

POLICIES AND PRACTICE OF POLITICAL CULTURE:

THEORY AND SUSTAINABILITY

Ljubomir Hristić

Ljubomir Hristic

**POLICIES AND PRACTICE OF POLITICAL CULTURE:
THEORY AND SUSTAINABILTY**

Belgrade, 2017.

Dr Ljubomir Hristic

**POLICIES AND PRACTICE OF POLITICAL CULTURE:
THEORY AND SUSTAINABILITY**

Reviewers

Dr Goran Bašić

Dr. Aleksandar Bošković

Dr Natalija Mićunović

Dr Zoran Pavlović

Dr. Marko Pišev

Publisher

Institute of social sciences Belgrade

Kraljice Natalije 45, Belgrade, Serbia

For the Publisher

Dr Goran Bašić, direktor

Impression

100 copies

Printed by

Faculty of Technology and Metallurgy,

Research and Development Centre of Printing Technology,

Karnegijeva 4, Belgrade, Serbia

ISBN 978-86-7093-171-8

The idea of political culture¹ has remained intuitively appealing as a framework for political explanation and assessment, despite a large body of compelling criticism that has accumulated since its introduction three decades ago. However, even recently, adherents of the political culture approach have been unsuccessful to address the fundamental shortcomings of the concept and its application. This book has two goals. First, a thorough analytical critique is undertaken of a dominant strand of political culture theory, closely examining major formative works (e.g. Almond and Verba) as well as numerous recent studies (e.g., Inglehart). Secondly, on the basis of this critique, a recasting of the concept is presented.

The thesis underlying the examination is that theoretical and methodological problems were built into the concept of political culture at the outset. The chief conceptual problems identified are that: 1) the conceptual melding of the broader culture with political culture has muddled the identification of causes and subverted the investigation of political structures and procedures; 2) the assumption of cultural continuity has left change to be explained only outside the model; and 3) the insistence upon national units of analysis has obscured the significance of subnational political groupings. Major political trends in recent decades defy explanation in terms of the predictable approach to political culture, for prominent subcultural cleavages and rapid changes in collectively held political attitudes imply not only important effects emanating from the functioning of politics itself, but also a lack of uniformity across subnational groupings².

Political cultures are shaped, not of broader cultural forces, but of individual subjective perceptions gleaned from a limited variety and quantity of interactions with the structures and processes of politics. These perceptions produce expectations, assumptions, choices, and incentives concerning the functioning of politics, all of which comprise political cultures. In this model, political cultures manifest themselves not in terms of national political cultures, but rather of political cultural subgroupings based on differential perspectives on politics (e.g. socioeconomic, demographic, regional...). The book concludes with discussions of the model and of its implications for research.

¹ The following book was written as part of the project

“Social Transformations in the European Integration Process: A Multidisciplinary Approach”, financed by Republic of Serbia. Ministry of Science and Technological Development; Project supervisor: Prof. Dr Aleksandar Boskovic.

² see, Hristic, Ljubomir, *POLITICS OF CULTURE AND THE MODERNITY: SOCIETY AND CHANGE*, financed by Republic of Serbia. Ministry of Science and Technological Development; Project supervisor: Prof. Dr Aleksandar Boskovic.

² see, Hristic, Ljubomir, *POLITICS OF CULTURE AND THE MODERNITY: SOCIETY AND CHANGE*, ppa. 5-18, Institute for Social Sciences, Belgrade, 2014.

