

[15] At that time, the Japanese had the idea that the gods lived in every place. (Kojiki, s. 24)

birth of the gods occurred. The five special gods – deities include the gods Ame no Minakanushi, Takami Musuhi, Kamu Musuhi, Umashi Ashikabi Hikoji and Ame no Tokotaki. They were created as lonely gods and never appeared. Then the other gods were created: a god named Kuni no Tokotaki – god of eternity of the earth; God Tojo Kumono – the god of the lush field of the cloud; God Uhdini – god of mud; His sister goddess Suhidjini – goddess of sand, god Cunogui – the god of planting herbs; His sister Goddess Ikugui – the goddess of the birth of herbs; God Ootonoji – the god of the big door; His sister goddess Ootanobe – the goddess of the big door; God Omodara – the god of perfecting the earth, his sister goddess of Ajaxishikone – the goddess of great respect; The god Izanaki and Izanami. All of them are called the seven generations of the gods, two lonely gods and five couples, where each couple is a single generation. There are many gods in Japan, of which I will mention only some, such as: Ookoto Oshio – God of great accomplished endeavor; Ivacucibiko – God of rocks and earth; Ivasuhime – Goddess of stones and sand; Otohivake – God of the Doors; Ame no Fuko – God of the roof; Oojabiko – God of the House; Kazamocuvake no Osio – God of the wind; Oovatacumi – God of the sea; God Haya Akicihiko and his sister, the goddess Haya Akicuhima – God and the goddess of water inflow – and many others. For example, god and goddess of foam, god and goddess of water surface, the god of the heavenly fog i god of the earth fog, goddess of sand, the god of fire, the god of burning heat, the god and goddess of mines, goddess of rich birth, goddess of the weeping mountain, god who cuts the stone, god of the fast lightning, god if the fast fire, god of the mountain hill, god of the mountain downhill, god of the forest, god of the big thunder, god of the fire thunder, god of the black thunder, god of the young thunder, god of the splitting thunder and others. Source: Kojiki, 2008. s. 17–50.

Illustration 2. Fuji mountain (*Fuji-san* 富士山) Sacred mountain and other religious symbols

In traditional societies like Japan, where people are connected with nature, holy places are built in nature. Every mountain in Japan has its own God, and the most famous mountain is certainly Fuji, the highest mountain in Japan. Together with two more mountains, they represent the three sacred mountains in Japan. Fuji, the holy mountain of Japan, is one of the national symbols of Japan. There are many temples on this mountain, and on it is one of the most famous Shinto temples. The protective goddess of the Fuji Mountain is the goddess Sengen–Sama. This mountain is celebrated by Shintoists and Buddhists. Every year, pilgrims climb at dawn to the mountain to watch the sunrise. In addition, this mountain is an inspiration to many artists. Fuji is 3776 meters high,

perfectly shaped, and the last volcano occurred in 1707. Still, the Japanese mark it as active. It is just one of four parts of the Fuj-Hakone-Iz National Park. In addition to this mountain, significant symbols of Shintoism are also individual trees (cherry, plum – symbol of loyalty); Flowers (chrysanthemum – symbol of the sun, orchid, bamboo and ikeban); Cereals (rice – a symbol of life, abundance, is considered a holy place, and sacrifices are offered to the goddess Inara[16]; some animals (cranes – symbol of longevity and wisdom, fish carp, symbol of love, happiness, strength and courage). The symbols of Shintoism also include parts of the human body. For example, eyes in Shinto religion are a symbol of state of alertness. The message of all these symbols is the order, simplicity and harmony of procedures. Source: O Konel, Eri, 2007.

1.1. Historical overview of religion in Japan

In the period of Nara (710–794), the "Cody" was shaped, because at that time there was a major tendency to establish the rule of law, with the aim of unifying Japan into a whole (an organism). By that time, Buddhism was the official religion of the palace and the state, but it was customized according to Shinto. Then there was a certain development of literature and fine arts, which in the next Heian period meant the creation of a national culture (History of Japan, 2003: 33–39). In the Heian period (794–1185), Buddhism was flourishing, but was associated with autochthonous Shinto beliefs and continued to dominate the religious and philosophical life of the nobility. The nobility at the court was more pious in large numbers and went to frequent pilgrimages to Shinto and Buddhist temples. In the middle of the Heian period, Buddhism of the "Pure Land" becomes very popular. In Kamakura period (1185–1333) there was a re-popularization of Buddhism, and it gained believers among the ordinary people. However, during this period, the flourishing experience of Zen Buddhism also permeates with its simplicity, the demand for self-sustainability and meditation in order to achieve enlightenment. As such it hit close to the warrior class. In the Muromaci period (1333–1568), rapid development of Zen Buddhism occurred, but other Buddhist sects also had great influence. However, in 1549. with the arrival of Francis Hawaier in Japan, Christianity arrived. In Azuga-Momojama period (1568–1600.), Japanese society moved from medieval to modern society and sought cosmopolitanism. At that time, the centenary internal conflict ended, and the ultimate unification of Japan took place. Buddhism was still flourishing, but the activity of Catholic missionaries was recorded. At the very end of this period, an order banning Christianity was made, and it was impossible to preach about Christianity. The authority of the clan Toyotomi, advocated for the construction of temples, as well as

[16] According to the Japanese belief, soaking rice before cooking releases life energy and brings peace to the soul.

the inhibition of art and enjoyment of the tea ceremony. In the Edo period (1600–1868), also known as the Tokugawa period, Tokugawa Shogun, as the most powerful person in the military regime, edited military and financial politics and held the entire territory of the country under his authority. He managed to oversee local masters, as well as religious temples. The laws of this regime rely on loyalty to the lord and obedience to parents, which are otherwise Confucian virtues. There has been an ideological revival of Shintoism, and he was the backbone of many Japanese people at that time. In the Meiji period (1868–1912), the period when Japan emerged from self-isolation and intensified development and modernization began, the Ministry of Interior Affairs kept raising state Shinto shrines called Shokhonsha. In them, Shinto religion were put in the service of government in those administrative areas from which those who gave their lives for their homeland. In that period, Christianity is also allowed. In the 19th century, when the Emperor fought against the Shogun, he tended to emphasize pure Shintoism, a religion that remained from his ancestors, according to which he had a divine "origin", so that he could free himself from the influences that came from outside. For these reasons, Shintoism was proclaimed a state religion in 1868. The official Shintoism, unlike the people's version, nurtured the cult of the imperial personality and turned into an ideology. As such, he was introduced to schools. In the Taicho period (1912–1926), named after the reign of Emperor Taicho, there was a continuation of industrial development, the acceptance of the influence of European culture, and the continued cultivation of traditional values. In the Shoah period (1926–1989) from the period of occupation, Shinto became the official religion of Japan and it has remained to this day. Immediately after the World War II, as is often stated, "the emperor gave up the divine origin", which he had until then in relation to the aforementioned sacred books. It is evident that since 1945, Shintoism has been separated from the state. Freedom of religion was guaranteed to all, but no one is forced to believe and participate in religious ceremonies and practices. Nevertheless, Shintoism has retained a significant share in Japanese spirituality, and even everyday life. Shintoist mysticism and rituals are still present in ceremonies related to the Japanese people, imperial family and court. After World War II, Shintoism and Buddhism as traditional religions were rising, but true and deeply religious families were considered to be few (History of Japan, 2003. s. 155).

1.2. Characteristics of Shintoism – sanctuaries and festivals

Shintoism, as well as all religions, has its own sanctuaries – temples, but also rules – ceremonies. Namely, the Shinto shrines are built in honor of the kami or former emperors. They were originally based on Japanese homes, which means they were built in the spirit of simplicity. Later, under the influence of Chinese architecture, they began to resemble Buddhist temples.

They are most often built in places where there are natural beauties and near the river or mountains. Some temples have been built in places of historical events. It used to be considered a great honor to die for Japan, and it was the Jasukuni temple in Tokyo that was dedicated to those killed in war[17].[18] The souls of the dead are loved as deities because they gave their lives for the construction of modern Japan. The temples were built out of natural materials (wood), with the goal of bringing together man and the whole Earth, celestial bodies and deities into one harmonious whole. When entering the Shinto temple, there is a "tangible" peace, which relates to the divine tranquility. The person entering the temple should acquire a "spiritual sense" of deep peace in their soul. The sanctuaries are governed by committees (Heihaku) composed of priests and representatives of the parishioners.

However, the environment and the environment of the temple represent a sacred place for pilgrims. The shrine is entered through the door called tori. They separate the sanctuary from the world outside the sanctuary, and therefore the door can be quite far from it. Tori are open gates, and as such they symbolize the divine state of permanent openness, and by passing through them, a being will pass from everyday life into the sacred (O Konel, 2007 p. 87). They are made of wood and painted in black or orange red in the form of arches with two pillars and two rods. The road from the door to the temple sensually prepares the visitors for a religious experience. On some occasions, a water-filled bridge can be crossed. The entrance to the temple is usually facing south, rarely east, while north and west are considered unfortunate directions.

In Shinto shrines, there are Buddhist temples, around them, within the shrine, there are peaceful gardens as places for meditation, built out of sand stones and plants. That's a Zen Garden. Originally, such gardens in Japan, were formed by Buddhist monks as places of deliberation, and their purpose was to calm you down through simplicity. In the gardens, all elements are significant, and the goal is to achieve harmony between the yin (water symbolized by sand or gravel or moss plants) and yang (a land symbolized by large stones or plants maple, ginger, bamboo and azaleas). Zen gardens should maintain the durability of the mind, and durability symbolizes a transcendental spirit that is neither limited in time nor space. Therefore, these gardens are exactly the same today as in the ancient times when they appeared (O Konel, 2007. s. 91).

The Japanese today come to the temple to find peace from everyday pressure, noise, and pace of life. Often they buy small tiles called ema and snatch them into temples as a prayer for the help from the kami. These are small prayers written by the visitors themselves. There is a cleansing ritual

[17] http://tesla.rcub.bg.ac.rs/~japan/religija/Sinto%20religija.htm, Date of Availability 12.3.2017.

[18] One of the famous shrines is Nachi Temple.

in Shintoism, and the temples also have some kind of water source. In ancient times people took water from the river to wash their hands. Today there is a pavilion for purification in the vicinity of each temple, and people stop there, washing their face and hands with clean water, and thus ritualy cleanse themselves before worshiping. They need to be "clean" to get closer to the kami. In the sanctuary, the presence of the kami is marked by an object called shintain, which can be a mirror, stone, or other object hidden in the wrapper for centuries. Natural objects that testify about the presence of stones are of a larger scale, and can be trees, mountains, waterfalls. Kami differ from God in the Western sense. They need to care about humanity, purity, and purification is a creative act important for advancement. Human beings can be called kami only after death and the process of purification, thus transforming themselves into the ghosts of ancestors. Invisible kami appear in the field of nature.

Otherwise, the overall goal of Shintoism is to promote harmony, purity in all aspects of life. It also implies spiritual and moral purity – a pure and sincere heart. It implies that all human beings are good, and that evil spirits are evil. They act on people as a disease, thus reducing their resistance, and therefore their ability to resist temptations. The wrong behavior of people is a sin and hinders the harmony of this person with the kami and their blessing.

In Japan, people go to the sanctuaries during the festival. Sometimes they visit a local temple when they want to pray to kami. They do not visit temples every week on a particular day. Almost every temple has its own festival, and most are held once a year. They can last for a few days, and should mark historical events, or celebrate events such as harvesting or the beginning of another agricultural season[19]. An important part of the festival is the "procession", which involves carrying the kami through the streets into the *mikoshi* (portable shrine). Shintoism is a religion that has a lot of rituals, but there are no rigid specific moral rules that bind the believers. No one is obliged to believe in the Shinto of the Deity. This religion is characterized by *macura* (worship of the deity) and *hanami* festival (festival of flowers). The macura especially refers to the goddess Amateras no Mikoto (the word mikoto means "her Highness", and is used only after the word of the name of god or goddess, and less often emperors)[20]. The most important festivals are the Adult Day (Seijin Shiki – January 15th); Autumn Festival (Aki Matsuri – celebrated by different shrines on different dates); Labor Day (Niinamesai – November 23rd); New Year (Haru Matsuri – January 1st); Spring Festival (Rissun – February 3rd); and Festival 7-5-3 (Shichigosan – November 15th). There is a "Great Cleansing Ceremony" (Oharae) in Japan, a ritual of purification used to remove sin. The ritual is performed at the end of June and December at the Imperial Family Temple, as well as other

[19] Shinto festivals represent a combination of ceremonial rituals and happy celebrations.

[20] https://sr.wikipedia.org/sr/Šintoizam, Date of Availability 30. 3. 2017.

temples in order to purify the entire population. This ceremony can also be conducted for the purification of companies at the end of the year, but also after certain disasters. In Japan, there is also a ritual of salting (Shubatsu) – a ritual of purification by sprinkling salt on a priest, a believer or on the soil of the earth in order to be purified.

So, in Japan, Shinto religions are dominant and have a major impact on the whole way of life, and as such affects the way of work, so that they are transferred to enterprises through loyalty, harmony, peace and silence that are desirable. One of the characteristics that emerged from the Shintoist religion is harmony, which is in line with collectivism, and they together encourage the self-sacrifice, solidarity and respect of the superiors. This respect is mutual, thus building mutual trust and cooperation in a spirit of solidarity (Maksimović, 2014 p. 1). However, thanks to Shintoism and the acceptance of Buddhism, according to some Japanese intellectuals, morality based on compassion and pity has spread to the whole society. "The spirit of the ruler is the soul of men." Through this, Jamai Aizan (1865–1917) explained that the Japanese did not mechanically follow and respect their emperors and their successors[21]. In addition to him, anthropologists and other analysts have argued that through the history, the built and manifested characteristics of family relations among people have been transferred to the political life of Japan. This meant that in their society, the supreme authorities acted as mother and father figures, who have a lot of understanding about the concerns, aspirations and expectations of their people. Thus, the empire didn't control, but ruled Japan through history.

However, a link between ordinary citizens, i.e. the people and the emperor was stable and strong throughout history. The foundation for this was in religion. (Šuljagić, Sanja, 2009. 50, 58). Today, Buddhism and Shintoism are mixed in Japan, and there is no significant difference between them, so there is Shintoism with the remnants of Buddhism. While a number of Japanese declare themselves to be Shintoists, others claim to be Buddhists, with the only difference being the choice, but not the actual belief.

The mythology of Japan emphasizes community life, and the social community values diligence, purity, service, development and progress. The two dominant religions are Shintoism and Buddhism, and Confucianism is applied to the life and work of people. Human resources in Japan are an extremely important resource, and sometimes it is said that the secret of the economic success of this country lies in them. Japanese workers are highly qualified and hard working, and collective wisdom is not limited to production, but is also applied in sectors such as research and development, sales, and their slogan is "the company belongs to those who work in it" (Maksimovic, 2004. 132). Order, restraint in speech and non-verbal communication

[21] In addition to the names of each Japanese emperor, the word "teno" stands, meaning "heavenly emperor".

are always present. Religious understanding is manifested through the glorification of nature and love towards it, from which comes the love of life in general, a positive attitude towards yourself, the business. According to Zen Buddhism, every religious learning requires attention, so every work deserves attention and needs to be focused on results. Confucianism, on the other hand, advocates moral behavior, education, diligence, loyalty and commitment and honesty. In addition, the Japanese religion accepted empathy, i.e. compassion with others and a sense of public good (Novak-East 2008. 140–141). Also, loyalty is very pronounced in Japanese society, and present everywhere, within family, school, university and enterprise. The commitment to employee loyalty is actually their attitude, and it depends on personal previous experience, work experience and job characteristics (Maksimović, 2004 p. 129). Also, the way of communication is very important. Communication is polite, everywhere and at all times, and it means modesty in reading, talking, picking cars and housing.

Conclusion

Shintoism as an autochthonous religion of Japan is very old. It has its foothold in the ancient books of Kojiki and Nihon Shoki, according to which people descended from the kami. Even though Buddhism had a strong influence for centuries, Shintoism succeeded with the Meiji Restoration to become the official state religion. After the World War II, this religion was reorganized and, on that occasion, separated from the state. It is also separated from Buddhism, though they are permeated in real life. The impact of Shinto on people's lives is very strong and visible, but there is also a visible influence on the spiritual values, culture, political roles, everyday life, family life, and also an impact on the business environment. In addition, many virtues that characterize Shinto religion are transferred to enterprises, to workplaces in terms of peacefulness, purity, regularity, modesty, simplicity, care for others, functionality and savings.

Shinto religion is associated only with Japan, and it has no influence on other people in other countries.

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Маријана Максимовић

Управљање људским ресурсима и религије у Јапану

Apstrakt: Zvanična religija u Japanu je Šinto (Šintoizam), specifično japanska religija, mada u toj zemlji ima dosta uticaja budizma, konfučijanizma i taoizma. Najveći procenat japanskog stanovništva pripada drevnoj Šinto religiji koja je okrenuta poštovanju prirode i predaka. Ona je uticala na način života, uređenje domova i vrtova japanskog naroda. Uticala je i na način rada, tako da je u preduzeća preneta kroz odanost, harmoniju, mir i tišinu koji su poželjni dok teče proizvodni proces. U Japanu je više nego u bilo kojoj drugoj zemlji sve podređeno čoveku, te su tako ljudski resursi najznačajniji. Velika ulaganja u ljudski kapital kroz obrazovanje, obuku na poslu i celokupnu filozofiju rada doprineli su da Japan postane jedna od ekonomski najrazvijenijih zemalja sveta i tehnološki najrazvijenija zemalja sveta. Istovremeno dok je sledila put industrijskog razvoja, podsticala je očuvanje kontinuiteta sopstvene tradicije, kulture i verovanja i tako postala jedna od najuticajnijih zemalja.

Ključne reči: šintoizam, budizam, upravljanje ljudskim resursima, Japan.

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RELIGION IN THE TRANSITIONAL EX-YUGOSLAV COUNTRIES[1]

Abstract: The trends in the revitalization of the social role of religion and the level of religiosity have not avoided the Balkans. These trends were more pronounced in this region partially due to the history of war, on the one hand, and the use of religion in the function of "cultural defence", on the other. In the state of uncertain national identities, religion was one of the basic sources of differentiation between the conflicted peoples in the Balkans. Today, in the postwar period, apart from suffering from the global crisis, this region is still affected by the consequences of its recent past. Religion is acquiring a new social relevance (Habermas). The paper presents the religious fields – the spreading and level of religiosity in the observed societies (Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina). The data used in the paper were acquired in the empirical research conducted by the Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies in 2013. The data show that there is an influence of confession/religion on the level of religiosity within certain countries, as well as on the relation towards the public role of religion.

Key words: religion, society, revitalization of religion, ex-Yugoslav countries.

Global trends of the revitalization of the social role of religion[2] and levels of religiosity have not passed the Balkans by. Increased religiosity is characteristic of post-socialist societies in general, and the conflicts that took place in this region have further encouraged turning to religion for various reasons. These processes were more marked here due to past wars and the use of religion in the function of "cultural defence". "The role of religion in cultural defence can be described like this. Where there are two (or more)

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[1] Prepared as a part of the project *Sustainability of the Identity of Serbs and National Minorities in the Border Municipalities of Eastern and Southeastern Serbia* (179013), conducted at the University of Niš – Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, and supported by the Ministry of Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

[2] Replying to the, obviously, high level of religiosity, as well as the major role of religion in the public social sphere, and the preservation of certain religious rites in the "secular" society, theoreticians begin to use the terms "the return of the sacred" (Bell, 1978), "postsecularism" (Habermas, 2006).

communities in conflict, and they are of different religions (for example, Protestants and Catholics in Ulster, or Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims in what used to be Yugoslavia), the religious identity of each can acquire a new significance and call forth a new loyalty as religious identity becomes a way of asserting ethnic pride and laying claim to what Max Weber called 'ethnic honour'" (Bruce, 1996: 96). Under conditions of uncertain national identities, religion was one of the main sources of differentiation between the clashing peoples of the Balkans. "More than one faith coexistence in this region in earlier periods was based pragmatically on 'negative tolerance'. The acceptance of group differences in the imperial systems of the past did not alter their 'structural opposition' and the potential of religion to mobilize followers as an ethnic group" (Hann, 2004, 157). Two decades after the conflicts, the tension is still present, and religion can be and is continually instrumentalized for political purposes. The majority of symbolic battles in these societies possess a religious connotation, and these symbolic battles are still linked to the ethnic and religious differences.

The revitalization of religion that is empirically verified in the contemporary society addresses the individual and social needs of modern human beings. Both the individual and social needs are not satisfied by functional equivalents in whose strength the classics of sociology believed (Comte, Durkheim, Weber, Marx), as well as all the followers of the secularization hypothesis since, predicting a decline in the influence of religion, "As religions can no longer integrate all of the members of a society, other movements and ideologies take their place, acting as substitutes that perform this integrative function. They fill the vacuum left by religion, which becomes increasingly irrelevant, and thus obtain the characteristic of a 'religion-substitute'" (Jinger according to: Knobloh, 2004: 130). The second important factor that influences the level of religiosity in the observed region is the socialist past of these countries, in which ideology, i.e. a "religion-substitute", attempted to erase ethnic and religious differences, yet these still emerged newly empowered after the dissolution of Yugoslavia.[3] Today, some twenty years later, the religiosity in this region is stabilizing at a much higher level than it was the case during the era of the atheistic concept in socialism. The level of religiosity then, and now as well, was not at the same level in these countries, i.e. the level of accepting atheism as the state ideology, similar to the differences that exist today in the level and quality of religiosity on the observed territory.

The roles that this renewed religion plays in modern societies are different. "It all looked like modernization in reverse, from rational collective action back to primitive rebellion… The archetypal dream of a liberating

[3] The increase in religiosity is evident in all post-socialist countries (from Poland and Romania where 90% of the population belong to the religious community to the Czech Republic with 33%) http://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-belief-and-national-belonging-in-central-and-eastern-europe/

Exodus from enslavement had not yet lost its utopian, eschatological force" (Casanova, 1994: 3). In the contemporary social conditions religion plays an important public role and it has not become the matter of private and individual choice, which is the case in the region being analyzed here. "Religious traditions and communities of faith gained a new, hitherto unexpected political importance. Needless to say, what initially spring to mind are the variants of religious fundamentalism that we face not only in the Middle East, but also in Africa, Southeast Asia, and in the Indian subcontinent. They often lock into national and ethnic conflicts, and today also form the seedbed for the decentralized form of terrorism that operates globally and is directed against the perceived insults and injuries caused by a superior Western civilization" (Habermas, 2005: 1). It is precisely in the Balkan Peninsula that religion played an important role in the series of unfortunate circumstances that led to the bloody conflicts of the previous decades. The link between the ethnic and the religious is strongly pronounced in the conditions of small differences between the Balkan peoples, since religion plays a crucial role of a differentiating element (Cvitković, 2012, 2017, Gavrilović, Jovanović, Todorović, 2016). "The church is connected with the powers that fight for the defence of the national identity, with priests endorsing this fight, and sometimes even leading it" (Gavrilović, 2008: 71). In this region, despite the universal character of Christianity and Islam as dominantly present religions, the connection between ethnic belonging and religion has been very strong. And it was exactly during the conflict that the largest increase in religiosity occurred (Cvitković, 2004). "Similar to the fact that in a number of European states language played the crucial role in national differentiation, many believe that on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina different religions and confessions played that role" (Ibid, 9). We cannot treat the role of religion uniformly in the creation of thetransitional reality of individual states. Firstly, different religions dominate; then, they combine in various ways in different states in terms of presence and importance; finally, in interaction with other social factors, the importance and roles of religion differ. The economic situation and existential uncertainty (in accordance with Inglehart's theses on the persistence of religion, Inglehart, 2007) also have a certain effect on these transitional societies, which face major economic issues, and the life within is characterized by a high level of uncertainty.

It is the aim of this paper to presentthe religious fields (shape and degree of presence of religion) of Macedonia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The analyses will rely on the results of the study "Resistance to Socio-Economic Changes in Western Balkan Societies" conducted within the Regional Research Promotion Programme Western Balkans by the Centre for Empirical Studies of South-East Europe in 2013. This study was conducted using proportional samples (3115 respondents).

Context

Today, in the post-war era, this region is marked not only by the global economic crisis, but also by the consequences of the recent past. The countries that are the subject of this analysis: Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia are, as stated above, post-socialist, ex-Yugoslav, and that is what makes them potentially similar. However, each of these countries has experienced a number of events in their histories, which could determine the position of religion and the level of religiosity in a significant way. All three countries are multi-ethnic, with different relations between the present religions, which in the Balkans implies an important connection with the religious differences that are key to ethnic differences.

All of the observed countries have passed through a turbulent period in the previous decades. Ethnic and religious differences are still important in these countries and they represent a potential danger to the internal peace even today. This opposition instigates a high level of religiosity, since religion is an important indicator of the difference between the ethnic groups in this region.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a former Yugoslav republic that is non-homogenous with regard to the ethnic and religious belonging, which to a great extent affected the war situation that marked the fate of this country in the post-communist period. According to the 1991 census, Muslims (now Bosniaks) were the most numerous group in Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by Serbs, then Croats, and finally the members of the other ethnicities. The national structure of the mostpopulous peoples was as follows: Muslims 43%, Serbs 31%, Croats 17% (Cvitković, 2004: 9). This ethnic division was accompanied by confessional demarcation, since Serbs were mainly Orthodox, while the majority of Croats were Catholics. Despite this, before the war the members of different religious communities lived mixed and together in the majority of B&H cities (Abazović, 201: 3). Religion played an important role in the Bosnian war conflicts, thus certain authors consider it the main factor of the conflicts (Cvitković, 2017: 17). What is without any doubt is the increase in religiosity in the previous period (Cvitković, 2004). Today, after the war that took place on its territory, Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska (with one municipality, the Brčko District, not belonging to any of the above entities). This way the religious and ethnic divisions have been institutionalized, with the majority of the Muslim and Catholic population living in the Federation, while the Orthodox are concentrated in the Republic of Srpska. Religious homogenization has been linked with national homogenization, which in turn influences the rise of religious self-identification. Today in B&H, unimodal environments are present (where one confession is dominant). According to the estimates, 45 percent of the

population is Bosniak (Muslim), 36 percent is Serbian (Orthodox Christian), and 15 percent is Croatian (Roman Catholic).

Serbia belongs to the post-communist but also the Orthodox circle of countries, at that being anex-Yugoslav republic as well. Historically speaking, and according to the 2011 census data, Serbia is predominantly an Orthodox country (84.49% of the population), with a renewed, yet very intensely discovered religious tradition that appeared after the breakup of Yugoslavia. Apartfrom the dominant Orthodox population, other significant groups in Serbia are Catholics (4.97%), mainly in Vojvodina, and Muslims (3.1%), mainly in Sandžak. Sociological research into the religiosity on the territory of Serbia has shown an increase in and the intensification of the religious practice compared with the previous periods (Gavrilović, 2013: 30).

Macedonia is an ex-Yugoslav, post-socialist country with the tension present between Macedonians and Albanians, i.e. Christians and Muslims in a high percentage, respectively. The majority population comprises Orthodox Christians (64.7%), followed by Muslims (33.3%), with the other religious groups being far less represented (0.37%). These are mainly Catholics, Protestants and Jews. According to the more recent data, the Republic of Macedonia is the second country when it comes to the Muslim minority in the entire Europe. Only Bosnia and Herzegovina has the larger percentage of Muslim population, without it being the majority in relation to the other citizens.

What is common for these three countries today is that all of them are on the path to joining the EU, albeit in different stages of this process, with the procedures based on the implementation of tolerance and coexistence according to the requirements of the European standards. The underlying obstacles of the ethnic-religious relations hamper these processes from time to time.

Confessional picture today

Today, the confessional picture of the observed countries looks as follows:

Table 1: Confessional belonging

	Serbia	B&H	Macedonia
Orthodox	90%	34.7%	66.4%
Catholic	5%	12.3%	0.4%
Muslim	3%	51.5%	31.6%
None	1.5%	0.7%	

Graph 1: Confessional belonging



Serbia used to be the most homogeneous country with regard to religious belonging, and the events in the Balkans only led to further homogenization. Despite the relatively homogeneous religious structure, problems tend to occur from time to time in relation to the coexistence of religious communities. These communities are very ghettoized (Catholics in Vojvodina, Muslims in the Raška District). Ghettoization is not merely a consequence of the relation of the majority population and the state, but also a wish of the very members of these religious communities (Petrušić, Gavrilović, 2011). In Bosnia and Herzegovina the war and migrations also play an important role in the presence of religions and the level of religiosity[4] that could previously be found on that territory, while Macedonia remains burdened by the conflict between the two most numerous ethnic-religious groups, which makes the religious differences particularly significant. Both B&H and Macedonia are deeply divided today along the ethnic and religious borders, with these divisions getting their institutionalized resolution in B&H, while in Macedonia the tension is occasionally escalating.

Table 2: Self-declaredreligiosity

	Serbia	B&H	Macedonia
Religious (traditional religious communities)	68.3%	86.8%	87.6%
Religious (none of religious communities)	**16.2%**	1.4%	2.0%
Religious (new and small rel.communities)	3.7%	3.4%	0.4%
Indifferent	3%	3.3%	4.4%
Convinced atheists	1%	2.6%	1%

It is interesting to note that only in Serbia a certain "distancing" from the dominant religious community, i.e. the Serbian Orthodox Church, can be observed, since there exists a substantial percentage of those who declare themselves religious, and even Orthodox, yet do not belong to the traditional

[4] Cvitković, 2004, Religious Connfession in War, Svjetlo rijeci, Sarajevo

religious community (SOC). This is the section of the examined body that experiences Orthodoxy as a part of the identity and tradition. In B&H and Macedonia, i.e. the countries with the largest Muslim population that is not the majority, this relation is different, meaning that all believers belong to the traditional religious communities. Bearing in mind that other studies have also confirmed a high level of religious and ethnic identification in these countries, it can be noted that religion and religiosity are in the state of "ethnic mobilization".

Introducing new indicators can provide further data on the importancethat religion has in the lives of the people from these countries. The importance of God in the lives of the respondents is one of such indicators.[5]

Table 3: How important is God in your life?

	Serbia	B&H	Macedonia
Very important 10	25.3%	46.0%	51.1%
Very important 9	17.9%	6.2%	9.8%
Very important 8	17.8%	12.8%	8.1%

In all three observed countries, God occupies, according to one's own experience, an important place in the lives of the respondents. It is interesting that the highest percentage of those who believe subjectively in the importance of God in their lives can be found in Macedonia. One could partially assign this importance to "cultural defence", which functions in the conditions of a smouldering conflict. According to certain studies (Media Galup, www.tnsmediumgallup.co.rs) Macedonia is the fifth most religious country in the world. Representatives of the Albanian Muslim community believe that this is above all due to the activity of the Muslim believers, since they see the Orthodox population as traditionally religious and lacking in the department of religious practice (AlJazeera http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/makedonija-medu-pet-najreligioznijih-zemalja). In Serbia, even though in the lowest percentage compared with the other observed countries, there is a high percentage of recognizing the importance of God in the lives of its citizens. Based on the data from previous research, it can be concluded that the number of those people who positively assess the importance of God in their lives is on the rise.

Macedonia and B&H are the countries in which, contrary to Serbia, lives a significant number of various religious communities. The data for B&H show that there is a statistically significant difference between the members of different religious communities with regard to the importance assigned to God (X2 (88)= 414.860 Sig.000). A similar situation can be found

[5] In Pakistan 90% of the respondents choose 10 when giving their opinion on the importance of god in their lives, in Brazil and Nigeria this percent is at 87%, in Japan 6% (Inglhart, Bejker, 2000: 25).

in Macedonia, where there is a statistically significant difference between communities (X2 (77)= 224.385 Sig.000).

Graph 2: How important is God in your life, by confession B&H and Macedonia



In both of these countries, the Muslims assign more importance to God than the Orthodox do, while in B&H both Muslims and Catholics are in front of the Orthodox to a certain degree.

Even though self-perception is such that it implies a high level of religiosity, when additional indicators are introduced a rather different picture is obtained.

Religious practice, Serbia

To evaluate the level of religiosity, certain additional indicators are introduced – regular attendance of rites, visits to the religious buildings during holidays, reading literature, praying:

- visits religious buildings for prayers and rites, regularly – **16.4%**, sometimes – 65.5%, never 16.2%
- celebrates religious holidays – regularly – **82.5%**, sometimes – 12.5%, never 3.5%
- charity activities of a religious community, regularly – 6.8%, sometimes – 35.8%, never 54.9%
- reads religious literature – regularly – 5.9%, sometimes – 24.8%, never 66.0%
- prays – regularly – **13.7%**, sometimes – 45.2%, never 37.8%

These data also show that which has been addressed in the sociology of religion on multiple occasions (Kuburić, Gavrilović), namely, that the level of religious practice of the believers in Serbia is not at a high level. "The rites of passage and major holidays are the backbone of the religious practice in Serbia, while the introduction of a more distinctive indicators such as fasting, praying or reading religious literature leads to a drastic decrease in the level of religious practice" (Gavrilović, 2013: 37). This practice is,

indeed, higher than in the period before the breakup of Yugoslavia and the socialist system, however, the statement made by Zoran Krstić, a pastoral sociologist, that "the modern man, even the contemporary Serb, is mostly religious and unchurchly" seems adequate. (Krstic, 2012)

Religious practice, B&H

When talking about B&H it can be noticed that the religious practice is higher than in Serbia in all of the observed indicators:

- visits religious buildings for prayers and rites, regularly – **25.0%**, sometimes – 65.3%, never 8.1%
- celebrates religious holidays – regularly – 78.1%, sometimes – 17.6%, never 2.8%
- charity activities of a religious community, regularly – **15.7%**, sometimes – 45.7%, never 34.2%
- reads religious literature – regularly – 15.4%, sometimes – 42.6%, never 36.0%
- prays – regularly – **28.0%**, sometimes – 54.9%, never 14.3%

When the general data for Bosnia and Herzegovina are examined, it can be noted that the level of religious practice is higher in all elements compared with the Serbian case. Statistical analysis shows that there is a statistically significant connection between belonging to a confession and the level of practicing one's religion. The Orthodox believers have the lowest level of religious practice in comparison with the Catholic and Muslim populations in all observed elements. It should be taken into account that certain differences may arise from the very nature of these religions, for example, prayer being the fundamental obligation for Muslims, while in Christianity it is the matter of a believer's free will. Still, the Catholic population is the one with the highest level of prayer practice here. The difference is statistically significant when belonging to a religion or confession is linked with praying (X2 (32)= 208.013 Sig.000). In the same vein, *zakat* or almsgiving is defined as an obligation in Islam, while in Christianity this decision is a matter of one's conscience as well.

The introduction of new indicators can provide a further insight into the "depth" of faith, loyalty towards institutionalized religion, in more popular confessions in B&H, as well as into the intrinsicality of their faith. Other indicators, such as the reading of religious literature, also show a statistically significant connection between belonging to a certain religion and the pronouncedness of this activity (X2 (32)= 305.052 Sig.000). This activity is most present in Catholics, followed by Muslims, and finally Orthodox believers.

The situation is similar with the indicator that shows the relation towards institutionalized religion – regular observance of rites, as proposed by the

dogma (X2 (32)= 217.475, Sig.000). The most diligent are Catholics, followed by Muslims, and lastly Orthodox believers.

Graph 3: Religious practice B&H by confessions



Religious practice, Macedonia

According to all of the observed indicators, the highest level of religious practice is present in Macedonia in comparison with Serbia, but also Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- visits religious buildings for prayers and rites, regularly – **36.4%**, sometimes – 52.1%, never 11.0%
- celebrates religious holidays – regularly – 87.6%, sometimes – 9.1%, never 2.5%
- charity activities of a religious community, regularly – **21.8%**, sometimes – 37.9%, never 36.5%
- reads religious literature – regularly – **20.5%, sometimes** – 33.4%, never 44.0%
- prays – regularly – **32.8%, sometimes** – 35.4%, never 30.8%

The papers of the authors who deal with religiosity in Macedonia show that the level of religious practice is relatively low in Macedonia, however, in relation to the other countries observed in this study, this level is still the highest. "The high rates of confessional and individual religious affiliation are not 'followed' in religious practice. Namely, in terms of practice, the Macedonian population is defined as traditional, marking the most important religious holidays (which have become nonworking days), at the same time, a significant part of the population sometimes goes to religious institutions (attends religious services), and marks the main events of their life. This is also the case with Orthodox believers and believers of the Islamic provenance" (Cacanoska, 2016: 18). Nevertheless, we cannot agree with the stated estimation that there is no difference between the Muslim and Orthodox community when it comes to the level of religious practice, since our data imply the opposite. Statistical analysis has shown that there

is a statistically significant connection between belonging to a certain religion and the level of religious practice.

Graph 4. Religious practice Macedonia by confession



The graph that shows the level of prayer frequency proves that this religious practice is more prominent in Muslims, which may be the consequence of the vary nature of the religion as stated above (X2 (35)= 247.300 Sig.000).

Furthermore, Muslims also read their religious literature and attend religious rites more often than their Orthodox counterparts.

Religion in the public sphere

What is today intriguing in relation to religion in the observed societies is the perception of the public role of religion and religious communities. "During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991–1995), politicized and ethicized religion became a powerful tool for mobilization against 'ethnic enemies'" (Abazović, 2015: 1). This statement is relevant for the other two countries as well. The instrumentalization of religion in the function of emphasizing the difference and mobilizing for the conflict was ever-present during the war period. The data examined here can point to the possibility of mobilizing people in the case of renewed conflicts, as well as to whether it is possible to cause new conflicts by problematizing religious issues.

This paper will draw attention to certain research results that have shed light on the perception of the role of religion in the public life. Namely, we intend to determine whether and to what degree experiencing religion as an important social factor is present in the formally secular states. It is not a secret that in the period of conflicts in this region there was a major influence of religious communities on the creation of social relations, not only by determination and announcement of certain social issues, but also actively through both formal and informal effects (mainly informal in the declaratively secular states), as well as through concrete actions (for example, in relation to the gay parade in Serbia).

Graph 5. Religious leaders should not influence the decision making authority



The graph shows the level of agreement with the statement that religious leaders should not influence the government and their decision making. It is interesting that Macedonia is the country in which the awareness of this issue is at the highest level, followed by B&H, while in Serbia it is at the lowest level. Perhaps this is so because the citizens of Macedonia believe that in the conditions of multi-religiosity and ethnic tension such practice could be dangerous and conflict-inducing.

This relation is also marked by belonging to a certain confession.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muslims mainly believe that religious leaders should not meddle in secular issues (Orthodox too). This is interesting because of the nature of Islam as a religion turned towards the world.

Table 4. Religious leaders should not influence the decision making authority, B&H

%	Completely agree	I agree	Neither	Disagree	Completely disagree
Orthodox	24,0	48,5	16,6	6,5	1,4
Muslims	30,0	28,4	20,4	9,0	4,0

X2 176.008 (48).000

In Macedonia, it is the Orthodox believers who are more aware of this than the Muslims. It seems that the influence of confessionality is here dominated by the current situation and the assessment of the immediate interest for one's own community.

Table 5. Religious leaders should not influence the decision making authority Macedonia

%	Completely agree	I agree	Neither	Disagree	Completely disagree
Orthodox	**41,6**	**31,5**	9,8	5,6	1,9
Muslims	19,8	22,5	25,7	12,3	3,6

X2 122.747 (56).000

Graph 6. Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public service



When it comes to the statement that politicians should be elected to public posts according to whether they believe in God or not, we return once again to the determined order where Macedonia leads the field in the religiosity indicators, i.e. the number of those who would want the people leading the society and creating social reality to be religious. When those who completely agree with this statement are added to those who merely agree with it, we can see that some 40% of the respondents believe that the politicians who believe in God are better fit for public service. A large number of respondents do not have a solid opinion on the matter. These data show that religiosity is considered desirable and important for the realization of social ideals that should guide the politicians in the observed societies.

In B&H, the Muslims (X2 (48)= 176.008, Sig.000) are a little front when it comes to wishing that politicians are religious. In Macedonia the Muslim believers, to a large degree, are most inclined to this idea (X2 (56)= 152.918, Sig.000), which again corroborates our hypothesis that the citizens of these countries position themselves in line with the situation, and make their choices in relation to their community and its interests.

Table 6. Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public service, B&H

%	Complitly agree	I agree	Neither	Disagree	Complitly disagree
Orthodox	2,8	30,3	28,9	23,8	9,7
Muslims	15,5	17,8	28,6	19,5	7,4

X2 176.008 (48).000

Table 7. Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public service, Macedonia

%	Complitly agree	I agree	Neither	Dosagree	Complitly disagree
Orthodox	15,8	15,8	14,1	28,6	15,8
Muslims	**22,5**	26,9	20,9	9,5	2,4

X2 152.918 (56).000

Observations

Confessionality in the observed ex-Yugoslav countries is almost complete. When we introduce other indicators of the level of religiosity, we can see that Macedonia is in the first place in all of the indicators of the level of religiosity, followed by B&H and then Serbia.

Only in Serbia there are people who declare themselves as religious, yet not as members of any religious community (16.2%). The level of religious practice is lowest in Serbia according to all parameters.

Based on the indicators in our research, the level of religious practice in Serbia is in accordance with the results from a number of previous studies, i.e. relatively low. It is very important to note the frequency of ir/regular visits to religious buildings, since it can point to the presence of church believers who attend the service every week and those traditional ones who go to church only during the major holidays. We can restate our opinion expressed in the analysis of the data from 2008 and 2011. "High confessional belonging has been present in Serbia for a couple of decades now, however, it has recently been accompanied by an increased level of self-declared religiosity. The level of religious practice has risen, yet it remains at a low level in all indicators, except when it comes to celebrating major holidays and practicing the rites of passage" (Gavrilović, 2013: 107).

In Macedonia the level of religious practice is the highest, however, the difference that exists between the Orthodox and the Muslim population in the level of religious practice has to be emphasized. This connection between confessional belonging and the level of religious practice is statistically significant in all of the observed elements. In B&H certain forms of religious practice are higher in Catholics, while other forms are mainly present in Muslims, while the Orthodox believers are characterized by the lowest level of religious practice, except in the case of celebrating holidays and observing rites. These are not the indicators of intrinsic religiosity. The orthodox believers in all three observed countries have a lower level of religious practice compared with the other examined religions. There are data that indicate a low level of religious practice in other Orthodox believers (in Bulgaria, Greece), but also those that point to a high level of religious

practice, for example, in Romania, thus no substantial conclusion can be drawn on the existing Orthodox religious culture.

Nevertheless, the religiosity in the observed region can be graded in the following order: Macedonia, B&H, Serbia. Still, it can be concluded that in all of these countries the level of religious practice is not high.

When it comes to the perception of the role of religion in the public sphere, we can emphasize that in all of the observed societies there exists a division in the opinions on the role of religious leaders in the society, as well as on the religiosity of politicians, which is a glimpse of hope that the awareness is rising on the need to differentiate social spheres, which is characteristic of modern societies.

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Danijela Gavrilović

Religija u društvima Zapadnog Balkana

Apstrakt: Trendovi revitalizacije društvene uloge religije i nivoa religioznosti nisu zaobišli Balkan. Ovi trendovi su bili izraženiji na ovim prostorima delimično usled ratne prošlosti, i upotrebe religije u funkciji „kulturne odbrane". U uslovima nesigurnih nacionalnih identiteta religija je bila jedan od osnovnih izvora razlikovanja sukobljenih naroda Balkana. Danas u postratnoj eri ovaj region pored globalne krize potresaju još uvek i posledice nedavne prošlosti. Religija dobija novu društvenu relevantnost (Habermas). U tekstu će biti predstavljena religijska polja – rasprostranjenost i nivo religioznosti u posmatranim društvima (Srbija, Makedonija, BiH). Korišćeni du podaci empirijskog istraživanja sprovedenog od strane Centra za empirijske studije kulture 2013. godine. Podaci pokazuju da postoji uticaj konfesije/religije na nivo religioznosti u okviru pojedinih država, kao i na odnos prema javlnoj ulozi religije.

Ključne reči: religija, društvo, revitalizacija religije, ex-jugoslovenske države.

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NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND RELIGION IN SERBIA AND CROATIA*

Abstract: The paper focuses on the Orthodox and the Catholic bioethical perspectives on assisted reproduction in Serbia and Croatia. Different positions are discussed in the chapter: theological positions, the official Church teachings, political agendas, and views of the general population and population interested in infertility. The paper argues that regulation of assisted reproduction and the prevailing social norms are influenced by the teachings of the two dominant religions in Serbia and Croatia. The Orthodox Church has more liberal attitudes towards new reproductive technologies than the Catholic Church. These differences are reflected in public discourse and legislations of Serbia and Croatia.

Key words: assisted reproductive technology, reproductive rights, religion, Eastern Orthodoxy, Catholicism.

Introduction

Before modern reproductive technologies were invented, people had very few options for treating infertility: formal and informal adoption or primitive quasi-surrogacy/donor methods.[1] Childlessness is not necessarily a destiny any more. Modern *assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs)*[2] are far more effective than any traditional methods. At the same time, many bioethical

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[1] For example, the Old Testament story about Sarah and Abraham as "intended parents" and Hagar, the handmaid of Sarah, who was a "surrogate" and "egg-donor".

[2] We are using different terms depending on the context (*ART*, *ARTs*, *assisted reproduction*, and *new reproductive technologies*). In this paper, the concept has a comprehensive meaning, referring to old techniques (a less invasive artifical insemination) and more invasive new techniques (IVF); both homologous (biological parents are intended parents) and heterologous methods (biological parent or parents is/are not the same as intended parent/s), and surrogacy (gestational mother is not

and biopolitical issues are entangled with modern ARTs. For example, surrogacy is not always embraced as a manifestation of women's reproductive rights. The European Parliament has strongly opposed to gestational surrogacy, aligning with conservatives and radical feminists (Ignjatović and Bošković, 2017).[3] Also, the available options for excess embryos – freezing, disposal, and donation – have raised many ethical questions. Even more debatable is embryo reduction in multi-fetal pregnancies, and pre-implantation genetic screening is not beyond ethical dilemmas.

Bioethics of ART is even more complicated in theological debates. Christian bioethics is based on a common set of principles, but there are also differences across Christian denominations. Some positions are elaborated in the official Church teachings, while other aspects of ARTs are implicitly considered as un/acceptable. In this paper, we look at the ethical debates in the two dominant religious denominations in Serbia and Croatia, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the Roman Catholic Church. Even though Serbia and Croatia are secular countries, reproductive rights seem to be still influenced by religion.

Bioethics of ART in the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church in Europe

The modern Catholic and Orthodox (bio)ethics is based on the Christian "perception about man and their relationship to God" (Koios, 2009: 362). Infertility was mentioned in many places in the Holy Bible. There is a strong patriarchal background of the Old Testament's interpretation of the causes of infertility. Female infertility was predominantly identified as the reason for childlessness (Aničić, 2007).[4] For example, in the New Testament (The Gospel according to Luke: 1, 5–7), Elisabeth and Zecheria "had no child, because that Elisabeth was barren" (The Holy Bible, 1611: 2150). All these biblical women became mothers either with the assistance of another woman or by giving birth at a very old age "by the grace of God". There are many anticipations of modern ART techniques in the Bible. For example, surrogacy and egg donation are found in the biblical story of a childless couple, Sarah and Abraham. Hagar, the handmaid of Sarah, was a "surrogate" and "egg-donor" who gave birth to Ishmael, a son of Abraham (Radan et

the same as biological mother); genetic screening, freezing, reduction or destruction of embryos.

[3] Feminism has condemned surrogacy as a patriarchal exploitation of women (both the surrogates and women using their services). Paradoxically, their position is in line with a conservative perspective, although for different reasons (Ignjatović and Bošković, 2017).

[4] Six women were mentioned in the Old Testament, and one in the New Testament. Male infertility is rather tacitly implied (for example, the story about a childless widow who had a child with another man) (Aničić, 2007).

al. 2015). This is a rudimentary form of surrogacy and semi-heterologous fertilization, in which only the father is genetically related to the child, but not the intended mother.

However, the Old Testament and the New Testament have substantially different positions on in/fertility. Unlike the Old Testament, which emphasizes procreation ("And God blessed them, and God said unto them, be fruitful, and multiply"), the New Testament focuses on marriage as a spiritual unit: "Then said Elkanah her husband to her, Hannah, why weepest thou? and why eatest thou not? and why is thy heart grieved? *Am not I better to thee than ten sons?*" (The Holy Bible, 1611: 7; 620, italics mine; Aničić, 2007). Here we can see a subtle indication that marriage dyad is a unit *per se*, unifying the emotional and spiritual domain, thus transcending the traditional role of procreation. This position can be translated into the modern Christian views of infertility.

The modern Catholic bioethics is elaborated in the Donum Vitae Instruction (1987) and the update of the Instruction (2007). A strong ethical criticism of ARTs is based on the "*life is a gift*" postulate:

> The gift of life which God the Creator and Father has entrusted to man calls him to appreciate the inestimable value of what he has been given and to take responsibility for it: this fundamental principle must be placed at the centre of one's reflection in order to clarify and solve the moral problems raised by artificial interventions on life as it originates and on the processes of procreation (Donum Vitae Instruction, 1987, Introduction 1, as cited in Bauzon, 2008: 45).

Within this ethical framework, parenthood should not be conceptualized as a project, but as God's gift. There is a certain degree of theological fatalism in the Catholic understanding of human procreation. Instead of a pro-active, medically driven project, a new life should be accepted as a gift: "the woman should accept her *child as a gift from God*, rather than *claim it* (…) Giving and accepting a gift establishes a relationship of sharing, whereas fulfilling one's desire is a one-sided act" (Bauzon, 2008: 45, italic mine).

Another ethical proposition that comes into play here is the concept of marriage as an *inseparable spiritual and physical unity* and the only legitimate framework for expressing natural laws of procreation. The criticism of assisted reproduction has a long tradition. The Catholic Church had even disapproved of a less invasive method of artificial insemination, before modern ART methods were introduced in reproductive medicine (Kešina, 2003). The critical point was a separation of physical and spiritual side of human procreation (Kešina, 2003).[5]

Modern techniques of assisted reproduction are viewed through the same lens: "*Donum Vitae* teaches that if a given medical intervention *helps*

[5] First in 1897, then in the mid-20th century (Pope Pius XII), and in 1983 (Pope John Paul II) (Kešina, 2003).

or assists the marriage act to achieve pregnancy, it may be considered moral; if the intervention *replaces* the marriage act in order to engender life, it is not moral" (Haas, 1998). However, it is difficult to find a technique that would not interfere with a natural process. Even the less invasive GIFT technique[6] is ethically disputable. The Catholic Church was divided over GIFT: "Some theologians consider this to be a replacement of the marital act, and therefore immoral. Other theologians see it as assisting the marital act, and therefore permissible" (Haas, 1998). Evidently, almost all techniques of assisted reproduction interfere with marriage unity by separating the physical and spiritual (and emotional) component of marriage. Only the methods of microsurgery or other nonsurgical procedures (for example, in the case of blocked fallopian tubes) are acceptable.[7]

What follows from the above statement is that a wish to have a child is limited by ethical principles. *Human dignity* is the most important ethical postulate and a precondition for any consideration of ART techniques. Ethical justification of methods used to fulfill a human desire for parenthood rests on "the fundamental principle… the respect for the human being from the first moment of his or her existence" (Bauzon, 2008: 44). The principle of dignity applies to the process of conception, and from the ethical point of view, it is not only the question what happens to the existing embryos, but also *how* they are created. The key point here is that biological and spiritual side of human conception must not be separated. Human life is an intrinsic value, incorporating biological and intellectual life (Bauzon, 2008). The process of conception is not only biological, but also an emotional and spiritual process, like marriage is both physical and spiritual unit.

The concept of human dignity applies to every stage of human existence, from the very beginning of the conception, through all stages of embryo development. Any separation of these two components in the process of creation is a violation of human dignity. Child's existence is conceptualized as complex, bio-spiritual process, from the early stage of embryo formation. ART techniques have introduced the separation of two processes – the conception and parenthood, the biological and emotional dimension – and it is morally doubtful. Since a (hypothetical) child has the same rights as adults, there is no such thing as a right to a child (Bauzon, 2008). It has the right to be born in a "proper way" – "the child's right to be conceived and brought into the world of marriage" (Bauzon, 2008: 45). Being married does not legitimize separating the biological and spiritual part of the conception.

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[6] Gamete Intra-Fallopian Transfer (GIFT) is less popular today compared to IVF which is much more common. After hormonal stimulation, eggs are first removed and than placed with sperm in Fallopian tubes. Technically, the process of fertilization takes place in Fallopian tubes and not in the laboratory as in IVF procedure.

[7] These methods are effective only in the treatment of some infertility issues.

Within the Catholic ethical framework, all ART techniques are more or less problematic, some of them spurring more ethical criticism than the others. Surrogacy, with its evident physical and symbolical interference with a holy dyad of marriage (another person is involved), is probably the most criticized technique. However, even though Catholicism disapproves of any form of artificial intervention in human reproduction, there is still a tacit gradation of ART techniques. Artificial insemination and GIFT are not as problematic as IVF and surrogacy. Also, there is a difference between (heterosexual) married couples and other biologically and socially infertile groups (single women, gay couples). ART techniques "are perhaps less reprehensible, yet remain morally unacceptable" if used as a treatment for heterosexual married couples (Colliton, 2007: 14). There is a degree of tolerance for artificial insemination today, because this method mimics the natural conception, with a minimal medical intervention (Maros, 2015).[8]

The Catholic Church published another document – Dignitas Personas – 25 years after Donum Vitae (Mallia, 2013). The key issue remains the fact that reproductive technologies (such as ICSI) are replacing a conjugal act, "as 'such fertilization is neither in fact achieved nor positively willed as the expression and fruit of a specific act of conjugal union" (Mallia 2013: 386). As Mallia has noted, Dignitas Personas "does not say anything new in this regard other than acknowledge existence of new technologies such as cryopreservation of oocytes" (Mallia 2013: 387). The focus is still placed on the immoral side of assisted reproduction. Different issues related to ART (frozen or destroyed embryos, surrogacy related issues, etc.) are regarded only as consequences of unethical procedures that have replaced the natural act of procreation (Mallia 2013).

The Orthodox churches of Russia, Greece, and Romania are following the same basic principles as the Catholic Church. They have based their views of artificial reproduction on a general theological concept of human being and its status[9]:

> (…) the rights of an embryo emanate from the fact that the embryo is a person under development… From the very beginning of conception, the embryo is not simply a fertilised egg; it is a perfect human being as far as its identity is concerned, and is constantly being perfected during its phenotypic expression and development (Koios, 2009: 361).

The Orthodox theology has a clear negative view of certain ART procedures, such as destroying, selecting or freezing embryos at any stage of development: "In every embryo, from the very moment of conception, along with the cellular multiplication, the birth and development of its soul is

[8] Artificial insemination is a minimally invasive, *in vivo fertilization* technique. Medical assistance consists of placing sperm into the uterus or cervix around the time of ovulation.

[9] The same principles are used to condemn abortion as ethically wrong.

carried out. Both these inseparable elements, the birth and growth of body and soul constitute the human person-hypostasis" (Koios, 2009: 361). Following the theological premise of human dignity and body-soul unity, the Orthodox Church opposes to pre-implantation embryo testing (genetic screening) with a purpose of genetic selection (to prevent genetic disorders) and embryo freezing (every embryo should have an equal chance to develop). The same applies to other procedures, like embryo reduction in multi-fetal pregnancies or destruction of frozen embryos. Once the embryo is created, it should be treated with dignity and given adequate conditions to become a fully developed human being.

The Russian Orthodox Church holds an ambivalent position on assisted reproduction. It "sympathizes with childless spouses, blessing them to pray for the gift of offspring, to seek medical treatment for infertility, as well as to adopt children" (Pravmir, 2014). Unlike the old Catholic position, artificial insemination is accepted as a method which "does not violate the integrity of the marital union and does not differ basically from natural conception and takes place in the context of marital relations" (Pravmir, 2014). However, the Russian Orthodox Church has condemned surrogacy because it violates the concept of human person as a unique individual by reducing it to a biological specimen (Pravmir, 2014). The Church has debated about the consequences of surrogacy and whether it should deny the Baptism to the child born in such circumstances or not. The Church may refuse to perform the act of Baptism only if "the parents do not bear explicit repentance for their deed, and the sponsors in fact concur with the sinful act that has been performed" (Pravmir, 2014). Otherwise, children born to a surrogate mother have the right to the Baptism because they should not be held responsible for their parents' deeds.[10]

In a secular Europe, social norms are still influenced by religion (at least indirectly). For example, Italy and Greece have quite different approaches in the regulation of ART. Clearly, these regulations are influenced by the main religions in these countries, the Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Orthodox Church. Leon and colleagues (2011) compared the Italian and Greek legislations in five domains of ART (homologous artificial reproduction, heterologous fertilization, post-mortem fertilization, surrogate maternity and surplus embryos) and found that the only common regulation includes the homologous artificial reproduction. In all other cases, Greek legislation is far more liberal, while Italian legislation completely forbids the other four ART techniques. Moreover, Greek regulation of gestational surrogacy is far more liberal compared to many other EU states (Leon, Papetta, Spiliopoulou, 2011).[11] It was mentioned before that the European Parliament

[10] The issue of surrogacy was discussed at the meeting of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church that was held in December 2013 (Pravmir, 2014).

[11] There is no common EU framework in this area (Leon, Papetta, Spiliopoulou, 2011).

has condemned surrogacy because it "(…) undermines the human dignity of the woman since her body and its reproductive functions are used as a commodity" (European Parliament, 2015: 29). In Greece, gestational surrogacy is legal if there is no genetic relation between the surrogate mother and the baby, only the uterus is "rented" (the surrogate mother should be married). Traditional surrogacy (the surrogate is also genetically related to the baby) is prohibited. As we shall discuss later, Greek legislation is more liberal than Serbian regulation of assisted reproduction.[12]

Recent legislative changes have been criticized by the Greek Orthodox Church, especially some extreme cases (IVF for post-menopausal women). The main criticism of the Orthodox Church was aimed at heterologous fertilization, single motherhood, post-mortem fertilization, surrogate maternity and embryo experimentation (Leon, Papetta, Spiliopoulou, 2011). However, the Orthodox Church was not against the use of ARTs in specific circumstances – a married couple facing infertility should be allowed to utilize assisted reproduction. This means that the Church approves homologous artificial reproduction.[13]

The Catholic Church and ART in Croatia

The Croatian public is divided over the regulation of assisted reproduction. Reproductive rights are very important policy issues the political debate and election campaigns. Compared to Serbia, there is also a much more vigorous debate about ART in theological and academic circles. The general public shows much concern about political agendas aiming at reproductive rights and these issues are widely discussed on the Internet (for example, the Forum Roda). However, the general population in Croatia is rather liberal than conservative towards assisted reproduction technologies. According to recent public opinion surveys, around two-thirds of respondents supported the right to ART for single men and women, and the same percentage did not support state protection of the embryo against the will of a woman (Galić, 2011).

Before 2012, Croatia used to have a very restrictive regulation of medically assisted reproduction: "In Croatia, the Medically Assisted Reproduction Act allows freezing of reproductive cells, but not embryo freezing; instead, all fertilised cells (no more than three) are transferred into the uterus" (Roksandić Vidlička et al, 2012: 46). The law was supported by the Catholic

[12] Ukraine or Macedonia also have a liberal legislation of assisted reproduction.

[13] An opposed, conservative position is found in the teachings of the Metropolitan Nikolaos, who is very close to the Catholic understanding of assisted reproduction. He does not support any kind of assisted reproduction, but recommends adoption as a solution for infertility: "Biological sterility may become the cause of rich spiritual fertility for the spouses, when they accept humbly God's will in their life" (Metropolitan Nikolaos, 2008).

Church and it was prepared in consultations with the Church (Galić, 2011). Due to the very restrictive legislation, the couples struggling with infertility had to go abroad to get a proper treatment (Galić, 2011).

The Assisted Reproduction Act from 2012 is much more liberal, but it still has many elements of the conservative/Catholic position. It is obligatory to use two natural cycles without stimulation (out of six cycles funded by the State Health Fund). A controlled stimulation is allowed to create a maximum of 12 oocytes; all of them can be fertilized, and a maximum of two embryos transferred (Zakon o medicinski pomognutoj oplodnji, 2012). This means that mild stimulation is still preferred.

Immediately after the new law was enacted in 2012, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ in Croatian), started a campaign against it.[14] The law was compared to the "biggest tragedies in Croatian history" – the concentration camps from the WWII, Jasenovac and Bleiburg (Vuković, 2012). During the 2015 election campaign, the Croatian Democratic Union started once again a public ethical debate about embryo freezing. Being asked if he intended to support "more natural methods of family planning which respect human dignity", a HDZ health board member said: "Yes, (I would support) natural cycle (IVF)". The reason for his preference for natural cycle over stimulated IVF, was that, in his opinion, "one third of (frozen) embryos do not survive the unfreezing process, which is unethical since each of them is a new human life. (It is best) if a natural cycle is stimulated with a low dose of drugs, and two embryos are fertilized and transferred" (Kovačević Marišić, 2015).[15] Embryo cryopreservation was also targeted by the Catholic Church and the bishops strongly opposed to the 2012 law (Kovačević Marišić, 2015).

In a regular medical practice, the choice of IVF procedure depends on a woman's hormonal status and other factors. In the above interpretation, it is presented as a one-size-fits-all approach. Using protocols for natural cycle and mild IVF has the aim to control the number of produced eggs (and consequently, embryos). The idea is that all embryos should be transferred in a fresh cycle to avoid embryo freezing. The main argument is that using cryopreservation does not provide equal conditions for all embryos. As one of the HDZ representatives said: "In order to have one child, ten of his siblings must be sacrificed" (Index, 2012). It is believed that a minimal stimulation (preference for natural cycle IVF) will produce an optimal number of embryos. The "optimum" implicitly refers to parental fertility preferences (the number of desired children), and the reasonable number of embryos that can be transferred to the uterus in the same IVF cycle.

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[14] The Croatian Democratic Union was the opposition party in 2012.

[15] Mild IVF is a procedure based on a low stimulation drugs compared to the standard IVF (for example, clomiphene citrate). In a (modified) natural cycle IVF, no drugs are used to stimulate ovaries to make more eggs; drugs are used to induce ovulation (Aanesen et al. 2010).

What does it mean in practice? A minimal stimulation is often used in order to stay within the limit of 12 oocytes, which is not effective for many women. Sometimes the production of small number of eggs and even smaller number of embryos results in low quality embryos and failed cycles. These women are forced to go through many IVF cycles, which paradoxically may have further implications of "life waste". Evidently, relying on medical indications and protocols to produce "the best embryos" is in a collision with the theological principle of spontaneity and fatality of human reproduction (the "child as a gift from God" axiom emphasized by the Catholic church). Two principles, utilitarianism and the natural law ethics are completely opposed in the case of assisted reproduction.

Furthermore, the principle of "life preservation" which is based on avoiding cryopreservation of embryos is not supported by scientific evidence. Recent studies have shown that embryo freezing success rates are now very close to those in a fresh embryo transfer (Wong, Mastenbroek and Repping, 2014). If preserving life and providing equal chances for all embryos is the goal, then focusing on fresh embryo transfer is not necessarily the best and the only acceptable option. On the contrary, there is some evidence that frozen embryo transfer is even associated with better perinatal and obstetric outcomes (Maheshwari et al. 2012).

In spite of the lack of scientific evidence for their arguments, the opponents of ART techniques in Croatia still have a strong impact on normative and legislative regulation in this area. Resentful men and women struggling with infertility are fearful that the pendulum will swing back to even more strict regulations that prohibit embryo freezing (Forum Roda, 2016). Conservative politicians have been advocating for more prohibitive regulations of reproductive rights in their political agendas, including the right to assisted reproduction and abortion.[16] These ideas are supported by the Catholic Church which offers an alternative to medical procedures. The approach called NaProTechnology is supposed to be the "Catholic alternative to IVF". The model focuses on obstacles that prevent fertilization (blocked Fallopian tubes, etc.) and avoids any methods that separates conjugal act and fertilization (Centar za skrb plodnosti, 2014).[17] Yet, some infertility

[16] During the nineties, there were several legislative proposals to introduce a restrictive regulation of abortion in Croatia. The conscience clause was introduced, allowing medical professionals to refuse to perform an abortion on moral grounds (Galić, 2011). In 2015, the protest was organized against the restrictions in exercising the reproductive right to abortion. The reason was a 24 year old request, submitted to the Supreme Court in 1991 to determine the unconstitutional character of the right to abortion. Right-wing political options and the Catholic conservatives re-initiated this request (Telegram, 2015).

