

Contested Minorities of the Middle East and Asia

Contested Minorities of the Middle East and Asia

Edited by

Attila Kovács and Katarína Šomodiová

Cambridge
Scholars
Publishing



Contested Minorities of the Middle East and Asia

Edited by Attila Kovács and Katarína Šomodiová

This book first published 2018

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2018 by Attila Kovács, Katarína Šomodiová and contributors

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-5275-0772-6

ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-0772-2

Dedicated to the Memory of our friend Dr. Mohsen Jafari-Mazhab (1958-2017), an eminent scholar of Iranian studies and expert of Eastern European studies in Iran.

CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Meeting the Otherness: Wladimir Ivanow's <i>Memoirs</i> and his Early Encounters with Iranian Minority Groups (Sufis, Ismailis and Gypsies) before 1920.....	5
Miklós Sárközy	
Is there Female Theology in Islam? Case Study of Fāṭima Bint ʿAbbās al-Baghdādīya.....	19
Admira Delić	
The Near Orient? The Transfer of “Otherness” to European Contexts.....	33
Martin Klapetek	
Christian <i>Sannyasis</i> at the Edge between (Religious) Minority and Majority in India	51
Matej Karásek	
Uyghur Separatism: A Fight for Cultural or Religious Identity?	73
Marko Jovanović	
Minority and Majority Representations of Jerusalem in Islamist Ideology.....	87
Attila Kovács	
The Mandaeans: An Endangered Minority of the Middle East	129
Katarína Šomodiová	
Abstracts	145
About the Authors.....	151

UYGHUR SEPARATISM: A FIGHT FOR CULTURAL OR RELIGIOUS IDENTITY?¹

MARKO JOVANOVIĆ

Introduction

More than 20 million Muslims live currently in China. Although this seems to be a rather large number, they still constitute less than 2% of the entire population (The World Factbook 2016). Chinese Muslims are not ethnically homogeneous, with the two largest groups being the Huis, who are not constrained to any specific territory, and the Uyghurs, who inhabit the western part of the country, the Xinjiang autonomous region. (Israeli 2012: 251)

Even before the 8th century, a host of nomadic steppe tribes known as Uyghurs had lived in the Tarim Basin of Central Asia. With the advent of Islam in these areas, the name was gradually disappearing, resulting in no mention of the Uyghurs between the 15th and the 20th century. The Islamisation of these tribes was not a brief process. It started in the 10th century and lasted until the 17th century, when even those Uyghurs who had been the most devout followers of Buddhism, up to that moment the most dominant religion in the region, converted to Islam. (see Gledni 2002)

The identity of the people presently known as Uyghurs is of a relatively recent date and closely connected with the struggle between the Chinese and Soviets for supremacy in Central Asia. (Gledni 2002: 489)

China conquered the Tarim Basin in 1760, when the Manchurian dynasty Qing seized the territory. (Gladney 2003: 456) It was then that the region was named Xinjiang which in translation means “the new border”. The Qing dynasty was deposed in the Revolution of 1912, the monarchy

¹ The paper was originally published in: Kovács, Attila – Šomodiová, Katarína (eds.): *Minority a majority na Blízkom východe a v Ázii = Minorities and majorities in the Middle East and Asia*, Bratislava: STIMUL, 2016.

was abolished and the republic established in its place, and the Kuomintang Nationalist Party came to power. Its rule lasted from 1912 to 1949, and in that period the Xinjiang region was governed by a succession of military commanders. (Trailović 2012: 273)

Sun Yat-sen, the first Chinese president, wanted to redefine the existing concept of the Chinese nation, as it happens so often after any revolution, proposing a concept of “Five races under one union”. His was the idea of “all races in China being equal, and they should be a part of a free and united China”. Not everyone was satisfied with this principle since the status of races was given only to the Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, and Hui Muslims, who were viewed as one race which encompasses all Chinese people who practice Islam, disregarding vast ethnic differences among them. (Gladney 1995: 2)

The region suffered from political interference from abroad, mainly from the Soviet Union, which, in order to further its own interests, incited the rise of nationalism among ethnic groups which populated these areas. It gave the best results with Uyghurs. The consequences of such politics manifested themselves at the Congress of Regional Delegates in Tashkent in 1921 when, with Soviet approval, it was decided to reintroduce the old ethnic name “Uyghur” and use it for Turkic ethnic groups that permanently reside in the Tarim Basin (Gledni 2002: 491).

