

RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
International scientific meeting almanac

RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

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RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

(Религия в современном обществе)

International scientific meeting almanac

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RELIGION, MIGRANTS AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN EUROPE

Abstract: Current migrations in Europe are the result of numerous geostrategic, political, regional, local and individual causes. They are multidimensional phenomena, whose research requires an interdisciplinary approach. The work examines the social conflicts between the domestic and the settled population, especially those based on religious fundamentalism. Firstly, the most important characteristics of contemporary Christianity and Islam, as the most dominant religions in post-secular Europe are analysed, described and explained. It points to their prevalence, basic values, and religious (non) tolerance. It is emphasized that the misunderstanding of these religions is often the cause of religious and other conflicts. Then the social conflicts in different environments and the place the religion has in them are explored. The authors proceed from the thesis that conflicts between the domestic population (regardless of religiosity) and contemporary migrants are the result of historical, cultural, political and other social factors. Conflicts in the name of religion are just one type of social conflict, which often conceals other causes. In short, the root causes of the conflict of the local population and migrants in the areas where the aforementioned religions are dominant are explored. The most important forms, dynamics and consequences of these conflicts are listed. It is concluded that religious conflicts and contemporary migrations are another factor in the crisis and (dis)integration of Europe.

Key words: Europe, Christianity, Islam, migrants, conflicts.

Introduction

In the mass migration of peoples from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe, in recent years, the encounter and conflicts of different cultures and collective identities, especially those based on religious and ethnic fundamentality, are inevitable (Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 2016a: 90). The fact that two-thirds of migrants in Europe make Muslims is being used by the extremists trying to bring fear, both among Christians and among Muslims, about the dangers “others” pose to their identity. In the first decade of the

XXI century, more than 20 million Muslims lived in Europe: about 2 million in Britain, about 5 million in France, about 3 million in Germany. According to Jacques Attali, a French philosopher, in the context of the aging of Europe's population, birth rate and birth defects decline, countries that refuse foreigners will experience a decline in population, and those who accept them will experience a change in population (Attali, 2010: 117). The most common argument defending the point of view of the conflict, and not the encounter of civilization is the increase in the birth rate of Muslims. Just in one century, from 1900 to 2000, the number of Muslims multiplied 8 times, from 150 million to 1.3 billion people, which makes up about 20% of the world's population (Grčić 2011). The increase in xenophobia and islamophobia due to the influx of migrants has evidently become a part of European everyday. The terrorist attacks of Islamic fundamentalists in European cities and the strength of the migrant crisis in Europe have contributed to the further spread of Islamophobia. *Subject of research:* Social conflicts between the domestic and immigrant population in Europe, especially those based on religious fundamentalism *The main hypothesis of work:* The growth of religious fundamentalism and mass intercontinental migrations as a consequence of globalization and evidence of the crisis in Europe. For their part, they contribute to the disintegration of Europe. The social conflicts between the domestic and the immigrant population are the result of numerous factors. Religious conflicts are often the "mask" for other conflicts (economic, ethnic, cultural, historical, political), as indicated by conflicts with migrants. *Method of research:* Current migrations in Europe are the result of numerous geostrategic, political, regional, local and individual causes. Researching this multi-dimensional phenomenon requires an interdisciplinary approach. Sociological analysis of the most important causes of conflicts between domestic and internally displaced populations, their consequences in different parts of Europe, especially where dominant religions are represented.

Social conflicts can be classified in many ways. This division is never exhaustive, but the most common types of conflict are listed here. Given the number of participants, they can be conflicts between individuals and groups, and at the global level, the states and wider regional communities. By intensity conflicts are tinting or latent and open or apparent. If they are long suppressed, they, very often, appear suddenly, powerful and "eruptive". Of course, at the heart of the conflict are the interests, values, desires of individuals and social groups, for which realization various means are used. They are peaceful, but also violent, and even warlike (Cosser 1956, Vidojević, 1993). By their nature, conflicts can be ethnic, cultural, religious, class, political, military, etc. The way they are resolved is different, from a peaceful, compromising solution to the imposition of the interest of one of the participants in the conflict. They can lead to permanent elimination of the opponents, which does not rarely happen in warfare. Conflicts can be

manifested in the public sphere, on an institutional level, but also in the non-institutional or private sphere of life. The result of the conflict depends on a number of factors, from individual attributes, but from the structural characteristics of the environment in which it occurs.

The authors begin from the thesis that the real causes of social conflicts are often blurred, and religious conflicts in contemporary society often represent a mimicry for deeper conflicts of economic, political and geo-strategic interests of the main actors on the social scene. In regard to this, the most important causes of the conflict between domestic and internally displaced persons in Europe are discussed here, with regard to their religious, cultural and ethnic affiliation in particular. Modern migrations are the product of at least three factors: the crisis of neoliberal capitalist globalization and the growth of economic inequalities and poverty, demographic changes on a global scale and distinctively changed relationships in the geopolitical power of the most important actors on the world stage. In the background of interest and conflicts of the most important and powerful countries in the world, local and wider wars are waging, both indirect and direct, inspired by the struggle for the most important sources of power (energy, raw materials, strategic roads). Victims of these conflicts of interest are members of various ethnic, cultural and religious communities, who are forced to move massively. The work analyzes the basic characteristics of Christianity and Islam in contemporary Europe and the most important forms of conflict between the local population and migrants.

Religion in Post-Secular Europe

Today's world can hardly be understood without the place and role that religions have in modern society. Although the catechism of most religions is basically non-violent, with an emphasis on peace, social and religious practice have shown another face of religion through history. According to statistics from 2005, around 2 billion Christians, 1.5 billion Muslims, 900 million Hindu people and 400 million Buddhists lived in the world.¹ Religion in contemporary society is becoming more and more a matter of collective identity, and not true religiousness (Vukomanović, 2008).