[17] NaProTechnology and FertiltyCare are developed at the The Pope Paul VI Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction. They are based on the natural family planning methods.

issues are more complicated. In that case, the only solution is acceptance. Aničić has elaborated pragmatic implications of infertility, offering a practical advice to infertile couples. Married couples should be encouraged to strengthen their relationship through their difficult experience of infertility (or rather, in spite of it) (Aničić, 2007: 199). They can devote their life to other children, orphans, their cousins, etc.

We have mentioned some of the authors who have written about ARTs in Croatia from theological perspective (Kešina, Aničić). Their anti-ART position is based on the teachings of the Catholic Church. There are even more extreme positions in Croatia. Tonči Matulić, a bioethicist and theologian, holds a radical view, aiming his criticism at "libertarian eugenics" of ART:

> Namely, if the practice of laissez-faire – libertarian – eugenics is guided in accordance with the assumed principle of the maximum freedom of the individual, that is, their desires and demands (…) what is the substantial difference between the desires and demands of Hitler to eradicate the hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings using eugenic methods, on the one hand, and the desires and the demands of any modern individual to practice eugenics, on the other (…) (Matulić as cited in Polšek, 2006: 181).

Matulić draws on the Catholic understanding of assisted reproduction as an epitome of narcissism, egoism and person-centeredness. However, his conclusions are much more extreme because he compares modern eugenics (including ARTs) with Nazi eugenics (Polšek, 2006).

The Serbian Orthodox Church and ART

The Serbian legislation of ART is based on utilitarian ethics. For example, according to the previous Act on Assisted Reproduction, the goal of ART was "birth of a child" (Malešević, 2016). At the same time, the principle of integrity was clearly emphasized: "the protection of individuality of human beings and the embryo or fetus integrity" (Zakon o lečenju neplodnosti postupcima biomedicinski potpomognutog oplođenja, 2009, Art. 5). Also, in the recently adopted legislation: "the protection of individuality and integrity of the embryo" (Zakon o biomedicinski potpomognutoj oplodnji, 2017, Art. 5). However, the secular concept of integrity applies primarily to the existing human beings. It does not have a theological meaning. Contrary to the strict Christian (especially Catholic) postulate that adults (intended parents) and unborn children have the same rights, the law gives priority to adults. A wish to have a child has priority over ethical consideration of procedures applied to that end (Malešević, 2016). Of course, there are strict regulations for ART procedures, and the law is not very liberal in many aspects (couples are privileged over singles, prohibition of surrogacy).

The 2017 act is similar to the previous law in two sections: surrogacy is prohibited and homologous and heterologous ARTs are allowed. The sections

about heterologous IVF were defined in 2012, but the necessary preconditions for heterologous procedures have not implemented yet (national bank of reproductive cells). There are new regulations for embryo donation, which is now legal. Also, the law permits importing and exporting of reproductive cells. The section about personal data and individual protection is elaborated. According to this regulation, donor's identity is protected, but the child born with the assistance of donor cells has the right of access to limited information about the donor (medical information) at the age of 15, and it is allowed only for medical reasons.

The 2017 law continues to insist on the family context for assisted reproduction. The right to ART procedures is given to men and women being married or cohabiting (partners living together) (Zakon o lečenju neplodnosti postupcima biomedicinski potpomognutog oplođenja, 2009, Art. 24; Zakon o biomedicinski potpomognutoj oplodnji, 2017, Art. 25).[18] The Croatian law is even more strict because embryo/cell transfer is allowed only if partnership (marriage or common-law marriage) is confirmed by valid personal documents (Zakon o medicinski pomognutoj oplodnji, 2012, Art. 11). Serbian and Croatian legislations allow embryo freezing (and reproductive cells as well), and also their destruction. In Serbia, conservation of cryopreserved cells and embryos is limited to five years (Zakon o lečenju neplodnosti postupcima biomedicinski potpomognutog oplođenja, 2009, Art 58; Zakon o biomedicinski potpomognutoj oplodnji, 2017, Art. 51). The Croatian law has the same limit, but embryo owners can choose to pay for continued freezing after five years.

The Serbian Orthodox Church has a more liberal attitude towards assisted reproduction than the Catholic Church in Croatia. The position of many Serbian Orthodox theologians is based on *the natural law*, which is the same nature-related argument that has been used to delegitimize ART in the previously mentioned Catholics views: "If ART is the only solution to get offspring, then it is unacceptable to avoid this solution with a justification that it violates natural relationship between spouses, not only from the biological but also from the theological perspective" (Peno as cited in Maros, 2015: 56). From the Orthodox perspective, ART is rather seen as "enabling continuity of a disrupted natural energy flow" (Maros, 2015: 56). Another Orthodox priest, Petar Dabić, argues that bio-medically assisted reproduction (under certain conditions) is not against the principles of Christian ethics (Pravoslavlje, 2011).[19]

Zdravko Peno, an Orthodox theologian is very critical of the Catholic position that assisted methods of reproduction are detrimental to the marital

[18] The right to assisted reproduction is also given to single women, but under very limited conditions, which are not precisely defined by the law.

[19] There is one position which follows the hard-line Catholic position on assisted reproduction (Svetosavlje, 2011).

relationship because they bypass the natural act of procreation (Peno, 2017). Even though he believes that general criteria based on the Bible and the Church Fathers should be applied here, his position is more flexible. Peno argues that natural fertilization is preferred, but "if assisted reproduction is the only chance for a couple to have a child, denying them this possibility under the rationale that it will disturb the natural relationship between a husband and wife, would be completely unjustified, both from the biological and theological point of view" (Peno, 2017).

Another key point stands in stark contrast to the Catholic idealization of the natural act of procreation. Peno argues that it is not morally justified because human procreation is based on Original Sin which is inherent to all humans born by any method, natural or artificial (Peno, 2017). In other words, both assisted reproduction and natural reproduction are sinful acts in the Christian eschatology. Assisted reproduction mimics the natural laws and it not unethical in a way that the Catholic Church has argued in Donum Vitae and other ecclesial documents. According to Peno, the postulate of natural procreation as ethically superior is not grounded in the Christian doctrine, because "our physical birth is not the beginning nor the end of our existence; it should be transcended by spiritual birth, so that we can overcome the law of necessity and enter the field freedom" (Peno, 2017). From the Orthodox Christian perspective, being born in this world by any method is "agreeable to God", because physical birth is a precondition that "the whole world becomes the Church or the Christ (…) God wants that people exist in eternity as His children" (Peno, 2017).

The critical remark about the Catholic idealization of the natural conception is supported by Dahl's argument that Catholic ethics is based on the Natural Law Theory and not on the Divine Command Theory: "According to this theory, we are to respect the natural order created by God and to follow the Natural Law that the creator has placed in us. The Natural Law is (…) written and engraved in the soul of each and every man. It is immutable and eternal and it tells us what we ought to do in the sense that it identifies the goods toward which we are inclined by nature and which perfect us" (Dahl, 2010: 835). By extending his explanation of the Orthodox bioethics of ART to Christian eschatology, Peno has provided a strong argument to support the Orthodox doctrine on that matter. However, he insists on the family context and does not support single parenthood and heterologous IVF methods.

Both the Orthodox and the Catholic position emphasize the rights of the prospective human being. Since physical and spiritual development are present from the very beginning, any differentiation between pre-embryo and embryo stages is not acceptable. The optimal scenario is similar to the Croatian conservative position: up to three eggs should be fertilized and up to three embryos transferred to the uterus. The position on cryopreservation of embryos is more flexible compared to the Catholic (or conservative

Croatian) views. If parents decide to have their embryos frozen, they should be responsible. A frozen embryo is a potential life or delayed life, and all embryos should be given the same chance to exist/develop. Interestingly, Peno has mentioned also that embracing the postulate of life as the biggest value will contribute to overcoming the issue of low birth rate (Peno, 2017). A strong familism is confirmed as a strong cultural pattern in Serbia (Tomanović, Ignjatović, 2010). It is no surprise that assisted reproduction is often associated with pro-natalist policies in the public discourse, and it is therefore reflected in the above Orthodox position. The financial support to infertile couples is sometimes justified by the necessity to overcome Serbia's low birth rate and population aging, in spite of the fact that the number of births by ART methods has minimal effects on the long-term demographic trends (Mondo, 2017). Finally, as for the general public opinion on ART, there are no such debates as in Croatia about the violation of reproductive rights, even though some segments of the population are practically denied the right to assisted reproduction (gays, singles).

Conclusion

In tracing the main points of the Christian positions on assisted reproduction in Europe, we have argued that theological doctrines of the predominant national/local Christian denominations are reflected in the prevailing social norms in this area. There is a clear difference between the Christian and secular (or mainstream) bioethics of ART. The former is based on theological principles of human dignity, proper methods of human procreation (conjugal act), and acceptance of God's will (accepting the child as a gift or childlessness as a given). The modern, medical and mostly secular bioethics of ART is based on utilitarianism. The aim is to deal with infertility in the most efficient way, respecting the preferences of patients about the number of embryos/children and applying state-of-the-art pre-natal diagnostic tools to produce healthy offspring. However, the two analysed Christian denominations show different levels of tolerance for the secular, utilitarian ethics. The Orthodox Church of Serbia and other national Orthodox Churches are more tolerant about the utilitarian inclinations of their flock. The Orthodox position is more compatible with utilitarian bioethics and secular legislation.

Modern Catholic positions prioritize the bio-spiritual model of human conception over any particular interest of husband and wife. The main axiom is that parenthood should not be a narcissistic endeavor, but a gift, and people should accept that gift (or lack thereof). Parenthood should not be forced but accepted, and the process should be guided by God's will instead of artificial methods. Unlike the Catholic Church, the Orthodox theology has more compassion for the "narcissistic" wish to have a child.

The Catholic position has moved beyond a traditional role of the family by giving priority to spirituality instead of procreation. The Orthodox

Church is much closer to the Old Testament position which focuses on a procreative role of marriage, rather than its spiritual side. Assisted reproduction has separated procreation (biological parenthood) from marriage (conjugal act) and the social and psychological dimensions of parenthood. Hence the Catholic claims that ARTs are detrimental to marriage. On the contrary, ART techniques are embraced by the Orthodox Church because they can resolve marriage problems caused by infertility. However, according to the Orthodox teachings, assisted reproduction should be limited to married couples, which prevents many other socially or biologically infertile men and women from using ARTs. Marriage and common-law marriage (cohabitation) are also privileged over single intended parents in both Serbian and Croatian legislations of ART.

What does it mean in practice for believers struggling with infertility in different religious contexts, like Serbia and Croatia? The Orthodox Christians have more options, because assisted reproduction is practically acceptable under certain conditions. On the contrary, the Catholic Church is offering two options: either using some alternative solutions instead of assisted reproduction (NaProTechnology, adoption, turning to children of their cousins) or accepting the state of childlessness as God's will. Even though Serbian and Croatian legislations are quite similar (now), the ongoing lobbying activities of a conservative-Catholic camp could have a strong influence on the regulation of reproductive rights.

Even in a secular context, religion plays a role in mundane issues. The religious cleavage remains relevant in secular societies (Todosijević t al. 2015). Spiritual dimension seems to be increasingly utilized for therapeutic or palliative purposes, especially when the mainstream medicine has proved to be ineffective (Sremac, Mijić, 2011; Ignjatović, Buturović, 2017). In spite of the great progress that has been made in reproductive medicine, infertility will always be untreatable condition for some people. After a long struggle with an uncertain outcome, religion may offer some answers:

> Religious statements claim to be based on a higher authority than statements based on secular evidence. Remarkably, not only proponents of various faiths, but also their opponents grant religious leaders a kind of moral supremacy and tend to believe that theologians are somehow experts on ethical issues. Why is that? One answer is obvious, in that most people still consider religion and ethics to be inseparable. Even more than that, some people believe that religion is the very foundation of ethics, that without theology there can be no morality (Dahl, 2010: 834).

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Nove reproduktivne tehnologije i religija u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj

Apstrakt: Rad istražuje katoličko i pravoslavno bioetičko shvatanje novih reproduktivnih tehnologija u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj. U radu se razmatraju različite pozicije teologa i teoretičara, zvanične pozicije crkava, politički programi i stavovi o reproduktivnim pravima u oblasti potpomognute oplodnje, stavovi o reproduktivnim tehnologijama u opštoj populaciji i populaciji zainteresovanoj za probleme neplodnosti. Analiza je pokazala da su pravna regulativa i društvene norme u domenu biomedicinski potpomognute oplodnje pod uticajem pozicija dominantnih religija u ove dve zemlje. Pravoslavna crkva je liberalnija prema primeni potpomognute oplodnje nego Katolička crkva. Ove razlike se vide u javnom diskursu i regulativi Srbije i Hrvatske.

Ključne reči: nove reproduktivne tehnologije, reproduktivna prava, religija, pravoslavlje, katoličanstvo.

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RELIGION AND CULTURE TODAY: BETWEEN THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CHRISTIAN CULTURE AND THE REVIEW OF MODERN CULTURE*

Abstract: Both religion and culture are the expressions of man's working relationship with the world. The first one perceives the world as the creation of God and represents a special view of the world which contains 1) the view of the order of the whole world, 2) awareness of the eschatological meaning of human life, and 3) awareness of the teleological sense of God's creation. The second understands the world as a physical creation and represents a view of the world which contains 1) a partial view of the order of the world, 2) awareness of man's call to preserve the created world (spiritual culture), 3) awareness of man's power of self-preservation and the call to change the created world (material culture). Religion is a source of culture that unites spiritual and material culture and gives her life through the aspiration of man's personality to perfection or, in other words, through growing towards God.

Today, in most societies, with strong faith in a positive outcome, an economic, political and ideological project is being developed to reorganize the existing world "with the help" of a free market that organizes itself and frees others. The idea of market efficiency, which is at the core of globalization did not justify expectations: general well-being is not ensured nor has satisfied longing for ensuring non-transitivity and limitlessness. The globalist cultural aspirations, however, have led to the suppression of Christian ethics and the collapse of Christian universalism, on the one hand, and to the unification of culture, on the other. And they are questioning the survival of the created world.

Key words: Religion, Culture, Christian culture, Unification, Globalization.

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Introduction

Identification of common cultural and spiritual tendencies, which play a decisive role in the development of the individual, as well as overall social development, enables the study of the interrelationship of the culture pattern of the given epoch and suppressed patterns, including religious ones, from previous developmental periods and reveals specific common value aspects. Individuals and entire social groups are existentially forced to adapt to the external demands of a real social environment. Different cultural mechanisms, as well as those coming from the sphere of religion and education, offer value orientations to individuals and groups, enabling them to integrate into society. The characteristic value structure of members of one society can be overcome through hierarchies of values that come from the sphere of culture, religion, and sphere of education. The value structure of individuals, members of different groups, is defined in the broadest sense by the organized influence of the socialization agents. Education stands out as one of the most organized actors of socialization in contemporary society, which in the longest period of time has the opportunity to subject each new young generation to ideology, indoctrination, manipulation (what it does), determining its value framework. Based on the knowledge of the logic of social conditioning of a culture pattern promoted in institutionalized education, as well as the importance given or not given to religious culture, one can observe desirable common values, characteristic for the majority of members of a given society.

Modern societies are forced to seek for a new philosophy of development. Centers of power direct and control the development of semi-peripheral and peripheral societies, whose international influence is decreasing, and internally characterized by the duplication of the cultural "being" and the constant presence of fluctuations in whether to harmonize their own culture with the so-called "World culture" (Lechner and Boli, 2006) whose contours are found in the emerging global society.

There is a tendency to develop a strategy of convergence of different cultures and the establishment of cultural homogenization, which is accompanied by the homogenization of education. At the religious level, there is a noticeable effort to start an ecumenist process that would "unite" different religions into one. If they do not want to lose uniqueness, by accepting participation in the processes of standardization, unification, homogenization as the predecessors of globalism, special cultures and religions should find their way to establish a balance between the systems of the supreme values of a global society and values, which enable the preservation of their individuality. Especially skilled in this maintenance of balance must be the bearers of the Christian culture that is today exposed to the experience of which I. Sekulić speaks as an experience of *international loneliness* – a state in which it is not possible to develop a culture that does not transcend to

the interest functions of the world (Sekulić, 1966). The Coptic Communities in Egypt, Christians in Syria, Orthodox Christians in Kosovo and Metohia, are faced with (a) the problem of the impossibility of preserving the cultural and religious individuality and values upon which they are founded; and (b) localizing these same values because they are not recognized by global society as valuable and not interested in their preservation. Globalist cultural tendencies lead to the unification of culture and a kind of departure from religion and its values and, in particular, Christianity that is no longer in the interest of the global society and culture of the world. Institutionalized education system, however, according to the impact it can have on new generations, can be seen as an important factor in the preservation of even localized values by incorporating the elements of religious culture into the so-called "Culture of education" (Bruner, 2000).

Religion and Culture – basic definitions and hidden purpose

Terminological difficulties make it difficult to study religion as a basic phenomenon of human existence, under which, according to E.From (Erich Fromm), it means *any system of thought or action is common to a group that gives the individual the basic orientation and object of loyalty.* Such a widely understood religion allows the claim that there was no culture in the past without religion and emphasizes the need for a common system of orientation that arises from the conditions of human existence, marked by dichotomies between the different entities of reality, man, society and nature, among which there is no unity. Man, however, although he has become a disruptive factor in the originally established unity between the designated entities, constantly feels the desire or the need to restore that unity and equilibrium. How to do so, tells him the basic orientations and object of loyalty, that is, the religious choice he performs. "A man can not freely choose whether to have or not have 'ideals', but he can choose between different types of ideals, whether to surrender to worship of force and destruction or to dedicate himself to the ideals of mind and love… That is why it ios wrong qand dangerous to hold relativistic conception according to which in itself it is worth having some ideals or some religious feelings" (From, 1986: 294). Religious choice or commitment to one type of ideal allows for the establishment of a certain order and balance in the human community, as well as a certain attitude towards nature.

According to From, it is necessary to distinguish between the types of religion and religious experience, the difference between *authoritarian* and *humanistic* religions: 1) in authoritarian religions, the emphasis is on the recognition that a man is in power of a greater power outside him, who, having the power, has the right to require *submissiveness, respect, and worship*, as well as the power to force man to worship regardless of the moral qualities of that power. Humanistic religion focuses on man and his forces,

developing his need to learn the truth, at the same time developing love for oneself and others, as well as the feeling of solidarity with all living beings, and the religious experience in this type of religion is the experience of unity With the Whole, *based on the connection with the world, understood by the mind and love*. At the same time, *he considers that there is a correlation between the social structure and various types of religious experience*. "In societies in which the mighty minority governs, which keeps masses in subordinate position, the individual will be so fright stricken, so incapable of feeling strong and independent, that his religious experience will authoritative. Whether he worships some merciless scaring God or similarly understood leader – it's pretty irrelevant. On the other hand, where a person feels free and responsible for his own destiny, or belongs to that minority seeking for freedom and independence, a humanistic religious experience develops" (From, 1986: 314). Different social structures, therefore, create different conditions for forming religious experiences and their institutional transfer.

Searching for the meaning of the word *culture* confronts us with a whole series of determinations that point to its multiplicity (the various purposes and roles that it has) and multifunctionality (the function of mastering the nature, communication, designing and marking functions, information accumulation, normative function, socialization and personalization function, etc.). Culture can be differentiated and efforts to arrive at a proper definition of a culture can be divided into five basic types according to their definitions: (1) *positivist* definitions take into account only cultural facts, material and practice, and try to define culture as integral phenomenon; These definitions do not give an answer to the question of what kind of meaning culture has for a human society; (2) *Normative* definitions emphasize the goal of culture, the purpose and norms that aim to achieve a particular culture, and the facts and the structures from which the culture consists of are ignored; (3) *metaphysical* definitions overlook the connection and conditionality of particular parts of culture – strictly separating spiritual from material culture, or even their particular elements; (4) *cultural* definitions consider culture as a wider from society – they explain society with culture as "an ideal abstraction that possesses its own ontological entity and which can be explained by gnoseological self"; (5) *the naturalistic* definitions of all cultural phenomena are reduced to the organic, biological or psychological plane of human personality – they consider that man, by belonging to a human race, is predetermined to be a cultural being (Ilić, 1983: 8–12). The pluralism of the meanings of the word cultures and the number of determinations indicate the need to overcome its individual purposes and actions and the need to perceive culture as the universality of the responses that human society and individuals have provided during their existence. Striving to overcome the basic types of errors in determining culture M. Ilic gives an integral definition that brings us closer to the understanding of its essence: in the forefront it is emphasized that culture

is a set of all material and spiritual values created by the physical and spiritual work of man, whose *basic meanings* are to facilitate the maintenance, extension and advancement of human society and the individual in it – culture is the highest expression of man's creativity, which is conditioned by historical circumstances, and *humanity* is the fundamental value and the conception of the principle of culture (Ilic, 1983).

Modernity imposed a special approach to culture. The development of science and technology transformed man's everyday life, bringing about a shift in the value system, as well as sharply opposing civilization to culture. A man, otherwise inclined by the Manichaean divisions, divisions that indicate sharp contradictions, understands the culture as the spiritual world came from freedom, and civilization as a material world originated from the externalities that H. Markuz (Herbert Marcuse) calls the realm of necessity: "*culture* refers to a higher dimension of man's autonomy and achievement, while *civilization* marks the realm of necessity, socially necessary work and behavior, in which a person is not really himself and in his own element, but subordinate to heteronomy, external conditions and needs" (Markuze, 1977: 224–5). Both "realms" (cultures and civilizations) today, however, demonstrate the potentials of convergence in the level of relationship towards the transcendent – they are prone to "deconstructing" the transcendent substance. Today, the freedom of mankind is liberated from the human empire of liberty (or culture) and proclaims the necessity of accepting faith in a material world that rests on reason. The European Union (EU), created in one part of the so-called European cultural space, which mostly belongs to the Western cultural circle, emphasizes in its founding document that it rests on the following premises: *free market, human rights and freedom and reason* (Majer, 2009). There was no place in this etalon for Christian values, which practically indicates the process of cultural revision in modern European societies. The formation of their cultural identities has been linked to Christianity for nearly two thousand years, so that in the last decades of the twentieth century there has been a strong suppression of Christian ethics and the collapse of Christian universalism, whose place now occupies *the culture of new capitalism* (Senet, 2009). In practice, man is able to organize society and the world according to humanitarian principles, but because of the state of his own spirit, the process of dehumanization in the world is at stake. Scientific achievements, new techniques and technology have the power that can become devastating and destructive, calling into question the survival of culture and human beings. According to Berdjajev, the question of technique becomes a spiritual question and, finally, a religious question from which the fate of mankind depends; technique, he points out, *inflicts a terrible blow on humanism, a humanistic view of the world and the humanistic ideal of man and culture*. Asked whether the rising materialization, at the same time, represents the death of spirit and spirituality, he answers: "Machines and technique inflict

terrible defeats on the mental life of a human and above all an emotional life… Mechanical technical civilization is dangerous primarily for the soul… Technique is less dangerous for spirit, though it may sound strange. In fact, it can be said that we live in the age of technique and spirit, and not in the time of spirituality. The religious meaning of technique is, in particular, that it puts everything under the sign of a spiritual question, and it can lead to spiritualization. It demands the effort of spirituality" (Berdjajev, 1995: 22). Humanity's spirituality, however, did not limit the power of technology over human life. Instead of ascension to freedom, man's subordination to the principles of the organization of modern civilization occurred, which is strongly influenced by the consequences of the scientific-technical-technological revolution. The predominance of the civilization of technological science in the modern society over Christian culture has been established because the basic *motto* of the present generations of scientists, researchers and, in particular, the rulers of power, *let it be My will*. The non-acceptance of the order in which the priority is given to the will above passion and desire, and above the partial (individual) will, man frees the force that kept him in fear of inhumanity (sin) – liberates him of the guilty conscience. Thus, a "liberated" man can easily dismiss the hierarchy of values in which central ethical values and virtues: wisdom, courage, moderation, justice and love.

A man who has *grown up in power* who refuses to admit that besides his existence there is the will of God, intends to change the created world according to his own criteria – he needs only the appropriate context of action that will give legitimacy to that intention. Both context and legitimacy are provided to him by revision of modern culture. The revision in this paper implies a *change in the awareness* of man's calling in the world: culture (calling, action) whose *basic meanings* are to facilitate the maintenance, continuation and advancement of human society and the individual in it is transformed into culture (calling, action) in which humanity is not basic valuable and a conceiving principle. The cult of Good and the cult of Love in the world that is emerging today become ephemeral, their place is occupied by the Cult of Greed or cult of King Mida, who with its touch turns everything into gold and controls its distribution and allocation. This all-powerful golden touch, however, at the same time destroys every spark of life (King Mida died as he turned food and drink into the lumps of gold) – he was not life-giving. It does not satisfy the aspiration to touch with the supernatural and supermaterial, touch with Beauty, Goodness, Justice and live feelings of Freedom.

Christian culture today

The proclaimed end of history (Fukuyama, 1997) whose herald was considered to be the collapse of the so-called. great utopias at the end of the twentieth century did not in real life lead to the fair distribution of wealth

among people, the material well-being of large groups of population, nor the conquest of freedom. The risk of poverty, illness, wars, natural disasters, absolute control did not lead to the abolition of utopian ideas, including religious ones, and is still present in the culture of daily life.

The development of science, technique and technology has led to the unimaginable stepping forward of man into the world of open possibilities: before the so-called man, he knowledge societies, thanks to its Prometheus view of the world and its willingness to actively participate in the revealing secrets of this world or secret *material*, opens a new field of action – the field of the creation of one's own world. It is declared in this Prometheus discourse, however, one limiting factor which can prevent man from creating for himself, and by himself, the best of possible worlds – a Darwinist bequeathing. Evolutionary theory of Ch. Darwin (Charles Darwin) with all the implications which it products and causes prevents a man to get rid of the subordination of the disastrous performances of the need to maintain constant *conflict* between the privileged and unprivileged or "lower" and "higher" forms of life to the latter to able to dominate the entire matter in accordance with its predatory view of the world. The governance over man, another living world, and an artificial (social) construct in which they would be habituated according to the norms established for the benefit of the so-called "Higher" (race, class, layers, group) and "selected" (individuals) is not a novelty in the development of human society and culture. Human history is also the history of the diversion of different management strategies. Being a master means ownership of someone and / or something. In the basis of *ruling* is *the rule over the other*, over the matter from which the living beings are made of and the matter that makes the so-called the inanimate world. Governance can be related to certain features, among which *expansionism* (rapid expansion and conquest) and (2) *normativism* (imposition of regulations in order to consolidate by expansion of the newly formed order) are especially distinguished. Its basic characteristic is, however, an *antithesis to freedom*. Today's societies, in addition to all the differences in the social organization of life, economies, culture and civilized attainment of quality of life, show, with regard to accelerated globalization processes, and the so-called. The smallest common denominator – *the collapse of freedom* despite declarative advocacy for human rights. In the pre-modern societies, poets dreamed of freedom and they were conquered by warriors, in the counter-culture of the sixties of last century, freedom was tryied to be reached by the wanderers – battles, while in the social space, today, we testify to her expulsion from public discourse. Masking the real facts to take away the freedom of people and expelling from their communities and societies by verbal décor on Human Rights fails to mask the deleterious effects of a new order-yet-not-established-but-soon-to-be-able. The global human rights story, which is part of the normativism of a new order-in-formation aimed at speeding up its expansion, has already been identified as a *human rights*

terror (Boudon, 2012) and can no longer hide its specific role in the process of deprivation of liberty. The ancient picture of freedom through the story of the Garden of Eden still lives in collective memory: a man made of matter has a soul, and for her to live, the necessary *freedom*. *Freedom from* repressive laws governing the human world (society) offers religion as a reality above this world. And *freedom* for the establishment of a new thinking, sensible and active order according to the principles of *love, faith and hope* offers religion as a promise of a world different from the earthly one.

The return of religion to the global scene and its revitalization are, we can assume, in part, the response to the godly behavior of the global elites. The dominance of the scientific-technical-technological trinity under whose influence have been developed for more than half a century by various societies, primarily those belonging to the so-called western cultural circle – brought human civilization to a crossroads. The crossroads are like destinies, and from there, depending on the choice, they can go to various sides, however, the outlines of the two main signs are distinguished:

1) First, who would give the man the opportunity through experience of deliberately caused Big Bang and the discovery and mastery of physical laws to establish himself as the Great Creator, who skillfully rearranges the living and inanimate matter, with the belief that it can create the God's particle. In the name of the development of science and human power, scientists today are trying to reconstruct the original explosion, which they presume have created the whole universe so powerful that the stars and planets have dispersed and are still moving away from the center of the explosion. One such research centers is the European Laboratory for Nuclear Research, known by its acronym CERN (CERN, Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire), which today is the largest scientific organization in the world whose work involves about 15,000 scientists and engineers. In the 20th century, CERN produced a number of accelerator facilities that are used to investigate the structure of matter (http://elementarium.cpn.rs/teme/mali-recnik-cerna/), hoping to "discover" and "master" the secret Divine particles.

2) The other, who would give man the opportunity to find Love through the experience of service. And the one who seeks Love is on the path leading to God. The wisdom that connects the soul with freedom and love in the *symphony* of transforming the old man, habituated by worshipping false values into a new man who is ready to accept and live the Truth, possessing Christianity, its original form, Orthodoxy. The true celebration of God, the celebration of the glorification of God's creation and the appreciation of the divine particle in every part of it, is proclaimed through the Christian culture. Conformation of everyday life according to simple rules (commands) that in ten points create the broadest context of the human operation at the micro level – horizontal material and the macro level – the vertical line that exalts to the sky, *releases mankind from the danger* that in the struggle for existence at the earth level should act as senseless creatures. Creatures

whose activism is stimulated by compulsion to satisfy needs relieved of the attachment of meaning and away from the principle of humanity.

Christian culture by spreading knowledge about higher principles that allow survival and preservation of life, providing *archetypes* of organization of life based on the *good* and *benefit* of all people and *the promise* of new life above and beyond the perishable goods – meets the boldest expectations of soul liberated of discipline of global dimensions and its transition from "Earthly empire" into the "heavenly empire" by spiritual scales (St. John the Lords, 2009). Christian culture, therefore, by the overall operation prepares man's t*ransition* from the worldly to the spiritual dimension / or dimensions: under its influence, the man is released from *passions*, develops *virtues* and determines the *faith* of the meaningfulness of the existence of life itself, and his own life, which is the integral part of One life.

Christian culture is based on Christian values. Their existence and widespreadness provide an opportunity for people to free themselves from the danger of falling into traps of material civilization and consumer culture that make the soul difficult and incapable of rising above physical legitimacy. The spirit of new capitalism based on the bogus idea of neoliberalism that *the will* of the market is the supreme will to which It creates the world, human life and life in general, however, introduces temptations to the everyday life that people produce in material dimensions and keep them captured there. "*Be patient and pray that you do not fall into temptation; Because the spirit is heartbreaking, but the body of a man is poor*" (Gospel according to Mark, ch.14, verse 38), and without intervention in the gospel truths, it enters the world of modern culture, which is also manifesting itself as an antithesis to Christian culture.

Christian culture and Serbian society today

Despite the established approach to the old religious story in this area of the 1990s (Blagojević, 1995), however, one can not speak of a comprehensive inclusion of religious values in the dominant form of culture in Serbian society. The change in the social order, which has gone through several stages since the 1990s, has also led to a change in attitudes towards Orthodoxy that, after decades of persecution from public discourse to private, is experiencing "rehabilitation" and enters institutionalized education (2001). The introduction of religious education, however, did not essentially respond to the essential challenges Orthodox Christians encountered in the new social context, but satisfied the shape of the changed relationship of Serbian society towards a type of arrangement in which religion was marginalized, socialist. With this, the political life participants in Serbia proved to be consistent followers of the tradition of *overthrowing* characteristic of modern Serbian statehood, whose basic feature is that political activity is primarily aimed at establishing the authority and maintaining the authorities, not the

interests of preserving the state. Orthodoxy was instrumentalized with the aim of the mobilization of the revolutionary energy of the Serbs, intent on strengthening one of the supporting elements of one's own cultural identity, with the real aim of replacing the existing "worn out" political nomenclature with a new "flexible" and "more vulnerable" to changes in the world. The critical attitude towards society and the change in the political paradigm (Pečujlić, Vidaković and Milić, 1991) have caused numerous consequences in the level of culture: (a) they reject the basic values that have existed and accept the new ones – they replaced the socialist ones with neoliberal; (b) new cultural patterns are developed that represent a discontinuity with the patterns emerging from the socialist ideology and the appropriate patterns of behavior; (c) cultural patterns are developed that partly rely on pre-socialist, grounded in both national and civic and completely new cultural patterns that represent harmonization with wider cultural spaces. The ultimate outcome of these associated processes is the value of clearing and national disassembly, which is always linked to Serbs with the loss of connection with Orthodox sources (Trifunović, 2010: 43). Members of the so-called. Contemporary Serbian society are exposed to growing global influences, expressed in the economy as well as in politics and culture. The events in the sphere of religion are an expression of the combined effects in the mentioned areas of society: Orthodoxy has been through the stages of "exit" to the public social scene since the 1990s, using it in political discourse to lessen its significance and re-marginalize. Such a relationship of society towards religion in general and, in particular, in Orthodoxy has numerous effects in all spheres, especially in culture and education. There is a noticeable process of dechristianization of society and culture, devaluation of the influence of religion on the socialization of young generations.

Understanding the relationship between cultures-religion-education and its implications for the younger generation today is based on the understanding of the subordination that was established among them in the so-called. Contemporary social context. All the factors of this three-way connection have an impact on an individual and different groupings in society, however, it is not identical and it is unequally supported by the society itself. Culture understood as an awareness of the laws governing the world and the creation of material goods whose distribution does not disturb the hierarchy of society is acceptable to society itself. Cultural development in the "acceptable level" is responsible for cultural policies shaped by the ruling groups. The developed strategies regulate processes in the sphere of culture, in general, in two ways: 1) by creating strictly regulated frameworks of action that "exacerbate" creative freedom and freedom itself and / or 2) by creating a "controlled chaos" which, by deliberately ruining the recognized rules moves a Man away from Freedom. A culture that is moving away from *freedom*, however, turns into a dressage that transforms man with all his creative potential into an alienated and frightened individual who is ready,

for personal security, to renounce the "multiplication of talents" of his own, and thus, consent to "voluntary" captivity.

Institutionalized education in every society has the role of transmitter of the dominant culture, that is, the culture which, by the adopted strategies, promotes and develops ruling groups (Trifunović, 2010: 174) in accordance with the perception of one's own interests, which may also be a departure from *freedom.* A strictly standardized educational process, organized to meet the demands of capital (Barlow and Robertson, 2003), rather than the needs of individual participants and groups, is shown as an instrument for their disciplining. In addition to the rhetoric about human rights and freedoms that has a decorative purpose, the story of *freedom* in institutionalized education is placed within the discourse of political correctness. Political correctness implies the acceptance of a concept or more that is in synergy with the chosen methodology of conquering (or retaining) the power of powerful political actors. The most widespread concept is the so-called. Positive discrimination (Semprini, 1999), which signifies the legalization of a "surplus" of rights to special minorities (ethnic, cultural and other) and the provision of space for the foundation of their special ideas that can destroy Christian culture. The accompanying activities of the Pride Parade, manifestations conceived as recognition of the right to the diversity of the LGBT population and its free expression in the public, are examples of the justification of one particular subculture and its pretense to become the default part of the dominant culture – at the same time affecting the dismemberment of Christian culture. For this purpose, a space is created in which members of this population, supported by representatives of the cultural establishment, represent their own view of the world and the artistic achievements that promote it. Such is the organization of the LGBT population within the "Pride Week" in Belgrade, October 2012, at the Center For cultural decontamination which opened an exhibition of photographs "Ecce homo" by Swedish artist E.S.Valin (Elizabeth Olson Valin) who treats basic symbols of Christianity and portray Christ as homosexual (http://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/beograd/364188-lgbt-izlozba-posetiocima-prikazana-slika-na-kojoj-je-isus-hrist-gej-foto). It is only a small part of the mosaic that suggests that culture in contemporary societies seems to distance itself from the religion that is the source of culture (Sando, 2015), precisely by enabling the creation of works that play with established values and new ways of loading into their context.

Moving culture away from religion is also linked to educational processes that are directly shaped by the overall social and cultural development policy. The place of the theory of evolution in institutionalized education is the paradigm of this connection. Ideas of Ch. Darwin based the modern theory of evolution using the concept of developing all life forms through the process of natural selection. Darwin's theory is in its entirety published in 1859 under the title of the *Origin of Species*, and the subtitle of the book

is called *the Origin of Species by means of natural selection or the survival of privileged races in the struggle for survival*. The idea that the man was created by God was lifted by the idea of the evolution of living beings-a notion that all kinds of living beings arose over time from a common ancestor. The evolutionary form of evolution, according to Darwin, allows the process of *natural selection* in which a *struggle for survival* is vital, which is similar to *artificial selection* applied under selective production conditions. The theory of evolution, promoted in an epoch when rationalism was dealt with religious dogmatism (the second half of the nineteenth century), today also provides the primacy of *reason* over *faith* in state schools. In addition, that approach made it *acceptable* to establish a hierarchical relationship between races and different groups and provided a reasonable justification for colonial and non-colonial conquests in the world. Powerful political actors now have the theory that *privileged races* (and / or groups) are free from responsibility for unauthorized ones.

Former Minister of Education in the Government of the Republic of Serbia, Ljiljana Colic, appointed in March 2004, due to the intention to "throw out" a teaching unit from the textbook of biology for the eighth grade of elementary school, in which "doubling" the processing of Darwin's theory led to her dismissal the same year. Due to the enormous public pressure, as explained, the intention of a civil official to "dismantle" school baggage from repeating one theory proved to be an insufficiently thought-out act with political connotations that led to a partial reconstruction of the government.

The theory of evolution suggests a scheme in which the living world develops, but it also has an undoubtedly social dimension. It represents one of the vertical elements of the so-called. Western culture and grants amnesty to the exploitation in the capitalist system as a "fair" instrument for securing the dominance of "stronger and higher" (privileged) over "weaker and lower" (unprivileged) races and groups. The world that shapes the theory of evolution is almost incompatible with the principles of Christianity that come out of the basis – that we are all *equal* before God. An attempt to reconsider the theory of evolution, amongst the creators of modern Western and domestic culture, is perceived as an antimodernization act, and the way they "fight" with advocates of such ideas is similar to the way that dogmatics choose. Twelve years after the first accident – an attempt to reduce the recurrence of Darwin's theory in elementary school – another occurred. The Ministry of Education, the Assembly Committee on Education, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), and the Senate University of Serbia were submitted a petition for revision of the theory of evolution in schools and faculties (2017). The petition was signed by 52 academics, scientific advisors and university professors, 61 doctors of science, five Masters of Science and fifty specialists (http://web-tribune.com/iza-kulisa/dr-ljiljana-colic-otkriva-sokantne-i-uznemirujuce-podatke-nastavni-sadrzaji-u-srpskim-skolama). Immediately afterwards, the Director of the Center for the Promotion of

Science (CPN) Nemanja Djordjevic invited the Minister of Education M. Šarčević to, although he announced that there would be no debate in the ministry, he would notify the petition requesting "the abolition of Darwin" in schools (http://rs.n1info.com/a247690/Vesti/Vesti/CPN-trazi-da-ministar-reaguje-na-peticiju-protiv-Darvina.html), advocating that science education in Serbia be based on science and in line with international documents. First of all, it refers to Resolution No. 1580 of the Council of Europe, the title of which is *the Danger of Creationism in Education* (2007). The resolution warns of the danger of the pseudo-science of creationism in education and society in general, and emphasizes the importance of studying the theory of evolution: "The study of the phenomenon in relation to-Evolution as a fundamental scientific theory is therefore crucial for the future of our societies and our democracies. For these reasons, it must occupy a central place in the school curriculum (Article 15)" (https://forum.krstarica.com/showthread.php/671045-Resolutions-1580-Saveta-Europe). One theory of the origin of living beings, the theory of evolution, created about 160 years ago, is defended by bringing documents within political representation bodies at the international level, that is, by directing from the sphere of politics. Does the interest of politicians to defend Darwin's theory of evolution and the rejection of another, contrary to it, arise for scientific or pseudo-scientific reasons? In the Western cultural circle, it is shown that all ideas are not equal, some are declared dangerous and undesirable, and it is, precisely, the Christian idea that God created the world. A secularized man in a modern society lovingly places God's science (or reason) and rejects the authority of the Creator – expelling God. At the core of this "action" is the man's rebellion against authority and the desire to achieve non limited power. The question of whether man's imperfect nature, because in its basis is the root of good and evil (Zenjkovski, 2002) can create a world that is not built on the struggle between those that are different, is only rhetorical. The supposed answer points to the danger of establishing an *Orwellian* world in which the privileged would have absolute authority over the unprivileged. In the world we know, today's world, the forces of good and evil are constantly confronted, but this conflict provides hope for the victory of the Good. The expulsion of the creationist theory of public discourse and, in particular, of education, can be viewed through the prism of the collapse of *freedom and the hope that we have the right to choose an idea in which we will believe and look at the world that we will accept*. And in the end, it signifies the collapse of the Christian idea and culture.

Conclusion

Culture and religion can have a strong influence on society and determine the directions of its development, as well as society with its overall development policy, which is always an expression of the power and interests

of the ruling groups, can lead to the destruction or, at least, of the revision of both culture and religion. The guidelines that society chooses to follow and which shape the organization of life in all its dimensions make sense only if viewed in a wider context of what the society intends to achieve. The change of development policy, as the expression of major structural changes in the so-called. Global society, in local societies, cultures and education, leads to the need for their harmonization with the "rest of the world". On the one hand, there is a tendency of declarative institutional support to different religions and confessions (in different types of confessional education in accordance with the recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 1999); and on the other, a tendency to support individual rights and freedoms through the so-called *Education* for the active participation of individuals in social life and preparation for the role of the *citizen* (Delor, 1996). Dechristianised Western societies, apart from the principle support to various religions, are actually focused on promoting the struggle for human rights and creating a context in which a citizen is "above" a believer. This opens up the path to the strategic changes in value orientations: there is a destruction of Christian culture and the creation of a culture of new capitalism in which *fear* and *anxiety* prevent the survival of *love* and *solidarity* perceived as elementary compassion with others and willingness to action to help others. Contemporary scientific-technical civilization, however, will not be able to avoid the responsibility that the definition of the concept of *citizenship* development relying on the normativism of human rights and freedoms against *Christianity*.

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Весна С. Трифуновић

Религија и култура данас: између разарања хришћанске културе и ревизије модерне културе

Апстракт: И религија и култура су изрази човековог делатног односа према свету. Прва свет поима као Божју творевину и представља посебан поглед на свет који садржи 1) виђење поретка целокупног света, 2) свест о есхатолошком смислу људског живота, 3) свест о телеолошком смислу Божје творевине. Друга свет разуме као физичку творевину и представља поглед на свет који садржи 1) парцијално виђење поретка света, 2) свест о човековом позвању у очувању створеног света (духовна култура), 3) свест о човековој снази самоодржања и позвања да мења створени свет (материјална култура). Религија је извориште културе које сједињава духовну и материјалну културу и даје јој животност кроз стремљење човекове личности ка савршенству или, другачије речено, кроз узрастање ка Богу.

Данас се у већини друштва, са тврдом вером у позитиван исход, развија економски, политички и идеолошки пројекат о преуређењу постојећег света „уз помоћ“ слободног тржишта које само себе организује а друге ослобађа. Идеја о ефикасности тржишта, која се налази у основи глобализације, није оправдала очекивања: опште благостање није обезбеђено нити је утољена чежња за осигурањем непролазности и безграничности. Глобалистичке културне тежње, међутим, довеле су до потискивања хришћанске етике и урушавања хришћанског универзализма, с једне стране и до унификације културе, с друге. И довеле у питање опстанак створеног света.

Кључне речи: религија, култура, хришћанска култура, унификација, глобализација.

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ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF SPIRITUAL-RELIGIOUS CORRELATION – IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GENERAL REVIEW OF THE SERBIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE CURRENT SOCIAL MOMENT AND THE PAST

Abstract: The importance of the spiritual-religious correlation can be discussed, especially illustratively and argumentatively, on the example of the Serbian-Russian relations, which have exceptional semantic depth and historical foundation. Among other things, the similar representations of New Israel with the Serbs and Holy Russia and Third Rome with the Russians point to related patterns that essentially influenced the formation of Serbian and Russian collective consciousness. Likewise, the pronounced and firm Russophilia among the Serbs is a specific phenomenon that relates to the above-mentioned conceptual patterns. In this Article – in a form of a concise and illustrative review, a special emphasis is placed on the current Serbian-Russian relations, as well as the importance of their cooperation and mutual understanding

Key words: spiritual-religious connection, Serbian-Russian relations, New Israel, Holy Russia and Third Rome, the necessity of cooperation and understanding.

Introductory digression review. In this Article[1], special attention is paid to the importance of spiritual-religious connection and relations based on Orthodox-Christian religious and civilizational foundations. They rely on Slavic linguistic, ethno-cultural and genetic connections. The emphasis was placed on the understanding of the role of Orthodox-Slavic reciprocity and civilization in the past and today, whereby particularly distinguished are the concepts of New Israel (in the case of the Serbs), that is closely related to the Third Rome and the Holy Russia (in the case of the Russians)[2].

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[1] The Article is the result of work on the project of the Institute of Ethnography SASA no. 177028: "*Стратегије идентитета: савремена култура и религиозност*" ("Strategy of Identity: Contemporary Culture and Religiosity"), funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

[2] В. Благојевић 1994; Bogdanović 1984; Тодоровић 2010; Тодоровић 2015a. Compare and a comparison of "Serbian Messianism" with the Russian in: Марковић 1998b: 27–30. On the other hand, about the different interpretations of the term Holy Russia, see: Лепахин 2002; on the relation between the terms of the Holy Russia and

In regard with the above, we also look at the basic matrix of contemporary mutual expectations and relations, with an emphasis on the Serbian observer perspective. Although at first glance this may seem far from our topic – for the reasons of their distinctness, paradigmatic and illustrative nature – we shall start by recalling the circumstances and character of the crimes against Serbs in the so-called Independent State of Croatia, which are among the most monstrous in the world and are so horrible that it's hard to read about them – with numerous testimonies of the mass slaughter of Serbian children, rapes and planned extermination of a whole nation (see: e.g. Зиројевић 2017; Крестић 2009; Страњаковић 1991). These crimes took place with the direct participation of Germany and the Vatican, but also with the support of other countries and nations, as well as entire civilizations. As most educated people should know, although multiple genocides over Serbs are continuously glossed, there are a large number of documents that testify and report on various episodes of Croatian, but also other genocides committed against Serbs (compare: *Страдање и геноцид* in Срби 2008; Зиројевић 2017: first see page 128–129), which is a phenomenon that takes place alongside the global spread of anti-serbism.

An uninformed reader might be able to conclude: "Anyway, it's gone!" However, it did not come to pass. The descendants of surviving Serbs, relatively recently, formed the Republic of Serbian Krajina *(Republika Srpska Krajina)* in the 1990s, in the territory they inhabited for centuries, but with the direct help and leadership of NATO, the Croats managed to completely ethnically cleanse this area, i.e. to expel and / or kill the Serbian population (see Република Српска Крајина 2008: 948; Срби у Хрватској 2015: first see page 398–444), whereby the Croatian occupation was "supported by the international community, including the ethnic cleansing of the Serbian people" (Дакић 2015: 444). Also, lately it could be clearly herd from Croatia, even that Russia during the 1990s directly supported and helped the Croats in their war against the Serbs[3]. Something similar is even written in Serbian encyclopedias, i.e. in recent historical syntheses[4]. In the meantime, the territory of Kosovo and Metohija was also occupied, and crimes against Serbs are practically continuously enforced, with the continued application of ethnic engineering (i.e. artificial *unserbing*) in different parts of

Third Rome, see on page 163–165. According to Lepahin, "one can assume (…) that the idea of the Third Rome, at the very beginning for its core, had the idea of Holy Russia, as an older, more common, widely known in all layers of people" (Лепахин 2002: 164). According to him, during the history there were open conflicts "between the Holy Russia as the new Jerusalem and the Third Rome" (Лепахин 2002: 165).

[3] See e.g. http://mondo.rs/a960430/Info/Ex-Yu/Rusi-su-za-vreme-rata-u-Hrvatskoj-naoruzavali-Hrvate-protiv-Srba.html; http://www.blic.rs/vesti/svet/hrvatima-od-rusa-90-tih-stizale-tone-oruzja-a-sta-je-dobila-srbija/d6pfy5g.

[4] According to one of these syntheses, "Russian Federation led by B. Yeltsin became one of the levers of Western pressure on Serbia during the 1990s" (Руско-српски односи 2008: 970). Compare e.g. Бјелановић 2015.

the Serbian ethnic-ethnogenetic area[5]. Above all – as can be concluded on the basis of titles and texts in numerous media – the Serbian people await daily, while the country is emptied of people, that Albanians, Croats and Islamists, jointly with NATO and other countries in the region, finally resolve "the Serbian problem". The Serbian public once upon again, as in the 1990s, as in all of these past years, asks one key question: "Will Russia again allow the Serbs to perish massively?", what would this time – in line with the circumstances – really signify the definitive end of "the Serbian problem".

About the primary importance of the Serbian-Russian relations (from the Serbian perspective). Pursuant to the foregoing, it should be emphasized clearly and without any equivocation that today the Serbian lands, their survival and prosperity depend primarily on Russia, and that the cultural-civilization and historical relations between the Serbian countries and Russia, regardless of what happened at the end of the 20th century, are still unique worldwide. In other words, from a Serbian point of view, the consideration of Serbian-Russian relations in the past and today[6] is of special and priceless significance, since the geopolitical position, as well as the civilizational affiliation of the Serbs, are of such a nature that their existence depends primarily on Russia and its support; so it was in the past[7], and – bearing in mind the different historical experiences and the current general international context – that is, perhaps more than ever before, even today. These unique Serbian-Russian relations are distinguished by their mutual foundation on the identical religious and ethno-genetic forms, which are expressed through very widespread and strong Russophilia among the Serbs (see, for example, Терзич 2010). Moreover, one can freely say that the Serbs are probably the most pro-Russian (*Russophilia*) nation in the world, as could be confirmed by appropriate public opinion polls. Traditions, beliefs, mythical perceptions of the past, as well as the eschatological and consecrated projections of the future, are often similar or permeated to both nations. Also, the conceptual and structural connection between Russophobia and

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[5] See e.g. characteristic examples in: Ђурковић 2013: 115–152; Трифуноски 1995; Терзић 2012. Compare the popularly written text on essentially very similar parallels with the Russians: Ишћенко 2017.

[6] See: for example, articles in the scientific anthology Россия и Сербия 2010 (first see especially interesting articles Гуськова 2010; Живанов 2010; Терзич 2010; Лещиловская 2010; Гаврилович 2010; Попович 2010); Српско-руски односи 2011 (first see Nikiforov 2011; Živanov 2011); Руска дијаспора 2007; see mandatory: the latest corpus regarding Serbian-Russian relations: Вместе сквозь века 2017. Also see for example Бјелановић 2015; Јовановић 2012. In the articles from mentioned corpuses and studies we are referred to – by leading experts, mostly historians – to extensive literature on Serbian-Russian relations in the past and in recent times.

[7] Among other things, the fact has been emphasized in the public was that everything that Serbia during the First World War "did with itself and future Yugoslavia – would certainly look significantly different that the revolutions of 1917 did not separate Russia from its great history".

anti-serbism in the past and today is obvious, and can be shown on a large number of examples[8]. It should be noted that other nations, even civilizations, in a qualitatively / essentially identical or very similar way approach to Serbian and Russian ethnos, as well as to their countries (sometimes having the similar type of hostility, originating from the same source; compare Живанов 2011: 373–374).[9]

It is of particular importance to emphasize that the formulation primarily depends on Russian-Serbian relations – the formulation of Orthodox-Slavic civilization (as former, as well as contemporary), or its historical mission, in the center of which is – most explicitly stated – primarily the idea of the Theandros (God-Man) and the mission of the global expansion of the Christian messages, along with the accompanying ideals of freedom and justice[10]. In direct relation with this, the already mentioned conceptual matrix of the Serbs as New Israel (the ideology of Middle Ages, Nemanjić dynasty's Serbia, which has been entangled to date by numerous contents) can in many respects connect with the mentioned, complementary notions of *Holy Russia* and Russia as the *Third Rome*[11]. [In this sense, the Serbian concepts of the *Kosovo Covenant / Myth*, which are directly related (and supplemented) with the ideas about New Israel, have special significance[12].] We shall pay

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[8] See a study of the famous Serbian historian M. Ekmečić, which is primarily dedicated to the direct relations between anti-serbism and anti-semitism, (see *Srbofobija i antisemitizam* in: Екмечић 2002).

[9] For example, in a book titled "Српска апологија Русије" ("Serbian Apologia of Russia") – which, in two volumes, was published precisely in 1998 and 1999, when the NATO intervention occurred – Marko Marković emphasized his view that "the leaders of the New World Order took on themselves the mission of destroying Orthodoxy, only this time doing it directly, from small to larger, from Serbs to the Russians", and "for the destruction of Serbs, the two most important levers in the Balkans were used again: Islam and the Vatican", taking into account that these civilizations continuously systematically create conditions for the destruction of Serbs (Марковић 1998a: 240–241). In any case, numerous Serbian and Russian authors (but also politicians and officials) have stressed many times that the Serbian and Russian fate is connected, that representatives of other civilizations perceive the Serbs and the Russians in an essentially identical manner.

[10] When it comes to the Russians, the frequent ideas are "that the Russian people one who bear God (in their heart)", and "that as such have the call to save Europe, and through it the world", that is, "in a sense, the Messiah – it is the Russian people itself", "the Messiah by the fact that he carries the Christ in his heart and his Christ is declared to all nations, but also the Messiah as the medium of salvation, because this time, through him, the universal salvation is performed" (Марковић 1998b: 28). The researchers of this phenomenon note that Russian messianism is very complex (Марковић 1998b: 28).

[11] See reference 2.

[12] See directly and more extensively in: Тодоровић 2010. [Pursuant to one very illustrative view, "representing the collapse of the empire, Kosovo is a foreshadowing the doom of today's Christian civilization, in the East and the West, but also the promise of salvation", and "in the twentieth century, all our planet turned into a

attention to precisely this issue, in the context of our work and its basic intentions, in the following part of the article.

The notions of the Serbian and Russian historical mission (in the context of the perception of common ideological roots). Heretofore, it has been repeatedly and from different angles – although still quite insufficiently (compare Живанов 2010: 287 et cetera) – written about Serbian-Russian connections in the past, as well as on how much these relations were mutually significant[13]. Here we shall, getting straight to the point, focus on the relation that is, from the point of view of our approach, of utmost importance and determinative significance. In fact, it can be said, as already hinted, that as a matter of fact the Serbian-Russian (both ideological as well as overall, historical and other) relations in the initial sense were responsible for the emergence of Orthodox-Slavic civilization, based on Orthodox Christianity, as well as of the idea of establishing a kind of Theandric (divine-mankind), that is, the constant testimony of Christ's path and message at the level of the nation and the country. According to Justin Popović (St. Iustin Popović), "Dostoyevsky attributes the theandric role to the Russian people, not because it is Russian but Orthodox. For, as Orthodox, they preserve the image of Christ in a holy and pious manner, which gives them the blessing of God's love and the forces of spiritual unity with all peoples and for the joyful gospel service to all people" (Поповић 1995: 308). Likewise, the diverse specific notions of the special importance of Serbs, as well as the particular role of this people in global historical events, are based on prototype patterns defined many centuries ago. Namely, what is meant by the *Serbian idea* and *Serbian ethnic / national being* was then formulated. In regard, for example, the famous Serbian scientist Dimitrije Bogdanović writes about the essential and fundamental historical significance of the notion of the Serbs as "the people of God", i.e. "the people who are the subject of a special care of God's providence", unambiguously making it clear that "all old Serbian sources seem to speak about it, and in that spirit" (Bogdanović 1984: 28). Later, this has been clearly shown and proved by academic, historian Miloš Blagojević and other authors[14].

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giant Kosovo", whereby "the entire Slavic world is crucified, the entire Orthodoxy is crucified" (Марковић 1998b: 31). Namely, "in front of this all-encompassing Kosovo, the world also needs to hear the lore and message of the Serbian Kosovo: *The one crucified with Christ, shall resurrect with Christ*. Therefore, not only does Serbian Kosovo have a universal meaning, but the world is at peril if it does not understand the lessons of Kosovo in a timely manner, even if the Kosovo is unknown to it. For the situation is worse in the world today than in the time of the Battle of Kosovo and the fall of Constantinople. At that time, despite the disagreement of the Christian peoples, there was, however, some kind of Christian solidarity that no longer exist" (Марковић 1998b: 31).]

[13] See reference 6 and 9.

[14] First see a study of exceptional significance: Благојевић 1994. In this context, see

At the very root of the emergence and shaping of the notions about the Serbs as New Israel, the second and last chosen people of God, are the personalities of St. Sava and his father Stefan Nemanja, i.e. St. Simeon the Myrrh-streaming. Namely, "the stay of the St. Sava and St. Simeon on the Holy Mountain (Mount Athos) presupposes their thorough preparation for the missionary activity in their fatherland, with the intention of finally bringing the Serbian people to Christ and that the people experience their spiritual renewal", i.e. "only after being restored by the Holy Spirit the Serbian people will at the same time become the *new* people, and after that they will be able to call themselves: *the second new Israel*, or the second and the new chosen people" (Благојевић 1994: 19). All in all, already in the Middle Ages the propagation of Old Testament symbolism and key biblical events to the immediate level of Serbian reality was carried out consistently and comprehensively. This is done in accordance with the faith in the historical necessity and the metaphysical veracity of different events (described in the works of Domentijan the Hilandarian, Teodosije the Hilandarian, etc.), as well as the analogy between the Holy Land and Serbia, i.e. between the Old Testament Israel and the Serbian people in the sense of a new, but more authentic, chosen people, with a special eschatological predestination and a historical mission[15].

[More precisely, "in many ways, in the Middle Ages, the Serbian people developed a special notion of their continent and spiritual homogeneity, which covered the idea of the 'people of God' precisely to the extent that in its social and spiritual being it hold the ideal of the church, as 'convocation' and as 'plenitude'. (…) One such view on the nation, in which all social functions and divisions would be consciously subordinate to the goals of the future, which can be reached only through the most difficult integration of the social organism, could explain many features and paradoxes of

Bogdanović 1984; Поповић 2006: see for instance page 19, 21, 41–73. etc; Тодоровић 2015a: 243–286.

[15] For example, according to Domentijan (in Доментијан 2001), "another or new Israel (i.e. the Serbian people) has taken the primacy over 'the first' Israel, for it has in full accepted the Orthodoxy" (Благојевић 2011: 171). Namely, "the reasoning that the Serbian nation gained the right to be called a 'new Israel' or the 'chosen people', raised the national self-esteem up to the highest possible height, taking on the sacred character", and "this conception was not limited to Domentijan" but he, as can be presumed "was just the best interpreter of those opinions, which were pleaded by the spiritual elite of the time, primarily the official Serbian church" (Благојевић 2011: 171). In other words, according to this conception, "'the new' or 'the newborn Israel' is equalized with the 'Serbian state' i.e. the country of Serbia", and "in 'the newborn Israel' the Orthodox Serbs live as 'the chosen people'" (Благојевић 2011: 171). Thus, among other things, in the *Hagiography: Life of Stefan Dečanski*, it is quite directly stated that "the was (the tsar) of the great and most famous people – the Serbs" (Цамблак 1968: 205). Namely, in context of the hagiography Serbian people, as chosen one, is viewed above the old testament Israelis and other peoples (see Цамблак 1968: 224).

Serbian history, and not only of that age but also later times" (Bogdanović 1984: 28). In the Serbian tradition, the idea of the "christocentricity of the great celestial Serbia" is clearly defined, that is, the synonymousity of the path and the suffering of the Serbian people and Jesus Christ (Велимировић 2001: 247), as well as the identity of the Serbian people and the old Israel (Велимировић 1999: 68). According to one scientific synthesis, "in contrast to Byzantine universalism, the Serbs saw themselves as 'the people of God' or as 'the new Israel' and Serbia, or more precisely Raška with Kosovo and Metohija, as the 'heavenly Jerusalem' on earth" (Грчић 2011: 191). In regard, the notion "about the determination of the emperor Lazar of Serbia for the 'heavenly kingdom' or the metaphor of the Serbs as a 'heavenly nation' symbolize the struggle for justice and peace, and therefore for the 'Kingdom of God', for where there is no justice and peace, there is no God" (Грчић 2011: 191).]

Similarly, on the other hand, with the Russians, in folk traditions we encounter the ideas "about the patron holy land and royal saints, of national greatness and of a special historical mission" (Грчић 2011: 191). Thereby, the related notions and motives in the collective consciousness of the Russians are directly linked to the Serbian prototype. For example, according to Billington, during its golden age under Stefan Dušan, 1331–1355, the Serbian kingdom was largely a general rehearsal of the pattern of rule that will emerge in Muscovy (Billington 1988: 79). In other words, quickly and boldly, Dušan took the title of Tsar and Emperor of Romans; declared himself as the heir of Constantine and Justinian, and called the assembly in order to establish a special Serbian Patriarchate. In short, he tried to replace the old Byzantine empire with a new, Slavic-Greek one (Billington 1988: 79). After the fall under the Turkish rule – during the fifteenth century, people and ideas have moved north into the Russian country and this contributed to instill a new sense of historical calling (Bilington 1988: 79). In other words, it is through the Serbs that the key Byzantine ideas came to Russia, conveying the notion of historical (Billington 1988: 80), and this, all together, encouraged the Russians to think of themselves as the heirs of Byzantium (Billington 1988: 80). Encouraged by these ideas, similar to ancient Israel, medieval Muscovy prophetically interpreted slavery and humiliation, believing in God's special care for its fate and developing the Messianic expectations of deliverance as the foundation of national solidarity (Billington 1988: 99). Thus, Russia – similar as Serbia – is called "Jerusalem" and "New Israel", as well as "Third Rome" (Bilington 1988: 100). Consequently, nothing less than the Jews[16] (and we can add here also – completely analogous to the primary constant of the Serbian understanding of the historical mission and the corresponding basic forms of the collective psyche of the Serbs)

[16] In a qualitative sense, similar to that of the Serbs and the Russians, the messianic idea has been "gradually, during a very long period of time, shaped in the Jewish people" (Kinđić 2009: 49).

the Russians sought a just remnant that shall survive persecution and temptation to bring the salvation of God's chosen people (Billington 1988: 100).

At this point, it should be emphasized that the above mentioned circumstance – concerning the number and rootedness of Serbian and Russian notions about the significance of their role, i.e. past and historical missions – did not arise without concrete reason and cause, and can not be explained in a simplified way, simply by renouncing and ignoring the obvious facts that testify in support of its importance and complexity (compare with the contents presented in: Тодоровић 2015a; Тодоровић 2005). Namely, the basic postulates of the idea of the Holy Serbia, but also of the Holy Russia – along with similar patterns – overlap with relevant, objective counterparts from historical, geographic, as well as theological and cultural contexts, further aggravating and complicating the understanding of various real facts from the perspective of scientific paradigms with an emphasized atheistic view (see Тодоровић 2015a). To illustrate, from the theological perspective that is presented by the bishop Saint Nikolaj Velimirović, "truly our destiny is foretold in the Bible", because "many of the words spoken by the Lord in it to the people of Israel, as if were spoken to Serbian. It is the way our fates coincide" (Велимировић 1996: 200). On the other hand, it can be seen here that, in many respects, they coincide with the sufferings of the Russian people through history. Among other things, the St. Nikolaj Velimirović writes the following: "Therefore I say: read the Bible in order to understand the history of Serbs" (Велимировић 1996: 202), and "the fate of the Serbian people resembles a fate of much-suffering Job, more than a fate of any nation in the Christian world" (Велимировић 1996: 257), that is, it is like the suffering (but also resurrected) way of Jesus Christ, as emphasized by various authors.[17] Similar (more similar compared to any other nation), however, was the fate of the Russian people[18], who – along with the Serbian people – shed the most blood for survival and freedom (or, one can freely say, for the freedom of mankind).

Serbian countries and Russia today: an illustrative overview of the most common questions (in anticipation of the right answers). In the previous chapter, we have focused on the past (from the conceptual point of view), and in the ensuing continent we shall try to illustrate and summarize – in accordance with the space available to us – take a look at the present and

[17] The aforementioned notions and ideas in a particularly referring way are also presented by the above mentioned bishop Saint Nikolaj Velimirović, when speaking of the "Serbian people as Teodul" (Велимировић 2001).