All of this had led to countless conflicts among Muslims (Uyghurs, Kazakhs and others) and the central government, which resulted in the proclamation of two independent “Muslim” republics: the First, short-lived, East Turkestan Republic, whose capital was Kashgar and which existed from 1933 to 1934, and the Second East Turkestan Republic, which existed for a slightly longer time – from 1944 to 1949, with the capital in Yining (Gulja). (Gladney 2003: 456)

The First East Turkestan Republic was indeed temporary, but, nevertheless, the Chinese authorities decided, upon the renewal of the control over the territory, to proclaim Uyghurs a new official Chinese nationality in order to eliminate the causes of the dissent by the local population. (Gledni 2002: 490 – 491)

After the victory over the Kuomintang in the civil war (1945 – 1949), the Communist Party established the People's Republic of China and its sovereignty over all of China's mainland territory, including Xinjiang. (Dillon 2004: 34)

Minority Policies after the Communists Seized Power

In the newly formed People's Republic which introduced a new social system, Communism, it was necessary to redefine the concept of the Chinese nation in such a way that every potential cause of dissent among the population was eliminated.

The ruling Communist party, true to its ideology, decided to use Marxist-Stalinist criteria for assigning a status to a national minority. This meant that only those ethnic groups that had their own language and inhabited a certain territory could have been recognized as minorities. (Gladney 1998: 109) Only 41 ethnic groups fulfilled these criteria, which is an extremely low number bearing in mind that over 400 of them had been taken into consideration. The number of officially recognized national minorities was being gradually increased until 1982 when it stopped at 56. Those groups that did not manage to attain the status were mostly identified with the majority Han people or, in a smaller number of cases, with some other nationality with characteristics somewhat similar to theirs (e.g. the same religion). (Gladney 1995: 4)

The Chinese authorities viewed the recognition of the identity of the national minorities as a merely interim solution. They believed in the Marxist concept of social development according to which in a communist social system, first classes, and then nationalities would be eliminated. By accepting the communist ideology national minorities would shed “the burden” of national identities. The ultimate goal was the creation of a unified Chinese national identity, with the new Chinese nation (Zhonghua Minzu) representing a family of all 57 nationalities inhabiting China. (Jenner 2004: 252)

As part of the process of development of a unified national identity, in order to secure the preservation of a territorial and political unity of the country and prevent potential internal unrest induced by nationalistic aspirations, parts of China with mainly minority population were given a status of autonomous regions by the 1954 Constitution. Those were mostly border territories crucial to national security and stability. One of these territories was Xinjiang, which has been inhabited mainly by Uyghur population. (Trailović 2012: 271)

Xinjiang – a Region of Social Cleavages

The autonomous region of Xinjiang, situated in the north-west of China, spanning 1,646,900 square kilometres, accounts for a sixth of the entire Chinese territory. This region abounds in natural resources. With

25% of the overall country reserves, it is leading in the production of natural gas, while in the exploitation of oil it takes the fourth position. There are, also, significant coal reserves in this area. (Trailović 2012: 270 – 272)

Although it encompasses a huge area, Xinjiang is notably sparsely populated. According to the latest 2010 census results it has a population of 21, 8 million, i.e. merely 13.2 inhabitants per square kilometre (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2011). However, six times more people live in this area today than immediately after the end of the civil war in China, when the population of this territory was only 3.6 million. (Trailović 2012: 275) To realize how great an increase we are discussing, it should be mentioned that in the whole territory of China the population has risen by a “mere” 2.3 times. (Orleans 1957: 565)