If, among the sociologists of religion, there is a certain concept of breaking the spear, then it is definitely secularization. We are in agreement with those authors who regard secularization as a complex, contradictory and non-linear, thus reversible process (Vrcan, 1986; Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 2016b). Secularization is manifested through the weakening of the social significance of religion and religious organizations; then, it is also manifested as a process of reducing the connection of people with religion and church; Finally, secularization is also manifesting itself as a process that

¹ www.adherents.com for 2005.

leads to changes in religion itself and religious organizations in response to the loss of social functions through an attempt to adapt: for example, in Catholicism *aggiornamento*.

Although Europe is the place where secularization theory has experienced its greatest empirical verification, recent research shows that this space is not religiously homogeneous (Radisavljević-Čiparizović, 2016b: 235). We agree with Knoblauch's conclusion that the religious situation in Europe is so multifaceted and unequal that it can not be judged by the same measure (Knoblauch, 2004: xi). For example, the focus of the British sociology of religion consists of "believing without belonging", new religious movements and New Age, religious minorities, the organization of religion and its role in individual life (Davie, 1994). In the center of French sociology of religion, there are new social structures of religious communities, the social consequences of religious pluralism, and especially the urgent issue of Islam and the separation of religious faith from religious-institutional dogmas (Hervieu-Léger, 2000). However, when reporting on the research of the European Values Study, instead of the term secularization, the inferiority is used because the population of Europe has not lost its "religious" needs. Europe is not religiously homogeneous because there are differences between Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox populations, between Great Britain and northern European countries. Therefore, generalizations can not be easily carried out in this narrower space, which is even more important when trying to generalize the views of secularization and the modern world.

One of the forms of the return of religion to the public scene is the *Cultural Defense* (Steve Bruce) "preventing the collapse of a national, ethnic, local or some other culture (Gavrilović, 2008: 71). Due to these differences in the religious situation in Western Europe itself, and based on the results of the European Values Study of 1990, Grays Davies (Davie, 2005: 25–26) conditionally divided these countries into *Catholic* (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain); *confidently mixed countries* (Great Britain, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, West Germany) and *Lutheran countries* (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden).² The results of the survey show that Christian Europe is not exhaustive, especially Lutheran countries, but not irreligious (Blagojevic, 2015).³

In Europe, the dominant model is that of a secular state, separated from religious communities, religiously plural, and the minimal influence of religion on social life. At the beginning of the 21st century, Europe chose to exclude the mention of Christian heritage and Christian values from the text of its Constitution, staying on the provision that accentuates "Cultural,

² According to the Grace Dayview division, we analyzed the migration of migrants in European countries.

³ See Tables of Religious Self-Identification, Belief in God and Church Visit in Europe 1999/2001 and 2008 (in %) (M. Blagojević 2015: 45–48).

religious and humanistic heritage of Europe".⁴ At the heart of this attitude lies the fear of discrimination of all who have no sense of belonging to the Christian tradition. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, while European citizens themselves questioned the scope of liberal democracy, intolerance grew among European "indigenous" and increasingly numerous immigrants of Islamic religion unprepared for adapting to formal secularism, an increase in religious beliefs and the influence of religious institutions was recorded. Expansion of the Eastern borders European secularism also faced with the expressed religious identity of new EU member states such as Bulgaria, Romania, and then Croatia (Radisavljević-Ćiparizović 2011: 33–34).

Historically, Islam has been present on the European soil for centuries (Spain, the Balkans, Russia). In several West European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain), the second or third generation of Muslims is growing. Europe met with Islam in four ways: conquests (the Pyrénées Peninsula, Ottoman conquests); immigration (from the former European colonies) and from the second half of the twentieth century by labor migration, as well as conversions. Islam is increasingly becoming an element of European culture. In a comparative approach to religions, some authors are starting with similarities, and the second is the difference between them and their followers. The Quran and the New Testament, are addressing everyone, so Islam and Christianity are of the Abrahamic / Abraham / Ibrahim, universal, published, monotheistic religion (the so-called Religion of the Book). Both Christians and Muslims are very heterogeneous in terms of nationality, education, culture. Differences: Christianity was created as a movement of the poor, and Islam emerged as a movement of the rich; Christianity (up to Constantine) remained the religion of the oppressed, and Islam of the religions of the ruling classes. In Christianity, Jesus brought the Annunciation, in Islam, it is published in the Quran. For Muslims, Jesus is only the Prophet who precedes Muhammad, not the son of God. They reject the idea of cross and sacrifice, refusing that Jesus died and resurrected. They do not accept the dogma of incarnation and redemption. They believe that Isa will come down at the end of the world and reign over the Sharia; the kingdom of Jesus is not from this world, but that of Muhammad is.

Like Judaism and Christianity, Islam is a monotheistic religion based on the belief in one God. Muslims use the Arabic word Allah when they speak of God to the creator and master of the universe. The etymological word Islam is of Arabic origin and means subjugation, submission to Allah. The disciple of Islam is considered to be a person who before the witness states that "there is only one God, Allah, and Muhammad is His Messenger. Muslims believe in the immortality of the soul, in the Judgment Day (Qayamat), the afterlife, the resurrection of the dead, the hell (Jahannam),

⁴ The first European Constitution was signed on 29 October 2004 in Rome by Heads of State and Government of the EU.

the paradise (angel), and the demons (Shaytan) (Cvitković, 2009: 169). According to Islamic belief, God through time sent many revelations to people, some of whom were received by Moses and the Christian prophet Jesus. Muslims believe that Muhammad is the last prophet through whom Allah sent a revelation in the middle of the 7th century, as recorded in the Holy Book of the Quran. The foundation of the Islamic community (ummah) is a set of religious laws and obligations under the common name shariat.⁵ By sharia, faith is not separated from other aspects of (daily) life (Gordon, 2001: 10–11). Islam is based on the teachings of the Quran and the Hadith, and emphasizes the ritual way of life through the diligent fulfillment of five daily prayers, fasting and pilgrimage.⁶ Islam emerged on the soil of Saudi Arabia, from where it spread throughout the world.