[18] See the collection of texts Голгота Христове Русије 1999. In general, only the most basic facts about the sufferings of the Serbs and the Russians (starting from the of data presented in percentage, up to the way of devastating peoples and individuals) are almost difficult to comprehend, in the context of the fact that these ethnoses after all succeeded to survive and to develop further. This is, in any case, another of the topics that require a separate space.

the future of the Serbian-Russian relations. All in all, it is of great importance to analyze some of the contemporary (Serbian-Russian) misunderstandings and mutual expectations, primarily in the circumstances of the struggle for the survival of the Serbian people (in parallel with the struggle to preserve the appropriate / corresponding ethno-cultural code). Namely, there are numerous and very specific expectations of the Serbs in relation to the Russian people and Russia, while on the other hand there is a very complex spectrum of indicators of the Russian attitude towards the Serbian people and countries (which is a problem that definitely requires a separate space); see e.g. Живанов 2010.[19]

As already indicated, in the next part of the article (but also in the next research period), it is necessary to focus as closely as possible on the most important issues and problems concerning the Serbian-Russian relations, in order to further emphasize the importance of spiritual-religious connection/correlation, but also (appropriate, applicable) urgent solution to accumulated dilemmas and problems, as well as the return of Serbian-Russian relations to their – in the historical context *usual* – level.

In other words – in accordance with certain historical facts, which can not be considered at this place in more detail – it could be noted that the Serbian countries and the Serbian people in the course of history developed and (in the statehood sense) circled, i.e. liberated the central part of the Serbian ethnic territory primarily thanks to the Russia and its support; moreover, if there was no support from Russia – the question is whether the Serbs, and how many of them, would have survived at all. On the other hand – going back to the very beginning of this paper – it should be emphasized that the Serbs had recently lost a significant part of its territory (occupation of the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, as well as of Kosovo and Metohija, the inauguration of an anti-Serbian regime in Montenegro, with the use of ethnic engineering in the southern part of the Serbian ethnic territory, the fragmentation of centuries-old Serbian areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc.)[20] and suffered real exoduses (starting from around a million killed Serbs in the fascist so-called Independent State of Croatia, to the latest, numerous sufferings and genocide)[21], reaching the edge of survival precisely because Russia's support was lacking. In fact – as already mentioned

[19] In terms of future research see page 307–308: Живанов 2010.

[20] Compare e.g., the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Republika Srpska in the period of their territorial rounding in Степић 2001: 346. Compare, in the wider context, and Тодоровић 2015b; Тодоровић и Рајковић 2016. About ethnic engineering in Montenegro see already mentioned text: Ђурковић 2013: 115–152. About ethnic engineering in old and southern Serbia / FYR of Macedonia see Трифуноски 1995; compare Ердељановић 1925; Цвијић 1906: 32–33; Терзић 2012. About the Jasenovac concentration camp in the so-called Independent State of Croatia see for instance Зиројевић 2017.

[21] See, for instance, *Страдање и геноцид* in Срби 2008: 1039–1040

– is not excessive to conclude that (in a qualitative sense, much like in the past), the whole Serbian current geopolitical-historical, spiritual and existential position is reduced primarily to one basic, but already pointed out question: Will and when will Russia help Serbian countries (?), whereby expectation of this assistance is based precisely on the corresponding unique spiritual and religious cohesion / correlation and an identical ideological matrix (compare Терзич 2010: 142; Екмечић 2002: 292, 299).

In accordance with the foregoing, during our, complexly conceived research we considered a number (written and oral) content, reaching more illustrative questions and concerns, undoubtedly present among Serbs. In accordance with the basic intention of the article and the space available to us, here we will be able to look at some of the aforementioned questions, which themselves sufficiently speak and directly locate the problem, that is, Serbian expectations. In fact, at this time the Serbs, on the one hand, express the multiple expectations of Russia and the brotherly Russian people[22], while, on the other hand, often fall into doubt[23] and even despair, when it comes to these relations, with the most frequently asked questions resembling the following ideal-type formulations: *1) Are the Russians aware of their multiple and essential connections with the Serbs, as well as of the importance of these relations? Do Serbian countries and Serbs have any significance for Russia?, 2) Whether Russia can not or does not want to help the Serbs? How is it possible that the biggest and one of the most powerful countries in the world can not help the Serbs?, 3) Has Russia lost all interest for the Serbs? How can Russia and the Russian people peacefully observe the occupation and the disappearance of the Serbian countries, with the constant suffering and exodus of the Serbian people (from the constant pogrom of Serbs to the spread of anti-Serbian propaganda worldwide, etc.) as one of the most perished people in world history, and not to react appropriately?*[24]

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[22] Namely, in the widespread opinion – "the reliance on Russia and its Eurasian alliance – with relations with Moscow similar to those existing between Tel Aviv and Washington – would enable Serbia to regain its sovereignty, and to leave the historical dead end of increasing decay and dependence on someone else's will and interest" (Билбија 2013), with the remark that "everyone who, as a counterargument, points out the fact that Serbia does not have a common border with Russia, should ask the question 'does Israel have a common border with the United States'" (Билбија 2013).

[23] Compare, for instance, one very referring view in: Старац Тадеј Витовнички 2006: 300.

[24] On the basic of the questioning that resemble the previous, many others arises, such as, for example, a number of issues which could be ideal-typically, concisely and illustratively (divided into several "sub-thematic frameworks"), formulated as follows: *Why Russia does not raise its voice against the overall promotion of anti-Serbism as the leading form of racism in the modern world, and why does it not speak more loudly about the occupation of Serbian countries and the Serbian people, as well as the numerous genocides committed during the 20th century against Serbs?*

This is, of course, only a small fraction of the questioning (ideal-type framed and for the purposes of this work shaped), whose practical-direct expressions can often be heard during conversation or (in a similar form) read in various texts and contents, in numerous journals, books, websites, forums, etc. Such questions are most often asked by people who can be labeled as benevolent in relation to Russia and the Russian people, i.e. as russophiles (and such a great majority of Serbs could certainly be classified as mentioned); they are, in fact, often asking "why Russia does not provide any concrete help?", but usually fail to find a rational answer.[25] More precisely, given the closeness of Serbian and Russian peoples, i.e. the friendly attitude of Serbs towards Russians and Russia, as well as the strength and size of Russia[26], it is obvious and undeniable – from the Serbian point of view – that Russia can do "virtually everything" in the Serbian countries, as well as to help them in the most direct way and once and for all defend

Why Russia does not (because, when it comes to the Serbs, there is nobody else to take a stand for them) more decisively speak – world-widely – of the assimilation and artificial "un-serbing" of Serbs in many countries they live in? Why Russia does not try to prevent a cultural-informative war (against everything that has a Serbian ethno-cultural significance), which has a global character and is imposed and organized in the Serbian countries too? / Why doesn't Russia do for the Serbs at least a tenth of everything that Western and Islamic countries did (and daily do) for Croats, Albanians, Muslims, Slovenes, and others? (The arguments are as follows: they did not only support their own protégés in every way possible, but they openly, directly and lengthily fought against the Serbs, practically destroying the Serbian people and permanently polluting the country where the Serbs live. They, by their own admission, led an informative, cultural, economic and military war against the Serbs, not hesitating of any of the most terrible lies and crimes, beginning with the multiple ethnic cleansing of Serbs from their centuries-old homes.) / Why Russia does not prevent the daily terror against the Serbs? Is Orthodox Russia, which is primarily addressed by Serbs, able to influence Russia in order to prevent (once and for all) the pogrom of Serbs? Is Russia aware that the Serbian people are at a loss and that it is the last moment to change their attitude and start with concrete help – or the Serbs and Serbian countries will no longer be? Does Russia even care? / Do the Russians know that there is nowhere in the world, nor there were in the past, nor shall there be, the greater and more sincere friends and Russophiles then Serbs? Do Russians mixed Serbs with other Orthodox and / or Slavic nations who have repeatedly sided with the Russian enemy (e.g., with the Bulgarians, who – unlike the Serbs who always fought along with the Russians – were almost always on the side of Russian opponents), and did they forget the Serbian and their history? Does entire Serbian history not testify to the lasting friendship between the Serbian and Russian people?

[25] Of course, to this particular subject a special study should be devoted, because – on the other hand – there is a whole series of semantic variants of explanations by which 'Russophiles', i.e., the Serbs are trying to explain the lack of concrete Russian assistance or, at least, greater interest in the Serbian issue.

[26] In any case, "Russia, after the disappearance of the USSR in 1991, remained the most widespread and the richest country in resources in the world, and remains a superior geopolitical factor in Eurasia" (Степић 2016: 489), but – also – on the global level. Compare Петровић 2007.

them, that is, prevent their disappearance. Because – from the stated point of view, which is very widespread among the Serbs – if the current circumstances are viewed exclusively rationally, the situation is such that "no exit is visible", and the Serbian media informs daily about the possibility of attacks on Serbia and the Republika Srpska, or various abuses, denials of basic human rights and assimilation of Serbs, as well as the disastrous situation in other Serbian countries and occupied territories. On the basis of the already implied, most frequent Serbian views (which we illustrate here in their idealistic form), Russia, *if interested, without major problems – primarily by the power of its state and military authority, as well as diplomacy – can secure the peace and stability of Serbian countries, i.e. to permanently guarantee its survival and smooth development (in accordance with Serbian identity and cultural tradition, which is in essence an extension of the Russian cultural matrix).* In fact, it can be summarized in place of the preliminary conclusion, and in the context of the previous chapter and the discussed ideas that connection of the Serbs and the Russians – addressing to Russia (and above all the idea of the Holy Russia / Third Rome) for help, the Serbs primarily address the God for help, expecting of representatives of its forces on Earth to carry out justice, and deliver his chosen people, whose historical mission is constant testimony of Christ's message to humanity. On the other hand, according to the available facts (the previously stated formulations of Serbian hopes and concerns about Russia are based on), it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that "skepticism" (or "restraint") towards the Serbian countries and the necessity of providing the help to the Serbs (as a people) to survive and to rise, in fact, at the same time, is "skepticism" of Russia towards itself, that is, in relation to the return to its essential nature and the true / total, primarily spiritual and moral exaltation.

Final observations. In accordance with the previously stated facts (that is, from the point of view of the primary content of Serbian collective consciousness, but also on the basis of a multitude of concrete data), it is difficult, but essentially unrealistic, to regard Serbian historical significance, people, countries and civilization as "a fistful of rice" (syntagm from the popular film "Battle of Kosovo")[27], i.e. as someone who does not deserve much attention. Or, to look at them as an acquaintance whom we remember as "in a fog" and "we pretend to be a fried", but in fact we are not quite sure who he is (as, approximately, the contemporary relation between the Russians and Serbs is interpreted by one of the most famous Serbian "folk" futuristic projections, the so-called "Kremna Prophecies").[28]

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[27] In the above-mentioned film – based on the drama of Ljubomir Simović, directed by Zdravko Šotra – Miloš Obilić, the greatest Serbian hero, says a sentence to Turkish sultan Murat (who decided to conquer Serbian lands): "Serbia is not a fistful of rice to be pecked by every crow that the wind brings".

[28] See different versions of this "prophecy", which, among other things, emphasizes the distancing of Russians and Serbs (see Голубовић и Маленовић 1997: 210).

In other words, pursuant to Serbian history and cultural matrix, it may be (from a standpoint of a narrowly understood state or civilization egoism) even logical why the countries of Western civilization want to destroy the Serbs,[29] or they will no longer exist or their cultural code shall be changed (see Вуковић 2009; Пирићанац 2008; Антонић 2008; Ломпар 2014; Аврамовић 2009) – which essentially comes down to the same (because losing the identity, practically means losing almost everything)[30] – but it is hardly understandable why Russia, in disagreement with its basic interests which are directly related to Serbian, is allowing the above mentioned for so long. [After all, the very modern territorial position of the Serbian people – whose state once intertwined onto three seas and whose ethno-genetic core is at the sea and near it[31], but today (with the exception of Montenegro, where, however, intensive planned unserbing is carried out) it is not allowed to even approach it – represents a difficult to compare geopolitical difficulty, but also one type of offensive paradox, i.e. world curiosity (bearing in mind the unique appearance of the territory of modern Croatia, which emerged at the expense of Serbian countries); however, the territorial issue is – after the occupations, genocide and the accompanying ethnic engineering, and with the continuing spread of anti-serbism – only one of many problems that endanger the survival of Serbian countries and the Serbian people.[32]]

On the other hand – as has already been emphasized – in accordance with the available facts, it can be concluded that (from the previously presented "Serbian viewpoint") the conclusion that restraint towards Serbia, i.e. the necessity of providing assistance to Serbian countries (to survive and to rise), is in fact, at the same time, Russia's suspicion towards itself, i.e. towards restoring its true nature and essential, primarily spiritual and moral elevation, for the attitude towards the Serbian people and countries

However, with the Serbs (in the national consciousness) eschatological-prophetic contents that associate the liberation of Serbian lands and the revival of Serbs precisely with the Russian assistance are extremely numerous and rooted.

[29] Among other things, NATO directly (and with terrible consequences), primarily during 1994 and 1995, attacked the Republika Srpska Krajina and the Republika Srpska, and – later on – the FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999. Namely, NATO forces had "played an important role in ending the war in 1995, bombing the Serbian forces and suporting Muslim-Croat offensive" (Рат у Босни и Херцеговини 1992–1995, 2008: 935), which resulted in the occupation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (see beginning of work), as well as a significant, forced reduction of the territory of Republika Srpska

[30] When it comes to the concept of identity see in, for example, Благојевић 2005: 65–70; Тодоровић 2009: 180–182. See, and Тодоровић 2015a: 246–247.

[31] See, for instance, Благојевић 2011: 30–31 et seq; compare and maps between page 258 and 259.

[32] See, for instance, the studies Степић 2004; Степић 2001; Терзић 2012; Тодоровић 2015b; Тодоровић и Рајковић 2016; Милосављевић 2002. Compare and Срби 2008.

during the 1990s, as well as today, certainly is the greatest moral stain in the glorious history of Russia and the Russian people[33] – what was unambiguously spoken of by many Russians – so direct help to Serbs would be logically, precisely the necessary moral basis and foundation of the Russian general revival.

In any case, *the threshold of endurance* was clearly stated by well-intentioned Serbian intellectuals, and this limit is present now and here "now and here"[34], so that the concrete (Russian) help – in this sense – is needed *immediately* in the *essential*, clearly visible and *immediate* level. In doing so, it is expected that Russian aid will be presented continuously, universals and materialized, as well as the Russian spiritual presence; from this point of view – the Serbian people should at all times know that they will always have the protection and unequivocal support of Russia (because otherwise, in the daily expectation of the last "blow" from abroad, it is threatened by danger of falling in complete disappears in the sea of hopelessness and apathy. From the given perspective, at the present time, to all well-meaning Russians and Serbs should be clear that Russia, by improving and protecting the Serbian people and Serbian countries, fully promotes and protects itself. From this point of view, however, this is not the case now – and the Russian people and Russian representatives need to understand that it is not only about idealism, but also about the most practical interests; in other words, the moral position and superiority of Russia – the Russian future

[33] In line with the above mentioned circumstances, sometimes it happened that even the patriotic-oriented and benevolent, leading Serbian intellectuals the expectation that Russia is to help them, conceive as the one of "the greatest Serbian misconceptions of the centuries" (which is, however, rare with Serbs), whereas – in this context – Serbs unreasonably believe that the Russians only need to present their "wistfully expectations", and "these Serbian pleas shall be promptly met" (Чавошки 2011: 273–274). Respectfully, it is also emphasized that "Serbs living across river Drina truly hoped that Russia would not let them down, and that Slobodan Milosević believed in it when he left Viktor Chernomyrdin in June 1999 to negotiate on his behalf with Ahtisaari, and, in the end, this Russian tycoon, as Elena Guskova recently stated, literally betrayed the Serbs" (Чавошки 2011: 275).

[34] It is difficult, and practically impossible, to list the texts and studies of competent authors who over the last few years directly emphasized the importance of the contemporary moment in the Serbian ethnic context. For example, one of the leading Serbian intellectuals, Prof. Dr Milo Lompar, during one of his last public speeches, emphasizes that "the state of the nation is mischievous", i.e. – among other things – "the Serbian people are occupied in Kosovo and Metohija, deprived of basic rights, what often include the right to live; in Montenegro it is exposed to great political, cultural, linguistic and existential discrimination; in Croatia there is an extension of the established patterns of discrimination of Serbian national rights; the survival of the Republika Srpska – from different centers – is continually being called into question" (see Dr. Milo Lompara's interview with: Ерић 2017: 26). In addition, Lompar (as well as some of the leading Serbian intellectuals), in his latest interviews, also emphasized that Serbia, at this moment, is essentially "occupied country".

primarily depends on – are based primarily on the quality of relations with the "dearest ones who were most neglected", i.e. precisely the Serbian countries and the Serbian people.[35]

In relation to the former, the expectations of Serbs from Russia are very high – because (and despite a variety of political rhetoric), Russia is the only country from which in the Serbian ethnic context, essentially taken, anything can be expected – with an additional, widely conceived and conscious hope that precisely its existence prevents the complete (both moral-spiritual, as well as physically-existential) collapse of mankind.[36] Exempli gratia, one of the many (in this sense illustrative) texts written in Serbian ends with the following sentence: "to the Lord Emperor of Emperors, the Lord of all the Empires, we pray for Russia and Serbia not to become part of the empire of the beast, but after many troubles and sufferings for them to help to create a large, sovereign Orthodox empire: the Holy Russia and the Holy Serbia!" (Тајна звери 2009: 94). In numerous texts of a similar character under the *Empire*, a free state that is not under (the spiritual and secular) power of the "globalist dictatorship" is meant, which is – primarily in the perceptions of Orthodox believers, but also wider (essentially very similar, with somewhat changed terminology) – equates with the planned unique, "Kingdom of the Antichrist".[37]

The aforementioned book, together with various contents of related type (present in the Serbian ethno-cultural context), can serve as an excellent example of notions that directly opposes contemporary (targeted) processes and futuristic projects of "globalization" with the Western sign and ideas / projects of the Holy Russia and the Holy Serbia.[38] (And under the extremely influential Russian authors, the Serbian resistance to contemporary globalism had a "planetary universal character"; Дугин 2009: 8–9; see, e.g., Шаргунов: 103–107). After all, the extent of the current phenomenon of anti-serbism / Serbophobia in global proportions can be explained by the aforementioned ideological-civilization antagonism[39] (see Тодоровић 2008:

[35] With the aforementioned point of view, for anyone who delves into the issues concerned and available facts, understanding the "semantic equation" should not be a difficulty. For this reason (i.e., the aforementioned syntagms) once more in the idealistic-illustrative formulation presented in the preceding chapter of the text, in which the basic description of the corresponding "Serbian view of the Russian position" (in relation to the Serbs) is presented.

[36] Such an experience (role) of Russia and the Russian people with the Serbs is widespread, and its presence can be supported by an extremely large number of examples.

[37] Compare, for instance, very referring collection of articles: Не бојте се 2006. In the journalism see a very paradigmatic text by Кнежевић Керн 2016.

[38] See collection of articles Пазите на време 2013; when it comes to Russia and the Russian context see, first of all, page 91–258.

[39] Various manifestations of the anti-serbism / Serbophobia phenomenon in contemporary circumstances see, for instance in: Пипер 2004: 57–59, 36–37, 41 et seq.; Вуковић 2009; Пироћанац 2008; Vlajki 2001. The historical dimension of some

250–253, 260–261; Екмечић 2002: 354 etc.), based on a specific geopolitical structure, but also on the causes that are symbolic, theological and archetypal (compare Тодоровић 2015a; Тодоровић 2016), that is, precisely, of the spiritual-religious character. The same is the case with Russophobia[40], since the Russian and Serbian people really represent two sides of the same coin of the same civilization entity.

From the point of view of the idealistic expressions of Serbian collective consciousness, these two sides are also linked by invisible, life-giving threads, whose dissolution surely causes mutual death. From this point of view, one who feels that the final solution of the "Serbian problem" (compare beginning of this article) will not at the same time mark the beginning of a definitive resolution of the "Russian problem" is deeply mistaken. On the other hand – in the presented sense – communion and solidarity can lead to mutual, incomprehensible heights whose reach can not be even foreseen.

In any case, when we think and talk about Serbian-Russian relations, above all, we notice the importance of *spiritual-religious connection*, which exceeds by far any economic and spatial mutual dependency / distance which made the mentioned Serbian-Russian relations specific even in the global proportions. Namely, to what extent the basic Serbian and Russian ideological and cultural matrixes are congenial and interconnected, is clearly shown in the third chapter of our article. Although there have been crises during the course of history these relations (among which one of the largest was in the near past), it is hard to imagine their permanent collapse or break (compare Никифоров 2011: 352–353), precisely because of the reasons that are in the sphere *religious identity*, which is the basis of human determination in relation to one's own existence and its primary, essential goals.[41]

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especially important aspects of this phenomenon see in studies: Екмечић 2002; Митровић 1991.

[40] Compare, for instance, (from the perspective of different disciplinary contexts): Metan 2017; Kjeza 2016; Шафаревич 1993; Екмечић 2002, see, first of all page 343–365.

[41] In regard, the contemporary (comparative) context of the revitalization of Orthodoxy (in Serbia, but also in Russia) see in: Благојевић 2004; Blagojević 2015.

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Ивица Тодоровић

О значају духовно-религијске повезаности – у контексту општих разматрања српско-руских односа у актуелном друштвеном тренутку и прошлости

Апстракт: О значају духовно-религијске повезаности посебно илустративно и аргументовано може се говорити на примеру српско-руских односа, који имају изузетну семантичку дубину и историјско утемељење. Између осталог, блиске представе о Новом Израиљу код Срба и о Светој Русији и Трећем Риму код Руса указују на повезане обрасце који су суштински утицали на формирање српске и руске колективне свести. Исто тако, изражена и веома снажна русофилија код Срба представља специфичан феномен који се надовезује на претходно наведене идејне обрасце. У раду се – у виду сажетог и илустративног осврта – посебан нагласак такође ставља и на актуелне српско-руске односе, као и на значај њихове сарадње и међусобног разумевања.

Кључне речи: духовно-религијска повезаност, српско-руски односи, Нови Израел и Трећи Рим, сарадња и разумевање.

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RELIGION, MIGRANTS AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN EUROPE

Abstract: Current migrations in Europe are the result of numerous geostrategic, political, regional, local and individual causes. They are multidimensional phenomena, whose research requires an interdisciplinary approach. The work examines the social conflicts between the domestic and the settled population, especially those based on religious fundamentalism. Firstly, the most important characteristics of contemporary Christianity and Islam, as the most dominant religions in post-secular Europe are analysed, described and explained. It points to their prevalence, basic values, and religious (non) tolerance. It is emphasized that the misunderstanding of these religions is often the cause of religious and other conflicts. Then the social conflicts in different environments and the place the religion has in them are explored. The authors proceed from the thesis that conflicts between the domestic population (regardless of religiosity) and contemporary migrants are the result of historical, cultural, political and other social factors. Conflicts in the name of religion are just one type of social conflict, which often conceals other causes. In short, the root causes of the conflict of the local population and migrants in the areas where the aforementioned religions are dominant are explored. The most important forms, dynamics and consequences of these conflicts are listed. It is concluded that religious conflicts and contemporary migrations are another factor in the crisis and (dis)integration of Europe.

Key words: Europe, Christianity, Islam, migrants, conflicts.

Introduction

In the mass migration of peoples from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe, in recent years, the encounter and conflicts of different cultures and collective identities, especially those based on religious and ethnic fundamentality, are inevitable (Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 2016a: 90). The fact that two-thirds of migrants in Europe make Muslims is being used by the extremists trying to bring fear, both among Christians and among Muslims, about the dangers "others" pose to their identity. In the first decade of the

XXI century, more than 20 million Muslims lived in Europe: about 2 million in Britain, about 5 million in France, about 3 million in Germany. According to Jacques Attali, a French philosopher, in the context of the aging of Europe's population, birth rate and birth defects decline, countries that refuse foreigners will experience a decline in population, and those who accept them will experience a change in population (Attali, 2010: 117). The most common argument defending the point of view of the conflict, and not the encounter of civilization is the increase in the birth rate of Muslims. Just in one century, from 1900 to 2000, the number of Muslims multiplied 8 times, from 150 million to 1.3 billion people, which makes up about 20% of the world's population (Grčić 2011). The increase in xenophobia and islamophobia due to the influx of migrants has evidently become a part of European everyday. The terrorist attacks of Islamic fundamentalists in European cities and the strength of the migrant crisis in Europe have contributed to the further spread of Islamophobia. *Subject of research*: Social conflicts between the domestic and immigrant population in Europe, especially those based on religious fundamentalism *The main hypothesis of work*: The growth of religious fundamentalism and mass intercontinental migrations as a consequence of globalization and evidence of the crisis in Europe. For their part, they contribute to the disintegration of Europe. The social conflicts between the domestic and the immigrant population are the result of numerous factors. Religious conflicts are often the "mask" for other conflicts (economic, ethnic, cultural, historical, political), as indicated by conflicts with migrants. *Method of research*: Current migrations in Europe are the result of numerous geostrategic, political, regional, local and individual causes. Researching this multi-dimensional phenomenon requires an interdisciplinary approach. Sociological analysis of the most important causes of conflicts between domestic and internally displaced populations, their consequences in different parts of Europe, especially where dominant religions are represented.

Social conflicts can be classified in many ways. This division is never exhaustive, but the most common types of conflict are listed here. Given the number of participants, they can be conflicts between individuals and groups, and at the global level, the states and wider regional communities. By intensity conflicts are tinting or latent and open or apparent. If they are long suppressed, they, very often, appear suddenly, powerful and "eruptive". Of course, at the heart of the conflict are the interests, values, desires of individuals and social groups, for which realization various means are used. They are peaceful, but also violent, and even warlike (Coser 1956, Vidojević, 1993). By their nature, conflicts can be ethnic, cultural, religious, class, political, military, etc. The way they are resolved is different, from a peaceful, compromising solution to the imposition of the interest of one of the participants in the conflict. They can lead to permanent elimination of the opponents, which does not rarely happen in warfare. Conflicts can be

manifested in the public sphere, on an institutional level, but also in the non-institutional or private sphere of life. The result of the conflict depends on a number of factors, from individual attributes, but from the structural characteristics of the environment in which it occurs.

The authors begin from the thesis that the real causes of social conflicts are often blurred, and religious conflicts in contemporary society often represent a mimicry for deeper conflicts of economic, political and geo-strategic interests of the main actors on the social scene. In regard to this, the most important causes of the conflict between domestic and internally displaced persons in Europe are discussed here, with regard to their religious, cultural and ethnic affiliation in particular. Modern migrations are the product of at least three factors: the crisis of neoliberal capitalist globalization and the growth of economic inequalities and poverty, demographic changes on a global scale and distinctively changed relationships in the geopolitical power of the most important actors on the world stage. In the background of interest and conflicts of the most important and powerful countries in the world, local and wider wars are waging, both indirect and direct, inspired by the struggle for the most important sources of power (energy, raw materials, strategic roads). Victims of these conflicts of interest are members of various ethnic, cultural and religious communities, who are forced to move massively. The work analyzes the basic characteristics of Christianity and Islam in contemporary Europe and the most important forms of conflict between the local population and migrants.

Religion in Post-Secular Europe

Today's world can hardly be understood without the place and role that religions have in modern society. Although the catechism of most religions is basically non-violent, with an emphasis on peace, social and religious practice have shown another face of religion through history. According to statistics from 2005, around 2 billion Christians, 1.5 billion Muslims, 900 million Hindu people and 400 million Buddhists lived in the world.[1] Religion in contemporary society is becoming more and more a matter of collective identity, and not true religiousness (Vukomanović, 2008).

If, among the sociologists of religion, there is a certain concept of breaking the spear, then it is definitely secularization. We are in agreement with those authors who regard secularization as a complex, contradictory and non-linear, thus reversible process (Vrcan, 1986; Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 2016b). Secularization is manifested through the weakening of the social significance of religion and religious organizations; then, it is also manifested as a process of reducing the connection of people with religion and church; Finally, secularization is also manifesting itself as a process that

[1] www.adherents.com for 2005.

leads to changes in religion itself and religious organizations in response to the loss of social functions through an attempt to adapt: for example, in Catholicism aggiornamento.

Although Europe is the place where secularization theory has experienced its greatest empirical verification, recent research shows that this space is not religiously homogeneous (Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 2016b: 235). We agree with Knoblauh's conclusion that the religious situation in Europe is so multifaceted and unequal that it can not be judged by the same measure (Knoblauch, 2004: xi). For example, the focus of the British sociology of religion consists of "believing without belonging", new religious movements and New Age, religious minorities, the organization of religion and its role in individual life (Davie, 1994). In the center of French sociology of religion, there are new social structures of religious communities, the social consequences of religious pluralism, and especially the urgent issue of Islam and the separation of religious faith from religious-institutional dogmas (Hervieu-Léger, 2000). However, when reporting on the research of the European Values Study, instead of the term secularization, the inferiority is used because the population of Europe has not lost its "religious" needs. Europe is not religiously homogeneous because there are differences between Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox populations, between Great Britain and northern European countries. Therefore, generalizations can not be easily carried out in this narrower space, which is even more important when trying to generalize the views of secularization and the modern world.

One of the forms of the return of religion to the public scene is the *Cultural Defense* (Steve Bruce) "preventing the collapse of a national, ethnic, local or some other culture (Gavrilović, 2008: 71). Due to these differences in the religious situation in Western Europe itself, and based on the results of the European Values Study of 1990, Grays Davies (Davie, 2005: 25–26) conditionally divided these countries into *Catholic* (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain); *confidently mixed countries* (Great Britain, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, West Germany) and *Lutheran countries* (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden).[2] The results of the survey show that Christian Europe is not exhaustive, especially Lutheran countries, but not irreligious (Blagojevic, 2015).[3]

In Europe, the dominant model is that of a secular state, separated from religious communities, religiously plural, and the minimal influence of religion on social life. At the beginning of the 21st century, Europe chose to exclude the mention of Christian heritage and Christian values from the text of its Constitution, staying on the provision that accentuates "Cultural,

[2] According to the Grace Dayview division, we analyzed the migration of migrants in European countries.

[3] See Tables of Religious Self-Identification, Belief in God and Church Visit in Europe 1999/2001 and 2008 (in %) (M. Blagojević 2015: 45–48).

religious and humanistic heritage of Europe".[4] At the heart of this attitude lies the fear of discrimination of all who have no sense of belonging to the Christian tradition. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, while European citizens themselves questioned the scope of liberal democracy, intolerance grew among European "indigenous" and increasingly numerous immigrants of Islamic religion unprepared for adapting to formal secularism, an increase in religious beliefs and the influence of religious institutions was recorded. Expansion of the Eastern borders European secularism also faced with the expressed religious identity of new EU member states such as Bulgaria, Romania, and then Croatia (Radisavljević-Ćiparizović 2011: 33–34).

Historically, Islam has been present on the European soil for centuries (Spain, the Balkans, Russia). In several West European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain), the second or third generation of Muslims is growing). Europe met with Islam in four ways: conquests (the Pyrénées Peninsula, Ottoman conquests); immigration (from the former European colonies) and from the second half of the twentieth century by labor migration, as well as conversions. Islam is increasingly becoming an element of European culture. In a comparative approach to religions, some authors are starting with similarities, and the second is the difference between them and their followers. The Quran and the New Testament, are addressing everyone, so Islam and Christianity are of the Abrahamic / Abrahamic / Ibrahim, universal, published, monotheistic religion (the so-called Religion of the Book). Both Christians and Muslims are very heterogeneous in terms of nationality, education, culture. Differences: Christianity was created as a movement of the poor, and Islam emerged as a movement of the rich; Christianity (up to Constantine) remained the religion of the oppressed, and Islam of the religions of the ruling classes. In Christianity, Jesus brought the Annunciation, in Islam, it is published in the Quran. For Muslims, Jesus is only the Prophet who precedes Muhammad, not the son of God. They reject the idea of cross and sacrifice, refusing that Jesus died and resurrected. They do not accept the dogma of incarnation and redemption. They believe that Isa will come down at the end of the world and reign over the Sharia; the kingdom of Jesus is not from this world, but that of Muhammad is.

Like Judaism and Christianity, Islam is a monotheistic religion based on the belief in one God. Muslims use the Arabic word Allah when they speak of God to the creator and master of the universe. The etymological word Islam is of Arabic origin and means subjugation, submission to Allah. The disciple of Islam is considered to be a person who before the witness states that "there is only one God, Allah, and Muhammad is His Messenger. Muslims believe in the immortality of the soul, in the Judgment Day (Qayamat), the afterlife, the resurrection of the dead, the hell (Jahannam),

[4] The first European Constitution was signed on 29 October 2004 in Rome by Heads of State and Government of the EU.

the paradise (angel), and the demons (Shaytan) (Cvitković, 2009: 169). According to Islamic belief, God through time sent many revelations to people, some of whom were received by Moses and the Christian prophet Jesus. Muslims believe that Muhammad is the last prophet through whom Allah sent a revelation in the middle of the 7th century, as recorded in the Holy Book of the Quran. The foundation of the Islamic community (ummah) is a set of religious laws and obligations under the common name shariat.[5] By sharia, faith is not separated from other aspects of (daily) life (Gordon, 2001: 10–11). Islam is based on the teachings of the Quran and the Hadith, and emphasizes the ritual way of life through the diligent fulfillment of five daily prayers, fasting and pilgrimage.[6] Islam emerged on the soil of Saudi Arabia, from where it spread throughout the world.

Factors of strengthening Islamic fundamentalism and Islamophobia

In his book Religious Fundamentalism, Klaus Kincler wrote about various aspects of fundamentalism in world religions. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the term fundamentalism has begun to be used more in connection to Islam. Today, in the West, Muslims are probably better known for the persecution of Salman Rushdie, bin Laden, the position of women in the society or jihad, rather than for example, its grandiose architecture, poetry, philosophy. The typical characteristics of fundamentalism are: The return to the basics, what was at the beginning, and what was later corrupted; Hegemony and exclusivity in terms of interpretation; It opposes secularization, and the tradition of enlightenment is the enemy of every fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is the product of a political, social, economic crisis, or a response to crisis. Fundamentalist ideas are ideologically directed against science, although in practice they often take advantage of modern science and technology. The spirit of ecumenism, dialogue and tolerance are foreign to fundamentalism (Vukomanović, 2008: 97). Islamic fundamentalism refers not only to the understanding of the Quran, but also to the entire structure of the Sharia, the Divine Law formulated on the basis of the Quran in the early Middle Ages. It is interpreted as the ultimate and unchangeable commandment of God. The Sharia regulates not only the issues of culture and morality, but also behavior in society, food and personal hygiene, and much more. This includes the generally known provisions on the position of a woman, that is "worth as a half-man", banning the consumption of alcohol and pork… The Sharia codex is a huddod – (the term often used in

[5] The Islamic post means not taking food, drink, abstinence from sexual intercourse, swearing, and inappropriate actions. It lasts from dawn to sunset.

[6] Pillars of Islam: The basic five obligations of each member of Islam: 1. Shehad – confession of faith, 2. Salat – the one-time daily prayer, 3. Zekat – compulsory religious services, 4. Saum – post during Ramadan and 5. Hajj in Meku (Cvitković, 2009: 402).

Islamic literature for the limits of acceptable behavior and for penalties for serious offenses: theft, robbery, extramarital sex, alcohol consumption, and false allegations of these offenses. Sharia also determines the way of dealing with members of other faiths. Christians and Jews, "followers of the Book," enjoy certain tolerance, they are considered to be guards (dhimmi). They are not disassembled, but they are subordinate to the true believers (Kincler, 2002). According to empirical research on the global scale, most people in the world today believe that the main causes of conflict are political power and interest, and not religions and cultures (Vukomanović, 2008: 74). 4).

Extremists try to bring fear among Christians and Muslims alike about the danger of "others" for their identity. The key issue is the question of the identity and integration of Muslims into European life. Spain, Belgium and Austria formally recognize Islam as a religion. Not only migrations have brought the new religious (Islamic) identity closer to the West, but also to communications, technology, the media… For Muslims in the EU it is important whether they want a "European value orientation" or a life in Europe with a "Muslim value orientation," or a combination of the first and the second. The most important variant would be the (only) ghettoization of Muslims in Europe. Europe has gone secularization, The Islamic world has not. Parliamentary democracy is based on the sovereignty of the people, and not God, and for some this is unacceptable to the Islamic world. The West has reduced religion into a private matter, under the influence of secularization, which has already been done with Christianity. Historically, Islam has been present on the European soil for centuries (Spain, the Balkans, Russia). In more Western European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain.), the second or third generation of Muslims is growing.

The EU (declaratively) protects religious freedoms; Respects diversity; is against discrimination on grounds of religion or worldview; Respects the legal status that religious communities have in member states; supports dialogue with a secularist and secularist culture; renouncing the condemnation of any religion and worldview. Being a European means renouncing your identity, which makes it a union of diversity. In Europe, the dominant model is that of a secular state, separated from religious communities, along with religious plurality, and with the minimal influence of religion on social life. Paradoxical images could be seen in the Western Europe at the beginning of the 21st century. On one side the sight of the empty churches, and on the other – the Muslims, praying in the streets and parks, because of the lack of mosques (Paris, London), The key issue is the question of the identity and integration of Muslims into European life. It is not only necessary to emphasize the differences, but to emphasize the similarities between Christianity and Islam against the growing xenophobia. The Quran and the New Testament are addressed to everyone, so Islam and Christianity are a universal religion (the so-called Religion of the Book). Both Christians and Muslims are very heterogeneous in terms of nationality, education, culture.

Muslims in Europe do not constitute a single community, but are distinguished by the diversity of nations, ethnic groups and languages (Devie, 2007: 69). They are mostly Sunni, but there are Shiites, Ahmadiyya, Alawites, Sufi, Wahhabi… Many Muslims in the EU have been fleeing from wars in their countries (from BiH, Sudan, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Chechnya, Syria…) or within the framework of the "family reunification" campaign (Turks, Algerians, Moroccans, Indians, Pakistanis…). Then, some came to the EU as political asylum seekers, refugees from Islamic countries with repressive regimes (Cvitković, 2011).

1. Migrants and social conflicts in Protestant countries

The United Kingdom is a predominantly Protestant country and the largest ally of the United States in Europe. UK is also an important participant in military operations in the areas where migrants come from. Its representatives were the most severe towards arrival of migrants. Prime Minister David Cameron talked about "overrun" of migrants and agreed to accept only 20,000 migrants by 2020 (*Blic*, September 7, 2015). Foreign Minister Boris Jonson requested the return of ships with migrants from the Mediterranean (*Blic*, September 15, 2016). Britain tightened the law on asylum, and the police directly engaged in preventing the arrival of migrants. In the port of Dover, there were arrests of migrants, the prevention of entry through Eurotunel, as well as the separation of demonstrators who were opposed to the acceptance of migrants (*Federalna.ba*, Janary 30, 2016). Especially severe were the conflicts in London, Birmingham (Birmingham) and some other cities, including right-wing parties. (*Blic*, June 24, 2017). Prior to that, the country was shaken by terrorist attacks. In March 2017, the attacker drove into pedestrians on the bridge in London and killed four people and wounded a policeman. (*Kurir*, 23 May 2017). After that, the opponents of migration pointed out: "The time has come for the fight against Islamic terrorism." In May 2017, a suicide bomber killed 22 and wounded 59 people in the concert hall in Manchester (Vujić, 2017). Finally, the protest against the host was also expressed by the Poles, whose 680000 live in UK. In 2015 they demonstrated wearing T-shirts saying: "Stop blaming us for economic problems." (*Blic*, August 10, 2015). The forecasts that in 50 years from now Britain will consist of the majority of migrants, is responsible for the anti-immigrant groups being reinforced in a special way, further influencing the decision to leave the EU or Brexit (June 23, 2016).

2. Migrants and conflicts in predominantly Lutheran countries

According to data from 2002, Denmark had 84% of citizens who are members of the Lutheran People's Church, and only 2% of Muslims.[7] In 2003, this EU member state sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2015, the right-wing minority government was in power, aimed at reducing the number of migrants. In the four largest daily newspapers in Lebanon, an announcement was made that migrants do not come to Denmark. It indicated that the social assistance will be reduced by 50%, in the first year joining families will not be allowed, and only those who speak the Danish language will have the right to stay (*Blic*, September 8, 2015). In addition to the said authorities, it initiated the adoption of a law on the refusal of asylum seekers at borders, and in 2016, she completely gave up the quota to receive 500 migrants annually. In everyday life, migrants were attacked by ordinary citizens and right-wingers burned camps, banned entry to night clubs if English, German or Danish language was not spoken (*Blic*, January 19, 2016), and even the police fiercely fought with young migrants. Intolerance and conflicts grew especially after the publication of the caricatures of Muhammad, portrayed as terrorists, which caused the mass reaction of Muslim believers around the world (p.dw.com, January 30, 2006). The riots were fierce and more frequent in the suburbs of Copenhagen (for example, Norrebro), where religion is part of a collective identity, and unemployment and class exclusion of young migrants are higher than the rest of the population. (Horvat, 2008). Denmark has legislated that valuables and money were being taken away from migrants in detention centers whilst they were staying in that country. In short, this is an example of the extremely restrictive asylum policy and the state's deterrence of migrants since its arrival in the country.

Sweden has the most liberal policy towards migrants. It received the highest number of migrants in terms of population. Its social system attracted them, so in 2014. 83,000 arrived, and in the next year 163,000. This is the society with the highest pace of growth inequality in the EU, which has increased by one third between 1985–2008. (*Biznis i finansije*, March 22, 2013). This was accompanied by a large spatial and residential segregation of classes, especially between rich domestic elites and the poor migrant population. The policy of the state was such that, among other things, the right wing movements were strengthened. They asked for a migration referendum. The first and second generation of young people in the special neighborhoods of large cities were also dissatisfied. Dissatisfaction lasted for years, individual and group incidents took place, so that at the beginning of 2017, a "war" broke out in the streets of Sweden (*Telegraf*, January 27, 2017).

[7] See more in: sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/

The causes were different: from the dissatisfaction of the domestic population with the rise of crime, verbal and physical attacks, to the killings of young migrants in the isolated Stockholm counties. According to official data, the number of violent incidents towards the asylum seekers centers was 145 in 2014. and 322 in 2015. (*Telegraf*, January 27, 2016). There were also setting fires in the Muslim school and reception centers, massive clashes, fierce battles of migrants and the police, and mass burning of cars across Sweden. The police used weapons. There were arrests, injurries, but also dead. It was strengthening the moves that were against the ethnic diversity of the society, with 40% of those who are foreign-born in the first or second generation. They emphasized that there is "reverse racizm", which is detrimental to the domestic population (Nima Golam Ali Pur, 2015). Sweden has also resorted to deportation of migrants, so it has been planned to expel even 80,000 migrants from the country. Labor market researchers in these countries have concluded that foreign workers are present in the labor market, especially in the gray economy. They differ significantly from foreign workers who came in the 1960s (Novaković, 2008:172, 176; Poleti, 2013: 341, 344). In short, the religious factor is more concealed here than it reveals the real causes of the conflict in Swedish society. In the foreground there are social, spatial, political and cultural differences, and in another conflict between Christianity and Islam.

3. Migrants in the countries dominated by Catholicism

Poland belongs to the economically successful new EU members of the so-called "Visegrad Group", whose population is predominantly Catholic. The authority of the authorities towards migrants, especially after the October 2015 elections, was markedly hostile. Firstly, the authorities pledged to receive 7,000 migrants, but demanded that they be Christians, especially women, elderly and children. Later it gave up on any quota. Jaroslav Kachinski, then former prime minister, said that the migrants bring diseases to Europe (*Kurir*, October 14, 2015). On October 25, 2015. his right-wing party, Law and Justice, shifted the liberal Civil Platform, from the power where it has been for 8 years, and won with an absolute majority. Since then, government resistance to EU decisions on migrants has been even greater. The essence of this resistance to Islam and migrants was also expressed by the message of Polish football fans from the club Slask Vroclava (November 2, 2015), which reads: "In Europe, Islam will not spread, we stand in the defense of Christianity" (*Telegraf*, 02.11.2015).

There were frequent incidences of individuals against migrants, but also counter demonstrations and demonstrations for migrants. The fiercest were organized by PEGIDE in February 2016. Some 2,000 demonstrators backed the slogan "Poland to Poles", and nearby around a 100 counterdemonstrators acclaimed: "ANTIPEGIDA – against the Fascism in Europe." (*Blic*, February

6, 2012). At the beginning of January 2017, a 21-year-old Polish man was killed by Arab migrants. It was a trigger for the anger, protests and destruction of the property of migrants by the local population (*srbijadanas.net*, January 2, 2016). Finally, in April 2017, the conservative government decided to suspend the reception of migrants. Poland's Prime Minister Beata Shidla stated: "It is certain that no solution can be imposed on member states." (*Blic*, April 6, 2015). The government was closer to the decision to provide humanitarian aid to refugees in the Middle East.

In Austria, they went from government support that was given to the arrival of migrants and massive welcoming by citizens, to the abolition of Schengen, controlling and closing the borders for migrants, and the construction of fences to Italy, Slovenia and Croatia, in just a few months. Finally, after a few years there came an announcement from the top of the authorities, it said that migrants should not be allowed to enter the European mainland. Austria planned to expel 50,000 migrants by 2019, and the authorities acknowledged that "… Austria realized that the desire to receive all refugees was a mistake" (*Kurir*, February 1, 2016).

Migrants who were rebelling to poor housing conditions, were treated strictly by the use of force that included deportation from the country. Other migrants were given a condition to integrate into society, ie, learn a language, qualify for entry into the labor market and appreciate values of their hosts. Depending on media control, individual conflicts between the population and migrants were being reported about. Finally, the official position of the country that the EU should protect external borders contributed to this turn in the policy towards migrants. The Foreign Minister officially demanded the closure of Muslim nurseries, in which children learn the values of Islam (B.A., 2015). Half a year later, a Molotov cocktail was thrown into a refugee center near Vienna (*Klix.ba*, January 27, 2016).

The intolerance and conflicts have been reared in other events, such as the news that a group of migrants raped a 15-year-old Austrian girl (*Srbija danas*, May 20, 2017). The spiral of protests and violence was fuelled by the official politics of Austria. In February 2017, migrants protested in Vienna, against the announcement that they would be banned from wearing hijab and burqa. Demonstrators exclaimed: "Do not ban scarf," "I love my hijab", "Islam is an integral part of our identity." (*B92*, February 4, 2017). Political split between right-wing parties and movements and those who are in the presidential election for the benefit of these others. In essence, the Austrian society has remained divided over the migrants.

Hungary is an example of resistance to migrants and violations of the basic rules and decisions of the EU institutions during the current migration crisis. The right-wing Fides party, headed by Viktor Orban, is in power. In the role of the prime minister, he has drawn the main moves during the last two years of the migrant crisis in Europe. As early as the summer of 2015, a decision was made to lift a wire fence towards Serbia, 175 km long

and 4 meters high. After that, the reception of migrants was halted, and on the border with Serbia in the beginning of August 18 migrants who were cutting the fence were detained (*RTV*, August 7, 2015). Due to the slow construction of this fence, the Minister of Defense, Csaba Hende, had to resign. Strong police forces clashed with migrants who set off from the reception camp to Budapest. The use of pepper spray and clubs were used by the police in conflicts with migrants at the Horgos Pass (September 16, 2015) Viktor Orban stated that "We do not want to have many Muslims in our country." He explained that it was not a matter of refugees that had been fleeing the war. Most of them are economic migrants seeking prosperity. In case of migrants crossing the fence, Orban decided to build another in early 2017, in the same place, towards Serbia (*Alo*, February 23, 2017). In the meantime, fences were built towards Croatia and Romania.

Hungary was placing migrants in closed-type camps in the south of the country. In June 2016, 300 such migrants were protesting in one such camp (Kishunhalas) because of poor housing conditions and slow bureaucracy (*Blic*, June 1, 2016). They were waiting for a decision about deportation. There was almost no solidarity with migrants. At the beginning of October 2016, the government held a failed referendum on refugees (*Mondo.ba*, October 3, 2016). In March 2017, Parliament passed a law on the closure of asylum seekers in closed centers, with no right to freely move, until their asylum applications were resolved. Hostility towards migrants and EU institutions has intensified so much that Viktor Orban, in the mass protests in Budapest in July 2017, demanded the stopping of migration and the abolition of the EU (*Patriot.rs*, July 21, 2016). Under such circumstances, the media reported little on the attacks on migrants and their admissions camps. In short, V. Orban rejected the Brussels "cosmopolitan immigration policy" and presented himself as a defender of the nation and Europe.

According to recent data in Slovakia, 62% of the population is of Roman Catholic religion. In the current migrant crisis, the government has been strongly opposed to the arrival of migrants. It especially emphasized that Slovakia does not want Muslims (of which there are 5000 in her population and only 3% of all foreigners.[8] The most that it allowed was the 200 migrants of Christian faith, explaining that there were no mosques for Muslims and they could not integrate into society. In the end, it refused to accept the quota of only 785 migrants. The arguments for this were different: it was required that EU members do not send weapons to Syria, refugee adoption would bring security risks to the country, and it would be better to send aid and money to the affected areas refugees are fleeing from and to secure the EU's borders.

The most clear in rejecting the admission of Muslim migrants was Prime Minister Robert Fico, whose party SMER – Social Democracy has been in

[8] sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/

power since 2006. As the clashes with migrants were more frequent in Europe, the rhetoric of R. Fica also intensified. He first stated that: "Let's be honest. We are not even able to integrate hundreds of thousands of our Romani fellow citizens. How will we integrate people who live in a completely different way of life and faith." (Vujić, 2015). At the beginning of 2016, he stressed that "Slovakia must be protected from threats and the only way to minimize risks is to prevent the creation of a complete Muslim community, which would be caused by the proposed refugee quotas" (*Nova srpska politička misao*, January 8, 2016). He saw the dangers of terrorism at the arrival of Muslims, and the formation of the Islamic community as a threat to the Slovak society. He pressed charges against The European Commission for determining the quota of refugees. He has appealed for the deportation of migrants. Then he represented himself as a defender of Christianity. In that sense, Robert Fica's stated: "I want clear words. Islam has no place in Slovakia. We are not "multi-culty". We say "No!" And we will not change our view" (*Nezavisne novine*, May 16, 2017). In this way, he opposed the central EU institutions and condemned the policy of accepting refugees, calling it "ritual suicide". In June 2015, an anti-immigration protest (several thousand participants) was held in Bratislava, with the slogan "Stop Islamizing Europe – Together Against the Brussels–Europe Dictatorship." (*Pravda*, June 21, 2015). In short, this small and new EU member stood in the defense of Christianity and against Islam and migrants.

Before the outbreak of the current migrant crisis in Italy, there was a conflict between the local population and migrants. In 2012, "the government passed laws against the stay of foreign workers" (Novaković, 2014: 290). This caused a revolt of migrants, and that year 300,000 foreign workers protested in six cities. The massive arrival of new migrants has further exacerbated the situation. They were arriving most frequently and massively by the sea. Thus, in 2014, came 170,000 registered and more illegal immigrants from Eritrea, Syria, Tunisia, Mali, Somalia and Ethiopia. By August 2015, the total number of registered migrants was 600 000 (*Novosti*, August 2, 2017). These were migrants from the war zones. According to Frontex data in 2015, the number of dead and missing in the Mediterranean was 3 500, and in 2015 as many as 30 times more (Milosević, Turudić, 2015).

It was noted that in only three days 2017, 13 000 migrants were rescued from Libya to Italy. The island of Lampedusa, the southernmost point of Italy, was often the place of arrival and conflict of migrants, the police and the local population. There were frequent conflicts of migrants of different religious affiliations on their way to Italy. In April 2015, for example, 15 Muslim migrants were arrested, suspected of throwing 12 Christians off the ship (*Blic*, April 16, 2015). There were clashes before the arrival of the Italian land. In September 2011, there were 55 000 migrants in Lampedusa, almost ten times more than the national population. Half a year earlier, fishermen blocked the harbor to prevent the entry of migrant ships. Migrants

protested over the conditions of accommodation, threatened with burning gas stations, clashed with natives and police (*Vijesti.me*, September 21, 2011). Similar conflicts occurred later and in other places. Especially violent clash happened in Milan square, in August 2015 when the police charged at migrants who were protesting because of the long await for documents and poor living conditions. In May 2017, the police used force dispersing migrants (who had trampled tents) on the square in Milan with dogs and helicopters (*Sarajevo radio*, May 3, 2017). In December 2013, at the migrant center near Rome, nine migrants sewn up their mouths in protest of poor housing conditions (*Buka.com*, 27. 01. 2014). This strengthens the anti-migrant attitude of the right-wing League for the North.

According to the data for 2015, France had two thirds of the Catholic population, one-fourth of the religiously undecided, 7–9% of the Muslims, and other religions. In the current migrant crisis, the country has faced two directions of conflict. The first was the arrival of new migrants from North Africa, and the second, that existed for years, tiring and renewed, the conflict between the domestic population and the second and third generation migrants. Their parents moved from former colonies, and they, as citizens of France, and integration into society was not eagerly accepted. "A special problem is that they" ethnicise "settlements and poverty. Among young people, unemployment ranges from 40 to 50 percent" (Novaković, 2014: 289). The number of migrants who arrived in France in recent years was several tens of thousands, with the official political elite struggling in all ways to limit this number. France was a significant player in military action in all areas where the "Arab spring" was happening. Moreover, France is an important member of the NATO alliance that bombards and destroys the countries that the most migrants come from in Europe. On this occasion we look at the attitude of state authorities and citizens towards current migrants from the beginning of 2015 to the present day. In this regard, the events in migrant camps in Calais, Paris and in the north of France are highlighted. The conflicts in and around them reflect the essence of the French migrant policy.

During 2015, migrants tried for months to reach the British land. They built a camp in Calais, where up to 10.000 migrants stayed. There were conflicts between the migrants, but even more so between migrants and the police. In the first place, the residents of Calais protested against the camp residents, and then the police forces tried to dismantle them and prevent them from passing through Eurotunel. In July 2015, a group of 2000 migrants tried unsuccessfully to pass the tunnel. The police reacted with force, so there were also victims among migrants (*Nova srpska politička misao*, July 29, 2015). When they attempted to evict them from the "Jungle", the migrants were massively opposed. It was a series of fierce clashes that lasted for months. It was ended eventually by the displacement of migrants at the end of October 2016 (*Novosti*, November 10, 2015). There was far less conflicts in other parts of France. In Paris, police and migrants clashed in

gymnasiums where they were staying. A somewhat smaller group of citizens have solidarized with migrants (*B92*, May 4, 2016). In France, the National Front strengthened on the wave of anti-immigration policies, which in February 2016, for example, aggressively performed in Calais (*Blic*, February 6, 2016). Both cold and firearms were used by the police in these clashes between the police and migrants. People were injured, arrested, wounded and killed on both sides. Protests against Islamophobia and racism were less frequent, less visited and insufficient to protect migrants more significantly.

France suffered several major terrorist attacks in the observed period. The first was on January 7, 2015. when 11 people were killed and 12 were wounded. This happened during an armed attack on the editorial staff of Charie Ebdo satirical magazine in Paris. The Muslims believed that the caricatures of Muhammad were insulting to them, and thus they took vengeance in the editorial office. The second attack took place on July 14, 2015, in Nice, when the terrorist fired at, and then drove a truck into a crowd of passers by. The death toll climbed up to 84, and hundreds were injured. The attacker had French citizenship and was of foreign origin. The third shook Paris in November 2015. The number of victims was significantly higher. About 130 people were killed (*Alo*, May 23, 2017). The fear and insecurity of the citizens grew. It became clear that terrorism in Europe is gaining new dimensions, and Islam is used as a justification for political goals. The so-called Islamic State stood behind the executioner of the above-mentioned attacks, and stressed that they were fighting the state that was waging war against it. These events have further strengthened Islamophobia in France and Europe.

4. Migrants in a predominantly religiously undeclared society

Particularly interesting was the attitude of the Czech political elites to migrants. According to the 2011 census, the country is most religiously undecided (45.2%), and every third person (34.2) is non-religious. (10.3) and the most numerous of the most religiously defined are Catholics (10.3).[9] In such conditions one would expect that there was more tolerance to current migrations. In reality, the Czech Republic, certainly not primarily for religious reasons, strongly opposed the arrival and acceptance of migrants. In this respect, the views of President Milos Zeman are most frequently cited. He called current migrations a migration of peoples that would destroy Europe even without terrorism. Some of the arguments against migrants were the following: they are people of a different culture and faith, which can not be integrated into the Czech society, they will bring infectious diseases, but also terrorism. Therefore, he advocated that the army defended the borders of the EU, and economic migrants were deported to the countries

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from which they came. (Vujić, 2015). Of a similar opinion was also the former president of Czech Republic Vaclav Klaus. He defined the actual migration as "organized invasion", triggered by European politicians, human rights and the ideology of multiculturalism. The consequences, he stressed, will be a threat to the way of life and European tradition. He concluded that "migrants will destroy us without terrorism" (*Vesti online*, August 23, 2016).

A quota of 2.000 migrants was granted to the Czech Republic, which it refused because, as Interior Minister Milan Hovanec said, "binding quotas are out of common sense" (*Blic*, September 13, 2015). Therefore, the authorities have advocated that the borders of the EU be defended by NATO, and refugees in camps in the Middle East should help financially. The only possibility was the possibility of integrating Christians from Iraq and Syria into the Czech society. For all refugees, the rule is that they must respect the laws of the host country, or return to their homeland. About 3000 transit migrants entered the country, which were placed in special centers. Against the arrival of migrants, it was more often protested rather than solidarize with them. At the beginning of 2015, 500 demonstrators in Prague pointed out the slogans "Islam in the Czech Republic we don't want" and "Islam is evil." They demanded that Islam be not recognized as a religious community (*Vesti online*, January 17, 2015). In the protests organized by PEGIDA in Prague, there were 4,000 supporters of the "Block against Islam" against the Islamists and migrants. In Brno at that time, the banner "Merkel + Junker = the Grave of Europe without Children" was highlighted. Exactly fewer demonstrators were against Islamophobia (*Novosti*, February 6, 2016).

From the protests of the migrants, the rebellion and attempted breakthrough of the fence around the Bijela camp near Bezdezov in August 2015 is highlighted. The police prevented them, and they used tear gas and handcuffs. Those were men from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, under special surveillance, which had their mobile phones and money taken away from them (*Fakti.org/Blobotpor*, August 1, 2015). Illegal migrants have been placed in ex-prisons, where they have been waiting for deportation. In protest of this, three migrants cut their hands, and 60 men (of all 240) were on hunger strike (*Kurir*, November 11, 2015). They were afraid of deportation to Austria, and protested against retention in the camp for 90 days. In the beginning of May 2017, several thousand people expressed solidarity with migrants, and against government policy. Like everywhere, there were individual attacks on Christian institutions, such as the Orthodox Church in Prague. On it, in Cyrillic was written "Allahu Akbar", "Death is near you", "Your God Allah (Skenderija, 2017).

5. Migrants in the religiously mixed societies of Europe

Germany is a country with about 30% of Protestants, 30% of Catholics and as many religiously unjust citizens. The other 10% are Muslims,

Orthodox, Jewish, Buddhist and new religious movements. Out of the 82 million inhabitants, 55 million are Christians and only 3.3 million Muslims.[10] It is the most populous and economically most developed EU member state, which played the most important role in the migrant crisis. Chancellor Angela Merkel advocated a "open door" policy all the time. There are several reasons for this. One is a demographic situation, because the population is demographically old. Under the age of 14 it is only 14,7%, and older than 65, it is 18%. Merkel preferred the Syrians, educated and Christians. For all others, after strict selection, the door was closed, followed by deportation. The mass of migration is reflected in the fact that in only one weekend (September 7, 2015) 15000 migrants arrived to Germany. By the end of the year, 1.1 million were registered (*RTS*, January 16, 2016).

During the resolution of the migration crisis, Germany has violated some of the EU's basic rules and policies, such as the suspension of Schengen, the tightening of asylum policy, making ad hoc decisions on the quota of refugees, beyond the normal decision-making procedure through joint EU-28 institutions. Angela Merkel was the greatest advocate of multiculturalism, and then she said that she had completely failed and interpreted it in a way that suited her in concrete political circumstances. From the ideology of the common life of peoples of different cultures, it has been made clear that it is necessary for migrants to respect German customs and culture, and Germans theirs (*Blic*, April 1, 2017). This, in its own way, strengthened the political movements that had been opposed to the migration from the onset, especially the arrival of Muslims. Between these extremes can be mentioned numerous examples of solidarity with migrants, but also individual and group incidents against foreigners.

In August 2015, a group of 200 right-wing extremists (the National Social Democratic Party-NPD initiated a protest) clashed with the police, preventing the accommodation of 600 migrants in an abandoned hall in Heydemann. The police used tear gas and pepper spray against them, and they shouted: "Strangers Out", "Germany to Germans" and "Heil Hitler". On that occasion, 30 policemen were injured (*Kurir*, August 12, 2015). The right-wing movement PEGIDA Coalition, called Patriotic Europeans Against Islamization of the West, was fastest growing. In January 2016, when in Dresden, Pegida collected 25.000 supporters, in other areas it was different. The main cause of the gathering was the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris and the sexual violence of migrants against women in Cologne (*RTS*, January 9, 2016). The greatest success was achieved during the demonstrations in February 2016. The protests were in 25 countries. Only in Dresden 8000 demonstrators gathered, separated by the police from 3500 demonstrators of solidarity with migration. The main message was – against the Islamisation of Europe, and the slogan "We are the people" (*Telegraf*, February 6,

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2016). The dissatisfaction of migrants with the conditions of accommodation and the attitude of the domestic population towards them often burst into the public. The most drastic violence and arrogance were experienced by migrants of African and Arab origin during the New Year's Eve of 2016. In Cologne, and later it turned out in other European cities – migrants sexually harassed and raped women. It happened on the open ground, in the city square in front of the cathedral, and the police did not respond adequately. The anger of the assaulted women, as well as other citizens, grew and buzzed in mass protests across Germany. According to official data, as many as 800 women were attacked (*Blic*, January 22, 2016). It was another impetus to all movements against Islam and migrants. A sharper policy of acquiring asylum has followed, and faster and more massive deportation of such abusers.

It is particularly important to point out that in the meantime, Germany was shaken with a wave of terrorist attacks, whose actors are not only current migrants. Moreover, some of them are directly linked to the Islamic State (ID or ISIS) against which Germany directly fights. In the last two years, there have been numerous terrorist attacks in various places, in the train, on the street, in the railway station, in markets, in discotheques and in the supermarket. The attackers used cold weapons (knives, axes), but also explosives and firearms. The victims were random passers-by, but also specially chosen. Most terrorists were killed and caught, and some of them were directly linked to the ID. This was confirmed by the suspicions of those who claimed that terrorism was coming up with migrants. Let us just mention the attack on people by truck on a Berlin market before the Christmas 2016. Several people were killed and 50 were wounded (*Blic*, December 21, 2016). In late July 2017. 18-year-old German citizen of Iranian origin opened fire in Munich "Olimpia" market, killing 9 and wounding 21 people. The state of emergency was declared (*RTS*, July 22, 2017).

6. Migrants and social conflicts in predominantly Orthodox countries

On the so-called Balkan path of migrants, there are four predominantly Orthodox countries, of which Bulgaria and Greece are EU members, while Serbia and Macedonia are on their way to join the EU. Since the beginning of the refugee crisis, multiple pressure was on these countries. The political pressure by the most powerful members of the EU was synchronized with the pressure of migrants to enter the countries and continue their path towards the most developed countries in Europe. The government's attitude towards migrants depended on the place in the regional distribution of political power and the efforts of the ruling elites to join the EU. In each of the countries there was a conflict between the population and the migrants, as well as the use of physical force by the police and the army. The specifics of relations with migrants in Bulgaria and Greece are summarized here.

In order to prevent the massive arrival of migrants, Bulgaria has built fences at the borders with Turkey and Macedonia. EU members participated in the financing of 200 km of fence, equipping it with state-of-the-art techniques. The police were assisted by the army and special forces, with the aim of reducing the number of illegal migrants. Extremely restrictive policies towards migrants are also reflected in almost prison like accommodation for migrants. The largest camp was in Haramnli with 3000 inhabitants. The clashes between the police and them were frequent. The peak was in November 2016, when the 1500 migrants burned and broke everything that had arrived (*Novosti*, November 24, 2016). They searched for better living conditions and shorter retention time. Most of the population, in the town and village, protested against migrants (October 29, 2016). At the borders inscriptions awated migrants telling them that they better not come, that they are not wellcome to stay in Bulgaria because they are poor and have no jobs. The anti migrant policy was even more dominant, including hiring private migrant hunters. Former athlete, Dinko Valev was "famous" for this, flying the helicopter to the authorities and signaled the movement of migrants (*Danas*, April 21, 2016). In addition, the state has done everything to reduce the number of migrants, strengthen the conditions for obtaining asylum and shorten the time of their stay in the country. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church saw the migrant wave as an "invasion" that, if it remained, threatened to destroy the Bulgarian people (*Radio Sarajevo*, November 28, 2016).

