Dualism, mental explanations and explanatory exclusion

Nešić, Janko (2013) Dualism, mental explanations and explanatory exclusion. Theoria, 56 (1). pp. 19-45. ISSN 0351-2274 eISSN 2406-081X

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Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE) generates the problem of mental explanation for dualism. Gibb argues that Kim’s principle is metaphysically implausible, but shows that a weaker principle EE* generates a similar problem for interactive dualism. In this paper I examine a possible dualistic response to arguments from EE and EE*. It is shown that both arguments from EE and EE* rest on the premises of the argument from overdetermination - causal exclusion and causal closure. Problem of explanatory exclusion can be reduced to the problem of causal overdetermination. I will show how an interactive dualist can make a plausible response to the argument from EE by rejecting the argument from causal overdetermination.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: explanatory exclusion, causal exclusion, interactive dualism, eksplanatorno isključenje, kauzalno isključenje, dvostruka determinacija, interakcioni dualizam.
Institutional centre: Centre for philosophy
Depositing User: Vesna Jovanović
Date Deposited: 19 Oct 2022 13:28
Last Modified: 19 Oct 2022 13:28
URI: http://iriss.idn.org.rs/id/eprint/1085

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