Factors of strengthening Islamic fundamentalism and Islamophobia

In his book *Religious Fundamentalism*, Klaus Kincler wrote about various aspects of fundamentalism in world religions. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the term fundamentalism has begun to be used more in connection to Islam. Today, in the West, Muslims are probably better known for the persecution of Salman Rushdie, bin Laden, the position of women in the society or jihad, rather than for example, its grandiose architecture, poetry, philosophy. The typical characteristics of fundamentalism are: The return to the basics, what was at the beginning, and what was later corrupted; Hegemony and exclusivity in terms of interpretation; It opposes secularization, and the tradition of enlightenment is the enemy of every fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is the product of a political, social, economic crisis, or a response to crisis. Fundamentalist ideas are ideologically directed against science, although in practice they often take advantage of modern science and technology. The spirit of ecumenism, dialogue and tolerance are foreign to fundamentalism (Vukomanović, 2008: 97). Islamic fundamentalism refers not only to the understanding of the Quran, but also to the entire structure of the Sharia, the Divine Law formulated on the basis of the Quran in the early Middle Ages. It is interpreted as the ultimate and unchangeable commandment of God. The Sharia regulates not only the issues of culture and morality, but also behavior in society, food and personal hygiene, and much more. This includes the generally known provisions on the position of a woman, that is “worth as a half-man”, banning the consumption of alcohol and pork... The Sharia codex is a huddod – (the term often used in

⁵ The Islamic post means not taking food, drink, abstinence from sexual intercourse, swearing, and inappropriate actions. It lasts from dawn to sunset.

⁶ Pillars of Islam: The basic five obligations of each member of Islam: 1. Shehad – confession of faith, 2. Salat – the one-time daily prayer, 3. Zekat – compulsory religious services, 4. Saum – post during Ramadan and 5. Hajj in Meku (Cvitković, 2009: 402).

Islamic literature for the limits of acceptable behavior and for penalties for serious offenses: theft, robbery, extramarital sex, alcohol consumption, and false allegations of these offenses. Sharia also determines the way of dealing with members of other faiths. Christians and Jews, "followers of the Book," enjoy certain tolerance, they are considered to be guards (dhimmi). They are not disassembled, but they are subordinate to the true believers (Kincler, 2002). According to empirical research on the global scale, most people in the world today believe that the main causes of conflict are political power and interest, and not religions and cultures (Vukomanović, 2008: 74). 4).

Extremists try to bring fear among Christians and Muslims alike about the danger of "others" for their identity. The key issue is the question of the identity and integration of Muslims into European life. Spain, Belgium and Austria formally recognize Islam as a religion. Not only migrations have brought the new religious (Islamic) identity closer to the West, but also to communications, technology, the media... For Muslims in the EU it is important whether they want a "European value orientation" or a life in Europe with a "Muslim value orientation," or a combination of the first and the second. The most important variant would be the (only) ghettoization of Muslims in Europe. Europe has gone secularization, The Islamic world has not. Parliamentary democracy is based on the sovereignty of the people, and not God, and for some this is unacceptable to the Islamic world. The West has reduced religion into a private matter, under the influence of secularization, which has already been done with Christianity. Historically, Islam has been present on the European soil for centuries (Spain, the Balkans, Russia). In more Western European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain.), the second or third generation of Muslims is growing.

The EU (declaratively) protects religious freedoms; Respects diversity; is against discrimination on grounds of religion or worldview; Respects the legal status that religious communities have in member states; supports dialogue with a secularist and secularist culture; renouncing the condemnation of any religion and worldview. Being a European means renouncing your identity, which makes it a union of diversity. In Europe, the dominant model is that of a secular state, separated from religious communities, along with religious plurality, and with the minimal influence of religion on social life. Paradoxical images could be seen in the Western Europe at the beginning of the 21st century. On one side the sight of the empty churches, and on the other – the Muslims, praying in the streets and parks, because of the lack of mosques (Paris, London), The key issue is the question of the identity and integration of Muslims into European life. It is not only necessary to emphasize the differences, but to emphasize the similarities between Christianity and Islam against the growing xenophobia. The Quran and the New Testament are addressed to everyone, so Islam and Christianity are a universal religion (the so-called Religion of the Book). Both Christians and Muslims are very heterogeneous in terms of nationality, education, culture.

Muslims in Europe do not constitute a single community, but are distinguished by the diversity of nations, ethnic groups and languages (Devie, 2007: 69). They are mostly Sunni, but there are Shiites, Ahmadiyya, Alawites, Sufi, Wahhabi... Many Muslims in the EU have been fleeing from wars in their countries (from BiH, Sudan, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Chechnya, Syria...) or within the framework of the “family reunification” campaign (Turks, Algerians, Moroccans, Indians, Pakistanis...). Then, some came to the EU as political asylum seekers, refugees from Islamic countries with repressive regimes (Cvitković, 2011).

1. Migrants and social conflicts in Protestant countries

The United Kingdom is a predominantly Protestant country and the largest ally of the United States in Europe. UK is also an important participant in military operations in the areas where migrants come from. Its representatives were the most severe towards arrival of migrants. Prime Minister David Cameron talked about “overrun” of migrants and agreed to accept only 20,000 migrants by 2020 (*Blic*, September 7, 2015). Foreign Minister Boris Jonson requested the return of ships with migrants from the Mediterranean (*Blic*, September 15, 2016). Britain tightened the law on asylum, and the police directly engaged in preventing the arrival of migrants. In the port of Dover, there were arrests of migrants, the prevention of entry through Eurotunnel, as well as the separation of demonstrators who were opposed to the acceptance of migrants (*Federalna.ba*, January 30, 2016). Especially severe were the conflicts in London, Birmingham (Birmingham) and some other cities, including right-wing parties. (*Blic*, June 24, 2017). Prior to that, the country was shaken by terrorist attacks. In March 2017, the attacker drove into pedestrians on the bridge in London and killed four people and wounded a policeman. (*Kurir*, 23 May 2017). After that, the opponents of migration pointed out: “The time has come for the fight against Islamic terrorism.” In May 2017, a suicide bomber killed 22 and wounded 59 people in the concert hall in Manchester (Vujić, 2017). Finally, the protest against the host was also expressed by the Poles, whose 680000 live in UK. In 2015 they demonstrated wearing T-shirts saying: “Stop blaming us for economic problems.” (*Blic*, August 10, 2015). The forecasts that in 50 years from now Britain will consist of the majority of migrants, is responsible for the anti-immigrant groups being reinforced in a special way, further influencing the decision to leave the EU or Brexit (June 23, 2016).