Greece exhibited relatively least xenophobia and Islamophobia, as it was the first to face the gust of migrants. In Greece, more than 50,000 migrants were captured in 2016 alone. The arrival by the sea was the main migrant route. This led to the overcrowding of the islands and migratory camps (Lesbos, Hios for example). This led to frequent conflicts with the local population as well as the police. In Lesbos, the living conditions were desperate, and emergency doctors also went on strike (*Politika*, April 24, 2016). The more intensifying the migrant crisis in Europe the more Greece paid a higher price. There has not been any real and substantial help from other EU member states, and the treaty with Turkey is poorly respected. In particular, members of the right-wing Golden Dawn protested against the migrants, but they were few and later forbidden. Thousands of citizens of Athens and others have repeatedly and massively solidified with the migrants (*Mondo.me*, March 10, 2017) On the other hand, migrants have protested against difficult accomodation conditions, long waiting for documents and the attitude of the police and the state towards them. Interestingly, the Greeks did not complain about migrants by emphasizing their belonging to another religion and culture. They were primarily against their arrival for economic reasons, because they were already over-indebted and poor. Every fourth Greek left the country beforehand, and new migrants were not seen as a factor in solving demographic problems. They were seen as a

common problem of the EU, so the authorities advocated that these problems be jointly resolved by EU members.

Instead of the conclusion

In the suppression of (religious) xenophobia, it is not only necessary to emphasize differences, but to emphasize the similarities between Christianity and Islam. In addition to the fear of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist attacks, the inadequate and uncoordinated responses of the European Union to the migration crisis also fuel Islamophobia. The text highlights the most important forms of social conflicts between individuals belonging to different religious, racial, cultural, political and ethnic groups on the ground of today's Europe. The relationship between them is complex and difficult to be reduced to one dimension of conflict. Moreover, there is a whole plexus of global, local and individual factors that determine the relations between the domestic and the migrant population. Investigating these relationships in communities where the religious and confessional affiliation of the population differs suggests that other, political, geostrategic factors are important for the universality of these relations and the outcome of the above-mentioned conflicts. According to empirical research on the global scale, most people in the world today believe that the main causes of conflict are political power and interest, and not religion and culture. The interdisciplinarity of access to these conflicts could scientifically explain and reveal many other causes of conflict and the mechanisms of their concealment and resolution. The most basic forms of conflicts between members of different religious, ethnic and cultural communities are only briefly sketched here.

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RELIGION AND SECULARISM BETWEEN PAST AND PRESENT

Abstract: The connection between institutional religions with politics in the contemporary age displays many consequences and forms of presentation. The author emphasizes that in layman and great part of the intellectual public those in search of the incompatibility of the original Christian doctrine with the immoral of the contemporary events actually neither show the readiness for the objective perspective of the cultural past nor perceive correctly the transformations of the religious systems in future.

The author reminds of the fact that accesses to Christianity from the perspective of the theoretical aspect of the sociological method frequently do not converge with the need to take a complete view of the analytical whole since they use ideological goals in which the Christian mercy is presented on the basis of the stereotypical evangelical pattern. Neither has the presentation of Christ in art always corresponded to the harmless peacekeeping and unconditional love for the human race, nor is the contrition unconditionally insisted on before the authority of the heavenly fatherin the transformation of the theological thoughtat the contemporary age. Simultaneously, churches are modernized and before the forces of adaptable need they participate in the creation of new emotions. The new sensibility gets a new qualitative impression through the specification of the general goals in the contemporary world.

Key words: religion, secularism, religious systems, Christianity, new sensibility.

Introduction

Never has there been an accurate distinction between the spontaneous flow of the religious authenticity through the historic time and secular processes with a specific way of life that was supposed to mark the weakening of the religious influence and its sensibility. In the intertwining of their mutual permeating, the specific nature of the connection between culture and religion came to prominence. With the specific connection in their historic context, the epistemological and ontological points of secularization have been constantly reviewed and its presence as chronologically new and

contemporary phenomenon has been evidently disputed. The perception of the social profile of secularization is inseparable from the designation of the man as *homo religius*and perception of the phenomenon of religion as an integral part of culture.

In one part of layman and even professional public there is encouragement of the wrong evaluation that the secularization is one-direction process of weakening of the religion's influence in the social life. Secularism is nowadays primarily defined as a transitional process of religion from its dominantly sacral area of thought and practice into its profane sphere. On the other hand, secular, earthborn goals did not dislocate religion out of the existential goals of bare survival until the undermining of the source doctrines and contents of their sermons in the world of big institutional religions.

The antinomy of the modern religiousness in the reflection of past

The later antinomy of the world we live in abounds not only in interdenominational conflicts, but also in historic and contemporary divisions among them. These processes have historical legality, so the conflicts and manners of existence are actually the first sources and rudiments of the secularism placing it in the position of traditional process historically conditioned and timely distanced from the exclusivity of the perception of contemporary forms in its recognition. Kokovic (1994:396) says that in the cult equally reside the secular and the religious so I believe that morality cannon separate these extremes because they are supporting columns in the spiritual architecture and integrity of each human being.

The evidence of the secularization as an immanent process to what we know about the history of religiousness is not only the rudiments of the original practice but also of the later epochs in which religions influenced the historical and spiritual physiognomy of then cultures. Even in the contemporary notion of secularism defined by the processes of hyper-differentiation, hyper-rationalization, hyper-modification and uncontrolled urge for comfort and enjoyment, the compatible traits with the elements of hedonism of previous high civilizations are recognized. H. Sonnabend notices that in Ancient Greece during the holidays and official cult ceremonies there was a regular tendency toward the profanity (Sonnabend, 2009:114). As music and dance were followed by a strong urge for fun, during the days of the celebration of Dionysus, Sonnabend concludes that despite the celebration of gods for some number of citizens in the polis religiousness was of less importance than the enjoyment in great spectacles with many pleasant performances (Ibid, 114). The gods in whose honor the holidays were celebrated also were not prominent like religiousness and they gave the prominence to specific contents of profane manifestations with expressed elements of fun and competition.

Sonnabendas a good connoisseur of the religiousness in Ancient world writes about the ambivalence in the relationship of gods and people then. On the one hand, the mysticism of religiousness was lost by turning gods into human beings, which turned their mutual relation into specifically partner communication with respect to the universality of the similarity that reflected their same or similar problems. This comprises also the form of consciousness and the notion *anthroposa*as*sui generis assumptions*of secularism later understood in its specific meaning. On the other hand, the traditional state cults could not please the religious needs of an individual because he was subordinate to gods in the general mission of keeping and protecting vital general values of the community. Therefore, according to Sonnabend, the Greek was looking for the answers to the questions that existentially and completely personally referred to him, beyond the traditional church (Sonnabend, 2009:116). The questions of his personal existence the Roman could not find in the state cults due to pragmaticality of the state order in search of the stabilization of the political rule, so he silently thanked the religious tolerance decreasing spontaneously the importance of the existing religiousness.

The connection between the institutionalized religions with politics at contemporary age shows many consequences and forms of presentation. They also can be stereotypically labeled so I will refer only to those not familiar enough or contrary to the stereotypical and traditionally conditioned interpretation of the doctrine itself. Those in search of the incompatibility of the source Christian doctrine with the immoral of the contemporary events today, neither express readiness to objectively look at the past nor correctly perceive the transformations of the religious systems in future. Except for the bare motive in which the feelings and needs for moral actions are encouraged, these intentions of free-thinking people sometimes do not possess the attributes of broad-minded perception of either the doctrine or the time as a historical frame within which it emerges and evolves according to the need.

The approaches to Christianity from the perspective of the theoretical aspect of the sociological method frequently do not converge with the need to perceive the analytical whole because they use ideological goals in which the Christian mercy is presented in accordance with the stereotypical evangelical form. Neither has the presentation of Christ in art been always correspondent with the harmless peacekeeping and unconditional love towards the comprehensive space of the human race, nor is the contrition of believers unconditionally insisted on before the authority of heavenly fatherat the contemporary age. In the book "The History of the European Mentality" (2009), whose editor is Peter Dinzelbacher, he also reminds about the Stuttgart psalter (year 820) and the psalter of St. Albans from 12th century in which Christ for the poets, with a spear and shield, protected with an armor and helmet, in military boots kills not only the snake below him

and beats a dragon and a lion, but also violently deals with sinners. In disciplining them Christ uses many tools, from hands, sticks, and hammers to peasant hoes. (Dinzelbacher, 2009:126–7).

The idea of Christ inclusion putsa regular man in a position that going after him, he can more easily beat injustice, sinners and devils of that time. This matrix of thinking, however, was known in the use of god during the great turbulences among the Yugoslav peoples in the nineties of the 20th century. It was known forever that god is with the Croats and that he is the guardian of the Serbs on the other side of their mutual conflict. The individualism against the collective spirits did not abandon the religious perception of an individual even in the Middle Ages.

In the mentioned study Dinzelbacher indicates the increasing number of individual prayers, the activism of the individual who freely joins the pilgrimages following the lines of beggars. Not wanting to passively listen to the priest who promises salvation, the individual aims at a bigger individuality, interiorization, and personal religious adventure. Dragana Radisavljevic-Ciparizovic believes that at each liturgy, the priest prays not only for the absolution from his sins, but also for the ignorance of people. (Radisavljevic-Ciparizovic, 2016:39). It is true. I would only add that there is more and more of those believers who do not accept the "preaching" in the form of personal and family defiance by old-new enlighteners as arrogant shepherds.

The original Christianity emphasizes the contrition of a man before god and in his work modernized and adjusted to the present time it is encouraged to debate with him. Radio Vatican broadcast on 25th January, 2017 that the Pope highlighted that god loves when a man is angry at him and when you say to his face what you feel because he is the father. The Pope emphasizes the form and the message based on the principle "here I am" instead of a man who is withdrawing, hiding, running away or pretending. The exclamation: "here I am" is more freely addressing and assumption that the lord's will is respected in the life I live. The rigid Catholic wing sees in this the absence of humbleness before god, arrogance and adulation to all the people of the unjust world.

The projection of god to everyday situations is the evidence of the comprehensive characteristics of faith where he is not weakened, but in search of the reinforcement paths. Even such lack of seriousness with the bizarre element such as courtship to women must be defined by rules and paths of Catholic faith. Young Catholics advise young men to say: "god was bashful when he made you" or "do you love Jesus? Then we have many things in common."

In the contemporary problems of culture, a great number of people find the support and hope of a logical answer in hyper-differentiated models of religiousness. It is only a final expression of the historic continuum which reflects the origin of religion as a part of culture. It is doubtless that people

turn to studies of spirituality and old wisdom, as confirmed by the literature of this genre conquering the world in hyper-nationalized cities and offering to an individual a revived hope in terms of human existence. However, the difference between the need of material belongings – the acquisition of material values and the improvement of the consciousness does not seem so deep. In accordance with that, Lipovetsky says: there is no doubt that in the books of wisdom new readers are looking for the ways to get them closer to happiness, but they want to reach it easily, comfortably, now, without any effort, without constant "spiritual exercises" prescribed by ancient teachers (Lipovetsky, 2008: 405).

This antinomy of the spiritual happiness essentially opposite to religiousness and spirituality in general, incorporated itself as a virus into the structure of our spiritual and institutional life. Whether what is true in theory, says Lipovetsky, it is true on other levels, too (Lipovetsky, 2008:405). The doctrines of big religious systems surely did not avoid that, on the contrary, Ikeda and Toynbee remind that the Chinese philosophers of non-Confucius school expressed harsh criticism for Buddha since he left his family and the founders of three main religions, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam left their families and birth towns for professing the path towards the salvation of the whole humanity (Toynbee, Ikeda, 2005:357).

Secularism is not just a historic consequence of the conflict within historic-church disputes and wider secular conflicts. Its present manifestations can be perceived as an assumption and implicitly conditioned walk toward the exact values of the original Christianity. The globalization of commercialism, the mobility of food products, the rise of information science revolution, the live consciousness of earlier forms of traditional agriculture and increased mobility of people caused the equalization in their mental structure even in the tiniest traits in anthropomorphic features of the world population. These processes represent the objectively founded supplement to the social assumptions that supported the idea of the equality of human kind and sameness of all people. Such obstacle to racism and religious intolerance should encourage consciousness about ecumenism and all aspects of tolerance towards the difference that fades. Even the most extreme racists and religious wanderers must take this fact into consideration.

Unfortunately, the spirit still did not win over nature, but from the aspect of the dark side of the human it is ready to make it senseless and adjusted to the greedy goals of the group. On the contrary, the unification enhances the competition within the same kind and greed towards the surrounding world making thealluring slogan on the uniqueness of the human kind frequently hypocritical. The social conditions with actors and institutions that create, form, and direct the ideas are the topic for sociology and not its content and confirmation that they are confirmed and proved on the content level in the need of compiling its structures with the events of the contemporary society. DjuroSusnjic believes that the sociological method exactly

refers to the abolishment of the original question of ideas and their boiling down to social issues (Susnjic, 1995:37).

The more they are turned into the means of politics, modern religions and their sources will be more flexible, represented through the tolerance of actors who study them and in the redefining of the following doctrine of ideas which is presented according to the moment. Epistemological problem of marking of the given compatibility is aggravated due to the fact that the original ideas have always been social. Their origin is the product of euphemism in which the essence is replaced by lingual form as a powerful means of convincing. Even though familiar enough, it is of less importance whether Christ responds to what he originally was, than why he was formed in the manner of narrative myth. The first dilemma aims at the structure of politics, and the other, even though it was motivated by it, is the subject of sociology. If it had not been for the rudimental manipulation reflected in the shaping of mythical content of the early Christianity, there would not be today's Christianity with all its consequences and forms of presentation. The Christian learning, says Dinzelbacher, which despite being a book religion was not static at all, but from the epoch to epoch it was reinterpreted: from the fundus of holy texts in the Bible and texts of church fathers it was emphasized what in this or that moment was suitable for the current interests (Dinzelbacher, 2009:123).

Religiousness and new sensibility

It is without any doubt that simultaneously with the esthetics of multiplication in the seats of cultural services there is a discursive expansion of the basic religious mission. It is the birthplace of the new sensibility which within the institutionalized faith renews the hope in healthy mission after the shaken reputation among believers. The sensibility used to be monotonous and unified in terms of thoughts. It was supported by the ancient polytheistic religiousness which connected the sensibility of the forest nature with the notion of an enemy and great dangers. The sensibility of nature was so underdeveloped that everything out of the range of cultivated areas, simultaneously felt as nice and caused not only esthetic absence of belonging but also fear (Thury, 2009:465).

In ancient times the order of fear was related to the forest environment, where beasts and other creatures resided. There was no place for a sensible man and a regular mortal. The forest was the place of residence of gods but they were strong enough and untouchable. Harry Kühnel writes that in the Middle Age the forest was also perceived as negativity and an obstacle to the wandering voyager (Kühnel, 2009:475). This place of repentance striving for taming with time becomes desirable and with the new century inspirational in the module of all-human sustainability. In the contemporary age the sense of diversity as an influential paradigm in the constitution of the

new sensibility conquers horizons of institutional religiousness. Churches are abandoning the traditional patterns of acting taken from the Middle-Aged spiritual matrix so they direct their mission toward the challenges and problems of the contemporary world. This internal secularism that conquered churches is the herald of the new sensibility emerging in its halls.

This sensibility is completely identical to the changed role of church and redirection of its attention and the issues such as: the abuse of scientific accomplishments, the debate on the biomedical procedures used in conception, the attitude toward the prolongation of life and its termination, then the protection of the endangered environment, marriages of same gender, consumer society, injustice in social differentiation and information technology. Even though the connection of science and religion in the contemporary society is unquestionable, the interpretation of church is still grounded in canon and dogma. While in the Middle Ages it fiercely opposed the scientific assumptions, nowadays church indicates that scientific research and technological achievements are useful because they are a gift of god. This inversion of faith does not question the creator and his intentions in coexistence with the modern way of life.

Every day we have the opportunity to see for ourselves how the church head in Rome is engaged in the accomplishment of the full concomitant of east churches with Catholic, of the revitalization of global European project that experiences serious problems, of faster integration of Balkan countries into previously reformed European community. The Pope criticizes the most developed countries for their selfishness and greed for material goods and money and that their brothers from the Catholic clergy and their prodigality are not exempted from the criticism.

Advocating in favor of the rights of the poor, he emphasizes their right to accommodation, education, work and country, believing that their perception of the gay culture and contraception are violently imposed as conditions for receiving material help. With these issues, by criticizing the media writing only about bad things causing the depression of the population, the Pope is not against their objectivity, but for the affirmation of more positive sensibility. In this manner, the church head of the Western world indicates the shift towards sociological and socio-psychological discourse in the perception of the contemporary world.

The moral transformation of church stems from the notion that our world is common while the isolation of layman and sacral world is no longer considered as the survival path. Despite previous Weber's conviction on the revolutionary accomplishment of the religious ideals to the existing social order and positive role of numerous religious leaders in history, the new sensibility of affirmative influences in the religious world offers increasing number of opportunities.

It is evident, however, that today churches do not deal with current issues only, but that in the form of their most significant representatives, the

Pope and the Patriarch, they focus on the symbolic relations towards the universal values. When the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russ Kirill goes to the Antarctica to visit smaller communities, he symbolically designates the toponym in order to remind about the place which has never been at war and the destination without arms. In that respect, the message is not just an active and value-affirmative act but also an aspect of the new sensibility expressed in a symbolic way. Therefore, the complete image of this act is captured not only by the engaged direction, but also it is the communication with the public and expression of an attitude with a deeper message.

Simultaneously, unacceptable behavior of influential people in the world stage and people with ambitions towards high thrones, are publicly condemned and their actions are compared to the disharmonic act which causes doubt in the coordinates of their Christian belonging. Trump, says Pope Francis, cannot say for him that he is a Christian because he wants to erect walls deprived of compassion for the immigrants. In other words, whoever erects walls instead of building bridges cannot attribute to himself the content of personal and Christian belonging.

In this form of marketing the humane coordinates of opinion such as the craze for services of the industrial luxury and private life designate the need for the private preferences and their adjustment to the mentality of differentiated individualism. These humane preferences even though different, relax reality setting it free from the evil thoughts and tendencies. They are accessible to people waiting to be recognized.

The Holocaust centers near major cities are not just places sending a message and warning to the humanity, but they are also an integral part of the touristic offer, true pilgrimages which in their promotional agenda calculated superior values. Between the humanization of the space and adjustment of the object to the personalization mode on the one hand and emancipation of consciousness in high politics on the other, there is no essential difference. It is about the corresponding walk towards dignified living where the creative marketing is a bare necessity.

Churches are modernized and before the forces of adaptable need they are involved in the creation of new emotions. The cumulative specification of functions, whether it is about technical or idea solutions – they conquer new modules in the image promotion. Even though the new sensibility is, at least when religion is perceived, its shift towards life subjects, it sometimes receives a qualitative impression through the specification of general goals. For instance, the government of UAE is considering the program of the new ministry whose goal would be the achievement of tolerance and accordance towards denominations.

Nevertheless, *the new sensibility* does not represent just a result of awaken emotions which the official church tends to encourage with its believers and always curious public. It is also influenced by the manner of interpretation of the relation of the faith and conflicts nowadays, which are

frequently enhanced by the emotionality of the sociologists, political scientists and historians themselves. In that respect, the new sensibility may have detrimental effects to the human relations. Certainly, the key question is whether certain theorists are prone to exaggeration of the evaluation of the directions of religious processes referring to the conflicts among denominations in unreal frames of their proportions. Can there be a confirmation of, for instance, Giddens's attitude relying on the opinion of some authors that Bosnia became the point for gathering of all the Muslims around the world (Ahmed. Donnan, 1994:7–8), (Giddens, 2007:572).

With doubtless fact that in this country during the war in the nineties of the 20th century and after it, there were many Islamic extremists – if the extends of their participation that Giddens discusses had been compatible with the stated proportions, the avalanche of terrorism would not miss Belgrade and Zagreb. It is not about anyone's specific guilt but about the blindness of terrorism which fortunately missed this area. Also, the extreme Islam from its headquarters perceived the Yugoslav peoples as a strong profiling of the citizen's identity.

Despite the strong Islamic and Catholic traditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, these peoples used to make a structured whole of religiously relaxed and unburdened people of the European and modest manners. The detrimental potentials of the fanatic part of Islam, neither perceived the political Serbs and Croat as the enemies of Islam, nor recognized in the Bosnian Muslims part of the whole worth dying for and for whom pan-Islamism would be significantly endangered.

Nevertheless, the multi-decade discrimination among the peoples of the Balkans did not exclude the attitude of powerful countries toward religious differences. The present globalization and bureaucratic system of the European continent have a strong impact of the preferred Catholicity and it is supported by the claims of S. Pokrajac (2004: 11) and M. Mitrovic (1998: 281, 283). Z. Gudovic reminds about the prejudice according to which the Western world is liberal and progressive and the Eastern Christian world is quasi prone to totalitarianism and different kinds of despotates (Gudovic, 2015: 44). In the research I carried out in Belgrade during April 2017, on a sample of 101 interviewees, the attitude was that the developed European countries looked upon Catholicity as the reflection of the western civilization and culturally more progressive religious system, as confirmed by 53 (52,47%) of the interviewees; 19 (18,81%) of them did not believe in such prejudice of the developed and 29 (28,71%) of the interviewees stated that they did not know the response or had no opinion on this issue.

The expansion of the western Christian civilization to the countries of East and Southeast Europe is equalized with the process of Europeanization (Ibid. 44). Gudovic (2012: 394) writes about divergent influence of Catholicity to the idea of the social development in former Yugoslavia. On the one hand, the areas with this religion were the most developed ones and

bearer of the advanced ideology. On the other hand, as the most religious areas with the strongest influence of church, the resistances opposing this ideology flourished.

The cognition of religion – the path of multi-disciplinarity

The sociological legitimization of today's de-secularization is not the same as psychological legitimization of the hidden secularization. Despite fixation of the specific process there is the need of its multidisciplinary treatment. Some authors instead of underlining different spaces of the watchtowers from which religion is looked upon, they indicate the differences related to realistic sides and ostensible insight of another approach. Philosophical-anthropological and psychological approach, framed by human interests to a greater extend is fixed in comparison to the actual aim of the sociology to bind religious processes to the visible manifestations of the appearance.

The contemporary sociology in the pretension for the trend of the new paradigms frequently approaches religion from the perspective of apodictic evaluations emphasizing the process as recognizably new and fixed enough order. The loss of existentialist reflection based on the historic grounds of the man and society, blurs the notions making religious phenomena simpler. The philosophical and anthropological thinking comprises the wholesome of the holy and secular as a unique pattern of its two sides.

The arising de-secularization of Islam nowadays represents a strong attachment to faith but simultaneously also a form of its use serving to the earthly goals of more aggressive groups. In that case, it is about naked secularism with the motivation outside the faith, the activism that manipulates the use of idea – a specific form of power increasing day after day with the intention to display the strength and demonstrate the influence. Most of the conflicts and wars today, as considered by Giddens are of secular nature because they are connected to different political convictions and material interests (Giddens, 2007:558). The dilemma whether in religious processes the influence of the secularization or de-secularization is prevailing is not the confirmation of the chaotic condition in the attempt to remove the complex layers of the religious thought. Actually, it is the sign that sociology enters its mature phase when it becomes aware of its limitations.

The constant penetration of the human existentialist consciousness possesses the potential problematically and analytically directed toward the contents of world religions, but also towards secularization. The dualism in the contradictory perspective of numerous values constitutes a deeply sophisticated structure of the methodological approaches which remove the layers of criticism and at the same time it constitutes the need for the perspective of the given religious problems always to be innovative. For instance, the claim on the epochal rise of the scientific though and its accomplishments in the contemporary world is usually present in order to simultaneously

emphasize serious modules of crises which the science is experiencing. Here the religious thought is born as an authentic response in the existentialist field of the man and his world. Both divergent tendencies historically include the attitude toward religiousness and the need for multiple aspects of knowledge which did not just go through a scientific norm.

In accordance with that, Djuro Susnjic, states righteously that the crisis of the science caught its very structure and that in the sciences about the man there is too much physics and too little metaphysics (Susnjic, 1999: 194). The contemporary age due to the development of machines and technology, decreased the alienation of people in physical work and production itself encouraging alienation in consumption and the sphere of thought. Therefore the significance and the influence of the religious perception of the everyday life are before dramatically bigger challenges. The rise of the information science revolution, city expansion and personal alienation in them increases the forms of individual religious beliefs placing the secularist tendencies to a specific level. The conceptual immanency of secularism finds the confirmation in the very sense of religion which disables one perfect and definite definition of religion because it is not possible to define completely a phenomenon which changes and has a history (Susnjic, 1995:40).

Nevertheless, contemporary globalization processes based on the value system of westernization, in last thirty years epitomize the strength of the upcoming Islam whose vision is not depleted completely in the resistance toward the Western cultural pattern, but also in the use of its crisis. The aggressive silhouette of Islam today has a trait of arrogant passing of numerous elements of the spiritual superiority. The dispute and thoughts on the norms of purity, personal hygiene, family life and intimate summer vacation in the public sphere to which Islam is dedicated, are almost offensive for the rest of the world outside Islam. The western cultural form is prone to everyday comparison whenever some life flaws and pathology are discussed. The present are the elements of the "enlightening" convincing and reminding of the Western world that Islam is chronologically the latest world religion at the same time and the higher stadium inside the institutional order of the society on different issues, such as family relations, marriage order, adoption, sexual moral, and hygiene.

The principles of multiculturalism and multi-denomination in big western cities instead of developing the values of cultural diversity urbanize the difference of almost conflicted civilizations. The knowledge and technology have become the weapon of fight and hostility and less the tool of liberation. The Islamic version of secularism related to the conduct and clothing of girls and young women in the European cities carries a specific symbol of moral dualism. Therefore in certain sense it is not possible for the expression de-secularization to comprise this conduct. The women are easily covered, mingling with the Christian people in big European cities consuming the values of all cultural manifestations at their disposal. It is not

disputable, of course, but with hijabs put on, they highlight the difference and latent conviction on their superior uniqueness.

On the other hand, in relation to the inhabitants of their mother countries the consumption of Christian values they contribute to the secular suppression of Islamophil rigidness positioning the progress compared to their fellow countrymen. The resistance of the Muslims carries a specific trait of preaching superiority to gradually reorganize the world after the western and European model of globalization. Consequently, the specific mixture of the resistance toward globalization and the ambition for domination and new forms of unification is apparent. These evaluations are not in the function of the criticism of Islam as a world religion but of the path by which its branches express Islamic values.

Conclusion, sense and perspectives of religiousness

Not only the rudiments of the practice, but also the later epochs in which religions influenced the historic and spiritual physiognomy of then cultures confirm that secularization is an immanent process to what we know about the history of religion. A strong tendency toward profanation was expressed with Ancient Greeks during the official cultural ceremonies. The individual forms of belief, however, recognizable as such today, were present in ancient civilizations through personal forms of religious actions.

Churches abandon traditional forms of actions taken from the Middle Age spiritual matrix and direct their vision toward challenges and problems of the contemporary world. It is about internal secularism emerging in church halls. The head of the Western church puts efforts for the moral transformation of not only church but also deeply antagonized and separated world which makes evident the transformation of the theological and frequently conservative doctrine so far into modern sociological discourse, which is truly important novelty in the general actions of church.

Churches are modernized conquering new modules in the promotion of the image encouraging the new sensibility it attaining qualitative impression through the specification of general goals. Even though the interpretation of the church grounded in the canon and dogma has changed the attitude toward the scientific researches and technological inventions. The inversion of faith which attributes these values to god's gift is adaptable form in the adjustment of church to the contemporary way of life. The sociological legitimation of today's de-secularization is not the same as the psychological legitimation of the hidden secularization and the radical Islam is a remarkable example. This religion does not oppose only the western pattern of globalization, but also arrogantly presents its values using the weaknesses and the crisis of the western societies.

Since education is the essence of each rationally ordered society, its goals will be empowerment not only for work roles but also for life (Kokovic, 1992:8). In the search for such goals, the education will not only revive but also represent further encouragement and direction of the religious approach to the man's life and the surrounding world. Although irreplaceable, the layman school reflects the education adequately, *sui generis* to the religious goals. The idea of human dignity, so little thought and talked about by students is completely immanent to this evaluation. Toynbee and Ikeda wrote that dignity is a value which cannot be replaced by anything else that would be measurable to it (Toynbee, Ikeda 2005:360). As such, it is absolutely unique value in the contemporarily understood perception of the irrelevant economic logic. It means that dignity is also the highest value of human relations and in a way not only contemporary but also traditional equivalent to the Christian god. Finally, Ikeda and Toynbee remind of "The New Testament" where it says: because what is the use to the man if he gets the whole world, but harms his soul.

The potential loss of dignity includes the need for compatibility of all the actions emerging in the form of god's commands. It is where the permeating of the past and future offers a tangible sense of religiousness as the attitude toward life. The loss of the need for process discoveries in the civilization of hyper-moment, and the healthy urges for the creation of cultural contents of religion are lost, too.

Even in the eighties of the last century the sociologist criticized church for its distance from life, incomprehensible language, unpreparedness for the urban revolution and conflict of the religious and technical mentalities. The question is raised, however, is it really the case nowadays? The strategies in obtaining believers and new soldiers for political goals conquered the cyber space from video games for the youngest to various forms of popularization of the doctrine for all ages. Also, the soutane and mysterious darkness of the Middle Age do not seep so attractive in the light of the new day. When it comes to the evaluation that today's church shepherd do not behave in a manner suitable to their function and eminent spiritual mission, 19 (18.81%) of the interviewees agree completely, 52 (51.48%) mostly agree and 30 (29.70%) interviewees state that they partially agree with this statement. As major causes of dissatisfaction the interviewees pinpoint commercialized behavior of priests derogatory to the spiritual relation toward believers and public: 43 (42.57%), luxurious life 31 (30.69%), inappropriate involvement in politics 8 (7.92%), and modality responding to something else actually comprising all these and probably some other reasons was offered by 19 (18.81%) interviewees.

The expansion of culture and education, the growth of standard, information technologies, social mobility and means of transport as luxurious assets changed the context of religion and decreased the aureole of church

as a holy place. In this manner, its autarchy is deprived of sense, mystical strength and the sense of awe before the priest and holy altar.

On the other hand, the polycentric secular structure of multiculturalism caused the priests and their perspectives of life to become only transient incident and unexpected difference of the same world. The pluralism of ideas of the contemporary society broke into pieces the centuries of the priest reputation. Having seen a tall man dressed in priest clothes, walking down the busiest street relaxed, eating crackers, made me think about the transformation by which a holy day from the church calendar was just moved to the holy days of hyper-defined hedonistic pleasure. The power of traditional ideas irresistibly yields before the charms and challenges of an exciting day. Freedom becomes the exploitation of the general principles and the ideal of consumption outside professional discrimination. Churches nowadays find the secular power more attractive than the traditional spiritual contents inspired by Christ's love. They allude to his love only in the context of critical attitude toward some aberrations of the society after they themselves were involved in the profane logic of the increase of wealth and power.

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Zoran Gudović

Religija i sekularizam između prošlosti i sadašnjosti

Apstrakt: Povezanost institucionalnih religija s politikom u moderno doba iskazuje brojne posledice i oblike ispoljavanja. Autor podvlači da u laičkoj i većem delu intelektualne javnosti, oni koji danas tragaju za inkompatibilnošću izvorne hrišćanske doktrine s nemoralom savremenih događanja, zapravo ne iskazuju spremnost za objektivnim sagledavanjem kulturne prošlosti, niti ispravno percipiraju preobražaje verskih sistema u budućnosti. Autor podseća na činjenicu da pristupi hrišćanstvu iz perspektive teorijskog aspekta sociološkog metoda često ne konvergiraju s potrebom da se sagleda analitička celina jer služe ideološkim ciljevima u kome se hrišćansko milosrđe prezentuje po stereotipnom jevanđelističkom obrascu. Niti je predstava Hrista u umetnosti uvek bila korespondentna bezazlenom mirotvorstvu i bezuslovnoj ljubavi prema ljudskoj rasi, niti se u modernom vremenu u preobražaju teološke misli bezuslovno insistira na skrušenosti pred autoritetom nebeskog oca. Istovremeno, crkve se modernizuju i pred silama adaptibilne nužde učestvuju u stvaranju novih emocija. Nova osećajnost zadobija novu kvalitativnu impresiju kroz specifikaciju opštih ciljeva u savremenom svetu.

Ključne reči: religija, sekularizam, verski sistemi, hrišćanstvo, nova osećajnost.

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CLASSICAL ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDING OF ISLAM AS RELIGION OF WARRIORS – THE IMPLICATIONS OF WEBER'S INTERPRETATION OF ISLAMIC DOGMA

Abstract: Max Weber, one of Europe's most influential social thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, characterized Islam as a warrior religion. As the pillars of Islamic religious ethos Weber saw the warriors from the Arabian Peninsula. The implication of such perception of the social history of Islam, among others, is also emphasizing the militant attitude of Muslims towards members of other religions, as well as the necessity of sacrificing in the religious war to ensure after-death salvation. In this paper the basic postulates of Weber's interpretation of Islam are presented. Also, we presented the possible (oriental, romantic and realpolitik) causes of this perception. Consequently we exposed data on the attitudes of Europeans towards Islam today, i.e., it was shown that such a (traditional) simplified perspective fits into modern postulates. In the second part, in the context of Weber's conception, therefore, the attention was paid to attitudes of residents of European countries, primarily Germany, Great Britain, and France, on the potential threat of Islam to their security, and on their perception of Islam, in general.

Key words: Weber, Islam, religious tolerance, Western Europe, violence.

Introduction

Max Weber (1864–1920), taking consideration of the basic postulates of *Verstehen* (interpretative understanding[1]), studied the religious dogma, not

[1] According to Weber's opinion, interpretative understanding is one of the main tasks of sociology. In the definition of Weber's sociology he refers that sociology is the science that is willing to understand and interpret the social interaction and thus illustrate what is causal in its course and its consequences (Вебер, 1976: 3). It should be borne in mind that for Weber's understanding is not merely hermeneutics

as a unconditional givens, but as a result of transcendent spiritual needs of a particular social stratum in a particular historical moment (Hamilton, 2003: 257).

Cognitive revolutionary hypothesis, which emphases that the content of mythology and symbolism is conditioned, among other things, by a class basis, has been the subject of various disputes and debates even today. The study of cohabitation between the Protestant ethic and the capitalist logic is probably the most famous example of his research on the conjunction between religious dogma and economic system (Veber, 2011).

Implementing both the diachronic and synchronic comparative studies, Weber also without doubt dealt with the Islamic religion. Although he did not complete a separate monograph on Islam (as he had intended), we can reconstruct some basic conclusions that this sociological classic drew on this youngest monotheistic religion (Bashier, 2011; Turner, 1998, Salvatore, 1996; Јовановић, 2016a, Јовановић, 2016b). Weber defined Islam as a religion of warriors and it, as such, certainly does not come into the corpus of religions of salvation (Вебер, 1997: 203). This interpretation of Islam allows us to understand that (militant) dimensions and interpretations of Islamic ethics (which, of course, is very important), but nevertheless, that kind of perception is not only simplistic, but entails serious realpolitik consequences.

In this paper we shall first shed light on some of the basic premises of Weber's understanding of Islam, then, in the second part we shall look at the contemporary implications of such perception. Therefore, the paper will discuss, at least implicitly, how the classic sociological heritage is also reflected in attitudes towards Muslims today.

Weber's vision of Islam in martial attire

Using a comparative method, Max Weber identifies different historical and social contexts of the establishment of religions. He, for example, shatters the modern prejudice that Christianity is a religion of peasants and that farmers are the most pious class of society. In fact, because the daily life of peasants is closely tied to nature, and because their existence depends on the climate and other biological conditions, the rural sections of the population are practicing different magical and animist rituals[2] to 'tame' external factors. Christianity, on the other hand, is the urban religion. The Christian *ethos*

(as in the example of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) in whose theory we also come upon this term) but here we deal with a sort of scientific knowledge (Đurić, 1964: 72).

[2] Weber explains the basic dichotomy between magic and religion. Under the magic he means ecstatic, current, orgy-like, contemplative entity, while religion implies a general, systematic, chronic and to everyone readily available spirituality. In magic the rationality is missing, while in religions it is present on the different level (Вебер, 1976; Вебер, 1997).

is compatible with suffering of underprivileged classes of European cities that needed after-life consolation and salvation from sufferings in this life (Вебер, 1976: 405). In the Far East, Buddhism has emerged as the religion of the intellectuals, while Confucianism is the religion of Asian bureaucracy. If we go back a little closer to the European continent, i.e., the Middle East, or, more precisely, to the Arabian Peninsula, we shall be able to see how the Islamic dogma came into being with the ethics of warriors led by the political, state, and religious leader, Prophet Muhammad (Вебер, 1976: 400).

Warriors, both in ancient times, and in the Middle Ages, as a rule, were inclined to embrace the decorations and enjoy the glory and honour of the battles won. Praises for which soldiers crave, no matter to what historical, geographical or cultural context they belong to, have always been of secular character, i.e., they do not come after death, but they receive them during lifetime. Moreover, from the viewpoint of a brave warrior, submission to the Prophet or Priest is unworthy of their behaviour (Вебер, 1976: 399). As Weber argues, the only exception to this general rule is precisely Islam and within its dogma was constructed the idea of a *holy war* as a link between the desire for recognition in this life and salvation in the *post mortem* horizon. Weber states that: "This concept implies exclusivity of a universal god and moral depravity of infidels as His enemies, whose uninterrupted existence provokes his justified anger. Therefore, this concept did not exist either in ancient times or in the West or in any of the Asian religions of Zoroaster; thus, there is no direct connection between the struggle unbelievers on one hand, and religious feelings of the other. The real creator of this connection is the Islam" (Вебер, 1976: 400).

Because the daily practice of religious rites is not, in Weber's opinion, the way to salvation and Islam and because there does not develop *chronic religious habitus*, rationalization had not permeated the Islamic ethics. Islam is therefore a religion of warrior stratum whose gravitational point is *jihad* (holy war)[3].

One of the problems with Weber's interpretation of Islam is that he perceives this religion as a monolithic system, without going into any kind of

[3] Jihad can be translated as "the overall effort to improve, spread and defend Islam, including the 'holy war' (Танасковић, 2010: 350). Jihad, in most interpretations, is not considered the sixth pillar of Islam, and yet today there are many theologians, lawyers and followers who consider this institution essential for the realization of the Islamic mission. This term is mentioned in the Qur'an 41 times and with different connotations. This is why we often talk about the distinction between jihad which is primarily a spiritual effort to overcome all challenges and jihad as a struggle (against the infidels) (Танасковић, 2010: 172). From this very brief statement, we can conclude that Webber did not make an error by accenting just the combat aspect of Islam, because this is certainly one of the most important elements for the understanding of Islamic dogma. However, Weber's 'missed' all other aspects of Islamic ethics (unlike other religions that he analyzed in a more detailed and comprehensive way) and in it lies the basic problem of his interpretation of Islam.

religious-legal diversities that exist in Islam (and which were also known in the nineteenth century). He only separates Sufism[4] (Islamic mysticism) from the rest of Islam, but he didn't emphasize the difference between the Sunni and Shia, and furthermore, he fails to recognize the fractional and all legal varieties. Precisely because of such perception Weber's analysis of Islam was 'blind' to all those other elements and different interpretations of Islam beside this, extremely militant interpretation which he advocated.

When we leave dogma and move to the level of social history, we can name at least a few controversial points regarding the Weber's interpretation of Islam. German sociological classic, in fact, completely neglected the importance of trade and trade class for the formation and expansion of Islam. It is a great cognitive failure when there he entirely disregarded the importance which trade had for the emergence of Islamic ethics as well, which is especially significant for the spread of this religion. Thus, it is not that Weber incorrectly described the specifics of the Islamic holy war and its role both in the historical moment and in the Islamic dogma generally, but here it means that by mere stressing only that aspect, all boils down to the ultimate reductionism. "We would say that here we actually deal with two sides of the same coin. The significance of the armed conflict and belligerent social stratum is indisputable, if not for the emergence, then certainly for the spread of Islam. However, this is only one dimension. The other side of the coin offers us a picture of a peaceful atmosphere in early-Islamic cities where there is coexistence of people, regardless of religious affiliation, and where people primarily traded. The whole town atmosphere reflected the fever for money, joy and suffering due to business successes and failures, which is why the town centers the Arabian Peninsula represented the then-modern version of the Stock Exchange of today" (Јовановић, 2016a: 110).

We should not forget the conclusion of the famous social anthropologist, Ernest Gellner (1925–1995), that Islam is a complete way of life, that it is far more the religion of *praxis* than the religion of dogma. This is, according to Gellner's opinion, the result of the existence of a comprehensive and highly obligatory legal system (*Shariah*) (Gellner, 1981). If we only look at the five pillars of Islam and how they not only psychologically and spiritually, but also physically engage every believer, one gets the impression that Islam is just one of the religions that develops *chronic religious habitus* of which Weber writes in detail. Although the interpretations of Islam are indisputable under which only the *mujahedeens* (fighters in a 'holy war') go to *jannah* (paradise), the absence of the analysis of Islam as a holistic religion that determines the life of the believers from prenatal to post-mortem phase is a great intellectual and scientific oversight.

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[4] "Tesavuf (*tasawwuf*) is the Arabic word for Islamic mysticism, Sufism. It literally means to be a mystic, Sufi" (Vukomanović, 2008: 129). Sufism implies both a speculative philosophical path and institutions, i.e., brotherhoods and tariqats (Vukomanović, 2008: 129).

If we look at what are the possible reasons why Weber only emphasizes warrior *ethos* in Islam, we can think in at least three directions. Namely, to Weber's analysis of Islam most commonly is stuck the label of Orientalism (Salvatore, 1996; Turner, 1998). Weber, according to these interpretations, as an apologist of modern, rational, bureaucratic and predominantly Christian West, searched for *Others* in relation to which the West would construct its own identity. Also, according to this, constructivist logic, making comparisons with the backward, patriarchal, traditional and militantly determined Orient, Occident shows his civilization's superiority. Following the logic of Edward Said (1935–2003) (the founder of the concept of Orientalism), Weber is just one of the thinkers who fell into the trap of Western-centricity (Said, 2008). Authors who rank Weber among the classics of Orientalist discourse in European science are mutually opposed by whether they sharply 'judge' him for such descriptions of Islam (Turner, 1998), or are, however, somewhat milder and justify his conclusions by the general intellectual climate at the end of the nineteenth century. In the second case Weber, therefore, failed to distance himself from the general perception of the Orient as a subjugated colonial territory (Bashier, 2011: 130).

The second direction, which is, of course, marked Weber's creativity in general is the German Romanticism in which we can reconstruct a specific (and compared to the previous description a different) attitude to the Orient as a corrective of just that cold, insensitive world and also far remote by its character by Western standards. Consequently, criticizing English and French concepts of *civilization* as superior to *culture*, the German intellectual elites often in links of the German spirit with oriental sentiment saw not only the nucleus of distinction, but also domination over technically defined *civilization* (Korać, 1990: 324). Precisely because Germany had no colonies there developed, according to some authors, a different attitude to the Orient which reflected the relationship of mutual understanding rather than hierarchical relationship (Pollock, 2000: 305). Some authors go so far that they assign Veber among the greatest theorists who criticize the rational Western, such as Foucault, Derrida, Liotar, Adorno and Horkheimer (Gandhi, 1998: 37).

Also, we should not forget the fact that Weber extremely respected the military spirit and advocated the development of militarism as a lifeline for Germany after Bismarck's rule. This element is our link with a third possible explanation of Weber's accentuation of warrior spirit in Muslim societies, in the former and latter ones. Namely, out of ultimate realpolitik reasons, Weber (as someone who engaged immensely in practical-political domain) could search for potential partners of Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century. One of the potential partners could also be the 'The Bosphorus patient', i.e., the former Ottoman Empire. Compatibility of Prussian warrior honor (which German sociological classic highly admired) with Muslim warrior *ethos* is another of the viewpoints from which

we can observe Weber's understanding of Islam as a whole (Turner, 1998: 122; Radkau, 2009: 450).

The scope of this study does not allow us a comprehensive analysis of Weber's understanding of Islam, his great contribution to the understanding of this religion, but also some oversights. Also, we cannot go into the causes of potential explanations of just such an analysis. Brief introduction to Weber's perception of Islam as a religion of warriors only provided the exposure to the modern interpretation of data on the relationship between Europeans (especially Western) against Muslims and Islam in general. We believe that the continuity of the classical heritage is a very important indicator for understanding contemporary social phenomena. We do not, of course, claim that we found direct causality, but we consider that we can identify conceptual continuity.

Contemporary attitudes towards Islam among Europeans

Recently there has been significant research about attitudes towards Islam within populations of European countries, especially Western. These results make it possible to analyze whether, and to what extent Weber's conception of Islam is embodied within contemporary attitudes among Europeans. We do not claim that there is direct causality between Weber's understanding of Islam and the contemporary perception of that religion, but we show that in Western societies there is a continuity of understanding of Islam as *a priori* religion of warriors.

Many of these studies are international. One of them was conducted by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, using nationally-representative samples consisting of 1 000 respondents from several Western European countries. It shows that about half of Germans, British, Dutch, and Italians think that Islam is a religion of intolerance. Nearly half of the British believe that many Muslims perceive terrorists as heroes, as and more than quarter of them that the majority of Muslims find terrorism justifiable. Only 17 percent of Germans and 27 percent of Italians think that the Muslim culture fits well into their country and Europe (Islam Surveyed, 2015a).

Also, even 69 percent of Italians have unfavourable view of Muslim in their country (Wike et al., 2016). Approximately the half of Germans considers Islam to be a threat, and that Islam does not fit in Germany. 60 percent of the Spaniards and 50 percent of the Swiss consider Islam as being dangerous (Hollstein and Peters, 2013). According to YouGov data from the survey in May 2015, 40 percent respondents from Great Britain have fairly or very negative impression of Muslims, just as 36 percent from Germany and Sweden, 40 percent from France, 45 percent from Denmark and Finland, and 37 percent from Norway (YouGov, 2015). 69 percent of Germans perceive Islam as dismissive of Western values, 61% as fanatical, 51% as submissive, and 38% as violent; similarly, 62% of French perceive Islam as dismissive

of Western values, 57% as fanatical, 49% as submissive, and 34% as violent (IFOP, 2010). Only 7% of Germans associate Islam with openness, tolerance or respect for human rights, as and 83% with discrimination against women, and 68% with intolerance towards other faiths. Two thirds of French think Islamic values to be incompatible with those of French society, 73 percent view Islam negatively, and 74 percent consider it intolerant (Murray, 2013).

The data from the French Institute of Public Opinion revealed that 47 percent of respondents from the United Kingdom, as well as 44 percent from the Netherlands, 40 percent from Germany, and 42 from percent France believed that the presence of a Muslim community in their country represented a threat for their country's identity. Also, most of respondents within the same survey believed that there's been a failure in integrating Muslims into society – 77 percent of Dutch, 75 percent of Germans, 68 percent of French, and 65 percent of British. The primary reason for that, according to respondents, is because Muslims refuse to integrate, while economic and social causes are much rarely considered as the main reason (La Croix, 2012). Pew Research Center recently found that the share of people believing that "refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism in our country" was, among others, 46 percent in France, 52 percent in Britain, and 61 percent in Germany (Macdonald, 2016).

According to Populus opinion poll in 2011, 52 percent of respondents from United Kingdom agreed that Muslims created problems in their country, which is far more comparing to other religious groups. Further, Survation and YouGov both found in 2015 that more than half of the British believed the values of Islam were incompatible with the values of British society. On the other side, according to both polls only about one fifth of the population think that they are compatible (Hasan, 2017). Another survey conducted by Institute of the Public Opinion survey in 2016 found that 47 percent of French people felt that the Muslim community posed a threat to national identity and nearly two-thirds of them felt that Islam had become too influential and visible (ibid.).

A Survey by the Bertelsmann Foundation in 2015 found that 57 percent of Germans considered Islam very much or somewhat of a threat, which is an increase of 4 percent in relation to 2012. Second, 61 percent of them believe that Islam is incompatible with the Western world, which is an increase of 9 percent in relation to three years before. 40 percent of non-Muslim respondents feel like foreigners in their own country because of Muslims, and nearly one quarter of them agree that Muslim should not be allowed to migrate to Germany (Agency France Presse, 2015). Also, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung conducted an opinion poll in 2012, according to which 77 percent of Germans think that Islam is a literalist religion, and 70 percent that is associated with radicalism and religious fanaticism. Also, 64 percent of respondents believed that Islam is ready for violence, 60 percent for hatred, and 56 percent for political influence. Further, 53 percent

of respondents believed that serious conflicts between Christianity and Islam would develop, and 47 percent did not see Muslims as a part of Germany. On the other hand, results from the same survey revealed that only 13 percent of Germans associate Islam with love for neighbours, 12 percent with charity, and only 7 percent with openness and tolerance (NSS, 2012).

Researchers at the University of Leipzig surveyed 2 420 Germans in 2016, and showed that more than 40 percent of respondents thought that Muslims should be forbidden from coming to Germany. This was much higher than in 2009, when just one-fifth thought the same. Also, because of Muslims living in Germany, about half of the respondents said they sometimes felt like foreigners in their own country. In 2009, there was about 30 percent of them, and in 2014 about 43 percent (Copley, 2016; Reuters, 2016). Approximately 60 percent of Germans believed that there was no place for Islam in Germany (Reuters, ibid.). Finally, 57 percent of Germans fear the Islamisation of their country (Perring, 2016). Only 5 percent of Germans think that Islam is tolerant (Zeit, 2010).

More than two fifths of 1 000 French respondents from Ipsos survey in March 2017 said that Islam is incompatible with their society, which is much more compared to Catholicism or Judaism. Until the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015, this percentage was falling, and has been constantly growing afterwards (Pleasance, 2017). Another French Institute of Public Opinion survey revealed that 43 percent of French considered Muslim community as a threat to their national identity. About 43 percent are opposed to building more mosques, while in 2010 there were 39 percent of them. 60 percent believe that Islam is "too important" in their county in terms of its influence and visibility, while two years before there were 55 percent of them. According to the same survey, two thirds of French think that Muslims are not well integrated into French society. Among them, 68 percent blamed lack of integration on Muslims' refusal to integrate, while nearly half of them said they believed it was a result of insurmountable cultural differences (Flynn, 2012). Another Ipsos research showed that 74 percent of French think that Islam is intolerant and incompatible with social values in their county. Further, about 80 percent of them believe that Islam tries to impose its views on others, 10 percent think a majority of Muslims are fundamentalists, while another 44 percent think that many but not all Muslims are fundamentalists. However, most respondents did not know how to define fundamentalism (ANSAmed, 2013).

YouGov poll, conducted on 1 641 respondents, showed that 55 percent of British believe that there is a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society (Lips, 2015). Another YouGov survey based on a sample of 6 640 respondents, revealed that British public associate Muslims with terms such as "terror", "terrorist", or "terrorism" more than any other issue in 12 percent of cases. "Extremist" and "misogynistic" were also phrases most likely to be linked to the religion (5 percent) (Lesley, 2015). 63 percent

of people from Britain did not disagree with the statement "Muslims are terrorists", and 58 percent linked Islam with extremism (Siddique, 2010).

British Social Attitudes Survey in 2010 showed that 34 percent of British had negative feelings towards Muslims. In contrast, there were only 6–11 percent of them with negative feelings towards other religions (National Centre for Social Research, 2010). According to Exploring Islam Foundation survey, also in 2010, with sample of 2 152 non-Muslims from London, nearly one third of respondents agreed totally or to some extent that Islam is violent religion (Islam Surveyed, 2010). The Islamic Education and Research Agency in the same year showed that even three quarters of Britons thought that Islam had negative impact on British society. However, every four out of five respondents admitted that they had less than very little knowledge about Islam, and even 93 percent of them had very little knowledge or no knowledge at all about the Qur'an. Nearly one quarter of respondents strongly or slightly agreed with statement that Muslims are terrorists (Islam Surveyed 2015b). Populous poll found that over half of the British agree that Muslims create problems in the UK (Islam Surveyed, 2015c). Also, YouGov survey with 1 750 respondents from Britain showed that 41 percent of people would be more likely to vote for a party that promised to stop all immigration, and 37 percent that promised to reduce the number of Muslims in Britain and the presence of Islam in society (Townsend, 2012).

In 2013 between 50 to 60 percent of all religious hate crimes reported to police in Britain are perpetrated against Muslims (Wright, 2013). Incidents of anti-Muslim abuse and attacks in public areas of the United Kingdom rose by 326 percent in 2015 (Sherwood, 2016).[5] Pew Global Attitudes Project survey in 2008 showed that nearly one quarter of respondents from Great Britain rated Muslims unfavourable, as well as 50 percent from Germany, and 38 percent from France (PEW, 2008). When feelings towards various religiously-defined groups were measured, using a series of 'thermometer' scales, ranging from 0 (warm) through to 100 (cold) towards particular groups – Muslims received the lowest mean scores of all religious groups (Clements, 2011). ComRes (2016) interviewed 2 012 British and showed that 56 percent of them did not think that Islam was compatible with British values. One out of three of them believed that Islam promoted acts of violence in the United Kingdom, and 43 percent of them that Islam was a negative force in their country.

One out of two Austrians consider Islam a threat to Austrian society and that Islam is attempting to change Austrian society, two fifths of them see Islam as a backward religion, 14 percent think that Austria's Muslims support Isis terrorists in Syria and Iraq, and 72 percent agreed that Austrians don't know what Islam really is (Salomon, 2010). According to a survey

[5] However, nature and extent of these incidents is shown to be under-documented, under-studied and under-reported (Yasmin and Marković, 2016).

conducted by ÖGM, 58 percent of the 500 respondents from Austria said that they felt that more Muslims were becoming radicalized in their country, 62 percent of them that the coexistence between Muslims and non-Muslims is not so good, and 72 percent said they were in favour of increased video surveillance and more monitoring of mosques and Islamic institutions (The Local, 2015). However, the survey was carried out after the shootings in Paris and Copenhagen, and the results are likely to have been affected by these events (ibid.; Ментус, 2017).

Survey conducted by PEW from 2015 showed that 61 percent of Italians (and 56 percent of Poles) have unfavourable view of Muslims in their county. Despite the fact that 1,5 million of Muslims live in Italy and that Islam is the second largest religion there, it is not recognised formally as religion, and the country's Muslim population are served by just two official, purpose-built mosques, which makes many of them pray on parking lots, warehouses etc. (Gaffey, 2015).

In other Western countries the picture is similar. According to the Finnish Social Science Data Archive, the Finns felt most critical towards Islam in relation to all other religions, and only 6 percent of them see Islam in positive light (Ketola, 2011). Further, The Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation, and Department of Political Science from the Aarhus University in Denmark showed that nearly one third of Danes see Islam as a threat to Denmark (Nannestad, 2011), and 33 percent of Danes believe that Denmark is in war with Islam as religion, not just radicalised Muslims (The Local, 2016a). The potential problem is that only 13 percent of Danes believe that moderate Muslims and imams in Denmark do enough to distance themselves from the attacks in the name of their religion (The Local, 2016b). Finally, it should not be surprising that according the De Hond survey, based on a sample of 2 500 respondents from Netherlands, 43 percent of them expressed that they would prefer to see fewer Moroccan people in their country (Dias, 2014).

From this part we can conclude that throughout Western Europe there is a fairly large degree of negative attitudes towards Muslims and Islam. This relation often includes viewpoints according to which Islam could be designated as the dominant warrior religion.

Disscusion

Although Weber wrote a long time ago, his views on Islam like a warrior religion are much alive even today. Of course, Weber was not the first who wrote about Islam in such a way, and today there are numerous factors that make such perception about Islam among non-Muslims.

This is especially visible after some important events; huge short-term fluctuations of attitudes towards Islam and Muslims that come to the fore

after major events that have Islamic connotation represent quite a good proof. For example, 24 hours after the murder of Lee Rigby of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, the number of citizens of Britain who thought that conflict between groups was "largely inevitable" has risen by seven points to 40 percent, and agreement with the suggestion that there would be a serious clash between British Muslims and white Britons has also rose, from 50 to 59 percent (in relation to six months ago) (Goodwin, 2013).

As Zick and Küpper (2009) argue, anti-Islamic prejudices are less restricted by norms than other prejudices and devaluing Islam gains more open and blatant support. Political and cultural opinion leaders often devalue Islam by associating it with terror and stressing that integration of Muslims has failed. This enhances anti-Islam sentiments and legitimates prejudices which are often precursors of discrimination. The suspicion of terrorism leads to feeling threatened (ibid.). Also, media often present Islam in a negative view, and larger news exposure is associated with both increased anger and reduced warmth towards Muslims (Shaver et al. 2017; see also: Ментус, 2014). The relationship between media exposure and anti-Muslim prejudice does not reliably vary with political ideology, which supports claims that it is widespread representations of Muslims in the news that drives anti-Muslim prejudice, rather than partisan media biases (ibid.). When it comes to perception of Islam as the external enemy, the main focus concerns national security, terrorism, and cultural threats (Cesari, 2013).

Negative perception towards Islam could also be the result of the lack of personal contact with Muslims. Although people have even less contact with Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, all of which are seen more positively than Islam – the picture the media give of Buddhism or Hinduism is that of peace-loving religions, while picture of Islam is distorted and the stress is put more on its fanaticism and aggressiveness (NSS, 2013). Extremist groups are often shown, and frequently no distinction is made between religion and extremism, as when, after the Boston Marathon attacks, the bombers were said to be part of an "Islamic network" (ibid).

Thereby, a simplistic perception of Islam that is represented by Weber among others today is very much alive among the populations of Western countries. There is not direct causality between Weber's understanding of Islam and contemporary perception, but as we have showed there are strongly rooted prejudices about Islam as a warrior religion in the West, even in classical heritage. Given the very deep roots of such perceptions, which is more or less constantly maintained, it is difficult to expect that in the foreseeable future this course would change.

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THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION FROM THE SECOND HALF OF 20TH CENTURY: A WESTERN PERSPECTIVE

(on J.Beckford's analysis)

Abstract: The paper describes and comments the analysis of the authoritative British sociologist James Beckford on the sociology of religion development all over the world from 1945 to 1989 published in the Social Compass journal (Beckford 1990). The paper focuses especially on those parts of Prof. Beckford study, analyzing the main theoretical perspectives of the sociology of religion in this period – concepts, ideas, theoretical authorities. The author comments and supports the Beckford's analysis and prognosis from the point of view of some of the trends within further sociological developments.

Key words: sociology of religion, J. Beckford's analysis, sociological theories, sociology of religion concepts, religious trends.

In the early 1990s, the authoritative British sociologist of religion Prof. James Beckford presented a general overview on the development of sociology of religion in its various dimensions and manifestations over a formidably long period – the nearly half a century between 1945 and 1989. His analysis has been confirmed in many respects by a discussion embracing a slightly longer period, and dealing with the formation and development of the conceptual perspective of *Social Compass*, the journal of one of the highly reputed associations in its field, the International Society for the Sociology of Religion (ISSR), whose trends the journal has reflected for many years (Mejido 2004; Houtart 2004; Bastenier 2004).

Although Beckford's analysis is focused on the sociology of religion of this period (more detailed information: Bogomilova 2017), inasmuch as the various fields of the study of religion are not isolated from one another, his discussion also touches upon other disciplines, such as history, theology, philosophy, ethnology, psychology.

Beckford characterizes the period from the late 19th century to the early 20th century as the "golden age" of sociology of religion, for that was when the basic epistemological paradigms were established, with which sociologists of religion have continued to work during the whole 20th century and until now. This refers to the theories of Max Weber, Georg Simmel, Ernst

Troeltsch, Emile Durkheim, etc. (Beckford 1990: 46). It is not accidental that the great sociologists of this "golden age", in addition to their other interests, produced major works on sociology of religion as a general subject (Allardt 1989: 65).

Organizational forms

In following a holistic sociological approach to the topic of his analysis, Beckford presents the organizational and public forms in which sociological thought developed during the period under study. Thus, he highlights the institutionalization of modern sociology in the 1940s in countries like US, Holland and Spain as a trend of creating mixed alliances comprising not only professional sociologists but likewise ecclesiastic administrators and researchers connected to religious organizations. In view of the mixed composition of these "alliances", it is understandable that their interpretations dealt foremost with internal processes taking place in religion and the importance of its social structures and trends (Beckford 1990: 47).

Beckford contrasts these cases with those of France, UK, Germany, countries marked by strong secularization after World War II and noted for their important research centers. In these countries, Beckford points out, the prevalent organizational forms of modern sociology in the 1950s were those of collaborative groups of historians, philosophers, anthropologists, and sociologists, who studied religion from more disinterested perspectives. In the British case, this trend went hand in hand with the salient process of secularization taking place in the 1960s and 1970s, and with immigration, primarily from South Asian, African and Caribbean countries. In this part of his analysis, the author highlights the professional specificity of French researchers, who pursue sociological analysis of religion in the broader context of the other social sciences and humanities. This is not accidental, as France has a strong secular tradition and is the only European country in which the separation between Church and state has been realized with full consistency and legal rigor (Bloß 2003; Willaime 2005).

In this respect, Beckford finds serious differences existing between France and the USA. In the latter country, sociology of religion developed in a structuralist and functionalist perspective, focusing on the connection between religion and social stability and development. While the emphasis was on social and societal aspects, less attention was given to the historical, cultural and political backdrop of religion (Beckford 1990: 47–48).

Each of the larger research associations had its own publication organ, in which many of its members published their works. One of the most authoritative such journal is *Social Compass*, which first appeared in 1953, with a predominantly Catholic outlook and thematic focus; only in the 1960s did the journal move away from these confessional leanings. Beckford sees this assessment to have been confirmed and closely argued in a discussion about

this important journal held on its pages five years later. Its editorial focus passed through four periods: sociography of Catholicism, sociology of Catholicism, sociology of religion, the post-modern situation (Mejido 2004: 25).

The author finds that the activity of journals in the field of sociology of religion in Europe was not especially successful: the four new journals that appeared in the period under study did not survive long; similar periodicals in Germany and UK, and more recently in Italy, were also short-lived.

Again, a comparison with the US is relevant in this respect, and Beckford points out the opposite situation there: journals in the sphere of religion and sociology of religion have endured and are, to some extent, flourishing. Beckford very correctly relates the difference between the fate of these journals in Europe and the US to the theoretical specificity and social status of studies on religion in the two locations. In summarizing his and other authors' observations on this difference, Beckford finds that American sociologists have focused their attention mostly on the relation between religion and other social institutions, and prefer empirical social surveys, while Europeans have been more interested in theoretical interpretations of religion, in the philosophical and historical approaches to it, and on social-ecclesiastical problems (Beckford 1990: 50).

Within this impressive "international division of labour" in the sphere of sociology of religion, Beckford finds that during the 1960s, British and Canadian authors were increasingly active, and in the 1970s, there was a visibly strong development of Japanese and Latin American sociology of religion – the same cannot be said for the situation in the rest of Asia and in Africa. This assessment has been confirmed by later specialized studies on this topic (Gumucio 2004; Binsbergen 2004), though made in the perspective of half a century of bold forecasts and expectations for new developments.

The author finds it "astonishing" that a similar flourishing of studies on religion was likewise evident in Central and East European countries in the 1980s and 1990s, referring to analyses on the role played by religion and religious institutions in the time of the official totalitarian ideologies in those countries, produced after the end of the regimes (Beckford 1990: 50). In support of Beckford's conclusion, it may be added that collaboration between authors from these countries was initiated at the biannual ISSR conferences, and later resulted in the publication of many collections treating of tendencies in the sphere of religion in this part of Europe, both during the time of totalitarianism and in the post-totalitarian context. These publications include: *Religioser Wandel in den postkommunistischen Landern Ost-und Mitteleuropas*, Ergon, Wurzburg, 1998 (eds. D.Pollack, I.Borowik, W.Jagodzinski); *Il tempo e il sacro nelle società post-industriali*, Milano, 1997 (A. Nesti, P. De Marco, A. Iacopozzi, eds.); *New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe*, Krakow, 1997 (I. Borowik, G. Babinski, eds.); *Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe*, Krakow 1999

(I. Borowik ed.). Research papers on the Bulgarian religious situation were published in those books too (Bogomilova 1997, Bogomilova 1998).