CONTENT

Abstract	3
PART ONE: OVERVIEW	7
Introduction	7
Crucial Works Concerning Political Culture	12
Definitions of Political Culture	15
Early Research	18
Theory of Change.....	21
Culture. Structure and Theory-Building	22
Structure, and Methodology of culture.....	34
The context of Inference	39
Conclusion.....	51
PART TWO: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL CULTURE ...	55
Introduction	55
Theory of Change	56
Culture Shift	69
Political Culture	70
Definition of Materialism/Postmaterialism	77
Roots in Maslow.....	77
Inalehart/s Survey Lists	81
Items in Index.....	82
Analysis of the Index	88
<i>Time</i>	98
<i>Frame</i>	98
<i>History</i>	100

Culture Theory	115
Political Culture	121
<i>Function</i>	124
<i>Explanatory value</i>	125
References	131

PART ONE: OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

When the concept of political culture was initiated to political science (Almond, 1956) it showed a great deal of promise in helping to explain, through an interdisciplinary admixture of social sciences, the interactions between people and politics. The first attempts to operationalize the notion (Almond and Verba, 1963; Verba and Pye, 1965) also hinted at its potential, but simultaneously began to reveal that methodological problems represented a significant obstacle to achieving that prospective. By the early 1970s the body of criticism of political culture studies had grown sufficiently large and compelling that many political scientists abandoned the concept entirely.

There has been, nevertheless, a "renaissance" (Englehart, 1988; Brint, 1990) recently in political culture studies, which signifies a rebirth in two different incarnations. The first takes the form of studies similar in theory and methodology to their forebears, but now, with the accumulation of certain kinds of survey data over the past two or three decades, researchers are able to study alterations in ways that formerly were not possible. The second incarnation, taking into account some of the criticism leveled during the 1960s and 1970s against political culture theory and methodology, takes the form of attempts to recast the concept itself of political culture. Because studies in the form of the first incarnation fail to respond adequately to the former criticism, and because I am not entirely satisfied with the attempts launched thus far in the mold of the second, I propose to contribute to our approach to studying and understanding politics, as well as to the debates concerning political culture conjectures and methodology, by attempting a conceptual recasting of my own.

My approach to formulating a innovative view of political culture is guided in part by questions which have not, to date, been adequately addressed in political culture theory, the most fundamental of which are: What precisely is political culture, where does it come from, how is it perpetuated, and how and why does it change? These questions were to some degree circumvented in earlier studies because of research agendas that were designed to explore, for example, the democratic feasibility or stability of certain nations, both in post-war Europe and in the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa. Even though the pioneers of the concept of political culture addressed (albeit, very briefly) the sources of political culture, actual research proceeded with an emphasis on the *effects* of political culture. The tendency in the

studies that followed, then, was to treat political culture implicitly as an independent variable, so that political structures and processes, and ultimately (and especially) democratic viability or stability, could be the significant dependent variables. In accumulation, "political culture" itself was left only vaguely, and tantalizingly, defined - and because this in turn afforded researchers a great deal of latitude in what phenomena they chose to observe and in how they interpreted them, there was little incentive to formulate ' self-imposed restrictions by articulating a clearer and more tightly defined formation of the notion "political culture" (Hristic: 19). Moreover, because political culture studies relied heavily on survey data, operationalisation required a sufficiently flexible, even indefinite, conception of political culture to support paths of inference from questionnaire to political cultural analysis which themselves went a long way toward defining both specific applications of the concept itself, and specific "political cultures." In short, it was frequently the interpretation itself of methodologically-determined and methodology-bound research that completed "definitions" of political cultures; the researchers' analyses served to elaborate on the basic definitions - to fill out what they meant by "political culture"

The consequences of timely research agendas and methodologies on our conception itself of political culture have been profound. The emphases on system stability and on a normatively conceived democracy³ - not democracy *per se*, but democracy *as opposed to* fascism, communism, or non- democratic traditional forms of political organization - establish a peculiar vantage point that is not entirely attuned with the basic definitions of the political cultural terrain. Of course, the "political system" as unit of analysis represents a significant (and ultimately controversial) point. Situating "political culture" in "political system" not only confuses the relationship but it also establishes the "nation" as the relevant unit of study, which implies a single, nationally-based "orientation to political action." Although early research (especially Almond and Verba, 1963) establishes the notion of "subcultures," implying that we need not assume national uniformity, subcultures are conceived as secondary to the "national political culture;" in other words, on the national scale, early research seeks first a national political culture, which may then be supplemented by any⁴ number of subcultures (Hristic: 33). However, a nation that seems inherently to have several political cultures has "a political culture of fragmentation" (Almond, 1956). The national focal point thus serves to obscure a great deal of the texture of a nation's actual politics - domestic conflicts, for example, all fit under a national drape. Moreover, researchers are led to search for phenomena which seem largely to obtain

³ For further reading on the context of democracy, See: Basic, Goran, *Iskušnja demokratije u multietničkom društvu*, Centar za istraživanje etniciteta, Beograd, 2006.