The population growth caused significant changes in the proportion ratio of the two biggest ethnic groups inhabiting this autonomous region, the Uyghurs and the Han Chinese, the largest ethnic group in China. In 1949, Uyghurs constituted over 82% of the total population of Xinjiang, while the Han contributed with less than 6%. Today that gap is drastically narrowed, with 46.1% of Uyghurs and almost 40% of Han people. (Howell and Fan 2011: 122 – 123)

Such radical changes might not be attributed only to a high population growth. Another significant factor has been the migration of population to this region, mainly of the Han majority. Although this process started as early as the mid-20th century (Trailović 2012: 250), there are still ongoing scientific debates over whether it was a state-organized movement of people with the aim of altering the ethnic structure of the region or rather spontaneous immigration prompted by the industrial and economic development of this region replete with natural resources. Whatever the reason, the consequences are highly evident in a series of changes in the demographic picture of Xinjiang. (Trailović 2012: 275)

The question how these changes impacted the stability of the region necessarily arises. The section of the Uyghur population that advocates the idea of a broader autonomy or even secession, cites increased presence of the Han people as the main reason for their discontent, which leads to the destabilization of the region. (Trailović 2012: 277)

That is to say that the two largest ethnic groups in Xinjiang do not mix and interact. The traditional Uyghurs primarily inhabit rural areas and southern parts of the region, while the Hans live in the north and urban communities. Thus, in the capital Urumqi which is located in the north, and its surroundings, Hans constitute 73% of the population. On the other hand, the city with the highest percentage of Uyghurs, around 90%, is

Kashgar, in the south of the autonomous region. The same applies to the city surroundings. (Dillon 2004: 25)

The data provided are clear indicators of the segregation in Xinjiang. The cause lies in various cultural, religious, ethnic, socio-economic, and other social cleavages present in this region between the two largest ethnic groups, Uyghurs and the Han Chinese.

According to the theoretical model of social cleavages defined by Nenad Zakošek, which represents a specific integration of the Lipset-Rokkan hypothesis and the model provided by Herbert Kitschelt, social cleavages in Xinjiang can be divided into three main models. (see Trailović 2012: 269)

The first one is the territorial-cultural model based on the centre-periphery cleavage which has pitted the dominant national cultures against minorities (ethnic, religious, and linguistic) in the peripheral regions. In China, this cleavage has been manifested through two conflicts: a unitary state (the Han Chinese) – independents (Uyghurs); and centre (Beijing, Ürümqi – the Han people) – periphery (Kashgar – Uyghurs). The latter can be classified as complex and evident through territorial and ethnic disparities. The territorial cleavage, yet, exists on two levels: the state one where the centre is represented by developed China, broadly speaking Beijing, while Xinjiang is the periphery, and another one which is internal and transpires through a division in the autonomous region itself, with the capital Ürümqi, mostly inhabited by Hans, as the centre, and Uyghur Kashgar as the periphery.

The next cleavage model is the socio-economic one, based on the struggle over resources. The cleavage occurs when it is needed to decide how the resources will be distributed – whether according to the principle of market allocation, favoured in this case by the Uyghurs, or the principle of state redistribution, preferred by the Hans.

The third and the last cleavage model is, perhaps, the most interesting for analysis. It is the ideological-cultural cleavage caused by diverse concepts of sociocultural identities. Here become prominent divisions along the following lines: dominant culture (Han) – subculture (Uyghur); modernist (Han people) – traditionalist (Uyghurs); and secular (Han people) – religious (Islam – Uyghurs). (Trailović 2012)

Such opposed positions lead to utterly different perceptions of certain ongoing processes in Xinjiang. Therefore, for instance, what represents the fight for freedom from the Uyghur point of view, is viewed as separatism manifested as extremism and terrorism by the central government. From the Uyghur standpoint, the immigration of Hans to this region constitutes an example of colonization, while, on the other hand, the state interprets it

as a matter of freedom of movement and residence. Consequently, what is considered as an exploitation of the natural resources of Xinjiang by one side, is interpreted as an attempt to achieve economic growth and development at a state level by the other.