International perspectives

In the extensive panoramic overview he presents, based on solid bibliographical references and powerful analysis, Beckford draws attention to the national specificity – thematic and theoretical – of the sociology of religion in different countries. For instance, he finds that Italian researchers were predominantly interested in the political implications of Catholicism, an observation confirmed by later studies. Catholicism has had a traditionally strong position in Italy, if not entirely in terms of personal religiosity of people, certainly as a strong element of Italian national and cultural identity, as a political factor, etc. (Pace 2005; Ferrari 2005). The sphere of scientific interests of Japanese researchers, as Beckford observes, primarily relates to popular religions and the new religious movements that are making way across the world, presenting a serious challenge to traditional religions. Scandinavian researchers have a similar preference in their interest: popular and folk religions in addition to the traditional for them topic of the Lutheran Church as a state Church in these countries (Gustafsson 1990; Holm 1991).

This widespread religiosity (which has undergone important transformation trends in recent years) had became a topic of interest even at the time recorded by Beckford; today it is becoming an increasingly salient focus of publications. Researchers are trying to capture the changes taking place in religion and are intensely discussing the phenomenon of "believing without belonging" (Davie 2001), "living religion", "practiced religion", hybrid forms, the so-called cultural improvisation in the sphere of religion, which passes the boundaries of different religious and cultural traditions (McGuire 2008). In this "cultural improvisation", researchers distinguish syncretic cults derived from popular religiosity; retroactive cultures; vitalist and holistic beliefs that combine transcendent and immanent energies and forces in a way that shapes a sort of counterculture echoing global culture (Gumucio 2002). This, as it were, "return to the neo-magical" is shaping personal religiosity into a kind of kaleidoscope, "bricolage", "cocktail" of different and heterogeneous beliefs, and thereby additionally stratifies the already complex religious sphere of our times.

Beckford finds that Danish and Belgian researchers work in a different thematic range. They are mostly interested in institutionalized religion, in the processes and transformations taking place among the clergy (Beckford 1990: 50). This particularity can also be accounted for by the specific position of religions in these two countries: in Denmark Lutheranism is the official state religion, while to describe the Belgian case, some authors use the paradoxical expression "clericalized laicity" (Javeau 2005). According to Beckford, the attention of German researchers is centered on ecclesiastical

organisation, which although separated from the state, is the state's traditional partner in various social activities, as other authors have also observed later on (Knauth 2007). French researchers, traditionally authoritative in this area of studies, are displaying special interest in theoretical ideas and in the phenomenon of ecumenism, while British scholars combine discussions on the broad theoretical problems of religious studies with empirical research on the observable trends (Beckford 1990: 50).

Themes and theories

The concept of "religion", central to all sciences engaged in understanding the religious phenomenon, continues to be a subject of debate, Beckford notes. He finds these debates are also going on in other sciences of religion, such as anthropology of religion, history of religion, and ethnology. In support of this view, we may refer to the article by the French author Yves Lambert (published one year after Beckford's article in the same journal) "La 'Tour de Babel' des définitions de la religion" (Lambert 1991).

That the concept of religion is still a topic of continuing debate, as it was more than 25 years ago, when Beckford published his comprehensive article, is confirmed by the intense discussions taking place around the so-called cognitive science of religion (Shunke 2015; Green 2015; Wilkins 2015).

Later in his analysis, Beckford considers in a critical perspective certain tendencies towards reduction and operationalization of the concept of "religion" for the purposes of questionnaire social surveys on religious experience. The target of his criticism is sociology's inclination to universalize the measurement approach, its confidence that the parameters of the religious phenomenon are measurable. The reduction of religion to verbal testimonies, conduct and beliefs of individuals enables capturing and recording only "privatized" religion filtered through personal identity, concepts and relations. It ignores the cultural and social influence of religion as a collective phenomenon, as Beckford concludes (Beckford 1990: 52). In support of his observation, we can add that a number of surveys at European, regional and national level have acknowledged that when personal religiosity is "measured" in a country and culture, much lower values are obtained for it than for religiosity seen as "affiliation" to a religious tradition, ethnic group, cultural identity, as measured by national censuses and statistics. The clear distinction between these two aspects, and the creation of theoretical and empirical instruments for capturing them in unity, would increase the reliability and operational capacity of social studies, whose deficits are the target of the author's critical remarks.

Beckford sees a trend of distancing away from this individualizing religion in sociology's new heightened interest in phenomena like implicit religion, popular and unofficial forms of religion, about which a growing number of authors are writing today. According to him, this trend is a kind of

revision of the church-oriented sociology of religion of the 1970s, and can be seen as an attempt to highlight the collective forms of practicing and experiencing religion, although the trend of privatized conceptualization of religion is still also prevalent.

In his further analysis of the basic concepts and themes of sociology of religion in the period under discussion, Beckford gives a positive evaluation of the sociological focus on the complex relationships between religion and politics, the Church and the state. He finds that, beginning from the 1960s, sociologists showed increased interest in these topics in the context of the problems of modernization, civil rights, the ecological crisis, and poverty. He registers that, in principle, the sociology of religion had shown sensitivity towards the strong connection between religions and power (Beckford 1990: 52). This topic of research, justly identified by the author, has grown in popularity in recent years, and now there are hundreds of publications focused on the problems of the connection between religion and conflicts in society, the synthesis between religion and ethnic identity, the role of religion in generating and pacifying conflicts, its role in the fight for group rights, etc. (Blagojevic 2015; Borowik 1999; Bruce 1996; Cipriani 2012; Liwerant 2002; Mayer 2002; Moe 2008; Spickard 2010; Stobe 2013).

Beckford confirms that an important tendency in the sociological study of religion is the movement away from research on institutionalized religion and increased interest in informal religious organizations, i.e., the social aspects of a fragmented, not consolidated, religion (Beckford 1990: 53).

Further, Beckford discusses the influence of certain trends and methods in philosophy, historiography, linguistics, etc., on the change in topics and approaches of sociology. As a result of the increasing influence of phenomenology and linguistics in the 1960s, social research came to include other, previously "unnoticed" topics, such as: the adoption of new religions by individuals, detachment from religion, etc. Among the changing fashions in sociological theory that were influenced by analytic philosophy and historiography, Beckford includes the emerging microsociological focus on everyday life structures, typical for Anglo-American and French sociology. These influences and transformations involved enhanced interest in the study of popular and implicit religion (Beckford 1990: 53).

An innovative tendency of this period, identified by Beckford, was the inter-disciplinary combination of sociological studies of religion with studies from other scientific perspectives and in other spheres, such as those of political sociology, sociology of deviance, the study of relations between religion and the media, health, bioethics. At that time, interest dwindled in a number of topics that had been salient in the 1940s and 1950s, such as religious organizations, clerical services and careers, Christian democracy, the relation between Church and sect, millenarianism, religion and social mobility, the Protestant ethic (Beckford 1990: 54).

Generalizing the results of his comprehensive analysis of the conceptual tendencies of sociology during the 45 years under study, Beckford finds that sociology of religion was more influenced by external processes and phenomena, and by the changes taking place in religion, than by its own inner logic. At the same time, these processes imposed a change in theoretical standpoints and concepts used to interpret the phenomenon of religion and its changing forms.

Theoretical perspectives

As a generalization of the theoretical perspectives in sociology of religion from 1945 to 1989, Beckford identifies the following orientations, tendencies and turns of its development during this period:

– In the immediate post-war period, religious sociology continued to be a fruitful form of interpretation of religion. In the following decades, there was a stricter specialization, and division of labour was made between theology and the sciences of religion.

– The strong influence of Talcott Parsons' normative functionalism was evident; in the sphere of sociology of religion, this perspective drew the attention of researchers to the functions of religion in modern societies as related to its connection with economic development, democratic policy, cultural pluralism, and the "adaptive" personality. The influence of Parsons' theory is manifest in the strong growth of studies on civic religion, denominations, the Protestant ethic and economic development, the institutionalization of sects, and religious pluralism (Beckford 1990: 55).

To this, we should add the new aspects of study stimulated by newly arising social processes and forms, such as consumer society, immigrants, ethnocentrism, and others. In the next two decades and at present, this circle of problems has continued to be among those most actively researched and written about in a large number of publications. It suffices to examine the catalogues of the large international publishing houses Brill, Ashgate, Edwin Mellen Press, Oxford University Press, and the contents of journals of sociology and religious studies (Science of Religion 2012: 37–132).

– The problems of secularization dominated the English-language sociology of religion in the 1960s, Beckford asserts. Various and heterogeneous explanations of secularization at that time referred to theories of rationality, the structural differentiation of society, the dissociation of the social sectors. As particularly active authors with respect to this problem field Beckford points out David Martin, Karel Dobbelaere, Brian Wilson, Danièle Hervieu-Léger, and others. In their studies, the theory of secularization retains its connection with the more general theories of modernization and continues to acknowledge the decreasing role and functions of religion in the modern world (Beckford 1990: 55). Today, the latter thesis is questioned

by more than a few authors. For instance, Thomas Luckmann argues that religion is not a transitional stage in the evolution of humankind but a universal aspect of the conditio humana. (Luckmann 2003: 275). He finds that the theory of secularization is based on Enlightenment philosophy, adopted as a methodological basis by the founding fathers of sociology, particularly Comte and Durkheim, and he considers this "dominant paradigm" to have been a mistake (Luckmann 2003: 276).

– Beckford points out the important turns in social cognition made in 1967 by Peter Berger, who theorized on the social construction of the "Sacred Canopy" (in his eponymous work of that year) and by Thomas Luckmann, with his innovative discussion on the religious nature of the process of secularization. According to Beckford, these authors provided philosophical and anthropological tools for analyzing the specificity of Christianity in industrial societies and of other religions in developing societies (Beckford 1990: 55).

– The reorientation of historical materialism towards structuralism and phenomenology in the 1960s also made religion an interesting theme for many researchers working in the framework of the Marxist tradition, as Beckford points out (Beckford 1990: 55). They usually included religion under the wider concept of "ideology", and tended to eliminate the negative aspects of materialist reductionism. These approaches contributed to a more adequate interpretation of the social role of religion with regard to pre-industrial and industrializing societies, and the crisis processes occurring in industrial societies. Such a reorientation of the religion studies based on historical materialism influenced, according to Beckford, the adherents of the critical theory of religion, of liberation theory, and feminist theologians. This theoretical "turn" in the tradition of historical materialism led, in some degree, to its intellectual rehabilitation, Beckford estimates (Beckford 1990: 55).

Old theories and old gods

In conclusion, and as a general recapitulation of his analysis, Beckford points out that the basic theoretical trend in sociology of religion during the period under study was innovative theoretical building upon the classics – mostly upon the works and methods of Weber and Durkheim, and to a smaller degree, upon Georg Simmel's ideas. This connection of the sociology of religion, in the period of 45 years under study, with classical sociological approaches took the connection with industrial society as its basic theme, but some attention was also given to post-modern, post-industrial society. Beckford finds sociologists of religion at that time were showing small interest in the post-classical methodological perspectives of symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology or semiotics (Beckford 1990: 56).

Qualified as a negative tendency by the author is the serious insensitivity of sociology of religion to emotions, spiritual joy and pain; he asks whether this insensitivity and emotional deficit were features of the object of study, and sociologists were simply reflecting this fact in their research, or whether sociology itself lacked the methodological and theoretical receptor required to capture the emotional phenomena that are so important to the experience and practice of religion. To justify and console sociology of religion for this shortcoming, the author points out that it was shared by the psychology of religion, the science that, above all others, should have been sensitive to this aspect (Beckford 1990: 56).

In his article of 1990, the author drew the general conclusion, valid today as well, that the social functions of religion, with which sociologists were occupied after 1945, had decreased, but the social importance of religion, in a new form, had perhaps increased. This new form requires new conceptualization. Hence, the author compares the nostalgia for the old, classical theories of the time of the emergence of industrial society with nostalgia for old gods.

Years later, another important sociologist of religion, Albert Bastenier, would draw a general conclusion, that the sociology of religion is at a turning point of its history and of its theoretical evolution (Bastenier 2004: 7).

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RELIGION, CHURCH & THE ISSUE OF SACRALITY AND HOLY PLACES IN MODERN THEOPOLITICS

Abstract: Against the background of the increasing role of religion in politics and religiously-motivated political violence within the modern state and in inter-state relations since the end of the Cold War, a range of topics related to secular and religious attitudes to sacrality, religious heritage and holy places have been attracting increasing attention and diverse, sometimes contradictory, treatment in theological, legal, anthropological and sociological analyses and debates. The variety of concerns and methods in the existing theological, anthropological and sociological approaches to sacrality and holy places sites display characteristic interpretative and methodological ambiguities which arise out of the multiple religious, spiritual, social and political functions ascribed to them in churches, societies and cultures. Doubts about the usefulness and applicability of theological interpretations of holy space (with all the ensuing epistemological and ontological issues) in the various methodological frameworks have led to the adoption of more sociologically-oriented interpretative perspectives on the spatial dimension of religion in which it is a relational descriptive category referring to "things set apart and forbidden", whose quality of sacredness is not intrinsic but reflects the judgement of the respective group or society. Will the modern churches and religiosities be open to such "metaphysically neutral" sociological notions of sacrality which are currently increasingly used in the scholarly study of material culture and heritage related to the archaeology and anthropology of religion and cult, especially in spheres such as the use of exclusive and inclusive space?

Key words: Theopolitics, Sacrality/Holy, Holy Places, Church and Politics, Desecularization.

In the aftermath of the Second World War and especially since the end of the Cold War a variety of issues and concerns arising from the shifting secular and religious stances to religious heritage and sacred sites have been assuming increasing topicality in the political and public sphere. This topicality has also provoked legal, theological, anthropological and sociological analyses and debates focused on the historical and contemporary religio-political role and diverse usages of religious heritage and sacred sites. These growing multi- and inter-disciplinary debates have evolved against the background of recent and ongoing significant developments on the

international scene such as the growing politicization and radicalization of certain currents in world religions, accompanied by the deprivatization of religion and its assertive reinstatement in the political and social space.

The manifold and dramatic outcomes of these rapidly developing processes in post-Cold War theopolitics include multiplying outbreaks of religiously-motivated, religiously-justified as well as state-sponsored, group and individual political violence. Such violence has been periodically incited by inter-religious strife in and around religious centres, sites and places of worship. The activation (and resurgence) of inter-confessional fault-lines and flashpoints at sacred sites has been accompanied at times by the forcible termination of historic or lately negotiated religious co-existence and/or sharing at the respective sites. These striking and coercive transformations in the praxis of religious co-existence has been consistently signaled and triggered by the rise to prominence and influence of new religious authorities and actors aiming to "purge" the sacred space (which they declare as their own to oversee and manage) from "alien" religious occupancy and rituals.

The swiftly unfolding and expanding conflicts over religious sites and sacred space (as symptomatic of a new kind of theopolitics) have caught by surprise and unprepared international political, diplomatic and military decision-makers, security analysts, opinion-formers and academic political science think-tanks, who, at least until the end of the Cold War have largely subscribed to the prevalent (until very recently) thesis of an irreversibly advancing global secularization. The widely anticipated global secularization was supposed to be bring about the universalization of the values and institutions of secular humanism and Western modernity and progressive decline of religious influence on the socio-political and socio-cultural spheres. Instead the encounters and interaction between the globalizing and secularizing outcomes of Western-driven modernity and the religio-political forces of counter- and de-secularization have been re-ignited and developed in a variety of new and currently unpredictable directions since the late 1980s. The future courses of this complex interaction came under increasing scrutiny and debate concentrated on the controversial current role of religion in world politics and inter-civilizational confrontation and/or dialogue, as articulated and popularized in the 1990s, for instance, in Samuel Huntington's and Francis Fukuyama's respective theses of the 'Clash of Civilizations'[1] and 'The End of History'[2] as well as in Peter L. Berger's landmarks collection of studies on the global phenomenon of the "Desecularization of the World".[3]

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[1] S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York, 1996.

[2] F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, 1992.

[3] P. L. Berger, (ed.), *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, Grand Rapids, MI, 1999.

The crisis of the theory of universal secularisation and the distinct resurgence of politicised and prophetic religion as a very dynamic force in post-Cold War theopolitics have brought into sharper focus the problems of regional and global inter-cultural and inter-religious conflicts as well as bridge-building and sharing at key historic religious sites. The subject-matter of religious heritage and sacred space, traditionally the subject of theological research and concerns, has lately become also the focus of anthropological, sociological and legal analyses. Approaches, perspectives and conclusions in the treatment of sacral heritage and holy places in legal, theological, anthropological and sociological analyses and debates have been varied and often contradictory.

Within the field of anthropology, for example, a conflict-focused approach to the balance of power in inter-communal relations around such religious sites, its dormant, occurring and contingent tensions and shifts, with their potential for expulsive violence, is clearly discernible in the much discussed thesis of "antagonistic tolerance" (seen in its line of reasoning as underlying the sharing of religious sites in South Asia and the Balkans) advanced in the anthropological studies of Robert Hayden.[4] Hayden's approach and conclusions are are paralleled in Ron Hassner's subsequent arguments for the essential "undivisibility" and "unshareability" of sacred places.[5] Other evolving anthropological approaches to the patterns of intercommunality at mixed holy places have shown that conflict-prioritizing models are not sufficient to analyze and explain the multi-layered socio-religious fields of interaction at such shared sites.[6]

Predictably, since the Eastern Mediterranean area and the Near East comprise the locations of the paradigmatic holy sites of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, studies on the sacred geographics and pilgrimage routes of these regions[7] have focused predominantly on the attitude to and concept and structuring of sacred space in the Abrahamic religions. The exploration of the notion of sacred space in religious worldviews remains one of the

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4 R. Hayden, "Antagonistic Tolerance: Competitive Sharing of Religious Sites in South Asia and the Balkans", *Current Anthropology*, 43(2), 2002, pp. 205–231; *idem*, "Religious Structures and Political Dominance in Belgrade: *Ethnologia Balcanica*, 9:2005, pp. 214–224.

5 R. Hassner, "To Halve and to Hold: The Politics of Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility", *Security Studies* 12(4), 2004, 1–33.

6 See, for example, the contributions in D. Albera and M. Couroucli (eds.), *Sharing Sacred Spaces in the Mediterranean: Christians, Muslims, and Jews at Shrines and Sanctuaries*, Bloomington, 2012; G. Bowman (ed.), *Sharing the Sacra: the Politics and Pragmatics of Inter-Communal Relations around Holy Places*, New York, 2012.

7 On the methodological and terminological aspects of the study of 'geographics' of religion, see J. Scott and P. Simpson-Housley (eds.), *Sacred Places and Profane Spaces. Essays in the Geographics of Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, Westport, CT, New York and London, 1991; R. H. Stoddard and A. Morinis (eds.), *Sacred Places, Sacred Spaces. The Geography of Pilgrimages*, Baton Rouge, LA, 1997.

principal topics of religious studies, especially the disciplines of history of religion and phenomenology of religion. The investigation of the conceptualizations and constructions of sacred space, both in religious studies and generally, has been much indebted to Rudolf Otto's[8] and Mircea Eliade's[9] influential treatments of the nature and evolution of religious mind and the phenomena of sacrality and holiness. Otto approaches and explains the sacred/holy/numinous as an universal transcendent reality representing the essence and "innermost core" of all religions and religious experience which is possible to acknowledge but eludes strict definitions. One of the fundamental aspects of Otto's approach is the differentiation between two different types of sacrality: the "awesome holy" (seen as characteristic of earlier or more "primitive" forms of religion) and the "ethical holy" (understood as a supremely elevated moral purity arousing a sense of moral reverence) as well as their relationship and its evolution.[10]

In a number of well-known studies Mircea Eliade variously advanced in some detail a more or less systematic theory reconstructing the mechanisms employed by religious cultures to translate views and experiences of the sacred into their organization and use of sacralized space Eliade consistently applied the sacred-profane dichotomy (essential to his study of religion) to sacred space and dwelled on its heterogeneity, with some of its spatial points being recognized and revered as *loci sacra* of divine manifestations through theophanies, hierophanies, miraculous events, etc. Indicative of the differentiation between cosmos and chaos, such sacred places serve also as *axis mundi*, conceptualized and represented in a variety of ways. They function as passages and communication channels between different strata of reality, as "meeting points between heaven and earth", "a point of junction between earth, heaven and hell", "the navel of the earth, a meeting place for the three cosmic regions"[11],[12] Significantly, they also provide the religious mind with the sacred center around which it can proceed with the creation of the ordered cosmos. The qualities, symbolism and imagery assigned to such sacralized spaces and sacred centres/axes are duly reflected in religious heritage: in the architecture, iconography and status of religious buildings (sanctuaries, shrines, temples, etc.), palaces and cities associated with the respective sacred places.[13]

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[8] R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, London, 1925 [1917].

[9] M. Eliade, *Traité d'histoire des religions*, Paris, 1953; *idem*, *The Sacred and the Profane. The Nature of Religion*, transl. by W. R. Trask, New York, 1959; *idem*, *Le mythe de l'éternel retour. Archétypes et repetition*, Paris, 1969 [1949].

[10] Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, pp. 4, 5, 7.

[11] Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, London: Sheed and Ward, 1958, p. 358.

[12] M. Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, London, 1958, p. 358.

[13] Eliade, *Traité d'histoire*, pp. 315–332; *idem*, *The Sacred and the Profane*, pp. 20–65, 116–160; *idem*, *L e mythe de l'éternel retour*, 17–35.

The application of the Eliade model of sacred space and places (as related to the dichotomies of sacred-profane and cosmos-order) to a variety of religious cultures and currents has been variously judged successful, helpful or inadequate, provoking some extensive debates within the field of religious studies. Whether employed in the case of normative Islam[14], Jewish mysticism[15] Constantinian era-Christianity and Graeco-Roman religiosity,[16] the Elide model has been the subject of a series of critical re-assessments on methodological and religio-historical grounds; it has been also undergoing reappraisals on the basis of scrutinies of empirical cosmological and cosmographic concepts and vocabulary of religious traditions not taken into account in his studies.[17] Such reevaluations have in addition advanced alternative approaches to the problem and definition of sacred space, including Jonathan Z. Smith's dichotomy of "locative" and "utopian" vision of space[18] and his explanation of sacred site as "a place of clarification (a focusing lens) where men and gods are held to be transparent to one another".[19] In another line of argument, Christoph Auffarth proposes a differentiation between a locally fixed shrine and a site which acquires a sacred character through the systematic observance of ritual.[20] While it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Eliadean sacred space model lacks universal applicability (largely being based on select data and sometimes disregarding the actual religious and historical context of the phenomena under discussion), it is also evident that it retains its usefulness as a general heuristic tool in the study of religion. It thus remains a helpful background model for new approaches to and theories of sacred space/sites which can continue to be

[14] See, for example, C. Bennett, "Islam", in J. Holm and J. Bowker (eds.), *Sacred Place*, London and New York, 1994, pp. 88–114.

[15] H. Pedaya, "The Divinity as Place and Time and the Holy Place in Jewish Mysticism", in B. Z. Kedar and R. J. Zwi Werblowsky (eds.), *Sacred Space: Shrine, City, Land: Proceedings of the International Conference in Memory of Joshua Prawer*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1998, pp. 84–110.

[16] I. Tanaseanu-Döbler, "Mircea Eliade and Concepts of Holy Places in Late Antiquity", *Archaeus. Studies in the History of Religions*, 13, 2009, pp. 281–305.

[17] See, among others, J. Z. Smith, "The Wobbling Pivot", *The Journal of Religion*, 52/2, 1972, pp. 134–149 (reprinted in Jonathan Z. Smith, *Map is not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions*, Leiden, Brill, 1978, pp. 88–103); C. Auffarth, "Sind heilige Stätten transportabel? Axis mundi und soziales Gedächtnis", in A. Michaels (ed.), *Noch eine Chance für die Religionsphänomenologie?*, Bern, 2001, p. 235–257; D. Cave, "Eliade's Interpretation of Sacred Space and its Role Towards the Cultivation of Virtue", in B. Rennie (ed.), *Changing Religious Worlds: The Meaning and End of Mircea Eliade*, New York, 2001, pp. 235–248.

[18] Smith, "The Wobbling Pivot".

[19] J. Z. Smith, "The Bare Facts of Ritual", History of Religions 20:1/2, 1980, pp. 112–127, reprinted in J. Z. Smith, *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown*, Chicago and London (1982), 1982, pp. 53–65, at p. 54.

[20] Auffarth, "Sind heilige Stätten transportabel?", pp. 254ff.

conceptualized and applied in criticism, revision or refinement of its theoretical and hermeneutical premises.

The progressing debates on the varied co-existing approaches to the phenomenon of holy space have been substantially enriched by a series of new contributions to the problematic pursuing its exploration specifically in Jewish, Christian and Islamic theological contexts. This steadily expanding study of the *geographia sacra* of the Abrahamic faiths (especially in Europe, the Mediterranean and Near and Middle East) and their changing early, medieval and modern discourses on spatial sacrality are of major importance to understanding of the tensions, confrontations and reconciliations in the historical and contemporary inter-Abrahamic. Indeed without these perspectives provided by Abrahamic faiths' historical theologies of sacred space it would be impossible to comprehend the religio-political background of the current inter-Abrahamic conflicts, fault-lines and bridge-building efforts over shared or currently (but not always previously) mono-confessional sacred places, especially in the Near and Middle East. This can be clearly demonstrated, for example, by a brief discussion of the novel theological and ecclesiastical approaches to and appropriations of sacred space and religiously significant sites in late antique Palestine (marking God's acts and epiphanies in history), formulated and implemented in the course of the evolving Christianization of the Roman empire during the fourth century.

Even without taking into consideration the other world religions, the study of the Abrahamic faiths' notions and imagery of spatial holiness is a very broad and complex field which in addition to theology needs also contributions and insights from disciplines such as religious history, art history, archaeology, etc. Both important historical and contemporary aspects of Jewish, Christian and Muslim attitudes to sacred space and their interaction still await more in-depth and comparative exploration, all the more that they do not exhibit essentially static and immutable stances but have undergone series of transformations in a variety of contexts. In the case of Christianity such pivotal transmutations took place during the Constantinian and post-Constantinian periods in the fourth century (in the wake of the issue of the Edict of Milan in 313), which set the stage for legitimization and institutionalization of the Christian Church in the Roman empire. One of the crucial features of this process was the appropriations of sacred space and religiously significant sites in late antique Roman Palestine, perceived as marking God's acts and epiphanies in history, as related in the Old and New Testament.[21] These continuous and wide-ranging Christian

[21] See, for example, J. Wilkinson, *Jerusalem Pilgrims before the Crusades*, Warminster, 1977; A. Linder, "Jerusalem between Jews and Christians in the Byzantine Period". *Cathedra* 2, 1979, 109–119; E. D. Hunt, *Holy Land Pilgrimage in the Later Roman Empire, AD 312–460.* Oxford, 1982; P. W. L. Walker, *Holy City, Holy Places? Christian Attitudes to Jerusalem and the Holy Land in the Fourth Century*, Oxford, 1990; R. L. Wilken, *The Land Called Holy. Palestine in Christian History and Thought.*

Roman campaigns, inaugurated by Constantine the Great (306–337) and his mother, St Helena (c.255–c.330), to Christianize Palestine, encouraged devotional pilgrimage and the building of churches and monasteries. These endeavours generated the expanding system of sacred and pilgrimage centres in Palestine, underpinned by the Christian "re-discovery" and infatuation with the physical Holy Land and Jerusalem of the Old and Testament, informed also by the church's supersessionist theology extolling itself as the "True Israel" or the "New Israel". The rapid progress of the Christianization of Palestine led to the flourishing of early medieval Palestinian monasticism[22] and the eventual elevation of the Jerusalem see to a Patriarchate in the mid-fifth century.

The newly forming Christian secular and ecclesiastical elites' attitudes to the Holy Land, its sacred sites and their "reconstructed" holy pedigree were authoritatively articulated in Constantine the Great's pronouncements on Jerusalem and Mamre (the site of God's appearance to Abraham in Genesis 18:1–8 and where the patriarch had built an altar to the Lord according to Genesis 13:8), as recounted by his imperial apologist, Eusebius of Caesarea (c.260–c.340). Both Jerusalem and Mamre are distinguished in his letters to bishops in Palestine as primevally holy places (by divine decree), whose sacredness was by divine decree but had been subsequently concealed only to be manifested again.[23] Mamre (the site of God's appearance to Abraham in Genesis 18:1–8 and where the patriarch had built an altar to the Lord according to Genesis 13:8) was thus extolled as the place where "the cultic observance of the holy law" initially commenced which necessitates its purification from all impure forms of worship practiced afterwards at its precincts and restoration to its "ancient holiness".[24] In reality, however despite these intentions and efforts to make Mamre an exclusive sacred space, with its status and appeal being actually internationally enhanced, it continued to be a shared Abrahamic site at the level of popular pilgrimage and veneration and attract diverse religious groups.[25]

New Haven, 1992; J. E. Taylor, *Christians and the Holy Places: The Myth of Jewish-Christian Origins*, Oxford, 1993; Jacobs, *Remains of the Jews: the Holy Land and Christian Empire in Late Antiquity*. Stanford, 2004.

[22] See, for example, Y. Hirschfeld, *The Judean Desert Monasteries in the Byzantine Period*. New Haven, 1992.

[23] See the analysis of Constantine the Great's articulation of the newly evolving Christian attitudes to sites such as Jerusalem and Mamre as the primal and divinely instituted holy places and the dialectic of the concealment and revelation of their holiness, in Tanaseanu-Döbler, "Mircea Eliade and Concepts of Holy Places", pp. 285–290.

[24] Eusebius, *Life of Constantine*, 3:52–53.

[25] See, for example, A. Kofsky, "Mamre: A Case for a Regional Cult?", in A. Kofsky and G. G. Stroumsa (eds.), *Sharing the Sacred. Religious Contacts and Conflicts in the Holy Land, 1st–15th century*, Jerusalem, 1989, pp. 19–30.

In the emerging new and enduring models of Christian sacred space in the early Christian Roman empire the principal holy sites of late antique Palestine enjoyed thus a much enhanced role in its new political theology – essentially they were elevated as inherently and om some occasions primordial sacred places in the "imperial-normative" space of its ecumene. Such notions of the ontologically sacred nature of the principal holy sites of Palestine clearly contrasted with certain contemporaneous non-Christian attitudes to sacred sites and temples in the Graeco-Roman world, as declared and even put into practice by the last Roman pagan Emperor, Julian the Apostate (361–363). In the course of his campaigns to revive the eminence and cultic life of Graeco-Roman paganism and thus reverse the process of the Christianization of the empire Julian approached the issue of the sacrality of temples and cultic complexes in a functional and flexible manner. Julian didn't regard them as inherently sacred but in his view they could acquire a temporary or lasting sanctification through the presence of the respective deities, strict cultic observances and appropriate human religious attitudes.[26] Julian's stances on and actual policies at sacred sites reflect the complex dynamics of ritual space in late antiquity, whether in view of his drawing on Hellenism and Platonism, introducing innovative ideas or treating topical issues of the ear such the extension of sacrality from the temples/sanctuaries to the cities serving as their locations.[27]

The formation of Christian theories and practices of sacralization of cultic sites thus took place against the background of contemporaneous pagan Graeco-Roman models and the entangled Jewish-Christian relations in late antique Palestine. Emerging Christian discourses on sacral spatiality and *geographia sacra* recognized and highlighted certain places, especially in Palestine, as being literally the physical sites of God's acts and intervention in history. These increasingly elaborate spatial constructs and spiritual geography of Christendom were to become thus intricately interwoven with Christian understanding and ideas of historicity. As these concepts of historicity are also central to the self-identity and self–perception of Judaism and Islam, the interrelations and mutual dependencies between the Abrahamic religions' theologies of historicity and sacred space could and did lead to competing spatial claims, especially in the Holy Land and Jerusalem in particular.

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[26] On Julian's functional and flexible attitudes to temples as sites of temporary hierophanies and meeting-points between the gods and their human worshippers, representing the gods but not divine as such, see Tanaseanu-Döbler, "Mircea Eliade and Concepts of Holy Places", pp. 290–296.

[27] J. Bouffartigue, "Les villes saintes dans la vision religieuse de l'empereur Julien", in Béatrice Caseau, Jean-Claude Cheynet and Vincent Déroche (eds.), *Pèlerinages et lieux saints dans l'Antiquité et le Moyen Âge. Mélanges offerts à Pierre Maraval*, Paris, 2006, pp. 90–96; Y. Stoyanov, "Strengthening Intercultural Dialogue Through the Contribution of Sacred Sites", in A. Benzo (ed.), *Protecting the Sacred Places of the Mediterranean*, Rome, 2012, pp. 91–96.

One of the high-points of these inter-Abrahamic rivalries over sacred space and sites during the era of the Crusades and Counter-Crusades has been the subject of intense study, generating voluminous publications. The grand-scale collisions of the Crusading era and their aftermath were antedated, however, by some less investigated but noteworthy episodes such as the reported Jewish attempt to reclaim and resacralize the lost holy locus of Judaism, the Temple Mount, in the wake of the Persian Sasanian conquest of Jerusalem in 614.[28] There are a number of indications that as a reaction to these designs, the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius (610–641) made moves to repossess the Temple Mount for Christianity upon its return to East Roman/Byzantine control in 628.[29] The process of the Umayyad Islamic re-sanctification and transformation of the Temple Mount (following the Umayyad annexation of Jerusalem in 638) into the sacral complex of Haram al-Sharif is much better explored. Given its continuing religio-political repercussions, the high point of this process, the building of the Dome of the Rock, with its manifest supersessionist and missionary ramifications, continues to attract much general and scholarly attention and debate.[30]

Furthermore, an increasing number of theological and religio-historical studies have also focused on the provenance and chronology of the internal development of the co-existing and periodically competing models of sacred spaces and places within each of the Abrahamic religions. These studies have highlighted a number of interrelated themes and patterns as well as largely new areas of inquiry which are also of major importance to to anthropological, sociological and legal approaches to holy sites, whether in historical or contemporary setting. The study of the most influential biblical roots of the concepts of the sanctity of place has highlighted, for example, some important dichotomies in various layers of the biblical text such as that between a sacred place where God dwells and where he reveals himself to humankind. Another such important dichotomy concerns the differentiation between the sanctuary-based localized as well as hierarchically-organized sanctity of "God's dwelling" and its "mobile" sanctity version of the Tabernacle.[31] This particular dichotomy raises the crucial ques-

[28] See the analysis of the state of evidence and research on these reported Jewish efforts in Y. Stoyanov, *Defenders and Enemies of the True Cross*, Vienna, 2011, pp. 52–53.

[29] Analysis of the evidence and theories about such Heraclius' designs in Stoyanov, *Defenders and Enemies*, pp. 68–69.

[30] See the analysis in R. G. Hoyland, *Seeing Islam as Others Saw It: a Survey and Evaluation of Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian Writings on Early Islam*. Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1997, pp. 311–312; A. Kaplony, *The Haram of Jerusalem 324–1099. Temple, Friday Mosque, Area of Spiritual Power*. Stuttgart, 2002, pp. 23–59; G. G. Stroumsa, "False Prophet, False Messiah and the Religious Scene in Seventh-Century Jerusalem", in M. Bockmuehl and J. C. Paget (eds.), *Redemption and Resistance: the Messianic Hopes of Jews and Christians in Antiquity*, London, 2008, pp. 285–296, at pp. 292–293.

[31] S. Japhet, "Some Biblical Concepts of Sacred Place", in Kedar and Werblowsky,

tion whether in biblical and post-biblical contexts any geographical site of divine revelation can be considered inherently sacred and/or its sanctity can achieve durability through the perpetuation of worship.[32] The eventual centralization of sacred space in the Temple in Jerusalem effected the theological justification of the transition from the principles of "mobility and impermanence" to "stability and permanence". This transition was accompanied also with varied rhetorical strategies to enlarge the sanctity of the Temple to the city itself and eventually also lead to the politicization of the holy space of the Temple and Jerusalem, with its major religio-political implications and consequences.[33]

The religio-cultural dynamics of the spacialization of belief in the normative monotheisms of early Judaism and Christianity raise another series of significant research questions. Some of them concern the evident contrast and interfaces between the recognition of only one centre for required pilgrimage in the religious cultures of early Judaism and Christianity, on one hand, and contemporaneous polytheistic religions, with their "inbuilt multiplicity of pilgrimage centres".[34] Other related areas of inquiry of increasing importance to the study of spatiality and sacrality in Judaism, Christianity and Islam include the networks and hierarchical interrelations between the key holy places of Judaism, Christianity and Islam in the Near East and the various sacred sites of local and regional significance. This sub-field is also of significance to the study of theory and practice of transposition of sacred space in ancient, late antique and medieval cultures. This transposition could also mark, especially in the sphere of religious experience, the transfer of sanctity from a permanently sacred centre to a ritually sanctified complex of temporary sacrality,[35] and the consequent "Jerusalemization" of sacred spaces in Christendom.[36] Similarly continuous and periodically intensified process involves the transfer of "Holy Land" and "Promised Land" vocabulary and imagery in the creation of the theoretical and practical territoriality of the "secular sacred spaces" or "hallowed lands" in modern nationalist ideologies (and their antecedents in medieval Christian political theologies).[37] Given its socio-religious and ethno-confessional dynamics as

Sacred Space, pp. 55–72.

[32] Japhet, "Some Biblical Concepts", pp. 69–70.

[33] Japhet, "Some Biblical Concepts", pp. 70.

[34] R. J. Zwi Werblowsky, "Introduction: Mindscape and Landscape", in Kedar and Werblowsky, *Sacred Space*, pp. 9–16, at p. 14.

[35] J. Z. Smith, "Constructing a Place", in Kedar and Werblowsky, *Sacred Space*, pp. 18–31, esp. pp. 24–25.

[36] See, for example, the contributions in A. Lidov (ed.), *New Jerusalems. The Translations of Sacred Spaces in Christian Cultures/Novye Ierusalimy. Perenesenie sakralnykh prostranstv v khristiianskoi kul'ture*, Moscow, 2006.

[37] For example, on the notion of "Holy Russia" in pre-Petrine Russia as being centred on the Holy Land, both in terms of earthly geography and spiritual reality, see R.

well as continuous topicality, this is also a problematic which has been also attracting increasing attention across a range of disciplines, ranging from religious history to political science.

At the same time, while retaining their importance for fields such as theology and religious history (and in formal ecclesiastical discourse), the categories of sacred space and places have not enjoyed comparable currency and usage in studies of religious behaviour coming from social anthropology and sociology of religion. Archaeologists, heritage experts, anthropologists and sociologists (whose interest lie primarily in the more tangible aspects of sacred places/cultic complexes) generally find it difficult to adopt and employ (in the various concrete dimensions of their work) the theological definitions of and approaches to sacred space.

Apprehensions and doubts about the benefits and appropriateness of theological interpretations of holy space (with all the ensuing epistemological and ontological issues) in disciplines such as archaeology, heritage preservation and site management have, etc., have opened the way for the formulation and adoption of more sociologically-oriented perspectives on the spatial dimension of religion. Such perspectives could build on the plentiful miscellaneous material assembled in the last century by the multi-disciplinary study of sacred sites of non-Abrahamic world religions and indigenous peoples in a rich variety of religious, cultural and geographic settings.

Such perspectives are largely indebted to the influential sociological reappraisal of sacrality of Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) which defines and uses it a relational descriptive category referring to "things set apart and forbidden",[38] whose quality of sacredness is not intrinsic but reflects the judgement of the respective group or society.[39] Intended thus to be "metaphysically neutral",[40] the Durkheimian sociological notion of sacrality has been increasingly considered a more suitable classificatory and categorization tool in the study of material culture and heritage related to the archaeology and anthropology of religion and cult. This sociologically-based and -oriented approach has proved especially useful especially in spheres such as the use of exclusive and inclusive space or the restrictions on and regulations of human behaviour at sites set apart and separated from the surrounding landscape due to a particular religious or other importance attached to them.[41] Other studies on the construction of ancient, medieval

M. Price, "The Holy Land in Old Russian Culture", in R. N. Swanson (ed.), *The Holy Land, Holy Lands, and Christian Culture*, Woodbridge, 2000, pp. 250–262.

[38] É. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, New York, 1967 [1912], p. 62.

[39] See the analysis of the Durkheimian sociological notion of sacrality in W. Paden, "Before 'the Sacred' Became Theological: Rereading the Durkheimian Legacy", *Method and Theory in the Study of Religion*, 3, 1991, pp. 10–23.

[40] Paden, "Before 'the Sacred' Became Theological", p. 16.

[41] See, for example, J. Hubert, "Sacred Beliefs and Beliefs of Sacredness", in D. L.

and modern space[42] and its role in collective memory have broadened further the field, allowing for innovative approaches on the wider cultural relevance and uses of sacred space.

The variety of concerns and methods in the existing theological, anthropological and sociological approaches to sacred sites hence betray distinctive and to some extent inevitable interpretative and methodological ambiguities and contradictions. These ambiguities clearly arise out of the multiple religious, spiritual, social and political functions and roles ascribed to sacred places in different human societies and cultures. Meanwhile, the need for a more inter-disciplinary approach which may balance these perspectives is becoming increasingly apparent, as the intensity of old and new threats to sacral heritage has lately worrying increased. These threats range from war and conflict (culminating in the deliberate and systematic destruction of sacral architecture and manuscript/archival collections), looting and natural disasters, development pressures, mass and uncontrolled tourism as well as negligent archaeological excavations and the growing application of destructive pseudo-restoration practices – occasionally unwisely funded by international agencies.

The new legal, heritage and inter-disciplinary initiatives (national and international) intended to counter and minimize these growing threats to sacral heritage and cultural property include the important Second Protocol to the Hague convention of 1954 (adopted in 1999). Furthermore, in addition to the various guidelines of the relevant international conventions some of these new international initiatives (like the Groupe de La Laguna project for a legal regime for the holy places in Israel and the Palestinian Territories of 2006[43] and the Universal Code on Holy Sites of 2009[44]) have addressed the need of identifying and applying new instruments, strategies and policies to secure the protection of sacral heritage and sacred places in particular. The debates accompanying the formulation and proposed implementations of these initiatives (which involved some dialogue and exchange with relevant ecclesiastic authorities) demonstrated the need to complement the existing and emerging legal discourses and guidelines regarding sacred

Carmichael, J. Hubert, B. Reeves, and A. Schanche (eds.), *Sacred Sites, Sacred Places,* New York, 1994, pp. 8–19.

[42] See, for example, M. Halbwachs, *La Topographie légendaire des Évangiles en Terre Sainte; étude de mémoire collective*, Paris, 1941; H. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, Oxford, 1991; E. Soja. *Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions*. Oxford. 2000.

[43] Document accessible at: http://fund-culturadepaz.org/spa/03/DOCUMENTOS/SANTOS_LUGARES_2006.pdf (accessed on 15.10.2017)

[44] Document accessible at: https://www.lutheranworld.org/sites/default/files/Appendix%201%20to%20Exhbiti%2018%20CAPV%20Code%20of%20Conduct%20Holy%20Sites.pdf (accessed on 15.10.2017)

space and sites with other disciplines' approaches and insights to gain extra historical and cultural dimension and depth.

Such an interdisciplinary project intended to establish common and shared principles and guidelines for the protection of sacred places and sacral heritage (acknowledged as possessing universal spiritual, cultural and social significance) was initiated in 2007 by the Sovereign Order of Malta and in 2012–2013 was jointly coordinated by the Order and the European Commission. The project assembled expert teams which conducted a series of workshops (the last two of which took place under the aegis of the European Commission, while the last was also in collaboration with UNESCO) exploring various theological, historical, sociological and legal aspects of the sacral heritage of the Mediterranean. Intended to lead to the adoption of the desirable common principles and rules for its protection and conservation of sacral heritage, one of the principal outcomes of this project was the formal issue of a "Declaration on the Protection and Enhancement of Sacred Places". The intention of the declaration was to articulate what the project identified as the core principles on access to and legal protection and enhancement of sacred sites/heritage of universal significance.[45] The declaration also clearly asserts the position that, while integrated in a new comprehensive legal framework, the protection of each sacred place can also additionally become the subject of a more specific legal discipline which would allow it to fulfill its traditional and historical cultural and religious roles.

The declaration was followed by further expert meetings and workshops whose purpose was to further specify (in thematic reports and other formats) the best conceivable way of achieving better protection of sacral heritage in view of the evolving major challenges (especially, but not only, in the Near and Middle East), expand the investigation and application of good practices and formulate agendas for change and reform which could be adopted by international bodies and policy makers.

In addition, projects also run by expert teams with a narrower regional focus but with a great importance for the protection of major sacral heritage sites include the Israeli-Palestinian Working Group Agreement on Archaeological Heritage. The agreement was prepared by leading Palestinian and Israeli archaeologists and heritage professionals between 2005 and 2008.[46] Endorsed by the World Archaeological Congress in 2008, the document aimed to address the most vital aspects of the role of archaeology and heritage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and propose recommendations for the appropriate management of archaeological heritage in Israel and Palestine in a final-status agreement.

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[45] The "Declaration on the Protection and Enhancement of Sacred Places" is published as an appendix in S. Ferrari and A. Benzo (eds.), *Between Cultural Diversity and Common Heritage. The Sacred Places of the Mediterranean*, London, pp. 337–341.

[46] Text available at: http://arclab.usc.edu/sh/agreement.pdf (accessed on 15.10.2017)

The current escalation of deliberate and wide-ranging destruction of cultural and sacral heritage in the Near and Middle East makes even more urgent to build on and expand the developments in international humanitarian and human rights law (as related to cultural and religious heritage) to urgently deal with the plight of religious communities and ecclesiastical bodies targeted by unprecedented modern genocidal theopolitics[47].

[47] Yury Stoyanov, Religion, "Violence and War in Eastern Orthodoxy: Classical and some Moderen Perspecitves", *Religion and Violence*, Forel – Institute of Social Science, Belgrade, Philosophical Commune, Belgrade, Ars – Sm. Palanka and Dosije, Belgrade, Belgrade, 2016. Yury Stoyanov, "Religious Dualism and the Abrahamic Religions", *The Oxford Handbook of the Abrahamic Religions*, Edited by Adam J. Silverstein and Guy G. Stroumsa, 2015.

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ПРАВОСЛАВНАЯ ЦЕРКОВЬ ПЕРЕД ДУХОВНЫМИ ВЫЗОВАМИ СОВРЕМЕННОГО МИРА

Аннотация: Тема настоящего исследования философско-богословский анализ феномена современной духовности и попытка в основных чертах представить возможные конструктивные ответы православной Церкви (православного богословия) на вызов одной такой концепции. Нам хотелось предложить для дальнейших размышлений позицию, что современная плюралистическая духовность, хотя и исключительно индивидуалистическая и анти-традиционная по сути эклектична и как явление – потребительская все же положительная провокация Церкви, которая должна силой заветов Христа Спасителя хронос этого духовного вызова преобразовать в *kairòs* (благоприятное время и подходящую возможность) ответа, который был бы направлен на преобразовательную инкорпорацию упомянутых предиспозиций современной духовности прогрессивными, а не как до сих пор агрессивными или регрессивными способами.

Ключевые слова: плюрализм, духовность, синкретизм, этика блужданий, расширение желаний, утрата надежд.

Введение

Тема настоящего исследования философско-богословский анализ феномена современной духовности и попытка в основных чертах представить возможные конструктивные ответы православной Церкви (православного богословия) на вызов одной такой концепции. Нам хотелось предложить для дальнейших размышлений позицию, что современная плюралистическая духовность, хотя и исключительно индивидуалистическая и анти-традиционная по сути эклектична и как явление – потребительская все же положительная провокация Церкви, которая должна силой заветов Христа Спасителя хронос этого духовного вызова преобразовать в *kairòs* (благоприятное время и подходящую возможность) ответа, который был бы направлен на преобразовательную инкорпорацию упомянутых предиспозиций современной духовности прогрессивными, а не как до сих пор агрессивными или регрессивными способами.

Учитывая эти исследовательские гипотезы, нашу работу мы поделили на несколько частей. После представления основных характеристик духовности наших дней и критического как социологического подхода к такому положению дел, мы провели сравнительный анализ современной и православной духовности. Затем мы предложим ответы на вопрос – каковы шансы у Церкви при таком духовном состоянии мира, а в конце мы предоставили богословские выводы, о том как существующие агрессивные и регрессивные платформы заменить прогрессивной парадигмой отношения Церкви к этим в Ее истории еще не встречавшимся вызовам[1] по отношению к Ее сущности и миссии.

1. Духовность современной цивилизации – основные характеристики

> «В настоящее время мы живем в супер-новом, своего рода галопирующем плюрализме в духовной плоскости»[2]

Человек современности больше себя не ощущает принадлежащим к культурологическому и религиозному универсуму, а к плюри-верзуму с его гетерогенной и нелинеарной структурой, которую можно сравнить с лабиринтом. Больше невозможно ссылаться на единые параметры или системы ценностей, по которым бы измерялся окружающий нас мир. Культурологический синтез «модерна» давно уничтожен. Технологическая научная цивилизация возвела человеческие творческие возможности на небывалую высоту, экстремно спустив порог предвидений. Нету больше проверенных целей – декаденция ценностей отождествляется с индифферентностью к ним.

Духовность современной цивилизации, духовность везде присутствующего западного мира, по существу индивидуалистична – субъект (индивид, одиночка) является носителем действия, без посредничества традированных норм и предпосылок.[3] Индивид, в дальнейшем, соизмеряя собственным разумом вооруженным знаниями, из большого числа выставленного на рынке духовных предложений, свободно, но

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[1] Профессор Богословского факультета в Белграде Зоран Крстич считает, что «современная общественная действительность со своими изменчивостью, плюрализмом и специфическим сознанием как и менталитетами являются таким искушением для Церкви, каких у Неё не было во всю Её историю». З. Крстић, „Могућност хришћанског теолошког мишљења у постмодерности“, *Саборност 8* (2014) 17–26, 17.

[2] Č. Tejlor, *Doba sekularizacije*, Albatros plus, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2011, 301.

[3] «При кризисе посредничества авторитетов и принципов традиции принимается конец предмодерной системы характерный по сознанию постоянного отношения с трансценденцией, с божественным Существом», C. Dotolo, *Moguće kršćanstvo. Između postmoderniteta i religioznog traganja*, Kršćanska sadašnjost, Zagreb, 2011, 23.

поверхностно выбирает тот товар, который будет лучшим способом соответствовать его наиболее глубоким требованиям. Этим выбором, субъект по *психологическим* предиспозициям, по нестабильным эмоциональным моделям, эклектически создает свою коктейл-духовность. Так потребительство питается синкретизмом, а всескрывается под маской счастья одиночки. «В настоящее время духовность не с той стороны повседневности, а на службе повседневности – поэтому понятно, что (именно как и эта повседневность) она несет на себе знаки потребительности»[4].

Центральные предпосылки духовности такого мира, философы, богословы, социологи религиологи описывали используя множество метафор, аналогий или парадигм. Учитывая некоторые из предпосылок христианских аналитиков плюралистического общества, мы принимаем до некоторой степени обобщенные но для нашего анализа полезные выводы некоторых из них, тех которые координаты постмодернистической духовности представляют на трех вертикалях – конкретно: этике блужданий, расширения желаний и утраты надежд.[5]

1. ЭТИКА БЛУЖДАНИЙ. Мир все больше представляется как открытое море и все меньше как прочная твердь. Начинает преобладать этос скитальца, а не человека привязанного к владениям и земле. Поэтому это общество, чьим героем опять стал Одиссей, а не прежний Авраам.[6] Это сравнение, надо сказать, используется Э. Левинасом, хотя другие аналитики уточняют, что истинной парадигмой является личность Одиссея-Улисса у Данте в 26 песни *Ада*. Он путник отправляющийся в море «движим горячим желанием узнать мир, что

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[4] M. Dragun, *Konzumeristička obilježja današnje sinkretičko-eklektičke duhovnosti*, *Druš. Istraž. Zagreb* 17 (2008) 1047–1068, 1055.

[5] Срв. I. Sanna, “Il vescovo di fronte alle sfide della postmodernità”, A. Montan (ed.), *Vescovi. Servitori del Vangelo per la speranza del mondo*, Lateran University Press, Roma, 2005, 401–424. Существуют и другие подходы, из которых мы бы упомянули тот ставший уже классическим Чарльса Тейлора, который индифицировал «три неудобства» (слабости или утраты сил) модерна: индивидуализм, инструментальный разум и потерю (политической) свободы. Иными словами, автор анализирует исчезновение смысла и ощущений (моральных и наследственных) ценностей, удаление целей из жизни и исчезновение свободы, а всё это при доминации инструментализированного разума. Срв. C. Taylor, *The Malaise of Modernity*, (Cbc Massey Lectures Series), Concord, Ontario: House of Anansi, 1991, опубликованно и как *The Ethics of Authenticity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992.

[6] Срв. I. Sanna, “Il vescovo di fronte alle sfide della postmodernità”, *цит*, 404. Автор ссылается на Э. Левинаса в использовании и частичном объяснении этой параллели, хотя и знает, что существует и сравнение Улисса и Моисея, контраста их поступков перед вызовами непредсказуемых морских волнений у первого и монотонной неизменяемости пустыни у другого исторического гиганта.

бы знать и добро и зло, которые порождает человек» (97–99)[7] и который не возвращается («пока над нами не сомкнется бездна», 142). На лицо напряженная диалектика: скиталец-одиночка, а не отец народа, одиночка со своей собственной системой ценностей, а не личность в преданиями определенном сообществе. В противовес целенаправленному продвижению Авраама паломнического скитания, хождения – к новой земле, стоят бесцельные скитания Одиссея, точнее говоря современных наследников Улисса Данте. Продвижению Авраамову в обетованную *землю* противопоставлено глобалистическое аннулирование сказа о полисе, государстве, королевстве, стабильном отечестве или городе. Больше чем вопрос, что будет с политикой как заботой о полисе, нас интересует что происходит с религиями в цивилизации, которая глобализирует пространства, превращая их в виртуальные?

2. РАСШИРЕНИЕ ЖЕЛАНИЙ. Вторая координата постмодерна связана с потребительством современного мира, этим «метастазом нездорового прогрессивизма»[8] и с культом желаний. В настоящее время все желают всё: вечную молодость, красоту, развлечения и счастье, и то сразу и любою ценой. Духовность современной цивилизации является исключительно результатом индивидуального выбора, покупательских возможностей каждого, который товар (материального или духовного типа) тратит на основании личных психологических предиспозиций и желаний. После банализации духовных ценностей, путем их популяризации в бесконтрольном процессе рекламократии происходит коммерциализация всех ценностей. Первое место этой поверхностности занимает желание индивида как неприкосновенное «высшее качество» нашего времени. Создается тип *homo oeconomicus-a*, человека у которого есть, а не человек который есть, или *homo ludens*, который вновь открывает консюмеризм и свободное время (досуг), но как элементы желаемого, а это значит и истинного существования. Поэтому подчиняются утилитаристической логике мундиального рынка и спешат прибрать к рукам все богатства, которые им доступны. «Смерть наконец прибывает» напоминает Даниэль Коэн, и «останавливает их прежде чем пересытятся этой бесполезной погоней за полным блаженством, которое все время увиливает»[9]. Экономическую глобализацию вполне устраивает экзистенциональная изоляция: современный человек перечисляет виртуальных знакомых, гордится многочисленными сайбер друзьями, а перед ним разоренные семьи, семейные раздоры,

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[7] Срв. Д. Алигијери, *Пакао*, Рад, Београд, 1976, перевод – Миховил Комбол, 206–214.

[8] Д. Джалто, *Respublica. Изабране студије и есеји*, Одбор за просвету и културу Епархије браничевске, Богословско друштво *Отачник*, Пожаревац – Београд, 2013, 67.

[9] D. Koen, *Homo economicus. (Zabludeli) prorok novih vremena*, Clio, Beograd, 2014, 65.

вражда. Он присутствует при уничтожении некогда священных добрососедских отношений. Желание духовности которое существует, тоже становится товаром, преобразуется в страсть к блиц-духовности и моментально просветляющим визиям. Ею торгуют туристические бюро (предлагая встречи с гуру и лже-мистиками, мгновения – максимум выходные мира и тишины), магов, гадалок, астрологов, ложных медиаторов, йога-техники и альтернативных психотехник, – всех тех, кто человека оставляет на горизонтальном уровне самодовольства, с опустошенной душой и «обчищенными» кошельками. Но, упомянутый *homo economicus* «стремясь преодолеть препятствия встречающиеся на пути к обогащению, во имя эффективности разгоняет своих соперников, таких как *homo ethicus*, *homo emphaticus*… эти иные стороны человека, которые стремятся к сотрудничеству и взаимности. Победив соперников он умирает, заключив человеческую натуру в неэффективный мир, лишенный идеалов»[10].

3. ПОТЕРЯ НАДЕЖД. Третья вертикаль нашего времени поддерживает первые две. Бесцельный скиталец, который и сам превратился в несбывшуюся надежду, теряет всякое доверие к громким творениям и великим идеологиям, и его охватывает чувство безнадежности. Крушение философских, политических, социологических, этических, религиозных опор, которые сопровождает и депрессия, после потери оптимизма эпохи Кеннеди или эпохи после падения Берлинской стены достигают апогея кризиса надежд. Отбросив прошлое (предание[11]) и потеряв (надежду на) будущее, человек остался в вакууме времени, лишенный возможности идти ни вперед, ни назад. Кто без корней, тот и без плодов. Так как временные плоскости отринул первым фундаментом (этос скитальца), так временную категорию возвратил в заколдованный цикл безвыходности и античной трагедии, этой третьей опорой – утратой надежд[12] и усилением страха (экологические бедствия, атомная война, болезни, терроризм, иммигранты, нехватка воды, питания, воздуха…). Человек отказывается от самой глубокой интимности и свободы ради институциональной защиты от новых ужасов, соглашается чтоб его пичкали лекарствами, устанавливали слежку, скрытно наблюдали, ограждали колючей проволокой, потому что утратил доверие к другому, потому что боится другого, потому что не желает другого. Таким образом антропоцентричный идентитет расслаивается до несуществования. «Сознание о силе, о возможностях, о способности благоустроить наш мир и нас самих, и о степени связи

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[10] D. Koen, *Homo economicus*, *цит*, 156.

[11] О сложности категории преданий и их подлинного сохранения и передачи см. З. Матић, *Свето Предање у богословљу Ива Конгара: критички осврт*, *Црквене студије* 11 (2014) 181–198.

[12] Установление различных теорий реинкарнации является следствием этих блужданий и экзистенциональной пустоты человека.

этой силы с разумом и наукой, сознание о огромном прогрессе в области сознаний и пониманий» разлетелись в пух и прах.[13]

Так перед нами новый тип человека, над которым доминирует потребительско-рыночная логика, который неспособен к встрече и диалогу с другими, и который порывая с традицией *vita contemplativa*[14] потерял и код к области потустороннего. Все чаще говорят о «четвертом типе человека» (выражение часто используемое итальянским социологом Джанфранко Моро)[15] том после человека эллинизма, христианства и модерна, о том, который отвернулся от трех своих предшественников. Его не интересует их наследие, он отбрасывает и их и любую другую философию, религию или историю. Для него этот мир «монотонно и скучно разволшебленное место» (синтагма Тейлора), мир на закате[16].

С этого момента, из этого положения, возникает наш новый вопрос: что в указанном контексте происходит с Церковью, Ее духовностью и Ее богословием? Не взираю ни на что, вопреки всему или благодаря всему этому, помимо его, другой человек не существует. Если она верна своему миссионерскому призванию свидетельствовать о жизни. Церковь должна обратиться к нему, призвать его к надежде, предложить ему смысл, «утраченный при исчезновении трансценденции»[17] и объявить ему радость жизни в изобилии. Для того, чтобы мы ответили на вопрос современных свидетельств православия, особенно на территории СПЦ нам необходимо в первую очередь в основных чертах показать возможные и уже использованные парадигмы реакции Церкви на вызовы нового мира, новой системы, нового режима и указать на наиболее важные результаты, достигнутые в этих столкновениях.

2. Регрессивная и агрессивная парадигмы отношений Церкви и мира

Прежние реакции христианских богословов на вызовы новых форм духовности, которые известны в истории Церкви показывают почти единодушно одинаковый по типу ответ – страх. Рефлексная реакция магистериума Католической Церкви в 19 столетии при

[13] Срв. Č. Tejlor, *Doba sekularizacije*, *цит*, 302.

[14] Срв. M. Lakroa, *New Age. Ideologija novog doba*, Clio, Beograd, 2001, 65.

[15] Срв. G. Morra, *Il quarto uomo. Postmodernità o crisi della modernità?*, Armando, Roma, 1996.

[16] Синтагму «закат Запада» принимаем по определению италианского философа Дж. Ваттимо, который идею, что истории присуще прогрессивное направление, что ею руководит рациональная предпосылка, считает существенным признаком модернитета, но что идея эта рассредоточилась. Срв. G. Vattimo, *La filosofia e il tramonto dell'Occidente*, *Colloquium Philosophicum*, 3 (1998) 197–209.

[17] Срв. Č. Tejlor, *Doba sekularizacije*, *цит*, 304.

модернистическом кризисе,[18] которую мы считаем парадигматической, видна в заключении церковного энтитета в самом себе, вернее в официальные энциклики, догматы и защитные действия безошибочности (непогрешимости) папы. Страх перед неизвестностью, который кроет в себе модерн, перед осложнениями истории, которая создается независимо от влияния клириков, страх перед утратой могущества, заставляет Церковь искать убежища в духовном и материальном укрытии. Такие действия римского епископа получат догматическое и каноническое закрепление на Первом ватиканском соборе через догмат папской безошибочности. Энцикликой *Quanta cura* Пий IX индикативно указывает епископам, ворующим, а и всему миру на все прерогативы своей мощи. Трудно найти документ, который в такой степени являлся предшествием событий и решений будущего собора, какой была энциклика, которую мы кратко проанализируем и собором 1869/70 годах.

Стиль энциклики можно охарактеризовать словом *монолог*, хотя автор обращается полноте Церкви, а анализ ее содержания подтвердит это мнение. В самом начале папа напоминает, о том какое проявление глубокой обеспокоенности и повышенного внимания, римские епископы – его предшественники оказывали *всему стаду* Господнему. Что бы вывести доверенную им паству на чистые пастбища папа был вынужден неоднократно применять учительскую власть и выявлять ереси и погрешности нового «самого печального» времени (tristissimae nostrae aetatis), которые разрушительно угрожали и *христианскому* и *гражданскому* государству (christianam civilem que rempublicam miserandum in modum funestarunt). Перечень заблуждений, весьма гетерогенных, но всех без отличий ясно отвергнутых и осужденных, который даст *Syllabus* открывает нам сознание римского первосвященника о его универсальной учительской службе, которую он осуществляет прямо, свободно и непосредственно, объявляя декреты и энциклики. Эхо такого подхода к реальности звучит в позициях указанных в энклитике, где папа утверждает: «Мы, сознавая свое апостольское служение, весьма озабочены исправностью святой веры и (…) ради блага человеческого общества, поднимаем свой голос и все извращенные мнения и лживые догмы точно указанные в этом документе, Своей апостольской властью отбрасываем, запрещаем и осуждаем, желая и *приказывая*, чтобы все чада католической Церкви к ним относились подобным образом» (DH 2896). От верующих ожидается окончательное и безотказное согласие и принятие позиций великого послания.

[18] Матић, З., *Societas perfecta и прва модернистичка криза римокатоличке Цркве*, Б. Шијаковић (прир.), *Српска теологија данас 2011, Зборник радова са годишњег симпозијума ПБФ*, Београд, 2012, 251–257.

Основным вопросом возникающим в этой части нашего анализа является: кто себя считает принимающим этих посланий? Какое «стадо» имел ввиду папа, а кто себя действительно считал принадлежащим к загону великого римского пастыря? Реакции после объявления энциклики[19] указывают нам на вывод, что римская курия того времени не осознавала факты, что мир изменился, что средневековая теория «двух мечей» не осталась неприкосновенной истиной политической реальности. Тогда как папа и кардиналы жили еще в убеждении, что нужно улучшать отношения двух властей (церковной и политической) в едином христианском обществе и навязывали уникатную церковную социологическую модель, мир направлялся к *модерному* состоянию, чей предпосылкой были две *отдельные* социологические реальности – Церковь и государство. Внешняя христианская маска общества постепенно падала.