2. Migrants and conflicts in predominantly Lutheran countries

According to data from 2002, Denmark had 84% of citizens who are members of the Lutheran People's Church, and only 2% of Muslims.⁷ In 2003, this EU member state sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2015, the right-wing minority government was in power, aimed at reducing the number of migrants. In the four largest daily newspapers in Lebanon, an announcement was made that migrants do not come to Denmark. It indicated that the social assistance will be reduced by 50%, in the first year joining families will not be allowed, and only those who speak the Danish language will have the right to stay (*Blic*, September 8, 2015). In addition to the said authorities, it initiated the adoption of a law on the refusal of asylum seekers at borders, and in 2016, she completely gave up the quota to receive 500 migrants annually. In everyday life, migrants were attacked by ordinary citizens and right-wingers burned camps, banned entry to night clubs if English, German or Danish language was not spoken (*Blic*, January 19, 2016), and even the police fiercely fought with young migrants. Intolerance and conflicts grew especially after the publication of the caricatures of Muhammad, portrayed as terrorists, which caused the mass reaction of Muslim believers around the world (p.dw.com, January 30, 2006). The riots were fierce and more frequent in the suburbs of Copenhagen (for example, Norrebro), where religion is part of a collective identity, and unemployment and class exclusion of young migrants are higher than the rest of the population. (Horvat, 2008). Denmark has legislated that valuables and money were being taken away from migrants in detention centers whilst they were staying in that country. In short, this is an example of the extremely restrictive asylum policy and the state's deterrence of migrants since its arrival in the country.

Sweden has the most liberal policy towards migrants. It received the highest number of migrants in terms of population. Its social system attracted them, so in 2014, 83,000 arrived, and in the next year 163,000. This is the society with the highest pace of growth inequality in the EU, which has increased by one third between 1985–2008. (*Biznis i finansije*, March 22, 2013). This was accompanied by a large spatial and residential segregation of classes, especially between rich domestic elites and the poor migrant population. The policy of the state was such that, among other things, the right wing movements were strengthened. They asked for a migration referendum. The first and second generation of young people in the special neighborhoods of large cities were also dissatisfied. Dissatisfaction lasted for years, individual and group incidents took place, so that at the beginning of 2017, a "war" broke out in the streets of Sweden (*Telegraf*, January 27, 2017).

⁷ See more in: sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/

The causes were different: from the dissatisfaction of the domestic population with the rise of crime, verbal and physical attacks, to the killings of young migrants in the isolated Stockholm counties. According to official data, the number of violent incidents towards the asylum seekers centers was 145 in 2014. and 322 in 2015. (*Telegraf*, January 27, 2016). There were also setting fires in the Muslim school and reception centers, massive clashes, fierce battles of migrants and the police, and mass burning of cars across Sweden. The police used weapons. There were arrests, injuries, but also dead. It was strengthening the moves that were against the ethnic diversity of the society, with 40% of those who are foreign-born in the first or second generation. They emphasized that there is “reverse racism”, which is detrimental to the domestic population (Nima Golam Ali Pur, 2015). Sweden has also resorted to deportation of migrants, so it has been planned to expel even 80,000 migrants from the country. Labor market researchers in these countries have concluded that foreign workers are present in the labor market, especially in the gray economy. They differ significantly from foreign workers who came in the 1960s (Novaković, 2008:172, 176; Poletić, 2013: 341, 344). In short, the religious factor is more concealed here than it reveals the real causes of the conflict in Swedish society. In the foreground there are social, spatial, political and cultural differences, and in another conflict between Christianity and Islam.

3. Migrants in the countries dominated by Catholicism

Poland belongs to the economically successful new EU members of the so-called “Visegrad Group”, whose population is predominantly Catholic. The authority of the authorities towards migrants, especially after the October 2015 elections, was markedly hostile. Firstly, the authorities pledged to receive 7,000 migrants, but demanded that they be Christians, especially women, elderly and children. Later it gave up on any quota. Jaroslav Kachinski, then former prime minister, said that the migrants bring diseases to Europe (*Kurir*, October 14, 2015). On October 25, 2015. his right-wing party, Law and Justice, shifted the liberal Civil Platform, from the power where it has been for 8 years, and won with an absolute majority. Since then, government resistance to EU decisions on migrants has been even greater. The essence of this resistance to Islam and migrants was also expressed by the message of Polish football fans from the club Slask Wrocław (November 2, 2015), which reads: “In Europe, Islam will not spread, we stand in the defense of Christianity” (*Telegraf*, 02.11.2015).

There were frequent incidences of individuals against migrants, but also counter demonstrations and demonstrations for migrants. The fiercest were organized by PEGIDE in February 2016. Some 2,000 demonstrators backed the slogan “Poland to Poles”, and nearby around a 100 counterdemonstrators acclaimed: “ANTIPEGIDA – against the Fascism in Europe.” (*Blic*, February

6, 2012). At the beginning of January 2017, a 21-year-old Polish man was killed by Arab migrants. It was a trigger for the anger, protests and destruction of the property of migrants by the local population (*srbijadanas.net*, January 2, 2016). Finally, in April 2017, the conservative government decided to suspend the reception of migrants. Poland's Prime Minister Beata Shidla stated: "It is certain that no solution can be imposed on member states." (*Blic*, April 6, 2015). The government was closer to the decision to provide humanitarian aid to refugees in the Middle East.