The most sensitive issue on which there is no consensus is undoubtedly the state minority policy towards the region, which is perceived by the Uyghurs as a religious, ethnic, and social discrimination with the purpose of weakening cultural identity, and subsequently accomplishing compulsory assimilation. The state deems these accusations unfounded and views its treatment of the region as a policy of fostering cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity of a unified multi-ethnic Chinese nation, as well as the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. (Trailović 2012: 274)

The causes of these clashes of views and intolerance should not be sought in the distant past. A series of events on the international scene has led to the eruption of discontent among the Uyghur minority in China. (Trailović 2012: 250) This is, thus, a part of a global process which has led to the strengthening of nationalism and bringing the religious identity to the forefront.

Nevertheless, none of that would have been possible if in China itself certain preconditions had not already been created. Namely, after communists seized the power, the new state policy brought a range of social changes that widened social cleavages among the Han people and the Uyghurs.

Creation of Preconditions – Cultural Repression

The period from the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 to the early seventies and political opening of China to the rest of the world is particularly interesting from a historical perspective and is characterized by an enormous impact of political events on the cultures of all ethnic groups in China (see Janssen 1979). Thus, Uyghur traditionalism came under fire, too.

Years before coming to power, in his renowned *Talks at the Yan'an* (1942), Mao Zedong discussed the purpose of art and literature. Namely, he advocated a stance that art forms should serve workers, peasants, and soldiers, with the purpose of advancing social reforms. In compliance with that, with the ascent of communists, “the traditional”, to a higher or lesser degree, was assigned a new function. (Spence 1991: 473) These fundamental changes affected both the majority people and all of the minority groups, including Uyghurs.

Not only did the communist rule bring changes in art but also the way of life and lifestyle of Chinese people underwent significant reforms. In 1958, the Great Leap Forward, a five-year plan by which China was to get abreast with and overtake Great Britain in the production of iron, steel and other industrial goods per capita, was introduced. The yearly production of steel was forecast to double, and in order to achieve that, everywhere in the country, makeshift smelters, where metal scrap was melted into steel, were established. (Janssen 1979: 211)

In order to implement this plan, five hundred million rural inhabitants all over China, inspired by slogans of agitators, more or less “voluntarily” joined people's communes, leaving behind their previous occupations and applying themselves to the jobs the state had flagged as priorities. Ninety million people were “mobilized” solely for the steel production. (Janssen 1979: 211) It soon became clear that their sacrifice was in vain. The steel production program was cancelled as the home-made metal proved not to be good enough even for the production of tools. It transpired that ordinary people, who bore the greatest burden of the Great Leap Forward and completely unnecessarily worked for ten, twelve, or even fourteen hours per day, quite often until they collapsed from exhaustion. (Janssen 1979: 214)

It is needless to say what kind of changes this absurd reform program brought to Uyghurs who lived in rural areas and traditionally engaged in cattle breeding. (Trailović 2012: 284)

Due to the failure of the Great Leap Forward, Mao Zedong was forced to resign as the president of the People's Republic of China in December 1958. (Janssen 1979: 215) Aided by the army, he started rising to power again in the mid-sixties. That is to say that, with the help of his old comrade-in-arms, the illustrious general Lin Biao, the contemporary Minister of Defence, Mao transformed the People's Liberation Army into an armed force that was able to provide for itself, partly an army, partly a workforce, whose soldiers planted the crops, and bred pigs on their own, sewed their uniforms and made their shoes in the Army's workshops. It was a true communist utopia.