Аналогичный подход к современному миру присущ, конечно, и *Syllabus*-у. Осуждения, которые в нем следуют одно за другим разбиты на десять категорий, по модерным заблуждениям, которые их породили, таким как: пантеизм, натурализм, абсолютный как и умеренный рационализм, религиозная индиферентность и латитудинаризм, социализм, коммунизм, активность тайных и библейских объединений, позиции несоответствующие природной и христианской морали, накрушения в связи с церковным браком. Особые четыре группы осуждений кульминируют в разделах 5, 6, 9 и 10 и относятся к Церкви и ее правам (заблуждения 19–38), гражданского общества как такового и по отношению к Церкви (39–55), гражданской (политической) власти римского главы и либерализма (75–80). Не удивительно тогда, что первым заблуждением осужденным в указанных главах является именно то, в котором утверждается, что «Церковь не истинное и совершенно свободное *идеальное общество*, и не обладает собственными и постоянными правами, которые ей ее божественный Устроитель дал, а что ей гражданская власть определяет права и рамки в которых она ими будет пользоваться» (*Syllabus*, 19). Новому обществу, которое больше не видит Церковь как *societas genere et iure perfecta*, папа противопоставляет идею реставрации монолитного, средневекового *христианского* общества. Пункты законов отдельных абсолютических политических структур европейских государств, которыми местным епископам запрещалось объявлять папские декреты до получения разрешения от гражданских властей (что также было осуждено в главе 28) маргинализация прав Церкви и прежде всего римского епископа главу маленького итальянского государства, привели самого папу к заключению, что голое существование католического церковного содружества под

[19] Выход этих документов был запрещен два месяца, а французская газета *Le Siècle* обозначила энциклику и список отступничества как «величайший вызов, который папа уже в агонии послал модерному миру».

угрозой. Принимая во внимание, что при таких условиях предстоятели Церкви во многих государствах не могли обеспечить независимую и свободную работу церковных структур и их коммуникацию с Римом[20] папа берет дела в свои руки: универсальная Церковь может быть сохранена лишь действиями верховной власти, которую она имеет по Божией воле. Поэтому необходимо все заблуждения модерного общества понять и поместить в число тех, которые в *Силабусе* под номерами 55 и 80, а по которым: «Церковь должна быть отделена от Государства и Государство от Церкви» (Ecclesia a Statu, Statusque ab Ecclesia sejungendusest, *Syllabus* 55) и «Глава Римской Церкви может и должен примириться и применяться к прогрессу, либерализму и модерному обществу». В этих рамках находится и разбор проблем гражданской *власти* папы, материальных *владений* Церкви, финансовой *мощи* Папского государства и его дальнейшего существования в целях обеспечения и свободного действования Церкви и ее миссии в мире[21].

В описанной (ре)акции католических центров расшатанной мощи одного периода истории этой Церкви, который мы обрисовали, это паническое желание избежать отношения, диалог, необходимость обеспечить стабильность, эту тягу к мощи и неприкосновенности эклисиального существа в мире, мы назвали профундаменталической тенденцией[22]. Тот же вывод присущ и любой реакции любого церковного энтитета, который пропагирует или осуществляет такую анахронную социологическую и политическую слепоту. Поэтому Джани Ваттимо (G. Vattimo) утверждает, что «христиано-гражданский субъект, который создал мир тяги к мощи, в настоящее время в испуге, отступает перед последствиями собственной акции»[23] и добавляет, что «эти

[20] В *Syllabus*-е 37 именно осуждается позиция, что «возможны формирования национальных Церквей, которые не подчинялись бы авторитету Римского Главы», а в заблуждении 43 осуждается позиция, что «государственная власть имеет право односторонне разорвать Конкордат с Папским государством, не взирая на возможные возражения другой стороны». Особенно существенны пункты 49–52, которыми осуждаются претензии государственных властей влиять на назначение епископов и создания монашеских орденов без разрешения гражданской юрисдикции.

[21] Данная проблема, которая тлеет и заметна во многих осужденных заблуждениях (Syllabus 26–27) превратится в пожар, названный «Римский вопрос» который будет погашен на стенах Папского государства, ограниченного в 1870 году до размеров ватиканской крепости, частичку города Рима, в которой в 1878 году закончит свой земной путь папа Пий IX.

[22] В этой части нашего исследования мы опираемся на выводы из З. Матича, *Фундаменталистике тенденције у енциклици Quanta cura*, *Теме* 2 (2014) 855–876.

[23] Đ. Vatimo, *Vjerovati da vjeruješ*, Fedon, Beograd, 2009, 41.

импликации лишь наиболее броский знак всеобщего регрессивного характера трагического христианства»[24].

В какой степени парадигма регрессивного христианства может применяться на православие в настоящее время? Прямое применение понятия регрессии и/или агрессии в рамках православной Церкви считаем невозможным, хотя бы когда речь идет о СПЦ. То, что характерно почти для всех поместных православных Церквей, все же являются феномены, которые могут указывать на про-фундаменталистические тенденции, которые бы при эвентуального создания социо-политических предпосылок могли проявиться и без приставки «про-»[25]. Привожу несколько вызовов, как то: введение рыночного и с «порядочным историческим опозданием облигационного духа»[26], а с другой стороны боязливое проявление экуменистического духа, который получает направление в сторону антизападности, затем вытекающее из этого протежирование провинциалистических взглядов на окружающий мир, изоляционизм и фрагментарность, и так все до самой страшной болезни православия – националистического самодовольства. Хотя и нет ясных симптомов интегрализма как желания весомой политической мощи в обществе, не можем не отметить факт, что Церковь требует определенные привилегии, что бы иметь влияние в обществе (Закон Божий в школах, священнослужители в тюрьмах и в армии, участие в работе органов правления СМИ и т.под.). Можем сказать, что одна истина на лицо: все еще с ностальгией поминаются те счастливые времена средневековья, к чему легко добавляется и мечта о возвращении в ту эпоху, в века мощной Церкви. Из таких позиций вытекает поверхностное отношение к современному миру, отсутствие знаний о его корнях и невозможность соответствующего и равноправного диалога с ним. Конкретно это значит, что миссия Церкви срублена в корне, что богослов находится в роли клоуна из метафоры Кьеркегора о цирке и деревне[27].

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[24] Ibid, 77.

[25] Так современный греческий богослов, не имещий сан, Ставрос Ягазоглу, в 2014 году в г. Пожаревац вообще не постеснялся говорить именно о «фундаменталистических тенденциях» в православной эклисиологии. Срв. С. Ягазоглу, «Кризис соборности – бюрократичское понимание эклисиологии и проблема содружества и соборности Церкви в наше время» у З. Матича, *Церковь как икона Святой Троицы*, Богословский симпозий по поводу юбилея Епархии браничевской (Пожаревац, 18–19 октября 2014 г.), 61–84, 62.

[26] Срв. С. Ягазоглу, *Кризис соборности…* цит. 61

[27] Срв. З. Матић, *Сведочење православног богослова данас*, *Саборност – теолошки годишњак* 2 (2008) 291–294.

3. Современная духовность как шанс Церкви: разрушение монопарадигм и прогрессивная парадигма их соотношенипй

Об отношениях христианства и современной духовности эффектно говорит богослов Иоганн-Баптист Мец (J.B. Metz): «Сейчас довольно часто можно услышать, что наше время «постхристианское время». Это бы было время, в котором христианство можно видеть лишь со спины, что у некоторых вызывает печаль, и других – ироничность, а пожалуй большинство остается равнодушными. А я хотел говорить о времени – опять об том еще модерном, или постмодерном, но это пока оставим в покое и нерешенным – какому христианству смотреть в лицо, а не в спину, если еще хотим говорить о способности в будущем людей и человечества. А это время – именно сейчас, это наше время»[28].

Это возможно только если и Церковь готова посмотреть миру в глаза, войти с ним личностное *отношение*, которое как правило актуализируется через диалог[29]. Какие, эвентуально шаги к реализации близкой встречи?

Отказ от мечты об *универсуме* подразумевает и отказ от всех уни- или моно-парадигм, которым каждый церковный энтитет начинает кланяться, как только забудет свой идентитет евхаристического и эсхатологического происхождения и превращается в авторитарный корпус. Духовность современного мира может являться шансом освобождения православной Церкви от трех наиболее существенных монопарадигм, а это: монолог, монополия и монолитность[30]. Монолитность общества, к которому в настоящее время христианские обращения чаще всего направлены – чистая фикция (я не знаю человека, который бы хоть немного интересовался праздничными посланиями СПЦ, потому что, по всему судя автор и принимающий обращения – не знают друг друга. Но даже и этот факт не анализируется достаточно серьезно. Монополия на истину (а этим самым и на духовность[31]) отнята временем, которое перечеркнуло существование носителя истины и существование окончательной истины. Монолог же, который как общий феномен часто отождествляется с диктатом, единственный может вернуть православных епископов и богословов на паперти, в стены их зданий, в их школы, как это случилось папой Пием IX, по-

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[28] Цитата из R. Gibellini (ed.), *Prospettive teologiche per il XXI secolo*, Queriniana, Brescia, 2006, 26.

[29] О диалоге как стиле христианской жизни мы писали у З. Матича, *Да истинујемо у љубави. Званични богословски дијалог Православне и Римске Католичке Цркве*, Пожаревац, 2013.

[30] З. Крстић, *Традиционални верници као пастирски проблем и изазов*, *Саборност – теолошки годишњак* 5 (2011) 119–129, 125.

[31] A. Domazet, *Kršćanska duhovnost u području pluralizma*, *Crkva u svijetu* 38 (2003) 1, 41–73, 44.

следним «папой королем» (papa re) и великим затворником в Ватикане (prigioniero in Vaticano).

Сознание, что возвращения к монолитному обществу или религии больше не будет приводит к выводу, по которому религиозный плюрализм отождествляется с первейшим вызовом пересмотра онтологического статуса всех религиозных объединений. Вместо борьбы с новым миром, «нового режима» и вместо пустой ностальгии о прошлом (которое по определению ложно представляется как совершенство) необходимо исследовать, что плюрализм предлагает религиозным системам. Церковь, исповедующая веру в Бога, который появлялся в истории, наиболее ответственна перед историей мира и должна принять, взять на себя муки и раны современного человека. Христианство поэтому должно принять схватку с новой системой, а не замыкаться в самом себе, в свою псевдо религиозную самоуверенность или огражденное догматическое гетто.

Шансы и возможности огромны. Первым шагом было бы всеобъемлющее восстановление исконного богословского понятия истины. Мы упомянули, что в настоящее время невозможно говорить об истине как сформированной и конкретной реальности. Как бы это не казалось странным, православная Церковь именно почивает на учении о том, что *истина* событие, что она возникает в процессе сообщности, что у нее нет догматических ценностей, а все это из-за идентификации истины с самим Христом, значит с живой, свободной личностью. Церковь и мир могут участвовать в *формировании* истины через ее происхождение. Вместо того чтобы исходить с позиций обладания истины, Церковь бы могла быть носителем майевтического метода рождения истины в свободном диалогическом процессе вникания в чаяния конкретных людей 21 века. Диалогический вызов, значит, ставит перед христианством и миром задачу изменяться, что не чуждо христианству если принять Церковь как живое объединение. Так бы мы оказались на пути создания истины до ее окончательной само-аффирмации в собственной деноминации.

Настаивая на том, что мы в пути, in via, создаем вызов и помянутого этоса скитальца, который мы определили как одну из опор современной духовности. По отношению к этой провокации, к диалектике Улисса и Авраама, Церковь должна быть исключительно осторожной. Нам кажется, что не нужно предлагать свою духовность персонифицированную в образе Авраама как первого верующего или отца народов, праотца трех монотеистических религий и т.д, а гораздо скромнее и проще предложить Авраама как тип – путешественника. Некоторые из ученых, кстати, причину избегания больших Церквей в процессе поисков духовного исполнения современного человека видеть навязчивую позицию церковных деятелей, которые дают готовые решения, прописывают лекарства не проведя осмотра пациента. На

вопрос почему люди избегают большие Церкви при поисках духовного исполнения, ответил бы словами:

> «Потому что мы слишком часто предлагаем ответы, а у нас спрашивают про пути. Те, что с различных сторон пускаются в путь, носимые вдохновением Духа Святого не ожидают, что мы им предложим верные, хорошо защищенные гавани, потому что они как раз покинули гавань ложной обеспеченности. Они отправились в море навстречу опасностям, зная что плавание будет долгим. Они не просят нас описать гавань, а присоединиться к ним в пути, чей конец еще им неведом… То, чему они надеятся не является согласное подвергание опасности, а содружество в поисках и в доступности. Они бы гораздо раньше встретили трех волхвов, которым по пути в Иерусалим напутствовала звезда нежели иерусалимских книжников, которых знают. А им слишком часто западные Церкви показывают лицо иерусалимских книжников. Слишком охваченные истинами, которые надо преподавать, часто слишком мало внимания уделяем ожиданию тех, которые не спрашивают во что надо веровать, а что значит веровать.»[32]

В этом случае всплывает одно из свойств Церкви – то, что она синодальная, соборная или кафолическая. Церковь и по существу синодальная: syn (с, вместе) + odós (путь, продвижение), ведь синодальность и есть сопутствие, совместный путь и продвигаться совместно к цели, творить совместно, решать совместно, жить как содружество и есть сущность Церкви как *ad intra* так и *ad extra*. Сама природа Церкви, значит, синодальная, не как приказ, а как действие и узнавание, принятие общего духа Церкви. Единственно Церковь, которая любовью собирает (все охватывает – кафолическая) может исполнить свое призвание от Бога: быть со-говорником, со-путником каждому человеку, так как основатель Церкви был со-логосник, со-путник и со-страдалец *абсолютно каждому* человеческому существу. Принцип кафолицитета Церкви превышает каждую форму замкнутой системы. Принимая во внимание, что ни у христиан нет постоянного города, а ждут тот который появится, что тогда более естественно чем путешествовать вместе с теми, которые также как и христиане ищут подлежащее, основу, ипостась. Так как ипостась (основа, личность) Церкви сам Христос, может быть Церковь и мир могут оказаться в роли Луки и Клеопы, которые движутся к своей цели, Эмаусу, не узнавая того сопутника, который с ними.

Так можем говорить о Церкви, которая миру сострадает, о христианах, которые являются живыми свидетелями любви Божией к современному дезинтегрированному человеку и о духовности, которая служит современному человеку, духовности, которая должна создать очаг обновления. При таком очаге сострадательного преобразовательного

[32] M. Rondet, *Duhovnost izvan granica*, *Svesci* 92 (1988) 25–29, 28.

принятия[33] современного мира исчезнет мечта о мощной средневековой Церкви, а будет реально расцениваться возможность «слабой мысли» (Ваттимо) Церкви которая следует за немощным распятым Богом. Призывая религии отказаться от политической мощи один из крупнейших протестантских богословов Мирослав Вольф в одном из недавних интервью сказал:

> «Для того, чтобы это случилось необходимы две вещи: первое – необходимо чтобы религии приняли плюралистические демократические визии и, второе, чтобы демократии себя восприняли как тех, кто одинаково примиримо относится ко всем всеохватным объяснениям жизни не взирая на то религиозные они или нет. Мы должны избежать секулярное исключение религии из общественного ангажирования и навязывание одной из религий общественности.»[34]

В этом анализе мы предложили некоторые возможные действия православной духовности. В цивилизации, которая глобализирует пространство, делая его виртуальным и в которой дилатация желаний переходит в утрату надежд. Предложенные ответы являются позицией одного из православных богословов и движутся в сторону Церкви не как универсальному ответу, а как свидетелю о том, что существуют и иные люди и иные объединения, которые и сами ждут осмысления своих желаний и надежд. В ожидании того кто есть Истина в это время преображающаяся и прочищающаяся интегрируясь в свое существо, мир, в котором и сама обитает временно. «Христианское объединение это историческое и общественное пространство, в котором оно не имеет места (т.е «у-топия» чуждая миру, отсутствие места для царства небесного, царства Божьего) «находит свое место». Христианское объединение таким образом становится местом, топосом «небесного действия.»[35] Единственно в теле Христа, того кто уипостазировал мир, могут неслиянно, но и неразделимо соединиться вечное и временное, все различия христианства и плюралистического общества, пребывая вместе, а оставаясь двумя субъектами.

Заключение

Говоря о католической Церкви один из современных авторов утверждает постоянная опасность этой Церкви интегрализм как желание

> «реальной политической мощью в обществе. В интегрализме Церковь не желает отказаться ни от каких-либо привилегий, даже настаивает

[33] Срв. Предложение вынесенное И. Рагужем, *Poslanje Crkve u pluralizmu – preobražavajuće prihvatanje*, *Bogoslovska smotra* 73 (2003) 269–292.

[34] IntRes: http://www.tacno.net/interview/miroslav-volf-hrabro-i-ponizno-svjedocenje-istini/ (15.3.2017)

[35] M. Zulehner, *Comunità*, у P. Eicher (ed.), *Enciclopedia teologica*, Queriniana, Brescia, 1989, 128.

на дополнительных привилегиях, чтобы быть сильной в обществе. Мы могли бы сказать, что Церковь и некоторые из христиан все еще живут в иллюзорном сне о среднем веке. Такой интегрализм желает известное своеобразное возвращение в средние века, в которых Церковь была влиятельной и мощной.»[36]

Господь Иисус Христос же призывал Церковь силу Божию в немощи проявлять, «слабой мыслью» преобразовать мир и не бояться его, хотя (вернее именно поэтому что) является малым стадом. Церковь же свою истинную природу проявляет в положении экстатического отбрасывания маски самозамкнутости и самодовольства ради служения другим, которые не только не являются угрозой, а предпосылка идентификации. Этот взрыв инакости, расшатывающий существующие, окончательные, малоподвижные и анахронные предпосылки костного магистерия, в то же самое время и вызов, кризис, которые являются шансом для разрушения редукций и однодимензиональности, а также и востанорвление индентитета эклисиального объединения. Когда свою единственную мощь, мощь служения некоторые из церковных структур заменяют и превращают в мощь навязчивой доминации, эсхатологический идентитет Церкви попадает под прямую угрозу. Парафундаменталистические и прямые фундаменталистические реакции (логика защиты и ностальгии) указывают на то, что Церковь надеется на мощность временных исторических личностей и структур, а не на мощь победителя смерти.

Эсхатологическая направленность предоставляет возможность сделать подход ко всем вызовам времени (предмодернистичного, модернистичного и постмодернистического) методом их «преобразовательного принятия», методом Христова служения «жизни мира» и созданием оазисов совместности. Интегрализму и релятивизму, агрессивной или регрессивной платформе отношений Церкви и современного мира мы предлагаем прогрессивную или христологическую платформу (по образцу веры Халкидонского собора в 451 году) по которой Церковь и мир в перихорезисе, взаимообщении. В диалектике созданного и несозданного, Церковь свободно любит мир, который ей дан, предварительно оттряхнув с себя те исторические балласты, которые ей навязаны или которые она сама некритически приняла: геттоизацию, политиканство, тягу к мощи, силе…

Перед духовными вызовами современного мира, православная Церковь может предложить лишь аутентичную евангельскую духовность страданий за мир, жертвования за жизнь мира. «Православная духовность не может существовать иначе чем как жизнь Церкви в истории и для истории… Задача православных христиан в преобразовании истории, активность в истории и для истории, сораспятие с историей…

[36] I. Raguž, *Poslanje Crkve u pluralizmu – preobražavajuće prihvatanje*, *цит*, 281.

Все христианство – в истории и для истории, не упрощенно или просто Откровение в истории, а призыв к созданию истории, призыв к исторической акции и действованию.»[37] Такой подход является ответом на вызов утраты надежды. Пусть наш заключительное призвание будет от канадского философа и теоретика общества Чарльса Тейлора:

> «Существует большой элемент надежды. Эту надежду я вижу заложенной в иудеехристианском теизме (каким бы не был ужасным вклад его поборников в истории) и в его центральном обещании божественного подтверждения человека, которое всеохватнее того, которое люди когда-либо могут достичь сами, без божьей помощи.»[38]

Zlatko Matić

The orthodox Church before spiritual challenges of the modern world

Abstract: The topic of this research is a philosophical and theological analysis of the phenomenon of modern spirituality, and an attempt to present a constructive answer of the orthodox Church (orthodox theology) to the challenge of such a concept. The author underlines the attitude that the pluralistic spirituality is individualistic, anti-traditional, eclectic and consumeristic. About that, the author attempts to present modern spirituality as a positive provocation to the Church, which is obligatory by strength of suffered (but not Almighty) Christ, to change chronos of this spiritual challenge to kairos (convenient time). The answer would lead to the way of transformation and incorporation of the mentioned predispositions of modern spirituality on a progressive way, and not like before on a regressive or aggressive way.

Key words: Church, globalism, pluralism, acceptance.

[37] М. Кардамакис, *Православная духовность*, Хиландар, 1996, 42.

[38] Č. Tejlor, *Izvori sopstva. Stvaranje modernog identiteta*, Akademska knjiga, Novi Sad, 2008, 778.

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ПРОПРАВОСЛАВНЫЕ И КОНТРПРАВОСЛАВНЫЕ СОЦИАЛЬНЫЕ НАСТРОЕНИЯ В РОССИИ НА ВОЛНЕ РЕВИТАЛИЗАЦИИ РЕЛИГИИ

Аннотация: Статья представляет собой попытку системного описания феноменов проправославных и контрправославных социальных настроений в религиозной ситуации в России. Данные явления характеризуют религиозную ситуацию на уровне общественного сознания. К основным проявлениям проправославных настроений в сознании общества правомерно отнести такие взаимосвязанные устойчивые тенденции, как: доверие в обществе к церкви в лице РПЦ МП; преобладание позитивного имиджа православия и церкви; преобладание позитивных социальных ожиданий от религии и церкви и их взаимодействия с обществом. Также в статье приведено общее описание проявлений контрправославных социальных настроений.

Ключевые слова: Россия, проправославный консенсус, контрапроавосланые настроения, ревитализация религии, религиозная ситуация

Введение. Религия и религиозность это сложные, переменные, противоречивые, но постоянно присутствующие духовные и общественные феномены. Социологию в первую очередь интересуют общественные аспекты религии и религиозности и не только то, как эволюция религиозного сознания человека воздействует на общество, в котором он живет, но и то, как общество влияет на религию, церковь и религиозность людей. Современная Россия (как и Сербия) страна с высокими темпами ревитализации религии (Blagojević, 2015:107–151). Социологические данные, полученные в Сербии, показали устойчивую тенденцию возрождения православия, как на уровне религиозного сознания, так и на уровне культового поведения и религиозных объединений. Конечно, такое возрожденное традиционное православие обладает не только общецерковным значением, важным для верующих и церковной организации, но и общественным, что важнее

с точки зрения социологического подхода к изучению религиозно-церковного комплекса. Выход православия из подполья общественной и духовной жизни социалистического общества на публичную сцену постсоциалистического трансформируемого общества связан, прежде всего, с его ролями в социуме, которые до периода последних двух десятилетий были немыслимы, как в социалистической Югославии, так и в бывшем Советском Союзе. Ситуационный фактор начала 90-х гг. обусловил выход на поверхность общественной жизни некоторых функций религии и Церкви: в Сербии начала 90-х гг. актуализируются, прежде всего, защитно-интегративная, гомогенизирующая, этно-мобилизирующая функции религии, а также компенсаторная и этическая функции.

Это порождает и актуализирует целый комплекс проблем в отношениях между модернизированной светской социокультурной средой и религиозными объединениями и культурными контекстами, притязающими на значимые социальные позиции, но не имеющими в своей истории соответствующего опыта взаимодействия. И секулярные, и религиозные институции и субъекты вынуждены взаимно адаптироваться, ежемоментно находя баланс между сохранением своих принципиальных основ и объективным требованием гибкости стратегий и тактик. Ревитализация религии понимается нами как повышение (возвращение) религиозными институциями своей витальности – жизненной силы. Это количественный рост и качественное усложнение религиозной составляющей социума, которые обозначились после длительного периода ее институционального упадка.

Некоторые исследователи, вслед за П.Л. Бергером, говорят о „десекуляризации“ современного мира (Благоевич, 2011). Многие социологи и специалисты по религиоведению в период общественных событий с середины 70-х видят религию, которая, готовя свое возвращение, ставит под серьезное сомнение тезис секуляризма или же сужает его в культурно-географическом смысле, ограничивая Европой или даже только Северной, точнее Западной Европой, как ранее предложил это „правоверный“ сторонник парадигмы секуляризма Питер Бергер, а затем и Дэвид Мартин. Но „десекуляризация современного мира“ нам представляется не вполне точным определением. Десекуляризация логически предполагает не только ослабление или разрушение светских институциональных моделей, но замену их моделями, образованными на конфессиональной почве и под эгидой влиятельных религиозных объединений. В России и Сербии, во всяком случае, об этом речь пока не идёт. Максимум, чего в наших странах добиваются наиболее влиятельные религии и конфессии – некоторого расширения поля своего влияния в рамках существующей системы отношений и дискурсов. Дело, однако, не заходит всерьёз об изменении самой этой системы, в ситуации отсутствия как „работающих“ альтернатив секулярным

устоям, так и властных возможностей религиозных субъектов провести такие альтернативы в жизнь.

Как следствие этого, религиозная ситуация в наших странах явно и неявно определяется светскими общими правилами – нормами права, традиций и стереотипов – в рамках которых, пока лишь в небольшой степени на них влияя, сегодня действуют религиозные объединения. К описанию и анализу этой ситуации применим концепт „асимметрия репрезентации“ и относящийся, главным образом, к культурно-смысловому измерению отношений религии и общества. Образно она может быть представлена как острова и островки религии в море светскости. Тем не менее, природа этих островков такова, что светская среда „большого общества“ не может с ними не считаться и не реагировать на их специфику. Аксиоматичным фактом представляется то, что: 1) религиозные институции и субъекты с необходимостью рефлексивно „подстраиваются“ к светской среде; и 2) светская среда также вынуждена учитывать их активное присутствие и, в свою очередь, вырабатывать паттерны рефлексивной адаптации к нему. В этой связи социологически корректным представляется определение конкретных проявлений такой взаимной адаптации и изучение структуры и динамики этих проявлений в различных ситуациях социальных взаимодействий.

Проправославные и контрправославные социальные настроения представляется методологически корректным рассматривать как специфические феномены религиозной ситуации. В российской социолого-религиоведческой литературе основное содержание последней определяется как состояние религиозности общества или его части, которое „рассматривается в двух аспектах или на двух уровнях: массового сознания и институциональном. В первом случае это характеристики религиозности населения, во втором – деятельности религиозных организаций“ [Лопаткин, 1996, с. 198].

Из двух базовых компонент соответствующих явлений нам представляется определяющей та, которая характеризует общественное сознание. Именно преобладающие состояния и процессы этого последнего, рефлексивно учитываемые государством, сообщает религии и церкви тот символический капитал, который и придаёт им в глазах последнего основную ценность [Зайченко, 2003, с. 7–8] и „кристаллизуются“ в институциональных формах взаимодействия. С уточнением: социальные настроения в данном случае характеризуют не самую религиозность православно-христианского характера, но отношение социальных субъектов к её опредмеченным проявлениям, наиболее актуальным (релевантным) в их восприятии. К таким проявлениям относятся артефакты (храмы, иконы), субъекты – носители „православности“ (епископат священники, монахи, рядовые верующие, их группы и объединения), социальные действия этих субъектов, и т.д.

В проекции общественного сознания социальные настроения являют собой комплексный, интегральный феномен „коллективных представлений“, характерный для эпохи современности. Ж.Т. Тощенко и С.В. Харченко выделяют следующие его сущностные признаки: это принципиально новое качество общественного сознания, определенно и наглядно отражающее предшествующий опыт; управляющее жизнью человека в данный момент времени и при этом более долговременное, чем просто общественное мнение; являющееся непосредственным предшественником и даже компонентом поведения, показывающим с высокой степенью вероятности его направленность [Тощенко, Харченко, 1996, с. 12–13]. Соответственно, социальные настроения типологизируются:

- по масштабу (шкала „индивидуальное – массовое“);
- по субъекту (настроение различных групп и слоев общества);
- по социальным практикам (политическое, трудовое, религиозное, этническое);
- по степени удовлетворения социальных ориентаций (шкала „позитивное – негативное“);
- по глубине (шкала „глубинное, или долгосрочное – ситуативное, или краткосрочное“) [Тощенко, Харченко, 1996, с. 22–24].

Исходя из приведённого определения и общей классификации, мы рассмотрим ниже оппозицию проправославных и контрправославных социальных настроений в России.

Впервые о проправославных социальных настроениях в масштабах „проправославного консенсуса“ в России заговорили в начале 2000-х гг. известный российский социолог и философ Д.Е. Фурман и его соавтор финский учёный К. Каариайнен. Они обратили внимание на характерное для массового постсоветского российского сознания „всеобщее убеждение в том, что православие – высшая ценность, что оно неотделимо от русского самосознания и русской культуры, что РПЦ надо доверять и надо оберегать ее, ограничивая деятельность других религий…“ [Каариайнен К., Фурман Д.Е., 2007, с. 79]. Это умонастроение они назвали „проправославным консенсусом“: например, на рубеже XX–XXI вв. до 96% жителей России, согласно данным опросов, „хорошо“ и „очень хорошо“ относились к православию. Данный вывод основывался на многолетней базе всероссийских исследований религиозной ситуации и находит косвенное подтверждение в исследованиях ряда других учёных.

При этом авторами обосновывалось и подчёркивалось отсутствие непосредственной связи между отмечаемым умонастроением и собственно религиозными убеждениями и верованиями граждан: репрезентация в общественном сознании индикаторов „консенсуса“ значительно превышала распространённость в нем основных индикаторов

собственно религиозного сознания и поведения. Так, исследования свидетельствовали, что проправославные проявления общественного сознания распространяются на значительную часть неверующих и даже часть атеистов. Из числа российских атеистов, согласно данным исследований упомянутых авторов за 2007 год, 9% „очень хорошо“ и 61% „хорошо“ относятся к православию, 21% – доверяют РПЦ, 36% согласны с необходимостью ее привилегий, 47% считают, что каждый русский – православный в душе. Специалисты Института социологии РАН в 2009 г. также отмечали, что не доверяют церкви только 45% российских атеистов, 13% признают церковный авторитет и склонны ей доверять, 42% затрудняются с оценкой, „что говорит о неоднозначности их отношения к церкви“ [Мчедлова, с. 147]. Приведённые данные, на наш взгляд, достаточны для того, чтобы отнести проправославные умонастроения не к собственно религиозным, а светским феноменам общественного сознания, являющим собой массовую рефлексию над ревитализирующейся религией.

Что касается феномена „контрправославных социальных настроений“ в постсоветском российском обществе, то он изучен гораздо слабее как в количественном, так и в качественном плане. Сам термин „контрправославный“, образованный по принципу противопоставления своему проправославному аналогу-антиподу, практически не встречается в научной литературе. Тем не менее, целый ряд свидетельств (см. ниже) заставляет с большой вероятностью говорить о контрправославных настроениях как о социальном факте.

Указанное обстоятельство, а также то, что феномен массовых проправославных социальных настроений, по-видимому, сохранил свою актуальность и к середине второго десятилетия XXI века, даже несмотря на череду громких медийных скандалов вокруг основного представителя российского православия – РПЦ МП [Мчедлова, 2012, с. 18; Синелина, 2012, с. 68], делает оба указанных явления заслуживающим специального анализа. Подход к такому анализу с социологической точки зрения представлен далее.

И проправославные, и контрправославные социальные настроения представляют собой новое (и довольно контрастное на фоне предыдущего периода) качество российского общественного сознания. Это качество актуально и непосредственно определяет поведение части общества в отношении религиозной ситуации и государственно- и общественно-конфессиональных отношений. При этом оно вполне определённо и наглядно отражает предшествующий, уходящий глубоко в историю социальный опыт.

Если под проправославными настроениями следует понимать массовое позитивное отношение к проявлениям православной религии, культуры и Церкви (в том числе со стороны неверующих [Российская повседневность…, 2009, с. 147]), то контрправославные настроения – это

массовое негативное отношение к проявлениям православной религии, культуры и Церкви (в том числе со стороны верующих). Данные умонастроения выражаются не только и не столько в согласии либо несогласии с вероучением и демонстрации соответствующего поведения, но и в доверии/недоверии религиозным организациям и деятелям, одобрении/неодобрении их инициатив, признании/непризнании социальной ценности веры и Церкви как института и организации. Оба эти понятия, на первый взгляд, являются парадоксальными. Если положительное отношение православного верующего к своей религии и отрицательное отношение к ней атеиста обычно принимается за аксиому, то обратная ситуация вызывает недоумение: зачем неверующему хорошо относиться к своим мировоззренческим конкурентам, а верующему – плохо к своим единоверцам? Ответ на этот вопрос заключается в том, что социальная реальность сложна и динамична, в ней возможны ситуации, когда какие-то мотивы заставляют человека мыслить и действовать не так, как следует ожидать на основании его социальной принадлежности. Такое кажущееся противоречие возможно, даже когда „верующий" – это определяющий социальный статус респондента, потому что остальные элементы его мотивационной структуры, вытекающие из других социальных статусов (например, гражданина, профессионала, человека определённого культурного уровня или представителя конкретных политических взглядов) могут совместно действовать против религии.

Предметом настоящей статьи выступают векторы социальных настроений в точках соприкосновения религиозного и светского общественных „кластеров", которые служат индикаторами типа социальных настроений. Относительно их проправославного типа накоплено достаточно сведений. В данной связи можно выделить следующие основные показатели влияния проправославного тренда таких умонастроений на массовое сознание российского общества, которые характеризуют взаимосвязанные, но отличные друг от друга компоненты указанного социального настроения:

1) доверие в обществе к церкви (в лице РПЦ МП);
2) преобладание позитивного имиджа православия и церкви;
3) преобладание позитивных социальных ожиданий от религии и церкви, их взаимодействия с обществом.

В постсоветском российском обществе Русская православная церковь Московского Патриархата олицетворяет собой социальный институт, вызывающий особенное **доверие граждан**. Уровень этого показателя в среднем составляет 60–70% (хотя в последние годы зафиксировано его снижение). По данным ФОМ на начало 2014 г., доверие к РПЦ испытывали 63% респондентов, при этом скептически по отношению к Церкви настроены лишь 15% россиян [Фонд „Общественное мнение" выяснил, как жители России относятся к РПЦ, 2014]. Такой уровень

доверия существенно превышает аналогичные показатели отношения людей к большинству основных институтов, за исключением нескольких сопоставимых, как-то: Президент, армия, Российская Академия Наук. При этом характерно, что целый ряд скандалов в СМИ вокруг РПЦ МП в 2012–2014 гг. повлиял на данное отношение слабее, чем можно было ожидать [Лебедев, 2012, с. 171–172].

Глубокое объяснение этому факту дал в своё время Б.В. Дубин. Согласно его точке зрения, „массовое ’доверие’ в нынешнем российском обществе перенесено на институты и фигуры, которые олицетворяют авторитарно-иерархическое господство… Таковы силовые структуры РФ, такова нынешняя Русская православная церковь“. В этой связи „в точном смысле слова здесь следует говорить не о реальном доверии, характерном для развитых и сложных современных обществ, а о традиционалистском и воображаемом уповании на желаемый результат“ [Дубин, 2007, с. 401]. Иными словами, это не непосредственное доверие, возникающее как следствие многократно повторённого целерационального обмена благами, удовлетворившего обе стороны, но особое, абстрактное по отношению к реальному социальному пространству-времени, ценностнорациональное доверие с большой долей традиционализма. Церковь выступает здесь, прежде всего, как символ „всего святого“, возвышающийся над суетой повседневной эмпирики, и этот символ является значимой ценностью сам по себе, вследствие чего он дистанцируется в сознании от этой суеты. По всей видимости, это и создаёт значительный „ресурс абстрагированности“, который позволяет людям сохранять высокий уровень доверия к церкви, невзирая на и даже вопреки удручающим фактам, происходящим порой в церковной ограде.

Позитивный имидж православия и Православной церкви связан с резким возрастанием в постсоветской России уровня социального престижа религиозной принадлежности и, напротив, снижением престижа неверия и атеизма. В этой связи с 1990-х гг., согласно выводам С.В. Туманова, религиозность „выступила составным и необходимым элементом … общего имиджа“ людей, при том, что она не стала для большинства из них внутренней потребностью [Туманов, 2000, с. 110]. Ближе к рубежу тысячелетий оформился чёткий вектор ориентации данного умонастроения на традиционные российские религии, в первую очередь – православное христианство, представленное РПЦ МП.

Нам представляется, что в своей основе этот ментальный поворот к указанной конфессии выражает общий для позднего Модерна мировоззренческий сдвиг от светскости атеистической и контррелигиозной к светскости, толерантной к религии, вплоть до активного практического интереса к ней [Лебедев, 2010, с. 89–90]. Но при этом непосредственным определяющим вектором умонастроений выступает восприятие „православия“ как этнонационального символа, что

некоторые серьёзные исследователи склонны трактовать в контексте категорий архаизации / традиционализма – „обращённости к прошлому социокультурному опыту на фоне социальных катаклизмов“ [Ламажаа, 2011, с. 97]. Православное христианство и церковь видятся людьми как, прежде всего, привлекательный смыслообраз общенациональной, с сильным русско-этническим акцентом, идентичности. В значительной степени здесь сохраняет актуальность формулировка, отчеканенная в своё время народным поэтом В.С. Высоцким: „Они – богатство нашего народа, хотя и пережиток старины“. Однако здесь, на наш взгляд, существенно то, что религия выступает в данном контексте не как значимая сама по себе (терминальная ценность), но рефлексивно опосредована светскими ценностями престижа и ресурса. При этом значимым фактором массового распространения и укрепления данной установки выступает то, что православные праздники и обряды „как для молодёжи, так и для старших поколений россиян, представляют собой сегодня по большей части массмедийное зрелище, своеобразное шоу, демонстрируемое одновременно по двум наиболее популярным и доступным для всех каналам центрального телевидения“ [Дубин, 2007, с. 183].

Наконец, важный аспект проправославного тренда социальных настроений составляют **массовые позитивные ожидания от религии и Православной церкви**, которые закономерно возникли и сохраняются на фоне затянувшегося кризиса социальных отношений. Среди способствующих этому факторов М.П. Мчедлов отмечал „общественную нестабильность, затяжной моральный и социальный кризис, отсутствие понятых и принятых народом светских концепций выхода из него, историческую память народа о патриотической деятельности церкви в самые трудные переломные периоды, выступление конфессий в защиту прав и достоинства людей обездоленных…, против распространившихся отрицательных явлений – бездуховности, цинизма, коррупции, наркомании и т. п.“ [Мчедлов, 2002, с. 16]. Б.В. Дубин, анализируя социальную эволюцию постсоветского российского общества, особенно подчёркивал тенденции массовизации и атомизации социального вещества без его социального „уплотнения“, под которым он понимал институционализацию и дифференциацию различных ценностей, идей, программ, форм действия [Дубин, 2007, с. 403]. Конфессиональные институции в данных условиях до известной степени выполняют функцию „заместителей“ дефицитных институтов гражданского общества.

Указанные ожидания, или экспектации, позиционируют ту функциональную (в плане явных и социально позитивных функций) нишу, которая отводится религии в массовых представлениях жителей России, конструирующих её повседневность. Прежде всего, это компенсаторная функция: „религия утешает в беде и помогает пережить

её“. Вторая функция – сохранение / поддержание / улучшение общественной нравственности („религия удерживает от дурных поступков и помогает стать высоконравственным человеком“), т.е. социализация в её сущностном ядре. Мировые религии сформировались и приобрели своё влияние именно как нравственно-этические учения, освящённые высшим (сверхъестественным) авторитетом, и социальная память продолжает ассоциировать их с этой сферой par excellence. Третья – функция помощи в решении жизненных проблем (в частности, „охране от несчастий и болезней“), что также можно рассматривать как подвид компенсаторной функции. Она представляется генетически более древней, архаичной, нежели религиозная этика, основанной на ассоциации религиозного и магического действа, предполагающего заручиться помощью высших сил. Не в последнюю очередь востребована и мировоззренческая функция религии, состоящая в объяснении жизненных ситуаций, „ответах на самые трудные вопросы миропонимания“. Кроме того, довольно значимы культурно-транслирующая („сохранение национальных традиций и культуры“) и регулятивная („обеспечение духовно-нравственного возрождения общества“) функции [Мчедлов, 2005, с. 233–234].

В свою очередь, контрправославный тип социальных настроений на сей день существенно хуже исследован в количественном отношении, поэтому мы опираемся на качественный подход. Кейс-стади показывает, что основные поводы для конфликта между сторонниками разных мировоззрений и, соответственно, „точки сборки“ и формирования в противовес проправославным контрправославных социальных настроений в российском обществе сегодня таковы (географически эти события / явления могут локализоваться на любом участке российской территории, но в СМИ на данный момент упоминаются преимущественно Москва, Санкт-Петербург, Новосибирск, Валаам, Соловки, Севастополь):

– передача религиозным организациям государственного и муниципального имущества религиозного назначения, особенно имеющего культурно-историческую ценность (впрочем, даже обычное бывшее церковное здание, занятое светским учреждением, становится „яблоком раздора“, потому что его передача влечёт хлопотный и не всегда возможный переезд);

– строительство культовых зданий в парках, культовых сооружений в публичных местах (например, замена скульптуры студента в МИФИ Поклонным крестом);

– вмешательство православных активистов, явно или неявно поддерживаемых церковным руководством и находящих понимание в широких массах верующих, в творческую деятельность светских граждан, что выражается в отмене или разгроме выставок, спектаклей, концертов;

– перестройка режима функционирования светских организаций и учреждений под религиозные требования (не дополнение, а замена обычного меню постным; ограничение доступа в учреждение граждан, чей внешний вид не соответствует религиозным требованиям; выделение специального времени для совершения культовых действий);

– назначение религиозных деятелей на руководящие должности в светских учреждениях („Валаам, Ипатьевский монастырь в Костроме, Покровский монастырь в Суздале, Тобольский кремль… Перечень ценнейших архитектурных памятников России, откуда „церковники изгнали музейщиков“, можно продолжать до бесконечности. В 2009 году Министерство культуры нащупало оригинальный способ разрешения конфликтов между церковью и учреждениями культуры: оно назначило директором Соловецкого историко-архитектурного музея-заповедника наместника Соловецкого монастыря РПЦ МП архимандрита Порфирия (Шутова). Вскоре о. Порфирий подписал сам с собою акты о передаче 159 объектов из собственности музея монастырю“ [Солдатов А. „Пока полного удовлетворения нет…“, 2011].

К сказанному следует добавить ставшее уже традиционным и знаковым „яблоком раздора“ внедрение в светскую школу конфессионально ориентированных учебных дисциплин [Ожиганова А.А. Битва за школу. Модернизаторы и клерикалы, 2016].

Следует отметить существенное различие в характере указанных социальных настроений. Преобладающая направленность проправославного тренда может быть охарактеризована как пассивно-одобрительная: люди в массе демонстративно-символически проявляют признаки позитивного отношения к религии и в особенности к „православию“, при этом дистанцируясь от того и другого в своих повседневных практиках. В этом отношении проправославные социальные настроения могут быть охарактеризованы как „абстрактные“. Что же касается контрправославных социальных настроений, то они носят характер активно-протестный и конкретный: недовольство людей вызывают реальные случаи нарушений общепринятых норм (правовых или моральных), совершённые под эгидой религии, позиционирующей себя как хранительница этих норм. В этой связи его можно рассматривать не только как антагонист, но и как непосредственную реакцию светского общества на крайности проявлений проправославного консенсуса. При этом, в силу известной асимметрии описанных умонастроений, конкретные проявления про- и контрправославного трендов социальных настроений вполне могут разделяться одними и теми же людьми и группами (например, поддерживая правозащитные инициативы РПЦ или СПЦ, человек может выступать против конкретного проекта строительства храма на неподходящей, по его мнению, территории, или, одобряя и ценя церковное искусство – протестовать

против передачи церкви каких-либо его шедевров по причине риска для их сохранности).

В целом формирующиеся в последние годы в российском и сербском обществах в качестве массового феномена контрправославные социальные настроения следует рассматривать как закономерную реакцию светского в своих основаниях общества на религиозную экспансию, в значительной, если не определяющей, степени выраженную в форме или осуществляемую на базе сильных проправославных настроений. В этой связи указанные логически противоположные умонастроения представляют собой диалектическую „связку“, обеспечивающую баланс социальной саморефлексии между светским культурным базисом „большого общества“ и „вызовом“ современной ревитализации религии. Конкретные социально-психологические механизмы, функциональные особенности и социальная динамика такого баланса представляет собой обширное и почти неисследованное поле, составляющее важную часть современной российской религиозной ситуации.

Из приведённого общего анализа следует предварительный вывод, что для религиозной ситуации российского (и сербского обществ) начала XXI века характерны два типа влиятельных социальных настроений: проправославный и контрправославный. Формирование и закрепление проправославных умонастроений задано комплексом обстоятельств, обусловленных не столько самой по себе ревитализацией религии, сколько трансформациями самого светского „большого общества“. Среди условий, благоприятствующих распространению и сохранению этих настроений, следует выделить: возросшую потребность общества и человека в религии вследствие системного социального кризиса („катастрофического постмодерна“); символический капитал православного христианства, понимаемого как национальное (этническое) достояние, и особого рода доверие людей к церковным институциям, тесно связанное с внутренним дистанцированием от них как от сферы „экстраординарного, далёкого, тайного“. Совпадение этих трёх разнородных трендов образует „точки опоры“ массовых проправославных социальных настроений. В свою очередь, реакцией общественного сознания на эти умонастроения и их социальные последствия в их крайних проявлениях, нарушающих важнейшие ценностно-нормативные установления светского общества, выступает формирующийся тренд контрправославных социальных настроений, контуры которого довольно явно обозначились в последние годы. Эти умонастроения, носящие преимущественно конкретно ориентированный активно-протестный характер, изучены гораздо слабее и требуют к себе более пристального внимания со стороны социологов и специалистов в смежных областях научного, прежде всего религиоведческого, знания. На данный момент остаётся неисследованным не только абсолютный и сравнительный масштаб соответствующих

явлений общественного сознания, но и их динамика, а также степень „пересечения“ и характер взаимосвязи между ними. Эти моменты, на наш взгляд, должны стать предметом сравнительных исследований в России и Сербии в ближайшие годы.

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Pro-orthodox and counter-orthodox social moods in Russia on the wave of revitalization of religion

Abstract: The article is an attempt to describe in system the unique phenomenon of the religious situation in post-Soviet Russia, called “consensus about the Orthodox” and “consensus against the Orthodox”. This phenomenons exists both at the institutional level and at the level of social consciousness. Its main manifestations for consensus about the Orthodox in the consciousness of society rightfully attributed three interrelated stable trends: trust in the community to the church in the face of the Russian Orthodox Church; the prevalence of a positive image of Christianity and the church; predominance of positive social expectations from religion and the church, and their interaction with society. Preliminary displays description of the consensus against the Orthodox is done.

Key words: post-Soviet Russia; consensus about the Orthodox; consensus against the Orthodox; religious situation; social mood.

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ОТНОШЕНИЕ РОССИЙСКОЙ МОЛОДЕЖИ К РЕЛИГИОЗНОМУ ЭКСТРЕМИЗМУ

Аннотация: В статье рассматриваются актуальные вопросы, связанные с ситуациями экстремизма на религиозной почве. Подчеркнута роль молодежи в принятии идей религиозного экстремизма. Для иллюстрации отношения молодежи к религиозным различиям демонстрируются результаты социологических исследований, проведенных в 2016 году. Исследование показывает, что современная молодежь делится на два лагеря: важность религиозного вопроса для одних, соседствует с религиозной свободой других. Невысокий уровень религиозного самосознания делает не устойчивыми системы ценностей и смыслов, формирующих мировоззрение и определяющих модели поведения современной молодежи. Актуальный для молодежи вопрос о смене религии может стать весомым фактором, определяющим дальнейший выбор их духовной стратегии. Так как каждый девятый молодой человек задумывается о смене религии, возрастает угроза вовлечения молодежи в экстремистские организации. Эмпирические результаты приводят автора к открытию новой формы толерантности, которая наблюдается у современной молодежи – «толерантность к религиозному экстремизму».

Ключевые слова: молодежь, религиозный экстремизм, религия, молодежь и религия, молодежь и экстремизм.

«Мир сходит с ума» – так, наверное, мог бы сказать незаинтересованный наблюдатель, прочитав новостные блоки наших печатных и электронных СМИ. Войны, конфликты, столкновения, споры, раздоры, санкции – такова агрессивная риторика нашего времени. По большому счету, в основании каждого такого явления лежит, прежде всего конфликтная модель поведения – противоборство, соперничество. Сегодня в ряду коммуникативных моделей достойное место занял и экстремизм. Экстремизм – не как явление, а как коммуникативная модель поведения индивида. Как вариант реакции на существующие различия, как поведенческий выбор. Экстремизм – поведенческая модель вседозволенности, приносящая своим приверженцам материальные и моральные выгоды – право на агрессию и террор, убийство, разрушение. Знаменами экстремизма становятся оправдательные поводы

веры, нации, языка – поводы, архетипичность которых объясняет фанатичность агрессии и вандализма.

Религиозный экстремизм является, наверное, самым древним его видом. Вера, религия – как некий центр человеческой жизни, позволяющий находить ее смысл, вводить высшие принципы, несмотря на научно-технический прогресс, возвращающий нас к нашим корням, связывающий с предками, с историей – это действительно ценно, и посягательство на смысловой фундамент достойно негодования и ответных мер. Ответных мер, которые порождают ответную волну экстремизма, запуская весь механизм моральных выгод, формирующих архетипическую модель отстаивания своего смысла, которую мы передадим нашим внукам и правнукам, также как передаем ее нашим детям.

Наши дети – молодежь цивилизации, которая сделала виток и вернулась в эпоху крестовых походов, религиозных войн, фанатиков и неверных. Как они воспринимают ситуацию, так ли для них важны религиозные смыслы?

Обратившись к российским исследованиям последних лет, мы встречаем противоречивую информацию по этому вопросу. Так, например, в исследовании, проведенном М.Б. Калашниковой [1], доказывается, что у современной молодежи «существует двойственное отношение к религии – повышенный интерес к внешним признакам религиозности сочетается с низкой внутренней религиозной направленностью» и убежденностью. Не опровергает эту точку зрения, но подчеркивает глубинность проникновения традиций в сознание современной молодежи, А.А. Глуханюк [2], говоря о том, что «в качестве одной из наиболее важных характеристик религиозной жизни российской молодежи,…, можно выделить отсутствие критического отношения к традиционным формам религиозной жизни и, прежде всего, к православию. Православная традиция воспринимается без критицизма, как духовное наследие, укорененное в собственной истории и помогающее найти в ней место молодому поколению».

Одновременно с этим, мы находим подтверждение у российских исследователей неустойчивости религиозной парадигмы в сознании молодежи, склонность ее к аффективным выборам, рост сектантства и нетрадиционных верований [3, 4, 5]. Еще более различий в религиозных установках, мировоззрении, духовных стратегиях и практиках можно увидеть в исследованиях религиозной ситуации молодежи разных стран [6, 7, 8, 9].

Все вышесказанное можно объединить в общее концептуальное восприятие молодежи, методологическую установку, предложенную Н.В. Топилиной, и побуждающую нас рассматривать молодого человека «не как пассивный объект воздействия со стороны различных религиозных организаций, а как активный субъект религиозных исканий» [10]. Именно такая концепция, несмотря на свою изначальную

гуманность, дает методологическое основание для исследования молодежного экстремизма. Однако, для установления наиболее точных методологических координат, стоит учесть позицию М.Г. Курбанова о том, что «современное массовое сознание открывает перед молодежью разнообразие идей и представлений, фрагменты которых в разных пропорциях и разными путями проникают в ее личные убеждения. Целый ряд таких фрагментов, особенно связанных с религией, беспорядочно оседает в памяти молодежи, некритически принимается к действию и бессознательно реализуется в поведении. В результате возникают опасные идеологемы императивного, деструктивного характера, стимулирующие экстремизм» [11].

Обратимся к исследованиям молодежного экстремизма на территории Российской федерации. Согласно последним данным социологических исследований участник экстремистского движения – это, чаще всего, молодой человек в возрасте 15–22 лет, либо старшеклассник, либо уже окончивший школу, но не поступивший в среднее специальное или высшее образовательное учреждение. Молодой экстремист является, по преимуществу, коренным жителем нашей страны, но не обязательно, русским [12]. Авторами последних исследований отмечено «качественное и количественное изменение состава современных экстремистских организаций: все чаще их членами становятся представители молодежи из социально и экономически благополучных семей» [13].

Освещение вопросов религиозного экстремизма и отношения к нему современной молодежи стало предметом исследований и Центра социологических исследований Белгородского государственного национального исследовательского университета. В рамках мониторинга оценки вовлеченности молодежи в экстремистские практики были проведены многократные исследования религиозной идентичности российской молодежи, ее религиозного самосознания и роли воспитания религиозной культуры [14, 15], на протяжении 2015–2016 года были проведены замеры по показателям, характеризующим религиозный экстремизм (N=3065) [16].

Участвующая в исследовании молодежь, в основном, относит себя к верующей части населения (в той или иной степени верят 71,6%, колеблются между верой и неверием – 15,0%), при этом продолжительность своей веры 75,8% определяют более 10 лет (19,2% – до 5 лет, 5,0% – от 5 до 10 лет). Однако, сила веры не определяется для молодых людей соблюдением церковных практик: так, чаще, чем раз в месяц, посещает храм только 14,2% опрошенных, большая же часть молодежи бывают там не регулярно, могут не заглядывать туда в течении года (37,5%) (таблица 1). К слову сказать, 11,7% не посещают храм вообще, но они в основном относятся к неверующей части респондентов.

Таблица 1: Распределение ответов респондентов на вопрос: «Как часто Вы посещаете храм?»

Вариант ответа	Относительное количество, %
Никогда	11,7
Очень редко, нерегулярно, не каждый год	37,5
Раз в год обязательно	13,3
Несколько раз в год (но не каждый месяц)	23,3
Раз в месяц и чаще	14,2
Всего:	**100**

Конечно, только посещение храмов не может являться показателем религиозности. Так, регулярно молятся 45,8% опрошенных, при этом чаще делают это дома 55,8% из них, дома и в храме – 32,8%. Только в храме молитвы творят 11,5% молодых людей. Из всех опрошенных молодых людей молятся по установленному образцу только 13,1%, а вот практически половина респондентов (49,2%) предпочитают «свои молитвы».

Нельзя сказать, что для молодежи свойственно усиление религиозности: только 13,3% отмечают, что с возрастом стали более верующими людьми, большинство же либо не видят особых изменений в себе (57,5%), либо отмечают охлаждение к вере (29,2%).

Какую же роль играет семья в религиозной жизни российской молодежи? Скорее да. Так, у 80,0% опрошенных члены семьи в той или иной степени верующие люди; однозначно в стан неверующих записали своих родственников только 3,3% (таблица 2).

Таблица 2: Распределение ответов респондентов на вопрос: «Считает ли Ваша семья себя верующей?»

Вариант ответа	Абсолютное количество, чел.	Относительное количество, %
Да	198	49,2
Скорее да, чем нет	123	30,8
Колеблется между верой и неверием	30	7,5
Скорее нет, чем да	13	3,3
Нет	13	3,3
В семье существуют разные мнения по этому вопросу	23	5,8
Всего:	400	100

Положительно к религиозности и вероисповеданию своих детей относится 55,8% родителей, 26,7% – нейтрально, а 2,5% высказывают негативную оценку (здесь мы говорим об общей оценке религиозной ситуации – связанной к с верой, так и с неверием молодых людей).

Интересно, что при ответе на вопрос, «считаете ли Вы, что существует жизнь после физической смерти?» среди молодых людей «да» ответили 67,5%, а вот характеризуя по этому вопросу свою семью – положительный ответ выбрали только 47,0% молодежи. Этот небезынтересный факт показывает нам как юношеский оптимизм, так и религиозную разочарованность родителей.

В целом, рассматривая выборку нашего исследования, мы видим ситуацию религиозной приверженности без атрибутивной обязательности. Вера, как сама идея присутствует у большинства молодых людей в умах и душе, но при этом, по большому счету, она лишена явно выраженной конфессиональности. С одной стороны – это демонстрирует некоторое равнодушие в вопросах отстаивания своей веры, иногда религиозную безграмотность, с другой стороны, по большому счету, является основой конфессиональной терпимости. Вера для большинства молодежи действительно носит скорее исторически сложившийся характер, не формируя нормативной ауры, если только она не совпадает с культурой личности и ее моральным обликом. Так, по данным наших опросов, основным регулятором поведения молодежи являются совесть (67,1%), закон (56,4%), личные интересы и представление о допустимом поведении (49,2%). Несколько менее значимы нормы тех групп, куда включена наша молодежь. На последнем месте, к сожалению, стоит религия, как регулятор поведения ее определяют всего 10,2% опрошенных.

Эта же ситуация, однако, позволяет нашей молодежи оставаться в большинстве своем конфессионально толерантными – так, невозможность заключения брачного союза с представителем другой веры выбрали для себя менее 30%. Остальная же часть опрошенных определила для себя возможность такого брачного союза, высказывая либо безразличие к этому вопросу (23,6%), либо некоторые условия (например, требование к определенной религии супруга (18,6%), или требование своей конфессиональной неприкосновенности (16,2%)) (таблица 3).

Таблица 3: Как российская молодежь относится к браку с представителем другой религии

Вариант ответа	**Относительное количество, %**
Безразлично	23,6
Положительно	5,1
Положительно, если в семье будут сохранены обычаи моей религии (конфессии)	16,2
Это зависит от того, с человеком какого вероисповедания заключается брак.	18,3
Отрицательно	29,7
Затрудняюсь ответить	7,1

В ходе проведенного исследования был отмечен критический взгляд молодежи на религиозную обстановку не только в мире, но и в России. Так, в 2016 году только 29,9% опрошенных говорят о том, что религиозная ситуация в нашей стране их полностью удовлетворяет. Отрицательную оценку обстановки дают 16,1%. Обращаясь к данным исследования прошлого года, отметим, что имеет место положительная динамика: так, количество молодых людей высказывающих отрицательную оценку религиозной обстановки в России стало на 10% меньше (рис. 1). Стоит надеяться, что критичность в оценке ситуации обеспечивает рефлексию собственного поведения у молодых людей.



Рис. 1. Ответы респондентов на вопрос «Удовлетворены ли Вы религиозной ситуацией в России?»

Положительный сдвиг по отношению к 2016 году наметился в ответе на вопрос о религиозном превосходстве – уменьшилось количество студентов, допускающих такое превосходство (с 8,7% до 5,5%). Лояльность позиции, допускающих некоторую амбивалентность измерения, относительность, отмечают 44,4% респондентов. Однозначный ответ религиозного равенства дают нам 43,0%, что на 6,3% больше, чем в 2016 году.



Рис. 2. Ответы респондентов на вопрос «Считаете ли Вы, что одна религия может быть лучше другой?»

Большинство молодых людей вполне культурно реагируют при встрече с человеком другого вероисповедания, даже если это различие

бросается в глаза. Большинство замечают различия, но реагируют спокойно (47,3%), многие вообще не обращают внимание на какую-то разницу (29,8%), 7,5% проявляют дружелюбное любопытство. И только группа в количестве 7,8% относятся к инаковости прохожих с опасением, а 0,9% свой негатив не пытаются скрывать. Менее 1% настроенных агрессивно молодых людей – не так уж велико их количество, и, скажем прямо, новостной фон, по нашем предварительным прогнозам, мог вызвать рост этой группы в разы, находись мы в стране, где религиозные конфликты являются информационным пиком.

Рис. 3. Ответы респондентов на вопрос «В случаях, когда Вы сталкиваетесь с людьми, отличающимися от Вас своей религиозной принадлежностью, какова Ваша обычная реакция?»

Дальнейшая маркировка ксенофобных религиозных тенденций показала, что при переходе к межличностным коммуникациям негативные спектр реакций существенно уменьшаются, что еще раз доказывает необходимость создания инклюзивной, открытой среды, смешанных групп, ситуаций взаимодействия в молодежной среде. Так, однозначное влияние религии на межличностное общение отмечают всего 1,6% опрошенных и 2,3% продолжают придерживаться адресности в ксенофобном выборе. 51,0% отрицают такое влияние, 25,9% смещают вектор на значимость личностных качеств и 12,8% на ситуацию общения. При этом наличие в близком окружении опрошенных представителей других религиозных вероисповеданий отмечают 73,3% респондентов. Знание о своих друзьях имеющих другую религию отмечают большинство респондентов. Более всего молодые люди осведомлены об образе жизни своих друзей (74,5%), менее всего об истории становления их религии (39,8%). Знание культуры отмечают 68,8%, семейных традиций 57,1%, ценностей 62,2% и религиозных обрядов 42,1%. Таким

образом, можно говорить о роли межличностного канала коммуникаций для предотвращения религиозных конфликтов.

Следует отметить, что российская молодежь формирует два, практически равнозначных по количеству лагеря: те, для кого религия значима, в той или иной степени (42,9%), и тех, для кого она не имеет особого значения (37,4%). Такая ситуация сохраняется на протяжении многих лет – для сравнения, в 2015 году два лагеря имели совершенно одинаковое количество человек (44,48% на 44,13%).



Рис. 4. Ответы респондентов на вопрос «Могли бы Вы принять другое вероисповедание?»

Одним из показателей социальной безопасности, косвенным индикатором вовлеченности в религиозный экстремизм, моральной устойчивости общества, является количество людей, меняющих или желающих сменить свое вероисповедание. Большинство респондентов не согласились бы сделать это ни при каких обстоятельствах (61,0%) – большинство, но не абсолютное. Помимо 8,2% способных на такой шаг и 3,4% думающих о принятии такого решения, настораживает группа молодых людей, затруднившихся ответить на этот вопрос (27,4%). Да и на первый взгляд небольшое количество – 3,4% – даже в натуральных цифрах нашего исследования уже складывается в 105 человек (рис. 3).

В совокупности с данными предыдущего вопроса, возможно мы говорим сейчас об отказе от устойчивой религиозной идентичности, формировании конфессиональной свободы и мобильности. Но, возможно, в российских вузах получила развитие негативная тенденция «религиозной вербовки», пополнения экстремистских отрядов.

Ответить на этот вопрос помогут причины возможной смены религии, указанные молодыми респондентами (рис. 5).



Рис. 5. Ответы респондентов на вопрос «Если Вы считаете возможным смену религии, то в силу каких причин?»

Так, в тройку основных причин определены большая информативность другой религии (17,4%), соответствие принципам справедливости (16,1%), разочарование в своей религии (11,0%). Нельзя сбрасывать со счетов и оставшиеся позиции – перспективность и массовость другой религии (7,9%) и коммуникационный аспект с референтной группой (5,4%). И, конечно, все тот же, «таинственный выбор» – затрудняюсь ответить (42,3%). Что стоит за ним? Все что угодно, в том числе и те причины, по которым к этому вопросу проявляют повышенное внимание службы безопасности.

Следует отметить смену ранга у причин религиозной мобильности молодежи – так в 2015 году на первом месте была справедливость, которую дает другая религия (25,0%), на втором информативность (20,0%) и на третьем – разочарование в религии (17,5%). А вот такие причины, как перспективность, массовость и выбор друзей – вообще не упоминались.

Современный университет представляет собой анклав единения и поликультурной коммуникации. Мулькультурность и мультиконфессиональность считается высоким показателем конкурентоспособности университета. Интерес представляет восприятие самими студентами такой ситуации в российских вузах. Однозначно позитивно реагируют на мультинациональность и поликонфессиональность университета 62,0% студентов. Амбивалентную позицию высказывают 26,3%. Положительным моментом можно считать достижение университетов в области снижения негативных национальных реакций: так в 2017 году такую реакцию дают всего 1,0%, в то время как в 2016 году эту группу составляли 3,1%, а, например, в 2013 – целых 8,58%! Позитивные тенденции наблюдаются и по остальным позициям национальной и религиозной толерантности студентов.

Причину негативного отношения к мультикультурности студенты видят в невозможности соблюдения единых требований (13,7%), в

национальных и религиозных конфликтах (7,6%), в нарушении принципа справедливости (6,4%), в создании препятствия нормального общения (4,6%). Положительные моменты в наличие большого количеств национальностей и религиозных представителей среди студентов университета респонденты находят в выработке навыков коммуникаций и межкультурного диалога (47,8%), повышении собственного уровня осведомленности о различных национальностях и их культурах (22,0%), распространению элементов российской культуры за пределы страны (5,5%).

Более сдержанную позицию молодежи мы видим при анализе ответов на присутствие представителей других национальностей и религий в различных социальных институтах. Рассматривая вопрос смешения национальностей и религий в аппарате власти, молодые люди преимущественно высказывают нейтральное отношение (60,8%). Одинаковое количество респондентов говорит, как об отрицательном, так и положительном отношении (по 13%). В аналогичной ситуации с коммерческими структурами отмеченная выше тенденция несколько меняется: по прежнему большинству опрошенных безразлично наличие представителей других конфессий и национальностей в коммерческих структурах (67,2%), но отрицательное отношение почти в два раза меньше, чем положительное – 8,7%. Таким образом, молодые респонденты скорее допускают передать часть бизнеса в руки представителей других культур, но им это менее приятно в отношении власти.