In Austria, they went from government support that was given to the arrival of migrants and massive welcoming by citizens, to the abolition of Schengen, controlling and closing the borders for migrants, and the construction of fences to Italy, Slovenia and Croatia, in just a few months. Finally, after a few years there came an announcement from the top of the authorities, it said that migrants should not be allowed to enter the European mainland. Austria planned to expel 50,000 migrants by 2019, and the authorities acknowledged that "... Austria realized that the desire to receive all refugees was a mistake" (*Kurir*, February 1, 2016).

Migrants who were rebelling to poor housing conditions, were treated strictly by the use of force that included deportation from the country. Other migrants were given a condition to integrate into society, ie, learn a language, qualify for entry into the labor market and appreciate values of their hosts. Depending on media control, individual conflicts between the population and migrants were being reported about. Finally, the official position of the country that the EU should protect external borders contributed to this turn in the policy towards migrants. The Foreign Minister officially demanded the closure of Muslim nurseries, in which children learn the values of Islam (B.A., 2015). Half a year later, a Molotov cocktail was thrown into a refugee center near Vienna (*Klix.ba*, January 27, 2016).

The intolerance and conflicts have been reared in other events, such as the news that a group of migrants raped a 15-year-old Austrian girl (*Srbijadanas*, May 20, 2017). The spiral of protests and violence was fuelled by the official politics of Austria. In February 2017, migrants protested in Vienna, against the announcement that they would be banned from wearing hijab and burqa. Demonstrators exclaimed: "Do not ban scarf," "I love my hijab", "Islam is an integral part of our identity." (*B92*, February 4, 2017). Political split between right-wing parties and movements and those who are in the presidential election for the benefit of these others. In essence, the Austrian society has remained divided over the migrants.

Hungary is an example of resistance to migrants and violations of the basic rules and decisions of the EU institutions during the current migration crisis. The right-wing Fides party, headed by Viktor Orbán, is in power. In the role of the prime minister, he has drawn the main moves during the last two years of the migrant crisis in Europe. As early as the summer of 2015, a decision was made to lift a wire fence towards Serbia, 175 km long

and 4 meters high. After that, the reception of migrants was halted, and on the border with Serbia in the beginning of August 18 migrants who were cutting the fence were detained (RTV, August 7, 2015). Due to the slow construction of this fence, the Minister of Defense, Csaba Hende, had to resign. Strong police forces clashed with migrants who set off from the reception camp to Budapest. The use of pepper spray and clubs were used by the police in conflicts with migrants at the Horgos Pass (September 16, 2015) Viktor Orban stated that “We do not want to have many Muslims in our country.” He explained that it was not a matter of refugees that had been fleeing the war. Most of them are economic migrants seeking prosperity. In case of migrants crossing the fence, Orban decided to build another in early 2017, in the same place, towards Serbia (Alo, February 23, 2017). In the meantime, fences were built towards Croatia and Romania.

Hungary was placing migrants in closed-type camps in the south of the country. In June 2016, 300 such migrants were protesting in one such camp (Kishunhalas) because of poor housing conditions and slow bureaucracy (Blic, June 1, 2016). They were waiting for a decision about deportation. There was almost no solidarity with migrants. At the beginning of October 2016, the government held a failed referendum on refugees (Mondo.ba, October 3, 2016). In March 2017, Parliament passed a law on the closure of asylum seekers in closed centers, with no right to freely move, until their asylum applications were resolved. Hostility towards migrants and EU institutions has intensified so much that Viktor Orban, in the mass protests in Budapest in July 2017, demanded the stopping of migration and the abolition of the EU (Patriot.rs, July 21, 2016). Under such circumstances, the media reported little on the attacks on migrants and their admissions camps. In short, V. Orban rejected the Brussels “cosmopolitan immigration policy” and presented himself as a defender of the nation and Europe.

According to recent data in Slovakia, 62% of the population is of Roman Catholic religion. In the current migrant crisis, the government has been strongly opposed to the arrival of migrants. It especially emphasized that Slovakia does not want Muslims (of which there are 5000 in her population and only 3% of all foreigners).⁸ The most that it allowed was the 200 migrants of Christian faith, explaining that there were no mosques for Muslims and they could not integrate into society. In the end, it refused to accept the quota of only 785 migrants. The arguments for this were different: it was required that EU members do not send weapons to Syria, refugee adoption would bring security risks to the country, and it would be better to send aid and money to the affected areas refugees are fleeing from and to secure the EU’s borders.

The most clear in rejecting the admission of Muslim migrants was Prime Minister Robert Fico, whose party SMER – Social Democracy has been in

⁸ sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/

power since 2006. As the clashes with migrants were more frequent in Europe, the rhetoric of R. Fica also intensified. He first stated that: "Let's be honest. We are not even able to integrate hundreds of thousands of our Romani fellow citizens. How will we integrate people who live in a completely different way of life and faith." (Vujić, 2015). At the beginning of 2016, he stressed that "Slovakia must be protected from threats and the only way to minimize risks is to prevent the creation of a complete Muslim community, which would be caused by the proposed refugee quotas" (*Nova srpska politička misao*, January 8, 2016). He saw the dangers of terrorism at the arrival of Muslims, and the formation of the Islamic community as a threat to the Slovak society. He pressed charges against The European Commission for determining the quota of refugees. He has appealed for the deportation of migrants. Then he represented himself as a defender of Christianity. In that sense, Robert Fica's stated: "I want clear words. Islam has no place in Slovakia. We are not "multi-culty". We say "No!" And we will not change our view" (*Nezavisne novine*, May 16, 2017). In this way, he opposed the central EU institutions and condemned the policy of accepting refugees, calling it "ritual suicide". In June 2015, an anti-immigration protest (several thousand participants) was held in Bratislava, with the slogan "Stop Islamizing Europe – Together Against the Brussels–Europe Dictatorship." (*Pravda*, June 21, 2015). In short, this small and new EU member stood in the defense of Christianity and against Islam and migrants.