It was this success that Mao Zedong used as a firm basis for further reforms. In August 1966, Mao exploited his renewed influence to obtain from the Central Committee an official proclamation of the outbreak of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which should have brought a definitive distancing from “the traditional”. (Janssen 1979: 222 – 232)

During the Cultural Revolution, art in China was reduced to a mere few genres that Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, deemed suitable. (Janssen 1979: 230 – 231) She took upon herself to put into effect Mao's war-time

directives on proletarian art. Jiang Qing, a former actress, believed that, for instance, dramatic art should be relieved of the burden of the past. All existing theatre plays were substituted by eight highly politicized operas. The main theme of all of them was the revolutionary struggle against both foreign enemies and the domestic bourgeoisie. By the time the Cultural Revolution ended this number increased to eighteen. These works glorified the bravery of the People's Liberation Army and ordinary people, while Mao Zedong was depicted as the most deserving of the triumph of socialism in China. On the stage, instead of classical heroes, there had to be Red Army soldiers, workers, and peasants as positive characters, as opposed to landowners, anti-revolutionaries, and urban scoundrels. These operas, along with their motifs, quickly spread all over China, finding their way into gramophone records, comic books, posters, postcards, vases, cigarette packs, calendars, etc. In the following 5 – 6 years, these eight operas were the only art form that 800 million Chinese people could enjoy. (see Mittler 2010)

In other words, people were practically deprived of freedom in their cultural and artistic expression. The most affected were the minority groups that even without such severe restrictions often had the impression that their culture was in an inferior position.

Bearing in mind the above-mentioned, Uyghurs found themselves at a disadvantage to the majority of other ethnic groups in China. This is due to their religiosity, i.e. the fact that Islam represents a fairly important component of the Uyghur identity and plays a significant role in their way of life. (Trailović 2012: 285) Since communism is incompatible with religion as such, Uyghurs found themselves in a highly unfavourable situation. (Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 2001)

Calls for Secession

Preconditions for the outbreak of conflict had been therefore already provided in the Mao era. Those, along with the processes in the eighties on the global level, made it possible for a single spark to cause tensions to emerge.

A whole series of unrest was initiated in 1989 by the so-called “Chinese Rushdie scandal” (see Gladney 1994). Those were triggered by the texts of some Chinese writers that considered Muslims sacrilegious and blasphemous. The demonstrations organized by Han Muslims started first on the streets of Beijing, then spreading to Xinjiang. Until 1990, the discontent of Chinese Muslims faded everywhere but Xinjiang, where it transformed into calls for the liberation of East Turkestan. (Israeli 2012: 261)

When former Soviet Central Asian republics gained independence in 1991, the calls for the secession of Xinjiang became even louder. The process was aided by the fact that Uyghurs share not only religion but also common ethnic and linguistic origins with the neighbouring Central Asian nations. (Gledni 2002: 495 – 496) That origin is Turkic and therefore, in the light of the processes of transnationalization and ethnic homogenization, present-day Turkey sees as its moral obligation to protect their “endangered brethren” in China. (Gledni 2002: 501 – 502) Thus, for example, the current Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, while he still was a prime minister, went to such lengths in his statements that he likened the Chinese treatment of Uyghurs to genocide. (Tanasković 2010: 63)

It should be mentioned that around 300,000 members of the Uyghur ethnic group live in Turkey. Having that in mind, it should not come as a surprise that in this country several Uyghur separatist movements exist. They enjoy tacit support from the Turkish government and act unhindered. (Tanasković 2010: 63) As Pan-Turkism is a common occurrence in the Turkish society, it is not surprising for Turks themselves to organize protests in support of their Uyghur “brethren”, and as a form of protest burn Chinese flags in front of the Chinese embassy in Istanbul or even physically attack Chinese tourists in the city. (BBC 2015)

Still, as the present-day Turkey is distancing itself evermore further from Kemalism, ethnically motivated support gradually gains religious dimension and morphs into Islamic solidarity. (Jevtić 2011: 295 – 296)

Uyghur separatist movements in emigration do not act solely from Turkey. Besides those located in Ankara or Istanbul, there are the ones in Almaty, Munich, Amsterdam, Melbourne, and Washington. (Gledni 2002: 492) Although all of them have the same goal, there is no consensus among them on the methods of its achievement. They are divided into those who propose a militant approach and the use of force and those who advocate secession through peaceful and political means. There is no consensus either over whether Xinjiang upon eventually gaining independence should be a secular state or attain a certain level of Islamic governance. (Fuller and Starr 2004: 24)