Существует достаточно устойчивая группа, в районе 85%, отмечающая толерантное отношение к различным национальным вопросам, связанным с смешением национальностей и религий – например, вступление в брак. При этом, ¼ опрошенных приветствуют такие браки. Невозможность заключения брачного союза с представителем другой веры выбрали для себя менее 30%. Остальная же часть опрошенных определила для себя возможность такого брачного союза, высказывая либо безразличие к этому вопросу (23,6%), либо некоторые условия (например, требование к определенной религии супруга (18,6%), или требование своей конфессиональной неприкосновенности (16,2%)).

Но по мере изучения вопросов, связанных с обособление религиозной и национальной культуры, мы все больше и больше сталкиваемся с негативной реакцией респондентов – так, возрастающую негативную реакцию мы наблюдаем на предложение создавать в городе национальные и религиозные кварталы (19,3%), национальные и религиозные школы (13,2%), национальные и религиозные места отдыха (12,0%) и национальные и религиозные социально-политические движения (16,1%). Эти данные позволяют выдвинуть два, противоречащих друг другу предположения, для уточнения которых необходимо проведение качественных методов исследования (фокус-групп). С одной стороны, можно говорить о социологическом голосовании молодежи за

интеграцию представителей иных национальностей и религий в социально-политическое пространство коренных жителей, с другой, у регистрируется настороженное отношение к различным формам самоорганизации и пространственной локализации, обусловливающей повышенную «концентрацию» лиц некоренной религиозности и национальности.

В целом же следует говорить о превалировании нейтральных оценок по большинству параметров отношений к лицам иной веры, что маркирует относительно благоприятную социальную обстановку.

Отвечая на вопрос о ситуациях неприязни к респондентам на основе национальности, 2,8% отмечают такие ситуации как постоянные по отношению к себе, а 9,2% часто фиксируют их по отношению к другим. 18,1% и 45,4% соответственно отмечают их как периодические и в первом случае 68,1%, а во втором – 32,0% говорят об их отсутствии.



Рис. 6. Ответы респондентов на вопрос «Сталкивались ли Вы в последнее время с национальной и религиозной неприязнью по отношению к себе? К другим?»

С позицией наблюдателя в отношении ситуаций религиозного и национального экстремизма сталкивалось достаточно большое количество молодежи, так конкретные адреса ситуаций смогли указать 70,1% опрошенных, при этом большинство из них локализованы в интернет-пространстве (24,0%), в общественных местах (16,1%). Но, 6,4% респондентов в качестве места таких ситуаций указывают университет.



Рис. 7. Ответы респондентов на вопрос «В каких местах Вы сталкивались с проявлением национальной и религиозной неприязни?»

Выражение негативных реакций экстремистского характера студенты отмечали в преимущественно в виде грубости и оскорблений (23,7%) и неуважительного отношений (36,1%).



Рис. 8. Ответы респондентов на вопрос «В каких формах Вы сталкивались с проявлением национальной и религиозной неприязни?»

Анализируя ситуацию религиозного экстремизма в собственном регионе, 42,5% молодежи отметила редкость проявления неприязненного отношения к людям другого вероисповедания, однако 16,2% часто бывают свидетелями таких случаев. При этом, без корреляционного отношения, но практически такое же количество респондентов (15,8%) не осуждают агрессию в сторону лиц другой конфессии, а 31,3% затруднились с ответом на этот вопрос. На этом фоне 53,0% высказывающих осуждения экстремистским настроениям общества уже не кажутся таким уж подавляющим большинством – скорее мы говорим о том, что религиозный конфликт находит, возможно молчаливое, понимание практически у половины опрошенной молодежи.

Подведем небольшой итог нашего исследования.

Российская молодежь считает себя верующей – мода на атеизм безвозвратно прошла. Верование большинства молодых людей, однако, не означает их религиозности: молодежь не демонстрирует ни религиозной «теории», ни практики. Такое «верование» чрезвычайно «удобно» и гибко – с одной стороны оно дает право говорить о внутренней идеологии личности, с другой – манипулировать регуляторами поведения в зависимости от ситуации.

Сегодня происходит разделение потоков молодого поколения – формируется два лагеря, на данный момент не враждующих, но сосуществующих с приверженностью разной цивилизационной парадигме: важность религиозного вопроса для одних, соседствует с религиозной свободой других. Невысокий уровень религиозного самосознания делает не устойчивыми системы ценностей и смыслов, формирующих мировоззрение и определяющих модели поведения современной молодежи, что приводит к возникновению социальных рисков разного рода [17]. И здесь мы вряд ли столкнемся с религиозным экстремизмом в полном его проявлении – недостаточно агрессивных выборов для такого вывода, но невнимание, равнодушие, обыденность будут сопровождать важные вопросы религиозного выбора и отношения молодежи к религиозной агрессии и войнам.

Судя по всему, мы говорим сегодня о возникновении новой формы толерантности – свойства, скорее в его физиологическом смысле, означающем «невосприимчивость». На этом фоне мы могли бы прогнозировать возникновение такого парадоксального феномена как «толерантность к религиозному экстремизму».

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Inna Shapovalova

The relation of the russian youth to religious extremism

Abstract: The article deals with the actual issue related to extremist situations for religious reasons. The role of youth in accepting the ideas of religious extremism is underlined. To illustrate the attitude of young people towards religious differences, the results of sociological research conducted in 2016 are demonstrated. The study shows that modern youth is divided into two camps: the importance of a religious issue for some, is adjacent to the religious freedom of others. The low level of religious self-awareness makes the systems of values and meanings that shape the worldview and determine the models of behavior of modern youth are not sustainable. Actual for young people the question of the change of religion can become a weighty factor determining the further choice of their spiritual strategy. Since every ninth young man thinks about changing religions, the threat of youth involvement in extremist organizations is growing. Empirical results lead the author to the discovery of a new form of tolerance, which is observed in modern youth – “tolerance to religious extremism”.

Key words: youth, religious extremism, religion, youth and religion, youth and extremism.

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ТЕХНОКРАТИЧЕСКАЯ РЕЛИГИЯ: ЧТО ЗА ВЫБОРОМ?

Аннотация: В статье рассматривается вопрос взаимодействия человека и техники, которое, по мнению автора, порождает технократическую религию, нарушая гармонию между материальными и духовными силами. Раскрывается опережающее развитие техники, которое приводит к технотезации общества, в котором техника занимает господствующее положение над человеческим сообществом, диктует ему свою волю и законы. Но к каким последствиям приводит такая слепая вера в технократические божества? Понимают ли простые потребители продуктов научно-технической революции их последствия использования? Автор обращается к результатам различных исследований.

Ключевые слова: технократическая религия, потерянная вера, научно-технический прогресс, техногенная цивилизация, человек, техника.

Введение.

Сегодня проблема взаимодействия человека и техники актуализировалась. Почему? Возрастает интерес к теоретическому анализу места и роли человека в техногенном мире, мире, который обусловлен глобальной технологизацией общественной жизни, активным внедрением информационных технологий.

XX в. – провозглашение идеи покорения природы. Идея Бога вытеснена на периферию общественного сознания как отражение зависимости человека от природы. Это время потери веры и приобретения страха. В этот период идея Бога была чужда эпохе развития науки и техники. Научное мышление определяет рождение новой веры, веры в технику, так называемую технократическую религию. Появляется технократическое мировоззрение, в котором человеку будет отводиться второстепенная функция.

Технократическая религия включает в себя несколько этапов развития:

1. Пользование машиной. Это вера и любовь в каждой конкретной машины, установки, технологии.

2. Политехнизм. Это вера в универсальность и безошибочность технократической системы (радио, телевидение, экономическая система, Интернет и т. д.).

3. Монотехнизм. Это создание единой глобальной информационной сети, единого технократического божеству, которое способно ответить на все вопросы и решить все проблемы.

Кстати говоря, социология, точнее индустриальная социология, стоит перед необходимостью исследований ситуации по проблеме взаимодействия человека и техники, последствий и возможностей такого взаимодействия. При этом важно начинать исследования такого рода с «лабораторной фазы». Анализ литературы, проведенный В.В. Фрике, последнего десятилетия позволяет увидеть следующие ее недостатки [1]:

1. Социологические исследования техники до сих пор ограничиваются в основном изучением исследования ее влияния.

2. Изучение «формирования труда и техники» сведено к анализу производственных (очень редко – надпроизводственных) взаимосвязей труда и техники. Действительные же исследования, которые предполагают анализ генезиса техники, за редким исключением не осуществляются.

3. Исследования техники начинаются, как правило, лишь post festum – «после того, как факты имели место». С этим связан характерный временной лаг – не меньше 5, а часто и 10 лет, «с которым опубликование результатов индустриально-социологических исследований отстает от фактического развития техники.

4. Промышленно-социологические исследования техники характеризуются одномерным, а поэтому «безальтернативным» понятием «социальной действительности». Оно сужается, ибо из виду упускаются все альтернативы: и те, которые, может быть, существовали в прошлом, и те, которые возможны в будущем, которые могут обозначиться уже в процессе разработки современной техники.

5. В исследованиях индустриальной социологии до сих пор не были сделаны ни методологические, ни концептуальные, ни стратегические выводы из того факта, что социальная действительность (а, следовательно, и техника) построена отнюдь не на основе линейного причинно-следственного закона, а на основе соглашений, которые заключили между собой силы, действующие в обществе (часто после предшествовавших конфликтов). Другими словами: решения о развитии техники всегда принимаются по принципам коммуникационной деятельности; речь здесь идет о политических решениях, а не о решениях, принятых на основе логики предметной области, как это часто пытаются представить.

6. Большинство указанных слабых мест связаны с тем, что в социологический анализ до сих пор не включен субъект социальных процессов. Это не раз отмечалось, что можно подтвердить и достаточно свежей цитатой: «При возрастании роли субъекта труда мы можем наблюдать в последние два десятилетия, скорее, противоположно направленную тенденцию к обезличиванию индустриально-социологических исследований. Здесь проявляется существенная слабость индустриальной социологии, которая в основном оперирует бессубъектной теорией общества». Однако далее фиксации этого недостатка дело почти не движется.

Исследуя феномен технократической религии, обратимся к социальной безопасности. Социальная безопасность представляет собой интегральное понятие, отражающее многогранность функционирования общества и его взаимодействия с природной и техногенной средой [2]. Отметим, что социальная безопасность и риск носят взаимопроникающий характер и должны рассматриваться в комплексе. В большинстве стран в настоящее время принята концепция «приемлемого риска» (ALARA – as low as risk acceptable), позволяющая использовать принцип «предвидеть и предупредить». Это является признанием того, что полностью исключить риск невозможно и придает определенный… характер вопросам обеспечения надежности и безопасности… [3, С. 67].

Социологический подход позволяет трактовать социальную безопасность в широком и узком смысле. Так, в широком смысле социальную безопасность можно рассматривать как национальную безопасность, поскольку с ее помощью обеспечивается целостность и устойчивость функционирования и развития социума в целом. Это обусловливается взаимосвязанностью сфер общественной жизни, жизнедеятельности человека, общества и государства, социальных процессов и явлений, взаимовлиянием внешних и внутренних угроз, независимо от среды их возникновения. Кроме того, безопасность выступает интегративной характеристикой.

В узком смысле социальная безопасность связана с обеспечением защиты от угроз жизненно важных интересов человека и общества (прежде всего в социальной сфере). Угрозы могут носить либо внешний, либо внутренний характер и возникать со стороны как социальной, так и природной или техногенной среды.

Проявление риска в различных сферах жизнедеятельности человека и функционирования организаций повлекло за собой многочисленные его трактовки. Значительная часть определений риска связана с двумя утверждениями: риск связан со случайными событиями или процессами; последствия этих событий или процессов являются нежелательными [4, С. 12]. Риск трактуется как вероятностная мера возникновения опасностей определенного класса, или размер возможного

ущерба (потерь, вреда) от нежелательного события, или комбинация этих величин.

В условиях развития техногенных факторов трансформации среды обитания человека максимальное обеспечение его социальной безопасности возможно, как нам видится, только при минимизации (или снижении) риска через упреждающее управленческое реагирование, способное исключить причины техногенных катастроф, с учетом освоения новых методов диагностики и прогнозирования техногенных опасностей, их моделирования (построение диагностических моделей).

В настоящее время при обеспечении социальной безопасности можно выделить несколько направлений:

- современная диагностика состояния объектов на всех стадиях жизненного цикла;
- определение рисков возникновения техногенных, природно-техногенных и антропогенных аварий и катастроф;
- мониторинг состояния объектов и рисков их эксплуатации.

Диагностика техногенных рисков позволяет оценить уровень реальной опасности и прогнозировать возможные последствия, как систематического техногенного воздействия, так и аварийных ситуаций. И хотя термин «риск» имеет множество научных трактовок, применение этого понятия позволяет переводить опасность в разряд измеряемых категорий.

Однако вернемся к предмету нашего анализа настоящей статьи.

Характер современной техногенной цивилизации диктуют человеку способ мышления, который называется технократическое мышление. Техника рассматривается как надсоциальный, надчеловеческий феномен со своей внутренней логикой и своими законами развития. В современном мире духовные базисы, которым учит религия, меняют позицию и иногда уходят на второй план.

Если смотреть со стороны – развитие техники выглядит прогрессивным явлением, однако научный и технический прогресс нарушает гармонию между материальными и духовными силами, частичной потери связи с Богом.

Нет сомнений в том, что это ведет неумолимо к дисбалансу между культурой и цивилизацией.

Опережающее развитие техники приводит к технотезации общества, техника занимает господствующее положение над человеческим сообществом, диктует ему свою волю и законы.

Особенно это ярко иллюстрируется компьютерной зависимостью людей всех возрастов, это всевозможные игры для детей и взрослых, развитие порнографического интереса, многочисленные социальные сети, затягивающие в виртуальный мир насилия, агрессии.

За развлечения подобного рода, получаемые от компьютера и интернета, население расплачивается болезнями, все больше появляются больные с нарушенной психикой, опорно-двигательной системы и пр.

Этот мир неуправляем и агрессивен, замещает собой мир человеческих ценностей, формируя новый тип личности – тип потребителя.

Но способен ли научно-технический прогресс сохранить человека? Обогатить душу человека?

«Научно-техническая революция изменила многое. Человек стал больше знать, больше думать, но стал ли он от этого добрее, честнее, человечнее?» – вопрошает советский писатель Даниил Гранин.

А принесли ли человеку блестящие технические открытия счастья? На этот вопрос Владимир Соловьев в своей знаменитой повести «Три разговора о войне, прогрессе и конце всемирной истории» писал: «Наша культура и наше внешнее усовершенствование жизни не принесло человечеству счастья. Несмотря на видимый блеск научных завоеваний, людей ныне, как и в конце античного века, мучит душевная тоска, тоска к любви, ужас пустоты небытия». Его ответ категоричен – прогресса нет и быть не может, поскольку коренные качественные изменения в индивидуальном сознании не возможны. Более того, необратим регресс в сознании и поведении людей.

Все больше культурологов и социологов приходят к общему выводу, что техногенная цивилизация разрушает культуру, разрушает духовно-ценностное содержание культурно-исторической традиции. И большая часть актуальных проблем, которые рассматривались вчера на конференции и сегодня, не является ли последствиями техногизации современного общества? Возможно, да.

Некоторые ученые (особенно философы, психологи, социологи) воспринимают успехи научного и технического прогресса как реальную угрозу деформации природы человека. В развитии техники увидели нарушение целостности человека, формирование односторонности, частичности, одномерности, линейности его мышления. В технократическом обществе технократизм разрушает традиционные представления о моральном, эстетическом, религиозном. Утверждается в социуме отчуждение между людьми, человеком и обществом, человеком и природой. Разрушаются связующие звенья всех человеческих взаимоотношений, а также социальных институтов, продуктов труда и творчества.

Более того, все больше людей понимают, что техника не всесильна, она подчинена воле политической власти, выполняющей интересы экономической и политической элиты. Именно по этой причине происходит отчуждение технической и научной организации, которая часто выполняет не гуманистическую роль в обществе. В современном

социуме постепенно нарастает непримиримость к использованию техники и науки не в интересах человечества, а во вред ему.

Но к каким последствиям привела такая слепая вера в технократические божества? Обратимся к результатам различных исследований. Но понимают ли простые потребители продуктов НПР их последствия использования?

Методы и результаты исследований.

Как же россияне (а также другие жители различных стран) относятся к достижениям и последствиям научно-технического прогресса в XXI веке? [5]. Во-первых, мы проанализировали данные всероссийских опросов, проведенных различными социологическими центрами за последние 7 лет. Во-вторых, мы получили результаты социологического исследования, проведенного в рамках проекта «Прогнозирование и управление социальными рисками развития техногенных человекомерных систем в динамике процессов трансформации среды обитания человека». Исследование было проведено учеными Белгородского государственного национального исследовательского университета (г. Белгород, РФ) в мае 2015 года посредством всероссийского экспертного опроса (N=120). Было выбрано 10 регионов Российской Федерации с максимальной и минимальной степенью рискогенности, а также по типу города (с ведущей экологической подсистемой, с ведущей социокультурной подсистемой, с ведущей техногенной подсистемой). Мы также изучили мнения различных ученых зарубежных стран по этой проблематике.

Влияние науки и новых технологий россиянами в 2007 году оценивалось скорее как положительное, 55% опрошенных считали новые технологии способными позитивно влиять на продолжительность и качество жизни людей. И меньше трети (27%) относятся к технологическим новшествам негативно, опасаясь негативных последствий от их появления и применения (рис. 1).



Рис. 1. Мнение россиян относительно влияния науки и новых технологий на качество и продолжительность жизни людей, (2007 г.)

Отметим, что больше положительных оценок дают мужчины, люди более молодого возраста и люди с более высоким образованием. Данная тенденция кажется справедливой, поскольку технологические новинки более привычны и воспринимаемы молодым поколением через активную вовлеченность в информационную среду и потребление гаджетов/устройств, а более высокий уровень образования не допускает появления «бытовых» страхов и опасений из-за недопонимания сущности появляющихся научных и технологических разработок. Эрудированность и образование индивида позволяет не бояться прогресса, поскольку таким людям претит застой и регресс, поэтому познание наук, освоение принципов развития мира ведет к снижению опасений и страхов перед появлением прорывов в науке и технике.

Данные ВЦИОМа коррелируют с недавним опросом Pew Research Center и Smithsonianmagazine (2014 г.), по результатам которого можно сделать вывод, что большинство американцев (59%) ожидают, что технологические разработки предстоящих 50 лет будут иметь в целом положительное влияние на общество и сделают жизнь лучше. В это же время только 30% думают, что эти технологические и научные изменения приведут к будущему, в котором люди будут находиться в худшей ситуации, чем они сегодня.



Рис. 2. Мнение россиян о степени влияния научных открытий, технических достижений на изменение мира в XX веке в лучшую сторону (2007 г.)

Россияне считают, что наибольшее влияние среди научных открытий и изобретений прошлого столетия на изменение жизни оказали интернет и компьютерные технологии, освоение космоса, достижения в медицине. Такие достижения, как атомная энергия, трансплантация органов, антибиотики, отодвинуты на менее значительные позиции (рис. 2). 37% затруднились назвать достижение, которое в большей степени изменило мир в 20 столетии в лучшую сторону, что может свидетельствовать об определенной доле негативистов, отвергающих позитивное влияние прогресса на человечество.

Напротив, как оказавшую негативное влияние на мир прошлого столетия респонденты оценили атомную энергию (23%). Строительство военной техники, изобретение бактериологического и химического оружия стоят на втором и третьем месте соответственно, но с гораздо меньшими показателями (6% и 5%). Больше половины россиян (57%) не смогли назвать научного или технологического достижения, которое привело бы к негативным изменениям.

Ожидания россиян от будущего научного прогресса заключаются, прежде всего, в открытии альтернативных видов топлива, на это рассчитывают 34% опрошенных (рис. 3). Почти столько же ожидают прорыва в области искусственно выращиваемых органов, еще 21% – верят в изобретение лекарства от всех болезней. Изобретение искусственного интеллекта уступает ожиданиям в области медицины и предсказывается только 16% россиян. Скептическое отношение демонстрируют 9% опрошенных, которые не верят в реализацию ни одного из предложенных достижений.

Рис. 3. Мнения россиян об изобретениях в 21 веке (2009 г.)

Немногие россияне (меньше 10%) верят, что в ближайшем столетии будут изобретены эликсир вечной молодости, телепортация, машина времени, секрет бессмертия, вечный двигатель, что говорит об ограниченной вере в возможности науки на данный момент.

Опрос PewResearchCenter демонстрирует высокие ожидания американцев от научного прогресса в будущем [6]. Восемь из десяти американцев (81%) ожидают, что в ближайшие 50 лет люди, нуждающиеся в новых органах, смогут получить их на заказ, выращенными в лаборатории, и еще половина опрошенных (51%) ожидают, что компьютеры будут в состоянии создавать произведения искусства (картины, музыку, скульптуры и пр.), которые не отличались бы от творения людей. С другой стороны, в американском обществе есть видение и пределов научных достижений. Только менее половины американцев (39%) ожидают, что ученые разработают технологию телепортации объектов, и только каждый третий ожидает, что люди будут колонизировать другие планеты.

Однако из-за различия в вопросах (у ВЦИОМа вопрос с единственным выбором, у PewResearchCenter – с множественным) мы не можем сопоставить результаты двух исследований, хотя вполне очевидны некоторые схожие тенденции в ожиданиях.

Интересными являются данные, полученные на американской выборке, которые, однако, не подвергались оценке в том или ином виде в российских опросах. В американском обществе широко распространены опасения по поводу некоторых спорных технологических разработок, которые могут стать реальными уже в ближайшей перспективе:

- 66% американцев считают неправильным, если будущие родители смогут изменять ДНК своих детей для получения более разумного, здорового или более спортивного потомства;
- 65% опрошенных негативно относятся к возможности того, что в будущем роботы будут играть главную роль в уходе за престарелыми и людьми со слабым здоровьем;
- 63% считают, что возможное разрешение на полеты через воздушное пространство США для личных и коммерческих дронов окажет негативное влияние на жизнь в будущем.
- 53% американцев считают негативной ситуацию, если в будущем большинство людей будут носить имплантанты или другие устройства, которые постоянно показывают им информацию о мире вокруг них. Особенно характерны опасения от такого будущего среди женщин.

Как видно из приведенных данных, людей пугает вмешательство новых технологий в естественные эволюционные и генетические процессы, замещение человеческих взаимоотношений на отношения порядка «техника-человек», распространение военных приспособлений

в мирной жизни. Возможно, эти опасения связаны с риском потери контроля над процессами/явлениями/устройствами, невозможностью управлять потенциальными последствиями изменений.

Отношение к ГМО в продуктах питания у россиян преимущественно отрицательное (рис. 4). Опрошенные считают, что продукты с ГМО не улучшают иммунитет, не помогают в борьбе с ожирением, приводят к мутациям и бесплодию, вызывают рак и в целом наносят вред здоровью (причем, доля тех, кто негативизирует влияние ГМО в целом выше, чем доля тех, кто согласен с конкретными вредными последствиями). При этом, отметим, что по большинству утверждений затруднились ответить от 23 до 28% опрошенных, что свидетельствует о низкой осведомленности обывателей о сущности и последствиях применения ГМО в продуктах питания.



Рис. 4. Степень согласия россиян с утверждениями о продуктах с ГМО (2014 г.)

Таким образом, россияне относятся к новинкам научно-технического прогресса положительно, возлагают надежды, что жизнь с ними изменится к лучшему, хотя и не настолько оптимистично, как американцы. Одновременно с этим людей пугает вмешательство новых технологий в естественные эволюционные и генетические процессы, замещение человеческих взаимоотношений на отношения порядка «техника-человек», распространение военных приспособлений в мирной жизни. Вероятно, эти опасения связаны с риском потери контроля над процессами/явлениями/устройствами, невозможностью управлять потенциальными последствиями изменений.

Особый интерес вызывает мнение некоторых исследователей о роли женщин, которые выступают как своего рода «подушка безопасности» safetybag, обеспечивающая превентивную защиту от загрязнения окружающей среды, а также борются с его последствиями.

Социологические исследования, проводимые в Германии, отмечают, что для женщин характерно «лучшее понимание опасности, которым подвергаются естественные жизненные основы, и связанная с ним готовность к помощи» [7].

Действительно, женщины, в том числе и русские женщины, обладают более выраженным экологическим сознанием, когда речь идет о воздействии загрязнения окружающей среды или экологических катастроф на эмоциональную сферу или влиянии негативных изменений окружающей среды на жизнь людей на локальном уровне. В реализации повседневных мер по сохранению окружающей среды женщины почти всегда показывают более высокие результаты, нежели мужчины. Прежде всего, именно женщины занимаются сдачей бытовых отходов в переработку, учитывают экологические аспекты в совершении покупок и составлении рациона питания и предпочитают более экологичные виды транспорта. Однако те из мужчин, которые активно занимаются домашним хозяйством, работой в саду и воспитанием детей, демонстрируют столь же высокий уровень экологического сознания и ответственного отношения к сохранению здоровья, как и женщины. В то же время женщины проявляют более сильную реакцию на угрозы загрязнения окружающей среды и, как правило, более критически воспринимают экологическую ситуацию, в среднем обладают более скудными знаниями о факторах, влияющих на экологию, нежели мужчины.

В мире существуют женские организации, которые сформулировали лозунг «Noclimatejusticewithoutgenderjustice» («Климатическая справедливость невозможна без гендерной справедливости»). Они требуют учета гендерных факторов при принятии мер и установлении критериев в связи с обязательным сокращением выбросов, а также гендерной справедливости при предоставлении средств для адаптации к изменению климата, для борьбы с бедностью и реализации прав на ресурсы и развитие [www.genderCC.net].

С этой целью должен быть подготовлен «GenderPlanofAction» («Гендерный план действий») для глобального финансирования мер по защите климата, должны реализовываться гендерные бюджеты проектов и программ по охране климата и проводиться гендерный аудит новых механизмов финансирования подобных проектов.

Шультц считает, что при выстраивании экологической политики и в различных областях науки феминистские социально-экономические исследования, а также специальные знания женщин, накопленные на основании повседневного опыта, учитываются лишь в весьма

ограниченном масштабе. По этому женщины настаивают на т.н. «технологическом эмпауэрменте», который открыл бы им равноправный доступ к естественным наукам и технологиям, одновременно давая им возможность изменить технологии и производимые продукты с учетом концепции устойчивого развития и возможностей воспроизводства природы и общества [8].

Женщины и мужчины по-разному используют и понимают природные ресурсы. Это приводит к гендерной дифференциации воздействия при изменении доступности, наличия или состояния природных ресурсов.

Кстати, этот подход очень тесно связан с двойным взглядом на феминистские исследования в рамках концепции устойчивого развития и социальной экологии, касаясь установления связи между гендерной демократией и перераспределением, с одной стороны, и преобразованием взаимоотношений общества и природы, с другой стороны.

Заключение.

Итак, человек, решая задачи достижения комфортного и материального обеспечения, непрерывно воздействует на среду обитания своей деятельностью и продуктами деятельности, генерируя в среде обитания техногенные антропогенные опасности.

Все многообразие рисков, связанных с неконтролируемыми последствиями влияния современной техники и технологий на среду обитания объединяются общим понятием «технологический риск». Технологический риск включает в себя риски, связанные с негативным влиянием научно-технического развития на среду обитания и самого человека (условия жизни, сознание, эмоциональное, физическое состояние и поведение), в т. ч. риски экологические (обусловленные техногенной нагрузкой на природную среду) и информационные риски (возникающие вследствие неуправляемого влияния глобальных информационных систем на индивидов и группы). Как следствие производственной деятельности людей, этот тип риска приобрел глобальный характер, затронув жизненные интересы больших территориальных сообществ, в том числе в России.

Развертывание техногенеза происходит хоть и ускоренно, но крайне неравномерно, путем подъемов на более высокие энергетические и информационные уровни. Соответственно идет рост его организованности и структуризация самой техносферы. Техногенез превращается не только в планетарную силу, определяющую характер его взаимодействия с окружающей средой. Он становится и социальной силой, которая влияет на человеческую интеграцию и участвует

в формировании личности, в становлении системы знаний, в биологической жизни человечества (нанотехнологии, генная инженерия, клонирование).

Существую следующие составляющие (компоненты) глобализации техносферы:

- дифференциация, неуклонный рост разнообразия технических систем и технологий;
- интеграция элементов техносферы, формирование ее архитектоники как единой планетарной структуры;
- пространственная экспансия во все зоны земного мира, включая человека и человечество в целом;
- космическая ориентация техногенеза, выход техносферы за пределы Земли и превращение планетарной эволюции в космическую;
- индивидуализация техногенного мира, выраженная в выделении главной ветви техногенеза – интеллектуальной, за счет широкого применения информационно-компьютерных средств и технологий;
- автономизация техносферы, выход на уровень взаимоотношений «техника – окружающий мир» без посредничества человека;
- автотрофность техники – способность усваивать энергию непосредственно из окружающего пространства;
- эволюционный переход техники на микроуровень, резкое уменьшение удельного веса техносферы по сравнению с другими планетарными оболочками;
- виртуализация техносферы (массированный переход материального в идеальное).

Результат взаимодействия человека и среды обитания может варьироваться в широких пределах: от положительного до катастрофического, вплоть до гибели людей и разрушения компонентов среды обитания. Негативный результат опасности – отрицательные воздействия, которые периодически или постоянно действуют в системе «человек – среда обитания». Такого рода опасность россияне выражают в своих мнениях относительно загрязнения окружающей среды и вызванных в этой связи техногенных катастроф. Результаты опроса российского Фонда общественного мнения, который был проведен 10–11 марта 2015 г. в 43 субъекта РФ, 100 населенных пунктов (N=1500), представлены в таблице 1 [9].

Таблица 1: Тревоги и опасения россиян, 10–11 марта 2015 года, данные в % от опрошенных

Варианты ответов	Население в целом	Пол		Возраст				Образование			Группы по образованию и возрасту	
		мужчины	женщины	18–30 лет	31–45 лет	46–60 лет	старше 60 лет	среднее общее и ниже	среднее специальное	высшее	молодые люди с высшим образованием	люди среднего возраста с высшим образованием
Доли групп	*100*	*45*	*55*	*28*	*25*	*26*	*21*	*39*	*34*	*27*	*9*	*8*
ядерная война	32	30	33	34	31	33	28	32	31	33	32	33
химическое и радиационное заражение воды, воздуха, продуктов	30	27	33	33	28	31	30	29	33	29	31	29
международный терроризм	22	24	21	24	23	22	20	21	19	28	33	27
засорение планеты отходами	22	21	23	24	20	24	20	18	25	24	28	20
уничтожение лесов на планете	20	20	20	18	20	20	25	22	19	20	15	22
стихийные бедствия (землетрясения, наводнения и т.п.)	20	19	22	15	24	24	18	20	20	21	18	22
массовые эпидемии, распространение СПИДа	20	15	24	23	22	17	16	21	19	21	23	23
истощение природных ресурсов, дающих энергию и питание	20	19	20	20	22	17	20	18	19	22	24	22
изменение климата на планете	15	15	16	16	14	16	16	14	18	16	11	19
уничтожение многих видов животных и растений	10	10	10	12	12	6	9	9	11	11	13	8
космическая катастрофа, столкновение с огромным метеоритом, кометой	6	6	6	5	5	5	8	5	6	5	4	6
истощение озонового слоя атмосферы	5	5	5	4	6	4	6	5	6	4	5	3
перенаселение планеты	4	5	3	6	3	3	3	3	4	6	8	5

ничего не вызывает тревог и опасений	6	8	4	5	5	6	8	8	5	5	4	6
затрудняюсь ответить	3	4	3	3	3	3	5	4	3	2	1	1

Как видно, россиян в первую очередь беспокоят две позиции: страх ядерной войны и страх химического и радиационного заражения воды, воздуха, продуктов. Причем как мужчины, так и женщины всех возрастов с различным уровнем образования практически в одинаковой степени беспокоятся о своем будущем.

Резюме.

Итак, человечество породило двуликого Януса. С одной стороны, неизбежно необходимого для дальнейшего развития и движения цивилизации, с другой – ведущий к потере связи с естественным, с природой, с Богом, диалога с самим собой. А какой лик Януса победит – вопрос времени.

Соотношение и границы между религией и наукой, религией и техникой, которыми пользуется человечество, должны определяться не на модели конфронтации и не на модели интеграции (которая заключается в фактическом приспособлении или науки под догмы религии, или религии под научные теории), а на модели дополнения, или критически конструктивного взаимодействия, в которой обе стороны сохраняют собственную сферу, отвергают абсолютизацию и взаимно обогащают друг друга, пытаясь лучше понять реальность как целое во всех ее измерениях.

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[7] Neugebauer, Birgit (2004): Die Erfassungvon Umweltbewusstseinund Umweltverhalten, ZUMA-MethodenberichtNr. 2004/07, Mannheim.

[8] Schultz, Irmgard / Weller, Ines (Hg.) (1995): Gender & Environment, Ökologie und die Gestaltungsmacht der Frauen, Frankfurt; Weller, Ines (2004): NachhaltigkeitundGender. NeuePerspektivefür die Gestaltung und Nutzung von Produkten. München).

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Лариса Шмигирилова

Технократска религија: а што је са избором?

Апстракт: У тексту се разматра питање односа човека и технике који, према мишљењу ауторке, рађа технократску религију а која опет нарушава хармонију између материјалног и духовног. Велики напредак у развоју техологије води према техницизацији друштва у коме технологија заузима доминантан положај у људској заједници и диктира његову вољу и законе. Али какве су последице слепе вере у технократска божанста? Да ли обични потрошачи производа научне и технолошке револуције разумеју њихове последице кориштења? Ауторка се позива на резултате различитих студија.

Кључне речи: технократска религија, изгубљена вера, научни и технолошки напредак, техногена цивилизација, човек, технологија.

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ГИПЕРРЕАЛЬНЫЕ РЕЛИГИИ ПО А.ПОССАМАЮ

Аннотация: Реализация религиозных чувств может проявляться в большом спектре социальных явлений. От участия в богослужениях традиционных и «мейнстримных» церквей до молитвы и медитации на природе. Набор верований и религиозных представлений оказывается под влиянием гораздо более широкого, чем в предыдущие времена, набора факторов, включающего не только религиозные доктрины и устойчивые религиозные локальные верования, но и СМИ, моду, популярные трактовки научных теорий и даже идеи культовых произведений. Одним из интересных современных авторов, работающих в этой области, является австралийский социолог Адам Поссамай, профессор Университета Западного Сиднея. В его книге «Религия и популярная культура: Гиперреальный завет»[1] рассматриваются вопросы взаимосвязи популярной культуры и религиозных верований в современном западном обществе.

Ключевые слова: Религия, популярная культура, гиперреальные религии, *Адам Поссамай*, *Западное общбество*.

Популярная культура, понимаемая как медиум самоидентификации социальных акторов, в том числе духовной и религиозной идентификации, оказывается сложным образом пронизана религиозными символами. Религия непосредственно влияет на популярную культуру через систему символов и образов.

Но со своей стороны индивиды выбирают духовные основы своего мироощущения в довольно сложной системе, результирующей процессы мультикультурализма, доступности образов других культур и цивилизаций посредством масс-медиа.

Реализация религиозных чувств может проявляться в большом спектре социальных явлений. От участия в богослужениях традиционных и «мейнстримных» церквей до молитвы и медитации на природе. Набор верований и религиозных представлений оказывается под влиянием гораздо более широкого, чем в предыдущие времена, набора факторов, включающего не только религиозные доктрины и устойчивые

[1] Possamai Adam, Religion and Popular Culture: A Hyper-Real Testament – P.I.E. – Peter Lang Press, Brussel, 2005 – 176 p.

религиозные локальные верования, но и СМИ, моду, популярные трактовки научных теорий и даже идеи культовых произведений[2].

Одним из интересных современных авторов, работающих в этой области, является австралийский социолог Адам Поссамай, профессор Университета Западного Сиднея. В его книге «Религия и популярная культура: Гипер-реальный завет»[3] рассматриваются вопросы взаимосвязи популярной культуры и религиозных верований в современном западном обществе.

А. Поссамай анализирует возникновение феномена, который он называет «гипер-реальными религиями». В контексте глобализации (позднего модерна) религия в современном мире оказывается включенной в процессы потребления, что в конечном итоге приводит к созданию нового религиозного мышления. Гиперреальные религии представляют собой новые формы духовности, где традиционные и современные религиозные идеи потребляются и проектируются в новые, полностью реконструированные формы. А.Поссамай отмечет исключительный авторитет «Я», которое подменяет внешние формы традиционной религиозной власти, присущие религиозным институтам. Важным для понимания современной религиозности является точка зрения А. Поссамая о духовности Нью-Эйдж (New Age). По его мнению очень немногие практикующие действительно принимают этот термин. В своей новой схеме духовность Нового Века является лишь одним из аспектов гораздо более широкого культурного феномена, который он назвал перенистской духовностью (perennist spirituality). Потребляя избранные практики, мифы и учения из времен до-модерна, а затем пересматривая и актуализируя их для современной жизни, верующие стремятся к личной трансформации и ориентируются на решение глобальных проблем.

В основе этой концептуализации реальности лежит понятие «перенизма», которое назвал А. Поссамай целостным пониманием истины, доступной в эзотерической мудрости или тайных знаниях (гнозах), которые не ограничены догмами традиционных мировых религий. Согласно А.Поссамаю, ключевыми чертами в этой синкретической духовности являются интерпретация космоса как монистической реальности, которая принимает участие в едином объединяющем

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[2] Трофимов Сергей, «Плюрализм и формирование религиозных верований как 'бриколаж' (по Д. ЭРвье-Леже)», *Faith and Reaseon*, Dosije studio, Belgrade; FOREL – Institut of Social Sciences, Belgrade; Philosophical commune, Belgrade, 2016., 217–226 p. Тоже и: Трофимов Сергей, «Индивидуализм и формирование религиозных верований в современном обществе», в *Социология религии в обществе позднего модерна*, Сборник статей VI международной научной конференции, Институт управления БелГУ и другие, Белгород, 2016.

[3] Possamai Adam, Religion and Popular Culture: A Hyper-Real Testament – P.I.E. – Peter Lang Press, Brussel, 2005 – 176 p.

существе или принципе, и взаимосвязь всех частей космоса с этой конечной реальностью. Разделяющие эту духовность стремятся к саморазвитию для достижения своего потенциала и конечной реальности.

Одной из характерных черт современного общества является потребление, и сегодня религия не избегает участия в этой глобальном явлении. Джордж Ритцер[4] называет новые способы потребления (means of consumption), торговые центры, супермаркеты, аэропорты и круизные суда, «соборами потребления». Чтобы привлечь наибольшее количество клиентов, они должны предложить исключительную, фантастическую, волшебную и очаровательную торговую среду. В этом ключе, можно интерпретировать, например, торговые центры как места, где люди практикуют свои «потребительские религии»: «Торговые центры обеспечивают централизованность, традиционно предоставляемую религиозными храмами, и они построены так, чтобы иметь сходный баланс, симметрию и порядок. Их атриумы обычно обеспечивают связь с природой через фонтаны и растительность. Люди приобретают чувство общности, также как и более конкретные общественные услуги. Игра почти повсеместно является частью религиозной практики, а торговые центры предлагают места для развлечений. Точно так же в торговых центрах есть условия, в которых люди могут принимать участие в торжественных приемах пищи. Торговые центры четко соответствуют ярлыку соборов потребления»[5].

Разумеется, можно утверждать, что подобные соборы потребления имеют квазирелигиозный характер, но в современном западноевропейском контексте можно найти примеры, когда некоторые религиозные группы следуют и продвигают потребительский аспект таких соборов.

Например, Чарльз Трюарт пишет о сети Новой церкви (the Next Church), также называемой мега-церквями, как о «церквях с полным набором услуг», церквях, открытых семь дней в неделю, пастырских церквях, апостольских церквях, церквях «нового племени», церквях новых парадигм, церквях для ищущих прибежища или церквях-торговых центрах»[6].

Новая Церковь (the Next Church), по крайней мере в американском контексте, выходит за пределы деноминаций и традиционного способа посещения церкви. Под одной крышей эти евангельские церкви предлагают «поклонения стили поп-культуре для бутик пастырских услуг. Здесь есть огромные аудитории и атриумы, оркестры и группы, играющие мягкий рок, многие располагают даже ресторанными

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[4] Ritzer, G., *Enchanting a Disenchanted World: Revolutionizing the Means of Consumption*. – California, Pine Forge Press, 1999.

[5] Ritzer, G., op. cit. P. 9

[6] Trueheart, Ch., “Welcome to the Next Church” // *The Atlantic Monthly*, 1996, August: 37–58.

двориками, фонтанами, «плюс множество парковки, чистые туалетные комнаты и вероятность того, что вы найдете что-то, что захотите, и вернетесь снова»[7].

«Растущие церкви и конгрегации, подобно растущим предприятиям, имеют рефлексивную жажду доли рынка. Они склонны приравнивать растущее число посетителей к самоценности, а кирпичи и бетон к благочестию. Рост масштабов является также выражением евангельской миссии. Когда я выразил восхищение Биллу Хибельсу, пастору внеденоминационной евангельской Церкви Уиллоу-Крик (Willow Creek Community Church) феноменальным ростом и размерами его церкви – более 15 000 человек посещали богослужение каждый выходной, – он нахмурился. «В течение часа езды от этого места есть два миллиона человек», – сказал он. «На языке бизнеса у нас всего два процента доли рынка. Нам предстоит ещё долгий путь»[8].

Дж. Ритцер[9] приводит пример «валматризации (Wal-Mart-ization) американской религии», цитируя пастора большой баптистской церкви, который, надеясь превратить свои услуги в «развлекательное событие», поручил своим сотрудникам изучить опыт Disney World. Говоря о МакДоналдизации (McDonaldization) общества, что «процесс, с помощью которого принципы ресторана быстрого питания становятся доминирующими в все большем и большем числе секторов американского общества, а также мира», Дж. Ритцер утверждает, что «церковь сегодня следует этому процессу и предлагает готовые и расфасованные службы и богословие» (Ritzer, 2000)[10]. Такое же мнение разделяет Дж. Дран (2000)[11].

В духе времени появились и развиваются телевизионные и радиоцеркви (Electronic church), которые переместили массы с церковных скамей на их собственный диван перед телевизором[12]. Например, Билли Грэхем и Джим Баккер использовали «религиозную индустрию», чтобы распространить проповедь Евангелия через телевизионные СМИ на самую широкую аудиторию. Сегодня многочисленные телевизионные проповедники представляют собой самые разные религиозные ориентации. Этот опыт используют не только протестантские церкви, но и католическая церковь, впрочем, подчеркивая важность

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[7] Ritzer G., Op. cit., P.49.

[8] Ritzer G., Op. cit., P.52.

[9] Ritzer G., Op. cit., P.6.

[10] Ritzer, G. (2000), *The Mcdonaldization of Society*, California, Pine Forge Press.

[11] Drane, J., *The McDonaldization of the Church: Spirituality, Creativity, and the Future of the Church*, London, Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd, 2000.

[12] См. Lyon, D., *Jesus in Disneyland: Religion in Postmodern Times*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000 – P. 62–66.

участия верующих в обычном воскресном богослужении и отводя для телевизионных передач иные функции.

А.Поссамай утверждает, что религия в эпоху постмодерна определенно становится частью потребительской культуры. Все религиозные группы производят товары и услуги или положительно оценивают товары, которые могут быть приобретены религиозным потребителем. Это может проявляться по разному: от книжных ларьков или ресторанчиков экзотических вегетарианских блюд адептов Харе Кришны в университетских городках и христианских магазинов, продающих книги и предметы искусства, до обращений к приверженцам Церкви Саентологии с просьбой о пожертвованиях на каждом следующем уровне духовного развития и магазинов движения Нью-Эйдж, предлагающих все, что может помочь духовному актору в его поисках.

И в предыдущие времена религия не была защищена от потребительской культуры – можно вспомнить Иисуса, изгоняющего торговцев из Храма. Менялы и торговцы, предоставляющие верующим необходимые для жертвоприношений в иерусалимском Храме сакрально чистые монеты, предметы и товары, являются замечательным примером проникновения повседневного менталитета в область (локус) сакрального, привнесения принципов обмена и расчет стоимости религиозных услуг. Благодаря развитию изобразительных искусств и моде человечество в целом обогатилось великолепными образцами религиозных сооружений, культовой утвари и других предметов религиозного потребления, которые взаимно влияли на внешний вид и убранство сооружений и предметов повседневной культуры.

Однако сегодня происходит полное погружение самой религии в потребительскую культуру. Некоторые религиозные группы приветствуют это, другие этому сопротивляются. Становится почти избитой истиной утверждение, что для эффективного распространения своих убеждений и ценностей, религиозная группа должна говорить на языке, который большинство людей этого общества может понять. А.Поссамай подчеркивает, что сегодня этим языком становится потребление. Он приводит пример организаторов фестиваля Нью-Эйдж, которые, рассчитывая, что приходящие развлечься посетители, подсознательно ищут в себе некую новую реалию, привлекающую их на фестиваль, и положительные вибрации мероприятий фестиваля приведут внутри людей к некому «резонансу», даже если «они не понимают глубины смысла того, что с ними случилось. Там что-то проникает в их подсознание». То есть религиозный фестиваль по мнению организаторов, представляет собой производство символов, которые, по их мнению, остаются в сознании религиозного потребителя и могут

повлиять на его или ее убеждения, – хотя степень этого эффекта остается неизвестной[13].

Потребительская культура в послевоенное время доминирует в западном образе жизни с её массовыми товарами и культурой. Вместо того, чтобы создавать чувство принадлежности к группам – например, классу, субкультуре, политическим партиям, сегодня эта культура проявляется в создании фрагментированного общества, частью в которого является религия. Человек эпохи постмодерна больше не соглашается, когда ему говорят, во что верить и как поступать. Потребительский выбор не ограничивается покупками, а распространяется на образование, здравоохранение, политику и даже религию. Д.Лайон считает, что люди теперь «свободны выбирать», и рыночная культура может превратить нас скорее в потребителей, чем в граждан[14]. Он или она сталкивается с распространением «духовных / религиозных / философских знаний», которые он или она свободно выбирает, исследует и испытывает на собственном опыте.

Во многих духовных практиках Нью-Эйдж этот религиозный выбор проявляется, но иногда этот выбор обременяется ответственностью, слишком тяжелой для религиозного потребителя. На это бремя предлагает решение фундаментализм, который по мнению З.Баумана, является постмодернистским феноменом, поддерживающим «рационализацию, реформы и технологическое развитие современности»[15]. Они предлагают полное удовлетворение сегодняшнего развития, не платя высокую цену; Цена самодостаточности, уверенность в себе и чувство, что они никогда не будут полностью удовлетворены.

Если рациональность рыночного типа подчинена поощрению свободы выбора и преуспевает в неопределенности ситуаций выбора, фундаменталистская рациональность ставит во главу угла безопасность и определенность и, следовательно, осуждает все, что подрывает эту определенность – капризы личной свободы в первую очередь[16].

Интересное подтверждение утверждения, что все религии являются частью потребительской культуры, но некоторые из них более активны, чем другие, можно найти у Н. Зайдмана, показывающего разный подход коммерциализации религиозных объектов у приверженцев традиционных религий и адептов движений Нью-Эйдж. Его выводы основаны на полевых исследованиях в Израиле с группами паломников, посещающими святые места. Хотя обе группы являются

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[13] Possamai A. Op. cit. P. 47–48.

[14] Lyon, D., *Jesus in Disneyland: Religion in Postmodern Times*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000 – P. 12.

[15] Bauman, Z., "Postmodern Religion?", in P. Heelas *et al.* (eds.), *Religion, Modernity and Postmodernity*, Oxford, Blackwell. – 1998. – P. 72.

[16] Bauman, Z., Op. cit, P. 75.

частью потребительской культуры, существует различие в отношении перспектив участников к «коммерциализации религиозных товаров, роли маркетинговых агентов и общих характеристик рынка»[17].

В традиционных религиях спрос на религиозные объекты сосредоточен на их подлинности. Новые объекты не будут куплены, если нет доказательств того, что они являются подлинными для определенной религии, и что это подтверждено конкретным духовным источником.

В менталитете Нью-Эйдж, индивид является основным источником атрибуции смысла, а авторитет объекта зависит от решения индивидуума и/или чувства ценности его религиозности. Религиозным товаром становится скорее предмет. Который индивид наполняет некоторым религиозным смыслом, что дает широкие возможности для духовных акторов в расширении рынков и поиске новых источников религиозных товаров.

Из исследования Н. Зайдмана можно легко сделать вывод, что религиозные потребители активны в разных религиозных группах. Однако здесь следует различать эти стили потребления. Религиозное убеждение будет способствовать выбору потребителя. В некоторых религиозных формах потребитель – это его собственная власть в принятии решения о том, что потреблять, в других – опора на руководство, внешний авторитет или традиции, которые легимитизируют религиозную ценность предложенного товара.

А.Поссамай утверждает, что в эпоху постмодерна проявляются две крайности. С одной стороны, духовность Нью-Эйдж не устанавливает своим адептам определенных границ для потребления, с другой стороны, потребители некоторых фундаменталистских и традиционалистских религиозных групп должны руководствоваться строгими рамками, признанными институциональным авторитетом. Между этими двумя крайностями континуума мы находим все другие религиозные группы. Духовность Нью-Эйдж А.Поссамай предлагает рассматривать как религию гипер-потребления, тогда как течения фундаментализма можно рассматривать как религию с гипо-потребителем.

Таким образом, А.Поссамай утверждает, что течение Нью-Эйдж объединяет по преимуществу религии потребления. «Альтернативная» духовность являются частью того, что Бауман[18] называет постмодернистскими религиями, а точнее «потребительскими религиями». Адепты потребляют продукты для получения и усиления собственных ощущений. Они могут посещать оздоровительный центр, участвовать в «квесте провидения»[19] (vision quest) по мотивам верований се-

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[17] Zaidman, N. (2003), “Commercialization of Religious Objects: A Comparison Between Traditional and New Age Religions”, *Social Compass*, 50 (3): P.357.

[18] Bauman, Z., op.cit.

[19] речь идет о языческом культе Американских индейцев.

вероамериканских индейцев и обучаться азам шаманизма, покупать магические кристаллы и атрибутику примитивных религий, изучать астрологию и.т.д. Религиозные объекты, предназначенные для продажи – книги, карты таро, кристаллы, продукты ароматерапии, компакт-диски и т. д. – давно потеряли в глазах массового западного потребителя какую-либо черту бесовства и стали обычными товарами.

Консультанты, гадатели на картах таро, ясновидящие и т. д. предлагают свои услуги не только в специализированных лавочках и на ярмарках, но и в обычных торговых центрах, в том числе через интернет. Многие обычные книжные и музыкальные магазины имеют отдельные разделы специально для книг и компакт-дисков Нью-Эйдж. Издаются популярные журналы и фэнзины (журналы для фанатов), а также существуют радиостанции, поддерживающие идеи Нью-Эйдж[20]. П.Элета[21] обозначает эти практики и убеждения как «популярную магию» и, по её словам, они стали распространенным потребительским продуктом в современном обществе. Исследования П. Хиласа, Р. Робертса[22], М. Хилла[23], Х. Ван Хова[24] и М.Йорка[25] показали сильную связь между идеями Нью-Эйдж, неолиберальным капитализмом и глобализованной потребительской культурой, которая получает все большее распространение в современных обществах пост-модерна.

Однако это потребление «ощущений» не ограничивается товарами и услугами. Согласно работе М. Фезерстоуна[26], оно распространяется на потребление знаков и текстов, а конкретно на знаки и тексты, найденные в культуре коренных народов, в истории и в популярной культуре.

Согласно М. Додсону, коренные народы в современном менталитете часто романтизированы и «экзотизированы»: «Коренные народы используются для создания контрапункта, на основании которого

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[20] Heelas, P. (1993), "The New Age in Cultural Context: The Premodern, the Modern and the Postmodern", *Religion*, 23: P. 103–116. (112)

[21] Eleta, P. (1997), "The Conquest of Magic over Public Space: Discovering the Face of Popular Magic in Contemporary Society", *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, 12(1): 51–67.

[22] Roberts, R., "Power and Empowerment: New Age Managers and the Dialects of Modernity/Postmodernity", *Syzygy: Journal of Alternative Religion and Culture*, 3 (3–4): 1994. – P. 271–288.

[23] Hill, M., "New Zealand's Cultic Milieu: Individualism and the Logic of Consumerism", in B. Wilson (ed.), *Religion: Contemporary Issues: The All Souls Seminars in the Sociology of Religion*, London, Bellow Publishing/ – 1992. – P. 216–236.

[24] Van Hove, H. (), "L'emergence d'un marche spirituel religieux", *Social Compass*, 46 (2). 1999 – P.161–172.

[25] York, M., "Le supermarche religieux: ancrages locaux du Nouvel Age au sein du reseau mondial", *Social Compass*, 46 (2). – 1999. – P. 173–179

[26] Featherstone M., *Consumer Culture* & *Postmodernism*, – London, Sage. – 1991

доминирующее общество может критиковать и оценивать себя, становясь живыми воплощениями романтического идеала, который предлагает заброшенному обществу надежду на искупление и завоевание того, что, по его мнению, потеряло в своем движении вперед. Те, кто хочет критиковать индивидуализм, указывают на то, что община изначальна (т.е. аборигена – *С.Т.*); Те, кто хочет подчеркнуть пагубные последствия индустриализации для окружающей среды, указывают на коренные народы как на первоначальные и естественные природоохранные организации. Мы представляем, хотя и стратегически отдаленный, оставшийся образ утраченного, в поисках того, что можно восстановить»[27].

Кроме того, некоторые комментаторы подчеркивают отношение власти в «культурном присвоении», то есть тех процессах, посредством которых значения преобразуются в определенных иерархических структурах власти, и в этом случае в структурах расы[28] – и видит в Нью-Эйжд – стремление к культурной инклюзивности, которая стирает все различия и часто сводит традиционную практику коренных народов к мелким терапевтическим схемам. Для этих авторов интерес современного общества является новым неоколониалистким «вторжением» в пространство аборигенов и становится романтической «экспроприацией» культуры аборигенов, которая позволяет затушевать такие вопросы, как их права на землю и самоопределение.

В своей работе А. Поссамай обсуждал культуру коренных народов с несколькими австралийскими информантами, считавшимися адептами Нью-Эйдж. Многие интересовалась духовностью аборигенов, и хотели узнать от нее больше, при этом считая, что такой интерес может вернуть часть «как на практическом, так и на духовном уровне нужно вернуть часть своей традиционной культуры». Некоторые считают, однако, невозможным приспособить и потребить культуру туземцев.

Интерес к туземной культуре порождает … предложение. Люди хотят узнать о местной духовности, но только от представителей коренных народов. Линн Юм[29] обнаружила, что «не только жители Запада устанавливают связь между Нью Эйдж и мировоззрением аборигенов, [но некоторые] отдельные аборигены [также] предлагают семинары и воркшопы по самопознанию, используя риторику и практики Нью Эйдж».

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[27] Dodson, M., “The Wenthworth Lecture. The End in the Beginning: Re(de)fining Aboriginality”, *Australian Aboriginal Studies*, 1994, No 1. – P. 2–13.

[28] Cf. Marcus, 1., “The Journey out to the Centre. The Cultural Appropriation of Ayers Rock” // *Kunapipi*, – 1998 – 10 (1&2). – P.254–275

[29] Hume, L., “The Dreaming in Contemporary Aboriginal Australia”, in Graham Harvey (ed.), *Indigenous Religions: A Companion*, London, Cassell. – 2000. – P.125–138.

М. де Серто (1988)[30] и А. Поссамай[31] отмечают, что, переннистская версия культуры коренных народов не принимается пассивно, но оспаривается и снова повторно присваивается.

В этой потребительской культуре, которая, как представляется, отражает наш глобализированный мир, эти актеры потребляют культуру коренных народов, а также историю и популярную культуру. Это глобальное «культурное потребление», которое можно определить как процессы, посредством которых значения трансформируются внутри себя, приводит к тому, что «духовный и коммерческий становятся все более преданными»[32].

Может ли это интерпретироваться как неакадемическая деконструкция истории, в которой почти свободная интерпретация историка поддерживает какое-то новое понимание[33]? Переннисты, по-видимому, субъективно реконструируют историю в мифы, которые могут быть представлены как «поэтические» истины. Формируются истины, которые не представлены как «точные» истины и тем не менее доступны тем, кто хочет верить в них. В этих мифах нет удовлетворительной научной точности. Скорее, они имеют смысл для алогично-магического, интуитивного мышления переннистов. В своих исследованиях о последствиях прошлого для духовных актеров в Бретани Эллен Бодоне[34] утверждает, что такой присвоение истории является легитимативным мифом.

Тем не менее, поскольку культурные формы всегда социально сформированы и переосмыслены в свете исторических и условных проблем, все традиции на каком-то уровне «придуманы». Это позволяет построение религиозных систем, использующих явления современной популярной культуры – от научной фантастики до кинематографа. Появление таких религиозных групп, как, например, последователи религии джедаев, использующее мифы саги «Звездных войн», представляет собой более серьезное явление, чем юношеская игра. Образы популярной культуры насыщают менталитет современного человека и, влияют на его мироощущение, в том числе на религиозные представления.

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[30] Certeau (de), M., *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press. – 1988.

[31] Possamai, A., Op. cit. P. 53.

[32] York, M. (a), “Selling Nature in the Spiritual Supermarket”, // Cesnur Center for Studies on New Religions. 2001. – P. 372.

[33] Cf. Himmelfarb, G., “Some Reflections on the New History”, *American Historical Review*. – 1989. No 94 (3). – P. 661–670 (667)).

[34] Bodone, E., “Ethnography, Fiction, and the Meaning of the Past in Brittany”, *American Ethnologist*, – 1991. No 10 (3). – P. 518–545 (536).

Уже в конце XX века многие адепты Нью-Эйдж не были согласны с применением к описании их практик и верований этого термина. А.Поссамай опросил 35 человек из Мельбурна, которых «обычно» описывают как «адептов Нью-Эйдж». Они участвовали в таких практиках, как астрология, западный буддизм, ченнелинг, манипуляции с кристаллами, феминистская духовность, медитация, натуропатия, нумерология, хиромантия, нетрадиционная медицина Рейки, спиритизм, тантризм, карты таро и городской шаманизм. Однако 25 (71%) участников опроса критиковали Нью-Эйдж, а 3 (9%), даже если они не возражали против термина в целом, но не считали себя адептом Нью-Эйдж[35].

Термин создает проблемы при использовании в поле. Действительно, Дж. Льюис описывает несколько важных проблем для исследования движения Нью-Эйдж. Прежде всего, поскольку сами люди, группы и периодические издания, которые раньше называли себя «Новой Эрой» (Нью-Эйдж), но больше не идентифицируют себя как таковые, то исследования, построенные на основе различия между учениями Нью-Эйдж и другими религиями, становятся более сложными[36]. Кроме того, отсутствует четкое определение этого термина в академической литературе.

Другая проблема заключается в том, что этот термин очень часто используется как метонимия, то есть как единый дескриптор для ряда различных религиозных явлений, частью которых он является. М.Йорк[37], с другой стороны, отделяет неоязычество от Нью-Эйдж. А.Поссамай[38] обнаружил, что необходимо выделить три подтипа этих современной духовности: аквариaнский переннизм (т.е. Водолея), неоязычество (движение берущее за основу, в основном, языческие традиции) и современный переннизм – движение, которое имеет свой генезис в постмодерне.

Эти подтипы не должны быть быть объединены под одним термином Нью-Эйдж, поскольку имеют различный генезис. Теософическое общество – эзотерическая группа девятнадцатого века – породило аквариaнский переннизм, а оккультизм – еще одна эзотерическая группа девятнадцатого века – вдохновил неоязычество. Эти две группы были сформированы в 1930-х и 1940-х годах.

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[35] Possamai, A., op. cit. P. 50.

[36] Lewis, J., J.G. Milton *et al.*, *Perspectives on the New Age*, New York, State University of New York Press. – 1992 – P.2.

[37] York, M., *The Emerging Network. A Sociology of the New Age and Neo-Pagan Movements*, Maryland, Rowmann & Littlefield Publishers. – 1995. – P. 48–88.

[38] Possamai, A., “Diversity in Alternative Spiritualities: Keeping New Age at Bay”, *Australian Religion Studies Review*, 12 (2). – 1999 – P. 111–124.

Современный перениизм не связан с конкретным эзотерическим движением, но утверждению А. Поссамая[39], вырос из-за культурного сдвига в индустриальных обществах. Постиндустриальные общества, включая их контркультурные движения, определяют себя в терминах глубоких культурных изменений, происходящих внутри них. Они предполагают снижение числа убеждений (верований) в идею прогресса, радикальный индивидуализм и обнаруживают движения обмена символами, знаками и т.д. между субкультурами. Современный перениизм, по мнению А.Поссамая, хотя он и относится эклектично к более раннему эзотеризму, следует понимать как выражение постиндустриальной или постмодернистской культуры в области духовности.

А.Поссамай считает, что перениизм определяется как синкретическая духовность, которая интерпретирует мир как монистический (космос воспринимается как имеющий свои, глубоко взаимосвязанные элементы. Признавая единственный конечный принцип, бытие или силу, лежащий в основе всей реальности, перениизм отвергает понятие Дуализма (например ум / тело). Наконец, адепты перениизма стремятся развить свою Человеческую Потенциальную Этику (актеры работают для своего личного роста) и стремятся к Духовному Знанию (способ развиться – это стремление к познанию, будь то знание вселенной или о себе, причем эти два существа иногда взаимосвязаны)[40].

Удивительным феноменом, характеризующим появление гиперрелигий в современной религиозной ситуации, является использование в образах этих религий научной фантастики и популярных медиапродуктов.

Иллюзия формирования каждым человеком в Постмодернизме своей собственной парадигмы и использование собственного субъективного мифа для культурного потребления приводит к тому, что перениисты для формирования религиозных целей черпают вдохновение в популярной культуре, литературе, искусстве и самых различных религий в качестве собственного источника духовности.

Для современного потребления характерен растущий комфорт читателя с паранормальными явлениями в популярной культуре. Так к области развлечений относятся вечеринки подростков, декорируемые как ночь в доме с привидениями. М. Трюцци отмечает, что характер ведьмы, ранее стигматизировавшийся, в последние годы романтизируется и считается гламурным среди молодежи среднего класса[41].

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[39] Possamai, A., op. cit. P. 51.

[40] Possamai, A., "A New Look at the Cultic Milieu", in Oakley *et al.* (eels.), *Sociological Sites/Sights*, – TASA 2000 Conference Proceedings, Adelaide. – 2000 – CD-Rom

[41] Truzzi, M. "The Occult Revival as Popular Culture: Some Rndom Observatioins on the Old and Nouveau Witch" // Sociological Quarterly, 1972, 13V P. 16–36.

Такая «гламурная литература ужасов» становится частью детской культовой литературы.

В качестве этих новых источников используются научно-фантастические рассказы и комплексы, триллеры (романы и фильмы ужасов), которые используются как своеобразные резервуары образов для построения культурной системы, которая затем потребляется последователями. Популярная культура предлагает сегодня в том числе в виде интернет-сайтов обширную библиотеку образов и мифов, которые предлагается потреблять, используя их для формирования субъективных мифов. Каждый потребитель использует общие образы, но формирует отличающийся миф.

Примерами таких религиозных систем, основанных на научно-фантастической литературе является Церковь Всех Миров (Church of All Worlds, CAW), основанная Обероном Зеллем (Oberon Zell) в 1967, частично основывающей своё учение на романе Роберта Хайнлана «Чужак в чужой стране» (1961) и распространяет свое потребление на образы саги «Звездный путь» (Star Trek, 1966 – наст. вр.). Другое движение, вдохновленное научной фантастикой – Церковь Саентологии, упоминаемая многими исследователями как «религия научной фантастики»[42] Основатель церкви Рон Хаббард, довольно плодовитый в то время писатель фантаст, опубликовал статью «Дианетика: эволюция науки», которая легла в основу его религии в выпуске журнала «Поразительная научная фантастика» в мае 1950. Вместе с тем, многие писатели и поклонники фантастики с одной стороны и последователи Саентологии» с другой утверждают, что религия не имеет отношения к научной фантастике[43].