Before the outbreak of the current migrant crisis in Italy, there was a conflict between the local population and migrants. In 2012, "the government passed laws against the stay of foreign workers" (Novaković, 2014: 290). This caused a revolt of migrants, and that year 300,000 foreign workers protested in six cities. The massive arrival of new migrants has further exacerbated the situation. They were arriving most frequently and massively by the sea. Thus, in 2014, came 170,000 registered and more illegal immigrants from Eritrea, Syria, Tunisia, Mali, Somalia and Ethiopia. By August 2015, the total number of registered migrants was 600 000 (*Novosti*, August 2, 2017). These were migrants from the war zones. According to Frontex data in 2015, the number of dead and missing in the Mediterranean was 3 500, and in 2015 as many as 30 times more (Milosević, Turudić, 2015).

It was noted that in only three days 2017, 13 000 migrants were rescued from Libya to Italy. The island of Lampedusa, the southernmost point of Italy, was often the place of arrival and conflict of migrants, the police and the local population. There were frequent conflicts of migrants of different religious affiliations on their way to Italy. In April 2015, for example, 15 Muslim migrants were arrested, suspected of throwing 12 Christians off the ship (*Blic*, April 16, 2015). There were clashes before the arrival of the Italian land. In September 2011, there were 55 000 migrants in Lampedusa, almost ten times more than the national population. Half a year earlier, fishermen blocked the harbor to prevent the entry of migrant ships. Migrants

protested over the conditions of accommodation, threatened with burning gas stations, clashed with natives and police (*Vijesti.me*, September 21, 2011). Similar conflicts occurred later and in other places. Especially violent clash happened in Milan square, in August 2015 when the police charged at migrants who were protesting because of the long wait for documents and poor living conditions. In May 2017, the police used force dispersing migrants (who had trampled tents) on the square in Milan with dogs and helicopters (*Sarajevo radio*, May 3, 2017). In December 2013, at the migrant center near Rome, nine migrants sewn up their mouths in protest of poor housing conditions (*Buka.com*, 27. 01. 2014). This strengthens the anti-migrant attitude of the right-wing League for the North.

According to the data for 2015, France had two thirds of the Catholic population, one-fourth of the religiously undecided, 7–9% of the Muslims, and other religions. In the current migrant crisis, the country has faced two directions of conflict. The first was the arrival of new migrants from North Africa, and the second, that existed for years, tiring and renewed, the conflict between the domestic population and the second and third generation migrants. Their parents moved from former colonies, and they, as citizens of France, and integration into society was not eagerly accepted. “A special problem is that they” ethnicise “settlements and poverty. Among young people, unemployment ranges from 40 to 50 percent” (Novaković, 2014: 289). The number of migrants who arrived in France in recent years was several tens of thousands, with the official political elite struggling in all ways to limit this number. France was a significant player in military action in all areas where the “Arab spring” was happening. Moreover, France is an important member of the NATO alliance that bombards and destroys the countries that the most migrants come from in Europe. On this occasion we look at the attitude of state authorities and citizens towards current migrants from the beginning of 2015 to the present day. In this regard, the events in migrant camps in Calais, Paris and in the north of France are highlighted. The conflicts in and around them reflect the essence of the French migrant policy.

During 2015, migrants tried for months to reach the British land. They built a camp in Calais, where up to 10.000 migrants stayed. There were conflicts between the migrants, but even more so between migrants and the police. In the first place, the residents of Calais protested against the camp residents, and then the police forces tried to dismantle them and prevent them from passing through Eurotunnel. In July 2015, a group of 2000 migrants tried unsuccessfully to pass the tunnel. The police reacted with force, so there were also victims among migrants (*Nova srpska politička misao*, July 29, 2015). When they attempted to evict them from the “Jungle”, the migrants were massively opposed. It was a series of fierce clashes that lasted for months. It was ended eventually by the displacement of migrants at the end of October 2016 (*Novosti*, November 10, 2015). There was far less conflicts in other parts of France. In Paris, police and migrants clashed in

gymnasiums where they were staying. A somewhat smaller group of citizens have solidarized with migrants (*B92*, May 4, 2016). In France, the National Front strengthened on the wave of anti-immigration policies, which in February 2016, for example, aggressively performed in Calais (*Blic*, February 6, 2016). Both cold and firearms were used by the police in these clashes between the police and migrants. People were injured, arrested, wounded and killed on both sides. Protests against Islamophobia and racism were less frequent, less visited and insufficient to protect migrants more significantly.

France suffered several major terrorist attacks in the observed period. The first was on January 7, 2015, when 11 people were killed and 12 were wounded. This happened during an armed attack on the editorial staff of *Charlie Hebdo* satirical magazine in Paris. The Muslims believed that the caricatures of Muhammad were insulting to them, and thus they took vengeance in the editorial office. The second attack took place on July 14, 2015, in Nice, when the terrorist fired at, and then drove a truck into a crowd of passers by. The death toll climbed up to 84, and hundreds were injured. The attacker had French citizenship and was of foreign origin. The third shook Paris in November 2015. The number of victims was significantly higher. About 130 people were killed (*Alo*, May 23, 2017). The fear and insecurity of the citizens grew. It became clear that terrorism in Europe is gaining new dimensions, and Islam is used as a justification for political goals. The so-called Islamic State stood behind the executioner of the above-mentioned attacks, and stressed that they were fighting the state that was waging war against it. These events have further strengthened Islamophobia in France and Europe.