It should be emphasized here that even on the matter of independence there is no consensus among the Uyghurs themselves, as there are those who want to remain a part of PRC, but with broader autonomy. (Fuller and Starr 2004: 25)

Religiously motivated separatism adds a new dimension to the issue. It becomes transnational, including the other Muslims that live in the region. When we add Kazakhs, Huis, Kyrgyz, and the others, we reach the number of around 11 million Muslims in Xinjiang (Trailović 2012: 271). Even

more importantly such movements are also supported by various extremist Islamist organizations from all over the world, including Al-Qaeda which, the Chinese authorities claim, has trained for combat over a thousand Uyghur separatists. (Israeli 2012: 262) Chinese estimates may be exaggerated, but it is an undeniable fact that only in Guantanamo prison there were 22 Uyghur terrorists captured in the fights in Afghanistan. (Jevtić 2011: 297)

In order to cope with this problem, China has introduced certain restrictive measures. People under 18 are prohibited from visiting mosques (Trailović 2012: 282), while in several cities in Xinjiang access to government institutions and use of public transport is denied to women wearing burqas and niqabs and men wearing long beards (Styles 2013).

In the report of the state news agency Xinhua the decision to ban wearing burqas is justified by the fact that a similar ban also exists in several European countries, such as France and Belgium. “Burqas are not traditional dress for Uyghur women... The regulation is seen as an effort to curb growing extremism that forced Uyghur women to abandon their colourful traditional dress and wear black burqas,” states the agency report. (Mengjie 2015)

As the main cause of Uyghur discontent the Chinese state nowadays pinpoints the unfavourable economic situation, because the poorest parts of Xinjiang are at the same time the most ardent strongholds of political and religious extremism. The authorities perceive investments and economic development as a solution. Their aim is, through economic growth, to pacify and integrate a better and stronger Xinjiang in the unified Chinese state. (Trailović 2012: 282)

Although this is an internal matter, China has to be cautious about the way of tackling these problems, as such measures are not perceived favourably by Muslim countries, therefore any potential worsening of the situation might not only reflect on the economic ties that China has with the Middle Eastern Muslim countries but, for example, also erode good neighbourly relations with Afghanistan or Pakistan. (Gledni 2002: 492 – 493)

Conclusion

Uyghur dissatisfaction stems from the internal policy conducted by the Communist Party after the end of the civil war and the establishment of the People's Republic of China. In an ideologically inspired transition process towards a completely different social system and adoption of new social values, both the majority and minority populations had to make

certain sacrifices that official state policy imposed on them.

Despite the fact that government moves were not directly aimed at the minority population, they still instigated accumulation of discontent among Uyghurs. Social cleavages between them and the majority Han population were created, the deepest of which sprang on the ideological-cultural level. Uyghurs are under the impression that their culture is in submission and that they are under pressure to be assimilated into the majority population and renounce their traditional identity. Furthermore, the secular system of government tends to hamper Islam which is highly influential on the Uyghur way of life.

However, is Islam really at the core of the problem? The first protests of the Uyghur population started actually as a support to the demonstrations that Huis, the largest Muslim population in China, organized in Beijing. It was a religiously motivated revolt, as Huis sprang to the defence of their religion. However, their protests ended as soon as the threat to Islam ceased to exist. It was not the same with Uyghurs. Their dissatisfaction with the Chinese rule that came to prominence at that occasion developed into still present demands for secession and resulted in numerous riots and terror attacks.

Thereupon, we can reach a conclusion that Uyghur separatism is not religiously motivated, but at its foundation has the official state policy that has inhibited religious identities of each and every ethnic group present in PRC. Religious dimension, certainly, is noticeable, but not decisive. It appears that Islam is merely the means for the Uyghur separatism to be expressed through, in order to enable the preservation of the endangered Uyghur cultural identity.