Мифы из сериала «Звездные войны» (Star Wars, 1976 – наст. вр.) – также повлияли на мировоззрение людей настолько, что из них были заимствованы некоторые элементы для вдохновения духовного движения. В 2001 в национальной переписи в Австралии и Великобритании по ошибке эта опция была введена в меню выбора религиозной идентичности, и 70 509 человек в Австралии (0,37% населения)[44] и 390 000 человек в Великобритании (0,7% населения)[45] её выбрали. Если большая часть этих людей воспользовалась опцией ради шутки или «чтобы задать правительству немного перца»[46], то по мнению Автра-

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[42] Cohen E., Ben-Yehuda Nachman and Avian Janet, “Recentering the World: the Quest for ‘Elective’ Centers in a Secularized Universe”// Sociological Review, 35 (2): 320–346 – P: 331.

[43] Holdstock, R., Encyclopedia of Science Fiction, London, Octopus Book, 1978 – P.197.

[44] AAP, Is Jedi Now a Religion& // The Age, August, 27 2002.

[45] Census Return of the Jedi // BBC News, 13 February 2003.

[46] Agence France Presse (AFP), Jedi census Ploy a Success // The Australian IT, August, 28 2002

лийского общества признания Звездных войн, около 5000 человек в Австралии сделали этот выбор сознательно и готовы стать ядром новой религии рыцарей джежаев.

По мнению А.Поссамая «Путь джедая» выходит за рамки выбора опции в переписи населения и даже за рамки научной фантастики. Од охватывает многие истины и реалии основных мировых религий, таких как дзэн-буддизм, даосизм, индуизм, католицизм и синтоизм, и одновременно является исцеляющим искусством и медитативным путешествием, которое адепт может принять, чтобы улучшить каждый аспект своей жизни. Вырываясь из рамок литературного и кинематографического произведения Джорджа Лукаса, адепты религии рыцарей джедаев считают, что история их религии насчитывает более 5000 лет, прошла множество этапов и лишь нашла отражение в культовом сериале.

В современном обществе произошло удивительное и не существовавшее ранее явление, когда люди используют развлечение как своего рода религиозный опыт. А.Поссамай приводит три пути гиперреального духовного развития в современном западноевропейском обществе: Во первых, осветительное развитие, то есть стремление к непосредственному внутреннему личному опыту божественного, который позволит более глубокое понимание внутреннего я и приведет в развитию индивидуального потенциала. Во-вторых, инструментальное развитие, акцентирующее внимание на выбранные методы и практики, с помощью которых индивид стремится улучшить себя в поисках личностного роста и развитию скрытых способностей. В-третьих, развлечение, как поиск развития. Люди обращаются к современной магии, как к сильному эмоциональному и творческому процессу. Использование йоги или джедаизма для улучшения своей повседневной жизни, придания ей определенной цели, например, развитие своего духовного и физического «я»[47].

Фантастические вымыслы, смешивающие мифологию с научными фактами, этнические пантеоны с историческими данными. Определенный набор кодов и подтекстов, традиционно используемый к классической мифологии и истории, активно потребляется в стиле фэнтези и компьютерных играх на этой основе. Фантазия никогда не была реальностью, но она выходит на новый уровень реальности, следующим за художественной литературой и искусством, а сложная игра с традиционными сюжетами и новыми форматами – предыдущими мифами фэнтезийных историй или добавлением персонажей Диснея (в игре Королевство Сердец (Kingdom Hearts, 2002)). То есть становится гипер-реальным.

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[47] Possamai, A. A New Look at the Cultic Milieu // Oakley et al. (eds), Sociological Sites/Sights, TASA 2000 Conference Proceeding, Adelaide, CD-Rom, 2000

Согласно А.Поссамаю, использование популярной культуры при создании своего духовного пути проходит через создание своего субъективного мифа. Происходит формирование религии нового типа, гиперреальной, в которой «реальная» религия была разрушена в жерле индивидуализма и потребления, а связи в «реальными» источниками были размыты.

Сергеј Трофимов

Хиперреална религија према А. Посамају

Апстракт: Религиозна осећања се испољавају у широком спекту друштвених појава: од учествовања у службама традиционалних и „већинских“ цркава до молитве и медитације у природи. Савремена веровања и религијске представе су под утицајем много ширег скупа фактора него у претходним временима, укључујући при томе не само верске доктрине и чврста локална религијска уверења него и медије, моду, популарне интерпретације научних теорија, па чак и обредна понашања. Један од занимљивих савремених аутора који се бави овим темама јесте и аустралијски социолог Адам Посамај, професор на Универзитету Западног Сиднеја. У својој књизи „Религија и популарна култура: хипер-реални завет“ пропитује однос популарне културе и религиозних уверења у савременом западном друштву.

Кључне речи: религија, популарна култура, хиперреалне религије, Адам Посамај, Западно друштво.

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КУЛЬТУРА ПРАВОСЛАВНОГО МОНАШЕСТВА В СОВРЕМЕННОМ СОЦИОКУЛЬТУРНОМ КОНТЕКСТЕ

Аннотация: Ольга Смолина. Культура православного монашества в современном социокультурном контексте. В условиях современного постхристианского / постсекулярного мира культура православного монашества все же не стала частью архивной культуры. Она не только вызывает интерес исследователей, но количество ее носителей неуклонно возрастает. Помимо очевидных исторических, социально-политических причин обнаружены механизмы, позволяющие этой культуре развиваться в противоположно направленной по ряду своих ценностных установок ситуации постмодерна. Культура православного монашества исторически представлена в виде двух основных типов: «монашеская культура» («созерцательное» монашество) и «монастырская культура» («социальное» монашество). Благодаря этому культура православного монашества обладает способностью одновременно и трансформироваться под влиянием внешней среды, и сохранять неизменными свои сущностные характеристики. Семантически богатая ситуация положения монастыря на стыке горнего и дольнего миров, а также личностный, исторический, географический факторы приводят к необходимости творческой деятельности в культуре православного монашества. В данном случае рождается ситуация переводимости / непереводимости культурных языков и кодов, которая определяет креативную функцию культуры, приводит к культурному творчеству.

Ключевые слова: культура православного монашества, монастырская культура, монашеская культура, традиционность, новаторство, виртуальная реальность, поэзис, мимезис.

Постановка проблемы и цель исследования

Возникновение христианства вызвало к жизни целый ряд принципиально новых явлений в мировоззрении, морали, философии, психологии, искусстве и других сферах человеческой жизни и культуры. Оно изменило само отношение к понятию «новый». По словам С. С. Аверинцева, «Для традиционной религиозности слово „новый“ могло

быть наделено только негативным смыслом. <…> Молодое христианство ввело слово „новый“ в обозначение своего „завета“ и своего „Писания“, вложив в это слово свои высшие надежды, окрашенные пафосом эсхатологического историзма» [1, с. 270].

Вместе с тем, понятие «культура монашества» гораздо привычнее сочетается со словами «традиционность», «ортодоксия», «консерватизм», чем с понятием «новаторство». Укоренённость в православном предании первых веков христианства, передача монашеского опыта личным примером, послушание как одна из главных добродетелей, канонизированные формы языка, литургии, архитектуры, иконописи, одежды и др. не оставляют сомнений, что, по выражению Андрея Кураева, монах-молитвенник во все века тот же. Неоспоримым также выглядит утверждение, что направленность магистральных векторов развития современной европейской культуры и культуры православного монашества различаются очень значительно, если не диаметрально противоположны. То же можно сказать и в отношении их ценностных систем, мировоззренческих концепций, антропологических представлений.

Вместе с тем, в условиях современного постхристианского (но по другим наблюдениям – постсекулярного) мира культура православного монашества, являясь определенной экзотикой, все же не стала частью архивной культуры. Она не только вызывает интерес исследователей, но и имеет последователей, живых носителей монашеского опыта. Так, после 1991 года в ряде стран постсоветского пространства, прежде всего, в России, Украине, Белоруссии, Молдавии, Грузии, значительно возросло количество монастырей и насельников в них. Например, в 1914 году в Российской империи было 1025 монастырей, в советский период (а именно в 1960–1980-е годы) их число сократилось до 16, а ныне в Российской Федерации численность монастырей снова приближается к 1000. В Украине сегодня действуют более 200 православных обителей. Процессы возрождения культуры православного монашества наблюдаются и в ряде стран Европы – Сербии, Болгарии, Греции, Румынии и др. На Афоне количество монахов с 1972 к началу 2000 годов возросло более чем на 100% [3].

Причины такого явления в настоящее время не изучены. Помимо очевидных социально-политических причин (смена политического режима, прекращение антирелигиозной пропаганды, процессы либерализации, демократизации) должны существовать и внутренние факторы, стимулирующие развитие культуры православного монашества в казалось бы неблагополучной для нее ситуации постмодерна. Как известно, важными чертами современной светской культуры являются самоценность новизны, динамизм, процессы глобализации и информатизации, ощутимая роль и влияние молодежной культуры и др.

Таким образом, актуализируется необходимость исследования механизмов, позволяющих культуре православного монашества существовать в инокультурном окружении, развиваться, осуществлять трансляцию культурного опыта. В связи с этим целью данной статьи является анализ диалектики традиционности и новаторства, а также поэзиса (как творчества) и мимезиса (как подражания) в базовых установках и практике культуры православного монашества. Данный вопрос, несмотря на его научную актуальность, еще не был предметом специального культурологического рассмотрения, за исключением нескольких публикаций [18].

Соотношение традиционности и новаторства в культуре православного монашества

Примеры негативного отношения к различным формам новаторства в культуре монашества довольно многочисленны. Так, Нил Сорский, опираясь на опыт Пахомия Великого, писал: «Нам сосуды золотые и серебряные, даже и священные, не подобает иметь: также и прочие украшения излишни, но только необходимое для церкви можно приносить. Пахомий же Великий не хотел, чтобы и само церковное здание было украшено. В обители Мохосской он создал церковь и красиво сделал в ней столбы из плинф: после того помыслил, что нехорошо восхищаться делом рук человеческих и красотой зданий своих гордиться. Взяв веревку, он обвязал столбы и повелел братиям тянуть изо всей силы, пока [столбы] не преклонились и не стали нелепыми. И говорил он: „Да не станет ум, от искусных похвал поползнувшись, добычей демона, ибо много у того коварства“» [10].

В дополнениях к монастырскому уставу Пахомия, известных как «Правила Орсисия», содержатся предписания поварам «чтобы по лености не заготавливалось сразу много соленой воды на два дня, но чтобы осталось не более одной тарелки» и работающим в поле «не оставлять соседа позади себя, но держаться в одном ряду с нашим братом, чтобы хранить сердце от хвастовства» [10].

Писатель В. И. Немирович-Данченко (1849–1936) оставил похожие воспоминания от встреч с монахами-самоучками фотографом и механиком в Святогорском Успенском монастыре (Донецкая область, Украина) в конце XIX века: «Только работать-то <…> и здесь (в монастыре – О. С.) вышло не совсем способно. Камень преткновения – монастырский устав. Он вовсе не дает простора таким талантам. Следует прежде всего смирять гордыню. Изобрел что человек – его сейчас же смирять, чтобы не вздумал превознестись» [4, с. 193]. Одной из главных добродетелей монаха является послушание старцу, наставнику, монастырскому начальству. А в чине рукоположения во священный сан в словах, которые произносит рукополагаемый, содержится

обещание следовать всем канонам и уставам Церкви, ничего произвольно не изменяя.

Вместе с тем, широко известен и другой подход, с позиций которого аскетика, как главная смысловая составляющая культуры монашества, именуется «искусством из искусств» и «художеством из художеств», то есть, допускает определенные нововведения. Так, преподобный Иоанн Кассиан Римлянин считал, что «Подвижничество есть искусство или наука, имеющая своей конечной целью получение Царства Небесного <…>» [5].

Само монашество есть новация в христианстве конца III – начала IV веков. Его возникновение связывается исследователями и богословами с прекращением гонений на христиан и их поисками других форм добровольного мученичества, воплощением максимально самоотверженных форм веры. Преподобный Антоний Великий одним из первых явил анахоретский, пустыннический образ монаха. Преподобный Пахомий Великий первым создал, напротив, максимально централизованную, иерархически выстроенную, с практически армейской дисциплиной монашескую общину.

Удивительно, сколь велика изобретательность монахов в области «умерщвления плоти»: «Сирийские иноки закрывали себя в помещениях меньше человеческого роста, подвешивали на качающихся досках, иные назывались „пасущимися“, то есть не употребляли хлеба и другой человеческой пищи, но ходили по горам, питаясь растениями. Именно здесь был впервые применен подвиг столпничества преподобным Симеоном Столпником <…>» [10].

Византолог, профессор И.И. Соколов (1865–1939) приводит следующие разновидности подвижничества: «Нагие – вместе с одеждой отвергали и всякую заботу о теле. Не заботящиеся о волосах – считали это мирской роскошью. Спящие на голой земле. Босые – никогда не носившие обуви. Грязные, не мывшиеся, не моющие только одних ног. Молчальники – в продолжении всей жизни или только некоторого времени. Безмолвники (исихасты) – стремившиеся к уединению, успокоению от всех мирских забот. Пещерники. Налагавшие на себя вериги, называвшиеся вооруженными воинами Божиими. Столпники, проводившие жизнь на деревьях или в жилищах, сооруженных на столбах. <…> Затворники – запирали себя в тесные кельи. Зарывавшие себя в землю. Стоящие долгое время с воздетыми руками (иногда недели). Просящие – пели совместные гимны Богу с плясками (подобно Моисею и Мириам). Странники – переходили с места на место. Юродивые <…>» [11, с. 35].

Интересный пример нетрадиционного, новаторского подхода к решению не только церковно-богословских, но и политических, национально-патриотических вопросов оставил духовный вождь сербского народа святитель Савва Сербский: «Однажды, когда свт. Савва

находился на Афоне, к нему прибыли гонцы от его брата, который писал, что с отъездом Саввы перестало истекать миро от святых мощей их отца, прп. Симеона. Святитель Савва в Сербию не поехал, но написал два письма: одно – Стефану (брату – О. С.), другое – своему отцу прп. Симеону (письмо мощам! – О. С.). После Божественной литургии крестный ход приблизился ко гробнице, где было распечатано и прочтено вслух письмо к прп. Симеону. Все присутствовавшие трепетали от страха, слушая, как живой человек пишет усопшему. Вдруг послышался шорох, подобный журчанию воды, и святое миро вновь потекло из гробницы. „Казалось, живой и мертвый через апостольский язык одного и мироточение другого заключили союз, дабы духовно и нравственно укрепить свой народ посредством восхищения и радости“» [11, с. 80].

Святитель Афанасий Александрийский, участник I Вселенского Собора, написал первый памятник христианской агиографии – «Житие святого Антония» (своего современника, подвижника египетской пустыни), дав тем самым начало этому новому жанру литературы [6, с. 62].

О наличии разных уровней и типов новаторства в культуре монашества можно заключить из анализа работы протоиерея Георгия Флоровского «Пути русского богословия» [22]. Характеризуя известные противоречия XVI века между «иосифлянами» и «заволжцами», Г. Флоровский оценивает Иосифа Волоцкого как новатора в монашестве, отмечает его нетрадиционный подход в отношении устава и социального служения, социальной ориентированности монастыря: «Своеобразие Иосифа в том, что и самую монашескую жизнь он рассматривал и переживал, как некое социальное тягло, как особого рода религиозно-земскую службу. В его „общежительном“ идеале много новых, не византийских черт. Неточно сказать, что внешний устав или обряд жизни заслоняет у него внутреннее делание. Но самое молитвенное делание у него изнутри подчиняется социальному служению <…>. Самого царя Иосиф включает в ту же систему Божия тягла, – и Царь подзаконен, и только в пределах Закона Божия и заповедей обладает он своей властью» [22, с. 18].

Что касается Нила Сорского, то он в данном же отношении, напротив, вполне традиционен: «Нового у преп. Нила мы ничего не найдем, по сравнению с общей созерцательной традицией Греции и Византии, – по сравнению с „Добротолюбием“» [22, с. 21].

Вместе с тем, в отношении богословия Иосифа Волоцкого Флоровский замечает: «Свое сказывается только в выборе или подборе чужого. В этом выборе Иосиф был скорее смел, не останавливался и перед новизною, даже западной <…>. Неверно изображать их (иосифлян – О. С.) традиционалистами <…>. Осифлян скорее нужно признать новаторами <…>. Победа осифлян означала прежде всего перерыв или

замыкание Византийской традиции» [22, с. 19–20] В том же отношении «заволжское движение есть новый опыт, аскеза и искус духа» [22, с. 20].

Таким образом, Г. Флоровский фактически выделяет своего рода внешний и внутренний уровни новаторской деятельности в культуре монашества, что можно соотнести с разграничением понятий «монашеской» и «монастырской» культур [19].

Созидание нового имеет свою специфику в каждом из этих типов культур. В монастырях с преобладанием монашеской культуры, то есть обителях созерцательного, «трезвенного» типа, идет напряженный процесс формирования новой личности. Это не прямое копирование образцов, процесс всегда идет с поправкой на место, время, исторический этап, возрастные, индивидуальные и даже национальные особенности человека. «Живя наедине, – писал Нил Сорский, – занимаюсь испытанием духовных писаний; прежде всего испытываю заповеди Господни и их толкование… О всем том размышляю и что … нахожу богоугодного и полезного для души моей, переписываю для себя» [11, с. 51]. Целью созерцательных аскетических практик, «схождения ума на сердце» есть обретение личностью свободы духа. Интересным фактом является допустимость новаций в определенных пределах даже в такой важной составляющей монашеской культуры, как Иисусова молитва. Она может быть более или менее краткой, например: «Господи, Иисусе Христе, Сыне Божий, помилуй мя, грешнаго», или «Господи, Иисусе Христе, Сыне Божий, помилуй мя», или «Иисусе, Сыне Божий, помилуй мя», или «Господи, Иисусе Христе, помилуй мя», и, наконец, самый краткий вариант, «Господи, помилуй» [16, с. 100]. Ее текстуальная длительность избирается индивидуально, в зависимости от духовных сил и способностей монаха.

В монастырях социального, миссионерского типа, с преобладанием монастырской культуры, имеют место новые подходы к организации взаимодействия монастыря и мира, социального служения. Одним из аспектов этого служения выступает благолепие монастырских культовых зданий – архитектура, иконопись, декоративно-прикладное искусство, целостный образ развитого монастырского ансамбля. Высокохудожественные по месторасположению, ракурсу, углу обзора места для монастырских комплексов избирались или благословлялись монахами.

Современные монастыри, развивая вековую традицию, находят новые способы взаимодействия монастыря и мира. В качестве примера можно назвать шефство Сретенского монастыря (г. Москва) над коллективным хозяйством «Восход» в Рязанской области, приведшее к кардинальному улучшению не только экономических показателей, но и социально-психологического климата в округе [14, с. 26–27]. В том же ряду создание пожарной части в Раифском Богородицком монастыре (республика Татарстан, РФ). Боевое пожарное подразделение

из семи монахов, кроме собственных нужд, обслуживает порядка десяти близлежащих населенных пунктов [8]. При киевском Свято-Иониинском монастыре на базе работающих здесь иконной, ювелирной и швейной мастерских организовано обучение подростков навыкам декоративной росписи и столярного дела. Кроме того, в монастыре работает компьютерный класс, где дети осваивают приемы компьютерной верстки и цифровой графики [21, с. 297].

Откликом на светскую социальную действительность являются и некоторые новые монастырские традиции. Например, родившаяся в Сретенском монастыре традиция ночных литургий в присутствии паломников в новогоднюю ночь с 31 декабря на 1 января. Известно, что в связи с разницей в 13 дней между григорианским (принятым в современной светской культуре) и юлианским (принятым в ряде Поместных Православных Церквей) календарями, новогодний праздник постоянно приходится на время православного Рождественского поста. Таким образом, ночная литургия является достойной для верующего человека альтернативой несовместимому со временем поста шумному застолью.

Культура монашества не раз находила адекватные ответы на вызовы времени. Так, в период своего существования в античном мире с его развитой философией и понятийным категориальным аппаратом, она сосредоточилась на создании литературных произведений морально-педагогического характера. Эпоха гонений породила апологетическую литературу. Возникновение ересей вызвало оттачивание богословских канонов и формулирование основ православия – догматов.

Реалии современной жизни и светской культуры порождают новые проблемные ситуации, касающиеся, например, организации жизни современных монахов, на которые культуре православного монашества еще предстоит дать ответ. В настоящее время эти вопросы активно обсуждаются в среде представителей культуры монашества [15]. Среди наиболее волнующих тем можно назвать следующие:

- проблема адаптации святоотеческих наставлений к контексту современной эпохи. Первоначальный монашеский энтузиазм способен со временем сменяться кликушеством (вид истерии), излишним вниманием к внешнему оформлению монастырской жизни, фарисейством (религиозное лицемерие, состояние самодовольства) и уставщичеством (утрата живой веры, формализм);
- проблема характера и меры монашеского труда и уровня комфорта жизни иноков;
- соотношение в монастыре власти его настоятеля и правящего епархиального епископа. Фактически это вопрос о степени свободы действий монастырского руководства;

- возможность отпуска (для лечения или восстановления сил) для монашествующих;
- необходимость наличия у монашествующего трудовой книжки и страхового медицинского полиса и ряд других.

Сама постановка вопросов, ставших возможными именно сегодня, говорит о значительных процессах обновления, имеющих место в современной культуре православного монашества. Так, говоря об изменениях, происходящих в Афонском монашестве за последнее время, Георгиос Мантзаридис отмечает, что если в 1960-х годах средний возраст монаха здесь был 55 лет, то теперь это 31–40 лет. Также значительно вырос уровень образования насельников Афона: около 350 из них закончили университеты. В процентном отношении ко всем афонитам это выше, чем средний уровень образования всего греческого населения. Кроме того, за последнее время все 20 афонских монастырей перешли на общежительный устав, который считается более полно отражающим идею коллективного монашеского жития. Что касается этнического состава насельников Святой горы, то сегодня здесь подвизаются не только люди из традиционно православных стран – Греции, России, Сербии, Румынии, Болгарии, Грузии, но и выходцы из Германии, Британии, Франции, Канады, Нидерландов, Перу, Сирии и некоторых стран Африки [3].

Монастырские реалии и виртуальная реальность

Среди новаций также освоение монастырями интернет-пространства, создание многими из них собственных сайтов, информационно-просветительских проектов. Сам вопрос взаимодействия и совместимости культуры монашества и важного элемента современного общества – интернета интересен и заслуживает более детального рассмотрения.

Присутствие культуры монашества в интернет-пространстве довольно многообразно. Помимо сайтов крупнейших монастырей существуют информационные сайты о монашестве как явлении, электронные библиотеки аскетической литературы, аналитические материалы современных теологов из монахов, влияющих на общественное мнение, монастырская публицистика и др. Сами сайты тех или иных монастырей также достаточно информативны. Здесь представлена ознакомительная информация о монастыре (его история, видеоряд, адрес, информация для паломников, расписание служб, престольные праздники, контакты и др.), новости, фоторяд прошедших заметных событий, электронная библиотека (библейские тексты, акафисты, молитвы, аскетическая литература, проповеди и др.), фонотека песнопений монастырского хора, информация о паломнических турах. Могут также присутствовать данные для сбора пожертвований и рубрика «Вопрос священнику». Интернет-пространство в данном случае

рассматривается монашеством как один из современных каналов миссионерской работы среди населения, чей стиль общения обусловлен новыми реалиями информационного общества.

Вместе с тем, отношение к интернету и самому явлению виртуальной реальности в церковной среде и среди ряда ученых неоднозначно. Речь идет не только об опасной и вредной для духовного здоровья (и не только для монаха) информации, которая содержится в Сети. С. С. Хоружий, например, считает, что виртуальная реальность выступает не как автономный род бытия, а как «недо-род бытия». Ей присуще частичное, недовоплощенное, мерцающее существование [23, с. 41, 43]. Наряду с этим, «виртуальные практики в то же время максимально доступны: они не требуют предельных внутренних усилий и строгой школы, как духовные практики <…>. Они обладают инерцией, затягивающей силой: сравнительно с ними, режимы актуальной реальности более резки и напряженны, и виртуальный человек стремится затянуть пребывание в виртуальной реальности, возвращаясь в актуальное неохотно» [23, с. 56]. Прогнозируя дальнейшее развитие ситуации, С. С. Хоружий пишет: «Человек будет совершать возврат из виртуальной реальности в актуальную все с большим трудом, что с неизбежностью будет приводить к дегенерации актуальной реальности. Дегенерация будет приближением актуальной реальности к виртуальной – убыванием формотворческой и жизнестроительной энергии, исчезанием связей и постепенным преобладанием распадных процессов» [23, с. 57].

Некоторые церковные иерархи не приемлют выражений «виртуальный мир», «виртуальная реальность», считая, что задача Церкви – свидетельствовать миру о единственной и самой реальной реальности – существовании Бога, любое удаление от которого есть гибельным для человека. Другие носители культуры монашества задаются риторическим вопросом, насколько современный монах, который имеет сотни «друзей» в Facebook, активно ведет свой Живой Журнал (ЖЖ), участвует в блогах, чатах и т. п., остается при этом верен призывам и практике древних подвижников, завещавших быть немногословным, собранным, «трезвенным», пребывать в своей келье и выходить из монастыря лишь при крайней необходимости. Кроме того, с точки зрения православного монашества, является совершенно неприемлемым совершение online-исповедей и некоторых других религиозных обрядов и ритуалов в Сети, что практикуется рядом христианских церквей протестантского направления и других церковных организаций.

Интересным фактом сегодня есть появление ряда терминов, возникших на «пересечении» реалий монашеских практик и информационного общества. Таковы, например, «медиааскетизм», «информационный пост», «богословие коммуникации», «литургичность как новый тренд» и др. Они отражают желание части людей поставить

под контроль свое пребывание в интернет-пространстве. Медиааскетика, например, «это образ жизни, характеризующийся пониманием новейших средств коммуникации и их разумным использованием. Цель медиааскетики – научиться осознанно существовать в мире современных технологий, медиа и рекламы» [20].

Своего рода «центристскую» позицию по вопросу совместимости виртуального и религиозного фактора жизни современного человека занимает А. Н. Крылов. Исследователь считает, что «Виртуальная идентичность способна в той или иной мере замещать и вытеснять религиозную идентичность, но в то же время – сопровождать и усиливать ее. Религиозная идентичность будет, в данном случае, включать только индивидуальную идентичность пользователя интернета, поскольку выступает в некоторой конкуренции к социальной религиозной идентичности, обретаемой, в том числе, посредством принадлежности к церковному приходу и реальным церковным традициям. Несмотря на то, что активность религиозных организаций, особенно религиозных фундаменталистов, в интернете увеличивается, виртуальная религия еще не создана, также маловероятным является создание полноценной виртуальной церкви» [7, с. 215].

Существует и мнение, что работа в Сети Интернет вполне согласуется с монашеским призванием. Игумен Петр (Мещеринов) считает, что «Если монах уже, так сказать, „устоявшийся“, то работа в Сети – самое что ни на есть монашеское занятие: не нужно никуда ходить, все – в келье, есть и время подумать над материалами и т. д.» [9, с. 53].

Таким образом, вопрос совместимости монашеского образа жизни и нового явления виртуальной реальности рассматривается Церковью в том же ключе, что и другие средства коммуникации и явления жизни. Возможность, допустимость и эффективность их использования зависит от целей работы и способности монаха к самоконтролю.

Вместе с тем, Патриарх Кирилл считает интернет большим соблазном. По его мнению, монах, выходящий со своего мобильного телефона в интернет, должен задуматься о смысле и цели своего нахождения в монастыре. Священников же первоиерарх РПЦ призывает, напротив, активнее использовать интернет для миссионерской работы [13].

Таким образом, если учесть наличие в культуре монашества двух ее типов – «монашеской» культуры и «монастырской» культуры [19], представляется оправданным заметить следующее. Для монашеской культуры интернет, безусловно, выступает разлагающим и опасным фактором. Для монастырской культуры, напротив, органичным есть использование в целях христианской миссии этого ресурса, дающего широкую аудиторию и новые возможности.

Поэзис и мимезис в культуре православного монашества

Диалектика традиционности и новаторства в культуре православного монашества тесно сопряжена с вопросом соотношения творчества и подражания в данной культуре. Как правило, высокий уровень традиционности культуры возводит подражание, то есть мимезис, в число ее базовых ценностей. Культурное новаторство, воспринимаемое как значимое, напротив, выводит на первый план ценность творчества, то есть поэзиса.

В культуре православного монашества творческий подход необходим, например, для того, чтобы переложить язык священного Писания и Предания в каждую конкретную эпоху на язык этой эпохи. По словам митрополита Антония Сурожского «Надо употребить свой ум и опыт для того, чтобы применять наставления, данные в пустыне, к городской пустыне» [2, с. 480]. Также А. И. Сидоров замечает, что «меняется видение святых отцов каждым новым поколением (не говоря уже о естественном изменении самого языка и связанного с ним мироощущения): каждое поколение и каждая эпоха отбирают в многообильной сокровищнице святоотеческого наследия то, что необходимо именно этой эпохе и именно этому поколению» [17, с. 6]. Для Г. Флоровского вообще «жить в культуре» – значит жить в обстановке творческого напряжения. Духовное творчество для него выступает синонимом богословского творчества. Творчество есть созидание, его не может заменить просвещение или ученость: «научиться богословствовать не из ученой традиции или инерции только, и не только из любознательности, но из живого церковного опыта и из религиозной потребности в знании» [22, с. 364].

По мнению доктора психологических наук Н. Н. Николаенко, творческий процесс и создание нового есть результатом напряженного «диалога познавательных способностей правого и левого полушарий головного мозга человека» [12, с. 7]. Христианская антропология имеет свои представления, согласно которым душа человека трехчастна – ум, разум, дух. Ум есть образ Божий, а место его пребывания – сердце. При совмещении этих двух антропологических представлений (светского и религиозного) можно сделать вывод, что источник творчества в культуре монашества – это диалог ума (= образа Божьего, сердца духовного) и души (понимаемой, в данном случае, как целостный человек).

По замечанию А. Шмемана, само понятие «новый» в православии означает не онтологическую новизну, но преображение, исправление: «определение новая – новая жизнь, новая тварь – подразумевает не онтологическую новизну, не возникновение „существа“, которого не было прежде, но искупленное, обновленное и преображенное отношение между единственно „субстанциональными“ существами – Богом и Его созданием» [24, с. 209].

При всей традиционности монастырской жизни существует «зазор» между заповедями, личными примерами подвижничества монахов согласно этим заповедям, и реальными условиями каждого исторического периода. В рамках этого зазора и есть место для нововведений. Создание нового в светской культуре ограничено наличными материальными средствами и физическими возможностями. В культуре монашества оно ограничено уставом, который, впрочем, «как леса, которые поддерживают здание, пока оно не стоит по-настоящему» [2, с. 409]. По мнению преподобного Пахомия, те, кто достиг свободы духа, совершенные, не имеют нужды в уставе [10]. Монах, как и гений, независим от социальных штампов – стереотипов в мышлении с его культом успеха, здоровья, потребления и пр.

Целью творчества и новаторства в светской культуре зачастую является самовыражение, в культуре монашества же оно имеет целью выразить в себе Христа. Следовательно, новаторство в светской культуре базируется на эгоцентризме, в лучших своих проявлениях – на антропоцентризме, в культуре монашества новаторство имеет своим основанием христоцентризм.

Таким образом, представляется вероятным, что поэзис и мимезис в культуре православного монашества стремятся к совпадению, или, мягче, объединению в личности Христа. Каким бы ни было аскетическое творчество монаха, он никогда не будет в состоянии стать святее и выше Христа, но всегда стремится и может лишь «следовать Христу». Вместе с тем, Личность Христа является настолько совершеннее человеческой личности, что следование Христу (мимезис) по сути превращается в творчество (поэзис) в практике земной жизни монаха. В данном случае рождается ситуация переводимости / непереводимости культурных языков и кодов, которая определяет креативную функцию культуры, приводит к культурному творчеству. Образ Христа не может быть до конца воплощен человеком-монахом. Священное Писание не может быть нетворчески наложено на современную жизнь. Данная семантически богатая ситуация описывается в определении святых преподобных (канонизированных монахов) как «во плоти ангел» и «небесный человек».

Вывод

В культуре православного монашества наряду с традиционностью и подражанием (мимезисом) имеет место новаторство и творчество (поэзис). Это позволяет данной культуре, с одной стороны, сохранять неизменным свое сущностное ядро, а с другой стороны – адаптироваться, изменяться и развиваться в условиях различных эпох, в том числе и в ситуации современной культуры постмодерна,

характеризующейся кардинально отличными от культуры монашества базовыми установками.

Анализируя актуальные факты из жизни и деятельности монастырей, можно выделить следующие особенности современной культуры православного монашества:

- омоложение, понижение среднего возраста насельников монастыря;
- повышение среднего уровня образованности монахов;
- унификация формы организации жизни монахов, постепенный переход от идиоритмической (особножительной) к общежительной форме, более соответствующей целям отречения собственной воли, послушания, настяжания и др.;
- интернационализация этнического состава насельников монастыря.

Новаторская деятельность в культуре православного монашества прослеживается по таким основным направлениям:

- поиск и обретение монахом собственного образа служения Богу;
- оригинальная комбинация существующих, опробованных аскетических практик, свой вариант полноты, силы их выражения в жизненном пути конкретного представителя монашества;
- модернизация миссионерской, социальной работы в деятельности монастыря.

Механизмами или источниками такого новаторства выступают:

- синтез; разнообразные сочетания «внутренних» и «внешних» аспектов монашества, а также культуры монашества и культуры светской;
- компаративность; сравнительный анализ и сопоставление существующих аскетических практик, и их преломление в данную конкретную эпоху;
- индивидуальность монаха, его менталитет, темперамент, здоровье, одаренность, влияющие на образ подвижничества.

Семантически богатая ситуация положения монастыря на стыке горнего и дольнего миров, а также личностный, исторический, географический факторы приводят к необходимости творческой деятельности в культуре православного монашества. Фактически ресурсом творчества выступает ситуация переводимости/ непереводимости культурного языка и кодов Библии на языки исторических эпох и культур. Можно сказать, что принцип этого творчества синонимичен новациям в иконописном творчестве: небесное не может быть несимволично (нетворчески, неновационно) представлено в земном. Творчество и новаторство возникает на «стыках» различных пластов и проявлений реальности: Небесная Реальность – Христос Сын Человеческий;

Христос – монах; монах – мир. Результатом первого «стыка» стало появление Евангелия и возникновение христианства. А история и культура монашества – это новации на двух других «стыках».

Кроме того, культура православного монашества исторически представлена в виде двух основных типов, которые условно можно обозначить как «монашеская культура» («созерцательное» монашество, анахоретство) и «монастырская культура» («социальное» монашество, монастыри с преимущественной миссионерской направленностью деятельности). Благодаря наличию этих двух типов культура православного монашества обладает способностью одновременно и трансформироваться под влиянием внешней среды, и сохранять неизменными свои сущностные характеристики.

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Culture of the Orthodox monasticism in the modern socio-cultural context

Abstract: In the modern post-Christian / post-secular world, the culture of the Orthodox monasticism did not become a part of the archival culture. It not only arouses the researchers' interest, but the number of its carriers is steadily increasing. In addition to the obvious historical, sociopolitical reasons, the mechanisms have been discovered that allow this culture to develop in a situation of postmodernism, which is oppositely directed in a number of its values. The culture of the Orthodox monasticism is historically represented in the form of two main types: "monastic culture" ("contemplative" monasticism) and "monastery culture" ("social" monasticism). Thanks to this, the culture of the Orthodox monasticism has the ability to simultaneously transform itself under the influence of the external environment, and preserve its essential characteristics unchanged. Semantically rich situation of the monastery position at the junction of the heaven and earth worlds, as well as the personal, historical, geographical factors lead to the needing for creative activity in the culture of the Orthodox monasticism. In this case a situation of the translation / non-transferability of cultural languages and codes arises, which determines the creative function of culture, leads to cultural creativity.

Key words: culture of the Orthodox monasticism, monastic culture, monastery culture, traditionalism, innovation, virtual reality, poetry, mimesis.

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ПРАВОСЛАВНАЯ ВЕРА И РЕЛИГИОЗНОСТЬ КРЕСТЬЯНСТВА В СЁЛАХ КОРОЧАНСКОГО РАЙОНА КУРСКОЙ ОБЛАСТИ В КОНЦЕ 20 – НАЧАЛЕ 30 ГГ. XX ВЕКА.

Аннотация: В статье на основе первых декретов советской власти, направленных на борьбу с Русской Православной Церковью, анализируется уровень религиозности класса крестьянства после введения РКП(б) запретов на религиозную деятельность в конце 20х – начале 30х гг. В материале констатируется, что декреты новой власти, которые были нацелены на борьбу с Русской Православной Церковью достаточно ощутимо затронули жизнь верующего населения России и Церкви, как института. В заключении кратко разбираются итоги постановлений партии и отношение к религии, а также религиозное сознание крестьянства Курской области в 30 годы XX века. В материале приводятся комментарии жителей сел Корочанского района на основе которых можно сделать выводы, что большинство декретов большевиков были не вполне продуманны для последующей реализации и не способствовали достижению поставленной партией цели – уничтожению религиозности населения и православной веры. В выводах автор говорит, что, хотя, религиозность притеснялись жесткими методами, крестьянство оставалось высокорелигиозным классом населения и православие в крестьянской среде сохранялось.

Ключевые слова: национальное самосознание, религиозная память, борьба с религией, христианство, православие.

К началу потрясений 1917 года Русская Православная Церковь в Российской Империи представляла собой внушительную силу и имела очень сильные социально-политические и экономические позиции. 70% населения исповедовали православие, имелось 78767 храмов и часовен, 185 духовных училищ, 62 духовные семинарии и 4 духовных академии. В начале 20 века авторитет Русской Православной Церкви был очень велик[1]. В программах всех политических партий предреволюционной России были положения о постепенном отделении Церкви от госу-

[1] Шубин А. Старт страны советов. Революция. – СПб.: Питер, 2017

дарства. Господствовали несколько точек зрения на будущую форму церковного управления. Сторонники партии мирного обновления с князем Е. Н. Трубецким выступали за то, что даже при проведении отделения от государства за Православием оставался особый статус. Русская Церковь, по их мнению, столь органически срослась с народом, его культурой и государственностью, что ее уже невозможно оторвать от общественного организма – национального государства[2],[3].

С этой позицией резко расходились идеолого-государственные установки захватившей в ноябре 1917 г. власть ВКП(б). В.И. Ленин отмечал, что корни религии нужно искать в страхе, невежестве народа, экономической и социальной неустроенности, и теоретически признавал право каждого исповедовать любую религию. Вместе с тем он определял религию как один из видов духовного гнета. В работе «Крах второго интернационала» (1915г.) он писал: «все угнетающие классы нуждаются для охраны своего господства в функциях попа. Поп утешает и рисует им (угнетенным) перспективы смягчения бедствий при сохранении классового господства, разрушая революционную решимость эксплуатируемых»[4].

Политика советской власти в отношении церкви в начале XX века была направлена на оперативное разрушение Церкви как института и вытеснение религиозного чувства русского православного народа квазирелигиозной коммунистической идеологией. Публикация в конце 1917 года проекта Декрета Совета Народных Комиссаров «Об отделении церкви от государства и школы от церкви» стала полной неожиданностью для населения России. Петроградский Митрополит Вениамин в письме от 10.01.1918 писал Совнаркому: «Волнения могут принять силу стихийных движений… и привести к тяжелым последствиям. Православный народ никогда не допускал подобных посягательств на его святые храмы». Также и М. Горький отмечал в статье «Отбой» газеты «Новая Жизнь» преждевременность и бесплодность данного декрета. Официального ответа партии не последовало, но Ленин в рекомендациях правительству по данному вопросу отмечал: «Очень прошу коллегию при комиссариате юстиции поспешить с разработкой декрета об отделении церкви от государства»[5]. То есть, захватив государственную власть, большевики не вполне были подготовлены к вопросу дальнейшего развития отношений с Церковью.

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[2] Шкаровский М.В., Русская Православная Церковь в XX веке, Москва: Вече: Лепта, 2010

[3] Всероссийский церковно-общественный вестник. – 1917.- 13 июня

[4] Политика советской власти в отношении религии и церкви в деревне Северо-Запада России в конце 1920-х – 1930-е гг. автореферат по ВАК 07.00.02, кандидат исторических наук Проскурина, Алла Владимировна

[5] Шкаровский М.В., Русская Православная Церковь в XX веке, Москва: Вече: Лепта, 2010, стр. 73.

Декрет Совета Народных Комиссаров о свободе совести, церковных и религиозных обществах был принят 20 января (2 февраля) 1918 г., исключив тем самым русское духовенство из жизни страны.[6] 21 января (3 февраля) 1918 г. Декрет был опубликован в газетах «Известия» и «Правда».[7] Первая половина 1918 года проходила под флагом сопротивления Декрету от 20.01.1918. Религиозность народа в тот период росла с невероятной скоростью. В Церковь пришли тысячи новообращенных, народ испытывал ту духовность, которую еще усиливала забота о нравственности.[8] Для нового правительства сопротивление Декрету об отделении Церкви от государства стало неожиданностью, прежде всего, было удивительно недовольство огромной части крестьянства России.[9]

Помимо отторжения населением столь радикальных нововведений, проведению Декрета в жизнь мешало и отсутствие профессиональных кадров для претворения в жизнь поставленных задач, недопонимание и различное толкование новых законов местными властями. Конституция РСФСР, принятая 10.07.1918 года, в статье 13 закрепила положение Декрета об отделении Церкви от государства и школы от Церкви, а также признавала за всеми гражданами свободу религиозной и антирелигиозной пропаганды[10], но при этом было узаконено и социальное неравенство относительно служителей церкви. Ленин исходил из признания реакционности религии и духовенства. В программе РКП (б), разработанной под руководством Ленина и принятой в 1919 году, подчеркивалось, что партия стремится к полному разрушению религии.[11]

Одним из актов борьбы с Церковью была кампания по ликвидации мощей святых Русской Православной Церкви. Отделом управления НКВД был выпущен циркуляр от 23.04.1919г. «О вскрытии мощей», определивший, что вскрытие святых мощей происходит в составе

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[6] Декрет о свободе совести, церковных и религиозных обществах от 02.02.1918г. Декреты Советской власти. Том 1. 25 октября 1917г. – 16 марта 1918г. Москва. 1957. С. 371–374.

[7] Декреты Советской власти. Т. 1. М.: Политиздат, 1957. С. 373–374.

[8] Шкаровский М.В., Русская Православная Церковь в XX веке, Москва: Вече: Лепта, 2010, стр. 73

[9] Одинцов М.И. Государство и Церковь (История взаимоотношений. 1917 – 1938гг.) – М.: Знание, 1991. – 64 с. – (Новое в жизни, науке. Сер. «Культура и религия, №11»)

[10] Конституция РСФСР 1918 года ст. 13// Хрестоматия по истории отечественного государства и права: форма государственного единства в отечественной истории XX века/ сост. О.И Чистяков, Г.А. Кутьина. – М.: Издательство Юрайт, Высшее образование, 2009. – С. 19–35.

[11] Политика советской власти в отношении религии и церкви в деревне Северо-Запада России в конце 1920-х – 1930-е гг. автореферат по ВАК 07.00.02, кандидат исторических наук Проскурина, Алла Владимировна

определенной комиссии и указывавший на необходимость фиксации происходящего с помощью фото – и видео средств[12]. В 02.01.1922г. Президиумом ВЦИК было принято постановление «О ликвидации церковного имущества»[13], что также повлекло за собой сопротивление и духовенства и самих верующих. Почти через месяц 16.02.1922г. Президиумом ВЦИК было принято, как бы уточняющее предыдущее решение, постановление «Об изъятии церковных ценностей для реализации на помощь голодающим»[14]. Предложения правительству Л.Д. Троцкого об активизации работ по изъятию церковных ценностей в центре и губерниях составляли четкую инструкцию, каким образом и кто именно должен проводить изъятие ценностей, а также рекомендации по изъятиям в губерниях.[15]

Конституция РСФСР, принятая 11.05.1925 года, в ст. 4 подтвердила положение об отделении Церкви от государства и школы от Церкви, а также закрепила свободу религиозной и антирелигиозной пропаганды.[16] В Уголовном кодексе РСФСР, принятом 26.05.1922 года, в главе 3 предусматривались наказания за нарушение законодательства об отделении Церкви от государства.[17] В статье «О значении воинствующего материализма» (1922) Ленин дает рекомендации по ведению борьбы с религией: «необходимо совмещать атеистическую пропаганду среди верующих и воинствующую борьбу с духовенством».[18] В 08.04.1929

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[12] Циркуляр Отдела управления НКВД № 2456 от 23 апреля 1919г. «О вскрытии мощей». Русская Православная Церковь и коммунистическое государство. 1917–1941. Документы и фотоматериалы.-М.: Издательство Библейско-Богословского Института св. апостола Андрея, 1996. – s. 59.

[13] Постановление Президиума ВЦИК «О ликвидации церковного имущества». Из протокола заседания Президиума ВЦИК №1, п.15. Архивы кремля. В 2-х кн./ Кн.2. Политбюро и церковь. 1922–1925 гг.-Новосибирск-М., «Сибирский хронограф», «Российская политическая энциклопедия» (РОССПЭН), 1998. С. 5–6.

[14] Постановление Президиума ВЦИК «Об изъятии церковных ценностей для реализации на помощь голодающим» от 16.02.1922г. Из протокола заседания Президиума ВЦИК №13, п.1. Архивы кремля. В 2-х кн./ Кн.2. Политбюро и церковь. 1922–1925 гг.-Новосибирск-М., «Сибирский хронограф», «Российская политическая энциклопедия» (РОССПЭН), 1998. С. 15–18.

[15] Русская Православная Церковь и коммунистическое государство. 1917–1941. Документы и фотоматериалы. - М.: Изд-во Библейско-Богословского Института св. апостола Андрея, 1996. – с. 85–87.

[16] Конституция РСФСР 1925 года ст.4// Хрестоматия по истории отечественного государства и права: форма государственного единства в отечественной истории XX века/ сост. О.И Чистяков, Г.А. Кутьина. – М.: Издательство Юрайт, Высшее образование, 2009. – С. 225–242.

[17] Уголовный Кодекс РСФСР 1922 года. Хрестоматия по истории отечественного государства и права. 1917–1991 гг.-М.: Зерцало, 1997. С. 72–110.

[18] Политика советской власти в отношении религии и церкви в деревне

года было принято постановление «О религиозных объединениях»[19], закрепившее и определившее правовой статус Церкви. Данный документ существенно затронул религиозную жизнь населения страны и повлиял на последующее отношение населения к религии и вере.

Очередной акцией против Церкви явилась просьба ВСНХ СССР с представлением о необходимости получения в квартале октябрь – декабрь 1930 года и в январе – июне 1931 г. не менее 25 тыс. тонн лома колоколов, в том числе по РСФСР не менее 20 тыс. тонн. Колокола снимались в тех городах, в которых был уже запрещен колокольный звон.[20] Ленин считал, что необходимость декретов данного периода вызвана потребностью наметить пути развития социализма, при чем, он и сам допускал, что что-то в них может быть ошибочным, невыполнимым и не выдержит испытания временем[21]. За письмами, декретами и прочими правовыми документами нельзя увидеть масштабы того морального и физического насилия над Церковью, духовенством и верующим русским народом, происходившими на протяжении достаточно длительного в периода становления советской власти. В Курской губернии «Красный террор» стал одной из начальных точек борьбы власти с духовенством.[22] В рамках постановления ВЦИК от 08.04.1929 года деятельность религиозных объединений «для удовлетворения религиозных потребностей верующих» была строго регламентирована. Конечно, данные правила коснулись и Корочанского района Курской области.

Корочанский район известен по писцовым описаниями как административно-территориальная единица Курского Наместничества с середины XVII века. С 1802 по 1924 год уезд жил без значительных территориальных изменений. В период между 1918 и 1924 годами несколько раз пересматривался состав и названия входивших в уезд волостей и сельсоветов. По постановлению Президиума ВЦИК от 12 мая 1924 года Корочанский уезд был упразднён, а его территория практически полностью вошла в состав укрупнённого Белгородского уезда. В 1928

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[19] Ведомости ВС РСФСР. 1975. № 27, ст. 572.

[20] Русская Православная Церковь и коммунистическое государство. 1917–1941. Документы и фотоматериалы. - М.: Изд-во Библейско-Богословского Института св. апостола Андрея, 1996. – с. 286.

[21] Одинцов М.И. Государство и Церковь (История взаимоотношений. 1917–1938гг.) – М.: Знание, 1991. – 64 с. – (Новое в жизни, науке. Сер. «Культура и религия, №11»)

[22] Субботин П.Ю., Осуществление политики красного террора по отношению к православному духовенству и верующим в уездах Курской губернии в 1918–1919 гг. // Научные ведомости Белгородского государственного университета. – №7(78). – Вып. 14, 2010.

году, после ликвидации Курской губернии и перехода на областное, окружное и районное деление был создан Корочанский район, вошедший в Белгородский округ Центрально-Чернозёмной области, а с 13 июня 1934 года стал составной частью Курской области.

Предварительные результаты глубинных интервью, приведенные в данной статье, могут помочь приблизиться к пониманию особенностей религиозного сознания и отношения к православной вере крестьянства в 30 гг XX века в рамках Корочанского района. Выборка респондентов основана на периоде рождения респондентов, а именно в интервью участвовали респонденты 1912–1933 годов рождения. Все респонденты рождены и проживали только на территории деревень Корочанского района. Всего в опросе на данный момент приняли участие 30 человек из 12 сел современной Белгородской области. С согласия участников, велась аудиозапись разговора. Период проведения исследования охватил время с мая 2016 г по июнь 2017 г. включительно[23].

Беспорядки, кровопролитие, грабежи, произвол властей, а также элементарное незнание или недопонимание новых законов советской власти по отношению к церкви приводили к невиданной жестокости исполнителей как по отношению к духовенству Курской губернии, так и по отношению к самим верующим. «У меня дед попом был церкви в с. Самойловка. Сколько раз приходили, допрос снимали… спрашивали – сколько тебе платили… потрепали нас» – Мария Ивановна, с. Круглый Бродок, г.р. – 1922. «Тогда церкви стали уничтожать… мать рассказывала, свекровь, еще в 29-м году… на батюшке молодежь ездила, издевались над им… и били… что только не делали… Никто никому не подчиняется… Так и тогда было… Что ты сделал, убил – убил, никто не запрещает, никто ничего. Это жизнь была трудная» – Федор Никитович, с. Большое, г.р. – 1929. Кампания по массовому закрытию церквей в 30 годах XX оставила глубокий след в крестьянстве. Респонденты данного опроса будучи детьми запомнили моменты снятия колоколов и разрушение церквей родных сел (Клавдия Михайловна, с. Подьяруги, г.р. 1926, Петр Михайлович, с. Коломыцево, г.р. – 1915). «А когда церковь превратили в клуб… Некоторые с удовольствием ходили, и танцевали там, и выпивали…Купола поснимали, кресты поснимали Некоторые женщины были активисты, по иконам танцевали, плясали…» – Клавдия Михайловна, с. Подьяруги, г.р. 1926. Стоит отметить, что организация в зданиях церквей развлекательных заведений на тот период являлась нормой. Если церковь не была разрушена по приказу властей, но в зданиях теперь уже бывших церквей в разные периоды были организованы: развлекательные клубы, библиотеки или, например, зернохранилища и другие казенные заведения в соответствии с постановлением от 08.04.1929 года «О религиозных объединениях». В

[23] Полевые материалы автора, 2016–2017 год.

случае, если имелся формуляр о сносе церковного здания, строительный материал уже разрушенной церкви не уничтожался, из остатков кирпича или дерева строили, например, конюшни, силосные ямы, частные дома, библиотеки и пр. Т.е. материал по итогам слома церквей вторично использовался для строительства необходимых по мнению партии зданий. При этом на общую коллективную религиозность крестьянства Корочанского района борьба большевиков с Церковью оказала небольшое влияние, что доказывают, даже после всех запретов и разрушений крестьянство в общей своей массе в 30 гг. XX века оставалось высокорелигиозным и богобоязненным классом населения. «Мама меня водила причащаться… Я причастилась, маленькую ложечку дали мне, говорю: «еще». А мама: «Ой, Господи!». За руку меня, долой» – Мария Ивановна, с. Коломыцево, г.р. – 1927. «Я была маленькой еще, мать водила в церковь, мы ходили в церковь… Сломали нашу церковь и все… (респондент говорит о закрытой церкви с. Подьяруги). «Было время… в другое село ходили, когда в своем не было» – Федосья Николаевна, с. Подьяруги, г.р. – 1922. Борьба с церковью как с институтом, борьба с духовенством и религиозностью населения страны в конце 20 начале 30 гг XX века совпала не только с репрессиями по отношению к духовенству, но и с общей коллективизацией и «раскулачиванием». Также нужно помнить о голоде 1933 года, который «забрал» огромное количество жителей всего Курского региона. Советская власть также в 20–30 гг проводила активную антирелигиозную политику в СМИ по отношению к религии, религиозным праздниками и пр. Партия в насаждении нового мировоззрения «коммунистического будущего» смешивала представленный партией негативный образ духовенства с негативным образом кулака.[24] Конечно, все вышеуказанные события коснулись и Корочанского района Курской области.

Не смотря на запреты новой власти в отношении религии и религиозности крестьяне как и раньше, люди в тот непростой период крестили своих детей, максимально сохраняя обрядность и традиции ритуала. Теперь крещение проходило не только в церквях, которые по большей части были закрыты или превращены в казенные места общего пользования Партии, но и в частных домах. Крестьяне готовились к ритуалу, заранее по соседям собирая новости, когда священник приедет в село. Часто, чтобы совершить обряд, ездили в другие села, подальше от дома, чтобы о крещении в селе никто не знал – «ни свои, ни чужие». «Мы своих детей крестили по хатам… В хуторе Кленовом, в хате, приехал, говорят, батюшка, можно покрестить детей. Мы схватили, у нас как раз было три младенца… и батюшка покрестил… Народ все равно в душе держался религии. Люди все равно. некоторые, кто мог, в дальние церкви ходил… Люди не отчуждались от религии совсем, все

[24] ГАБО, Белгородская Правда, 6 января, 1929 г.

старались детей покрестить…» – Клавдия Михайловна, с. Подьяруги, Прохоровский р-н, г.р. – 1926. Более того, часто обряд крещения мог происходить в тайне от всей семьи, например, если супруг занимал даже небольшую партийную должность. «Комсомольцам сказали детей не крестить… Государство приказало… Так крестили тайком… Узнают кто покрестил, говорили, что оштрафуют… но все равно крестили… в церкви» – Мария Ивановка, с. Круглый Бродок, г.р – 1922. Интересно, что даже партийные коммунисты тайно, иногда в другом районе или даже городе, но все старались покрестить своих детей. В деревне редко можно было что-либо скрыть, узкий социум предполагает достаточно тесное общение населения и уже позже дети арых коммунистов все же говорили в деревне кто им приходится крестными родителями. Т.е. даже коммунисты тайно, опасаясь наказания партии, но все же сохраняли традицию крещения. Человеческий страх, что власти узнают о крещении в семье и последуют санкции, сохранялся вплоть до 90 годов XX века. Как минимум, при обряде крещения крестьяне старались не вести записей имен родителей и/или крестных родителей ребенка. Стоит отметить, что обряд крещения крестьянство в советское время сохраняло на 100%. В рамках данного опроса не было выявлено ни одного отказа от крещения детей.

Чаще всего, если супруг в семье являлся активным сторонником коммунистической партии, например, занимал некую партийную должность, а супруга сохраняла высокую религиозность, по воспоминаниям опрошенных, супруг, подчиняясь партийным законам и не являясь религиозным и даже верующим человеком, не запрещал супруге, своим родителям или родителям жены совершать обряды Русской Православной Церкви, посещать церковь и крестить своих детей и учить их молитвам. (Вера Тимофеевна, с. Большая Халань, г.р. – 1926, Анна Павловна, г. Короча, г.р. – и 1922 и др.). Т.е. в открытом социуме – «на людях» семья вела себя как атеистическая ячейка общества, а дома, внутри своей семьи, как и ранее, продолжали вести уже не такую активную как ранее, но не менее традиционную религиозную жизнь (Елизавета Сергеевна, с. Большое, г.р. – 1912, Александра Ивановна, с. Хмелевое, г.р. – 1931). Также надо учитывать, некоторые ярые коммунисты все же веровали в Бога, хотя и тайно. Отец одного из респондентов в 20х–30х годах занимал высокий партийный пост в г. Короча и вместо веры имел свой собственный «моральный кодекс атеиста», но после ссоры с товарищем по партии, драки и последующих нескольких лет тюрьмы, вернувшись домой, осмысляя проведенные в заточении годы, говорил: «Я поверил в Бога. Меня спас Бог!» – Павел Артемович, отец Анны Павловны, г. Короча, г.р. – 1922.

В отличие от внутрисемейного отношения к религии, учителя сельских школ целенаправленно отучали от религии крестьянских детей. «Учителя говорили, чтобы в церковь мы не ходили, это неправильно»

– говорит Мария Дмитриевна, с. Большая Халань, г.р. – 1922. Стоит отметить, что религия и образование в 30 года XX века, а также отношение учителя к религии в 30е годы является отдельной темой для исследования, так как в сравнении с крестьянами учителя сельских образовательных учреждений достаточно активно поддерживали новую коммунистическую власть как по приказу власти так и по личным предпочтениям и активно боролись с религиозностью своих юных подопечных в рамках школьных занятий, не смотря на то, что учителя были воспитаны в православной вере, все были крещены и их семьи оставались высокорелигиозными. «Учителя говорили, чтобы мы в церковь не ходили. Это неправильно. Да и когда взрослая стала, учительницей работала, своим ученика твердила: ребята нельзя в церковь ходить. Вы – пионеры! И, чтобы яичко крашенное в школу не носили…» – Мария Дмитриевна, с. Большая Халань, г.р. – 1922.

Основными хранителями традиции православия в тот период конца 20–30 годов XX века оставались женщины. Именно женщины заботились о сохранении православных традиций в семье, поддерживали те правила, которые в их домах чтили на протяжении многих лет, и передавали веру своим детям. Женщины украшали дом к церковным праздникам и готовили праздничный стол (убрать и «побелить» дом, выстирать белье, приготовить праздничный стол и пр. приготовления к праздникам Пасхи и Троицы сохранились в регионе по настоящее время). Женщины так же, как и раньше, детей учили молитвам, заботились, чтобы дети следовали религиозным традициям, иногда приукрашивая, объясняли своим детям, как могли, значение слова «Бог». Например, как минимум в смысле, что жить надо по совести. «Мама говорила, что Бог есть, что нельзя этого делать, это плохо, Бог накажет, а только хорошо поступать надо, не баловаться. Не обижать людей», – Мария Дмитриевна, село Большая Халань, г.р – 1922. Иногда к вере приводили, объясняя ребенку какие-либо события через чудо. «Вся сила в религии. С моей бабушкой идем, ведет она меня, дошли до церкви. А наверху (церкви) березка растет. Я говорю: бабушка наверху березка растет (имея ввиду, что деревце растет без земли). Ой, говорит, деточка, ты же ангел, ты увидела эту березку, подумай, нет земли, нет ничего, а березка на церкви растет. А маме моей вера давала силу. Как и всем. Вообще человек без веры жить не может» – Анна Павловна, г. Короча, г.р. – 1922. Молитвы «Отче наш», «Богородице Дево» и «Символ Веры» («Верую») поколение детей, родившиеся в 20–30 годах, знали с младенчества. Чаще все же молитвам учили их бабушки. Бабушки водили в церковь, причащали, обучали ритуалам. Иногда данное поколение в религии воспитывалось и родителями, но участниками данного опроса часто упоминались бабушки (Анна Павловна, г. Короча, г.р. – 1922, Елизавета Сергеевна, с. Большое, г.р. – 1912 и др.)

Иконы для крестьянства всегда оставались святыней. В период разрушения религиозности крестьяне продолжали хранить иконы в домах. Наиболее почитаемы в регионе были и есть по настоящее время лики «Божьей матери», и «Николая Чудотворца.» Запрета коммунистов на хранение икон в домах Корочанского района не было выявлено. «Иконы мы не прятали…» – Клавдия Михайловна, с. Подьяруги, г.р. – 1926. В 30х годах при закрытии и разрушении храмов крестьяне в попытках сохранить частичку святыни тайком от властей старались унести (по сути, украсть) церковные иконы и спрятать дома. Иконы из церквей сел Пестаново и Коломыцево, так же, как и из небольшой деревянной церкви в с. Подьяруги крестьяне прятали по домам. «Я вот небольшой была, помню, как ломали ее (церковь села Коломыцево), и все ж там тащили иконы домой… мы с мамой взяли по иконке. И догнал нас мужчина, как я плакала, и взял вот так ключом разорвал, деревянные иконы были, сверху нарисованы лики были… красиво было…» – Мария Ивановна, с. Коломыцева, г.р. – 1927. В случае, если крестьяне были замечены, в том, что хотят унести церковные иконы домой, иконы отбирались силой и уничтожались прилюдно. «В эти годы, (когда ломали церковь с. Коломыцево, современный Прохоровский р-н) икону, которая снаружи была прибита к церкви, они (партийные) положили на землю, нас (деревенских жителей) поставили строем и заставили топтать ногами икону … Половина прошли, а половина разбежались», – рассказывает Петр Михайлович, с. Коломыцево, г.р. – 1915. «Иконы в доме и держали и держим. У меня до сих пор от матери и отца благословение» – Александр Ивановна, с. Хмелевое, г.р. – 1931.

По большим церковным праздникам, которые не только определяли сезонность деревенского труда, но и служили объединяющей нравственной силой, крестьяне украшали свои дома соответственно церковному празднику. Например, обычай украшать дом на Троицу веточками клена, орешника или березы сохранен в области до настоящего времени. На Пасху, иногда много километров ночью с маленькими детьми, часто босые, крестьяне шли освящать куличи в любую из действующих, но не всегда близлежащих церквей. «Я была девчушкой уже, на Пасху стою всю ночь, носила и светила яйца, куличи…» – Мария Ивановна, с. Коломыцево, г.р. – 1927. Православные праздники в непростой период насильственной секуляризации являлись национальной самоидентификацией и объединяющей силой крестьянства. Пасха, Троица, Рождество, Крещение, также престольные праздники каждой деревни отмечались в каждой семье не смотря на запреты новой власти.

Хотя религиозность крестьянства, как видно на примере Корочанского района, притеснялись жесткими методами не только физической расправы, но и морального давления, православная вера в крестьянской среде сохранялась. Советская власть старалась за исторически

короткий срок изжить не только Церковь как институт, но и религиозность населения как таковую, предложив взамен утопическую систему, на которую верующий народ и крестьянство в частности не могли опереться в своей повседневной, оберегаемой православными традициями, жизни. Под давлением новой власти вера из Церкви как из социального института перешла в дома и первоначально глубже поселилась в душах крестьян. И, несмотря на новые правила по отношению к религии, крестьяне оставались верующими и высокорелигиозными. На общую коллективную религиозность крестьянства Корочанского уезда борьба большевиков с Церковью оказала небольшое влияние, что доказывает: даже после всех запретов и разрушений крестьянство в общей своей массе в 30 гг. XX века оставалось высокорелигиозным классом населения[25]. Население стремилось максимально не только сохранить свою веру и соблюсти православные ритуалы, но и передать их последующим поколениям. Крещение новорожденных, празднование церковных праздников (главный праздник верующих региона – Пасха, далее Рождество, Крещение, Троица, престольные праздники и др.), соблюдение православных постов, чтение молитв, преклонение перед иконами: религиозные традиции в классе крестьянства сохранялись старшим поколением и почитались последующими поколениями. Часто респондентами данного опроса упоминалась пословица: «Без Бога не до порога». «Каждое поколение вырабатывает собственное отношение к прошлому… возрастные группы отличаются видением мира»[26], но в данном случае мы говорим о религиозной памяти, которая определяется не только воспоминаниями, трансляцией опыта и коллективным следованием религиозным традициям, но также передачей и коллективным почитанием религиозных обычаев из поколения в поколение. В период социальных потрясений первой половины XX века религия стала для крестьян объединяющей формой сохранения традиционной жизни.[27]

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Tatiana Pokrovskaya

Orthodox faith and religiousness of the peasantry in the villages of the Korochan district of the Kursk province at the end of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's

Abstract: In the article, on the basis of the first decrees of the Soviet government, is analyzed the level of religiosity of the peasant class after the Bolsheviks introduced bans on religious activity in the 20–30s of the 20th century in Russia. In conclusion, the religious consciousness of the peasantry in the Kursk region in the 30s of the XX century is briefly analyzed. The author says that the peasantry remained a religious class and religious memory passed the orthodox religion to subsequent generations.

Key words: national identity, religious memory, Christianity, Orthodoxy.

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