4. Migrants in a predominantly religiously undeclared society

Particularly interesting was the attitude of the Czech political elites to migrants. According to the 2011 census, the country is most religiously undecided (45.2%), and every third person (34.2) is non-religious. (10.3) and the most numerous of the most religiously defined are Catholics (10.3).⁹ In such conditions one would expect that there was more tolerance to current migrations. In reality, the Czech Republic, certainly not primarily for religious reasons, strongly opposed the arrival and acceptance of migrants. In this respect, the views of President Milos Zeman are most frequently cited. He called current migrations a migration of peoples that would destroy Europe even without terrorism. Some of the arguments against migrants were the following: they are people of a different culture and faith, which can not be integrated into the Czech society, they will bring infectious diseases, but also terrorism. Therefore, he advocated that the army defended the borders of the EU, and economic migrants were deported to the countries

⁹ sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/

from which they came. (Vujić, 2015). Of a similar opinion was also the former president of Czech Republic Vaclav Klaus. He defined the actual migration as “organized invasion”, triggered by European politicians, human rights and the ideology of multiculturalism. The consequences, he stressed, will be a threat to the way of life and European tradition. He concluded that “migrants will destroy us without terrorism” (*Vesti online*, August 23, 2016).

A quota of 2.000 migrants was granted to the Czech Republic, which it refused because, as Interior Minister Milan Hovanec said, “binding quotas are out of common sense” (*Blic*, September 13, 2015). Therefore, the authorities have advocated that the borders of the EU be defended by NATO, and refugees in camps in the Middle East should help financially. The only possibility was the possibility of integrating Christians from Iraq and Syria into the Czech society. For all refugees, the rule is that they must respect the laws of the host country, or return to their homeland. About 3000 transit migrants entered the country, which were placed in special centers. Against the arrival of migrants, it was more often protested rather than solidarize with them. At the beginning of 2015, 500 demonstrators in Prague pointed out the slogans “Islam in the Czech Republic we don’t want” and “Islam is evil.” They demanded that Islam be not recognized as a religious community (*Vesti online*, January 17, 2015). In the protests organized by PEGIDA in Prague, there were 4,000 supporters of the “Block against Islam” against the Islamists and migrants. In Brno at that time, the banner “Merkel + Junker = the Grave of Europe without Children” was highlighted. Exactly fewer demonstrators were against Islamophobia (*Novosti*, February 6, 2016).

From the protests of the migrants, the rebellion and attempted breakthrough of the fence around the Bijela camp near Bezdezov in August 2015 is highlighted. The police prevented them, and they used tear gas and handcuffs. Those were men from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, under special surveillance, which had their mobile phones and money taken away from them (*Fakti.org/Blotpor*, August 1, 2015). Illegal migrants have been placed in ex-prisons, where they have been waiting for deportation. In protest of this, three migrants cut their hands, and 60 men (of all 240) were on hunger strike (*Kurir*, November 11, 2015). They were afraid of deportation to Austria, and protested against retention in the camp for 90 days. In the beginning of May 2017, several thousand people expressed solidarity with migrants, and against government policy. Like everywhere, there were individual attacks on Christian institutions, such as the Orthodox Church in Prague. On it, in Cyrillic was written “Allahu Akbar”, “Death is near you”, “Your God Allah (Skenderija, 2017).

5. Migrants in the religiously mixed societies of Europe

Germany is a country with about 30% of Protestants, 30% of Catholics and as many religiously unjust citizens. The other 10% are Muslims,

Orthodox, Jewish, Buddhist and new religious movements. Out of the 82 million inhabitants, 55 million are Christians and only 3.3 million Muslims.¹⁰ It is the most populous and economically most developed EU member state, which played the most important role in the migrant crisis. Chancellor Angela Merkel advocated a "open door" policy all the time. There are several reasons for this. One is a demographic situation, because the population is demographically old. Under the age of 14 it is only 14,7%, and older than 65, it is 18%. Merkel preferred the Syrians, educated and Christians. For all others, after strict selection, the door was closed, followed by deportation. The mass of migration is reflected in the fact that in only one weekend (September 7, 2015) 15000 migrants arrived to Germany. By the end of the year, 1.1 million were registered (RTS, January 16, 2016).

During the resolution of the migration crisis, Germany has violated some of the EU's basic rules and policies, such as the suspension of Schengen, the tightening of asylum policy, making ad hoc decisions on the quota of refugees, beyond the normal decision-making procedure through joint EU-28 institutions. Angela Merkel was the greatest advocate of multiculturalism, and then she said that she had completely failed and interpreted it in a way that suited her in concrete political circumstances. From the ideology of the common life of peoples of different cultures, it has been made clear that it is necessary for migrants to respect German customs and culture, and Germans theirs (*Blic*, April 1, 2017). This, in its own way, strengthened the political movements that had been opposed to the migration from the onset, especially the arrival of Muslims. Between these extremes can be mentioned numerous examples of solidarity with migrants, but also individual and group incidents against foreigners.

In August 2015, a group of 200 right-wing extremists (the National Social Democratic Party-NPD initiated a protest) clashed with the police, preventing the accommodation of 600 migrants in an abandoned hall in Heydemann. The police used tear gas and pepper spray against them, and they shouted: "Strangers Out", "Germany to Germans" and "Heil Hitler". On that occasion, 30 policemen were injured (*Kurir*, August 12, 2015). The right-wing movement PEGIDA Coalition, called Patriotic Europeans Against Islamization of the West, was fastest growing. In January 2016, when in Dresden, Pegida collected 25.000 supporters, in other areas it was different. The main cause of the gathering was the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris and the sexual violence of migrants against women in Cologne (RTS, January 9, 2016). The greatest success was achieved during the demonstrations in February 2016. The protests were in 25 countries. Only in Dresden 8000 demonstrators gathered, separated by the police from 3500 demonstrators of solidarity with migration. The main message was – against the Islamisation of Europe, and the slogan "We are the people" (*Telegraf*, February 6,

¹⁰ sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/

2016). The dissatisfaction of migrants with the conditions of accommodation and the attitude of the domestic population towards them often burst into the public. The most drastic violence and arrogance were experienced by migrants of African and Arab origin during the New Year's Eve of 2016. In Cologne, and later it turned out in other European cities – migrants sexually harassed and raped women. It happened on the open ground, in the city square in front of the cathedral, and the police did not respond adequately. The anger of the assaulted women, as well as other citizens, grew and buzzed in mass protests across Germany. According to official data, as many as 800 women were attacked (*Blic*, January 22, 2016). It was another impetus to all movements against Islam and migrants. A sharper policy of acquiring asylum has followed, and faster and more massive deportation of such abusers.