Bibliography

- BBC. 2015. Chinese tourists warned over Turkey Uighur protests. On-line at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-33405520> (accessed: September 7, 2016).
- Bukharin, Nikolai I., and Evgenii Preobrazhensky. 2001. "The ABC of Communism." On-line at <https://www.marxists.org/archive/bukharin/works/1920/abc/> (accessed: September 7, 2016).
- Dillon, Michael. 2004. *Xinjiang – China's Muslim Far Northwest*. New York: Routledge.
- Fuller, Graham E. and Frederick S. Starr. 2004. *The Xinjiang Problem*. Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.

- Gladney, Dru C. 1994. "Salman Rushdie in China: Religion, Ethnicity, and State Definition in the People's Republic." In *Asian Visions of Authority: Religion and the Modern States of East and Southeast Asia*, edited by Charles F. Keyes, Laurel Kendall, and Helen Hardacre, 255 – 278. Honolulu: University of Hawaii.
- . 1995. "China's Ethnic Reawakening." *AsiaPacific Issues: Analysis from the East-West Centre* 18: 1 – 8.
- . 1998. "Clashed Civilizations? Muslim and Chinese Identities in the PRC." In *Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and The United States*, edited by Dru C. Gladney, 106 – 131. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- . 2003. "Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?" *The China Quarterly* 174: 451 – 467.
- Gledni, Dru K. 2002. "Centralna Azija i Kina: Transnacionalizacija, islamizacija i etnička homogenizacija." In *Oksfordska istorija islama*, edited by Džon L. Espozito, 453 – 502. Beograd: Clio.
- Howell, Anthony, and Cindy C. Fan. 2011. "Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: A Survey of Han and Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi." *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 52 (1): 119 – 139.
- Israeli, Raphael. 2012. "Islam in China." *Politics and Religion* 6 (2): 251 – 268.
- Janssen, Karl-Heinz. 1979. *Maovo doba*. Zagreb: Školska knjiga.
- Jenner, William J.F. 2004. "Defining the Chinese Nation: Hong Kong, Tibet and the Minorities." In *China Since 1919: Revolution and Reform: A Sourcebook*, edited by Alan Lawrance, 245 – 255. New York: Routledge.
- Jevtić, Miroljub. 2011. "Islamski ekstremizam kao oblik ugrožavanja Kine." *Srpska politička misao* 31 (1): 293 – 304.
- Xinhuanet News. 2015. "Xinjiang legislature approves burqa ban." On-line at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-01/10/c_133910351.html (accessed: September 7, 2016).
- Mittler, Barbara. 2010. "Eight Stage Works for 800 Million People: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Music – A View from Revolutionary Opera." *The Opera Quarterly* 26 (2 – 3): 377 – 401.
- National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2011. Communiqué of the National Bureau of Statistics of People's Republic of China on Major Figures of the 2010 Population Census[1] (No. 2). On-line at (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/StatisticalCommunique/201104/t20110429_61453.html) (accessed: September 7, 2016).

- Orleans, Leo A. 1957. "The 1953 Chinese Census in Perspective." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 16 (4): 565 – 573.
- Spence, Jonathan D. 1991. *The Search for Modern China*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Styles, Ruth. 2013. "Uighur women defy China's government by continuing to wear tiny Taipak hats." Uyghur Human Rights Project. On-line at <http://uhrp.org/featured-articles/uighur-women-defy-chinas-government-continuing-wear-tiny-taipak-hats> (accessed: September 7, 2016).
- Tanasković, Darko. 2010. *Neosmanizam: Doktrina i spoljopolitička praksa*. Beograd: Službeni glasnik.
- The World CIA Factbook. 2016. China. On-line at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ch.html> (accessed: September 7, 2016).
- Trailović, Dragan. 2012. "Socijalni rascepi i zahtevi za secesijom u NR Kini: Slučaj Sindaŋa." *Politička revija* 34 (4): 267 – 290.