It is particularly important to point out that in the meantime, Germany was shaken with a wave of terrorist attacks, whose actors are not only current migrants. Moreover, some of them are directly linked to the Islamic State (ID or ISIS) against which Germany directly fights. In the last two years, there have been numerous terrorist attacks in various places, in the train, on the street, in the railway station, in markets, in discotheques and in the supermarket. The attackers used cold weapons (knives, axes), but also explosives and firearms. The victims were random passers-by, but also specially chosen. Most terrorists were killed and caught, and some of them were directly linked to the ID. This was confirmed by the suspicions of those who claimed that terrorism was coming up with migrants. Let us just mention the attack on people by truck on a Berlin market before the Christmas 2016. Several people were killed and 50 were wounded (*Blic*, December 21, 2016). In late July 2017, 18-year-old German citizen of Iranian origin opened fire in Munich "Olimpia" market, killing 9 and wounding 21 people. The state of emergency was declared (*RTS*, July 22, 2017).

6. Migrants and social conflicts in predominantly Orthodox countries

On the so-called Balkan path of migrants, there are four predominantly Orthodox countries, of which Bulgaria and Greece are EU members, while Serbia and Macedonia are on their way to join the EU. Since the beginning of the refugee crisis, multiple pressure was on these countries. The political pressure by the most powerful members of the EU was synchronized with the pressure of migrants to enter the countries and continue their path towards the most developed countries in Europe. The government's attitude towards migrants depended on the place in the regional distribution of political power and the efforts of the ruling elites to join the EU. In each of the countries there was a conflict between the population and the migrants, as well as the use of physical force by the police and the army. The specifics of relations with migrants in Bulgaria and Greece are summarized here.

In order to prevent the massive arrival of migrants, Bulgaria has built fences at the borders with Turkey and Macedonia. EU members participated in the financing of 200 km of fence, equipping it with state-of-the-art techniques. The police were assisted by the army and special forces, with the aim of reducing the number of illegal migrants. Extremely restrictive policies towards migrants are also reflected in almost prison like accommodation for migrants. The largest camp was in Haramnli with 3000 inhabitants. The clashes between the police and them were frequent. The peak was in November 2016, when the 1500 migrants burned and broke everything that had arrived (*Novosti*, November 24, 2016). They searched for better living conditions and shorter retention time. Most of the population, in the town and village, protested against migrants (October 29, 2016). At the borders inscriptions awaited migrants telling them that they better not come, that they are not wellcome to stay in Bulgaria because they are poor and have no jobs. The anti migrant policy was even more dominant, including hiring private migrant hunters. Former athlete, Dinko Valev was "famous" for this, flying the helicopter to the authorities and signaled the movement of migrants (*Danas*, April 21, 2016). In addition, the state has done everything to reduce the number of migrants, strengthen the conditions for obtaining asylum and shorten the time of their stay in the country. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church saw the migrant wave as an "invasion" that, if it remained, threatened to destroy the Bulgarian people (*Radio Sarajevo*, November 28, 2016).

Greece exhibited relatively least xenophobia and Islamophobia, as it was the first to face the gust of migrants. In Greece, more than 50,000 migrants were captured in 2016 alone. The arrival by the sea was the main migrant route. This led to the overcrowding of the islands and migratory camps (Lesbos, Hios for example). This led to frequent conflicts with the local population as well as the police. In Lesbos, the living conditions were desperate, and emergency doctors also went on strike (*Politika*, April 24, 2016). The more intensifying the migrant crisis in Europe the more Greece paid a higher price. There has not been any real and substantial help from other EU member states, and the treaty with Turkey is poorly respected. In particular, members of the right-wing Golden Dawn protested against the migrants, but they were few and later forbidden. Thousands of citizens of Athens and others have repeatedly and massively solidified with the migrants (*Mondo.me*, March 10, 2017) On the other hand, migrants have protested against difficult accomodation conditions, long waiting for documents and the attitude of the police and the state towards them. Interestingly, the Greeks did not complain about migrants by emphasizing their belonging to another religion and culture. They were primarily against their arrival for economic reasons, because they were already over-indebted and poor. Every fourth Greek left the country beforehand, and new migrants were not seen as a factor in solving demographic problems. They were seen as a

common problem of the EU, so the authorities advocated that these problems be jointly resolved by EU members.

Instead of the conclusion

In the suppression of (religious) xenophobia, it is not only necessary to emphasize differences, but to emphasize the similarities between Christianity and Islam. In addition to the fear of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist attacks, the inadequate and uncoordinated responses of the European Union to the migration crisis also fuel Islamophobia. The text highlights the most important forms of social conflicts between individuals belonging to different religious, racial, cultural, political and ethnic groups on the ground of today's Europe. The relationship between them is complex and difficult to be reduced to one dimension of conflict. Moreover, there is a whole plexus of global, local and individual factors that determine the relations between the domestic and the migrant population. Investigating these relationships in communities where the religious and confessional affiliation of the population differs suggests that other, political, geostrategic factors are important for the universality of these relations and the outcome of the above-mentioned conflicts. According to empirical research on the global scale, most people in the world today believe that the main causes of conflict are political power and interest, and not religion and culture. The interdisciplinarity of access to these conflicts could scientifically explain and reveal many other causes of conflict and the mechanisms of their concealment and resolution. The most basic forms of conflicts between members of different religious, ethnic and cultural communities are only briefly sketched here.

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