⁴ Although Almond's early "embedding" of political system *in* political culture implied a wide-ranging fusion of system and culture, political culture was defined as "orientation to political action" (1956: 396); linking system stability or democracy to "orientation to political action" would seem to require more than merely taking this "embedding" for granted. In the event, however, research proceeded from there with much indeed taken for granted.

only at the national level - which may well represent only a thin strand significant political cultural features. And, lastly, this approach tends toward equating politics with culture by implying that political differences among different groups in a society are rooted in culture and not in politics.

In combination with a heavy methodological dependence on survey data, the research emphasis on system stability and democracy sent scholars into causal pursuits for which they poorly equipped. The stark limits of questionnaire-derived data (even today not universally acknowledged) cleaved a great, yawning chasm amid the explanatory matter and the phenomena being "explained." In addition, the "cultural" component of political culture (again, acting in combination with these particular research emphases) effectively built into the concept an explanatory thrust that was both bemused and inaccurate. For one thing, *culture* and *political culture* commingled ambiguously, dispersing explanation through a vast terrain. In addition, cultural continuity was assumed into the model, notwithstanding the practice of explicitly disavowing it.

Over the years, despite a steady stream of articulate and compelling critiques of the concept's usage (beginning with Kim, 1964), all of the ambiguity has remained. Insofar as we simply lack the sort of data that would be well-served by a more specifically defined concept, this ambiguity is not only desirable, but probably necessary as well. As some students of political culture have remarked, the concept provides at least an impetus toward research and the generations of propositions. I should emphasize in addition that the *interpretive approach* in general, when conducted by academics steeped in their subject matter (e.g., by area specialists), seems to be one in which expertise and insight may go a long way indeed into "political cultural" territory without requiring a precise, unambiguous concept. But here, interpretation is forthrightly that of the writer, and our means of evaluating the results are largely reliant upon our own reading of the work. Nevertheless, it is plain that a great deal of superior work has been conducted in this mold.

(Hence, for example, the "thick description" backed by Geertz promises to both to enrich the subject matter and to shift at least some of the burden of credibility from author to data.)

But much of political cultural enterprise cannot be included in this methodological category, and many students of political culture conjecture and methods find that after three decades, some adjustment might be in order. As Ruth Lane puts it:

Kaplan (1964, pp. 68-70)⁵ has taught us that ambiguity ("dynamic openness") can be useful in scientific development, conducive to creativity and to insight. The student of political culture must come to feel, however, that in this particular case the blessings of ambiguity have been carried quite far enough (1992: 363).

⁵ The reference is to A. Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964).

Lane advocates attempting "to put the various definitions, approaches and methodologies interested in an organized framework" (1992: 323). Her contribution in that regard is significant, and be added to the topical work of Street (1994) and the comprehensive and definitive study by Welch (1993).

This approach to the problem is dissimilar, however, for I wish to exchange some of the fundamental assumptions that inhere in the predictable approaches to political culture for a revised set of assumptions that collectively entail recasting the concept fundamentally. By "fundamentally," however, I do not desire to imply "radically," for the roots of the approach that I propose are, in fact, to be found in the seminal definitions that were supplied by the first political culture researchers. Though they reveal their ambiguity as soon as any sort of operationalization is attempted, the early definitions appear nonetheless, now as they did then, to symbolize a sound starting point; indeed,

I count myself among those who, upon first reading the seminal definitions, were made instant adherents.⁶ But in those same texts, definitions were elaborated first through theoretical discussions and then into models, and *then* were diced through the process of operationalization; investigation agendas, however, preceded elaboration, and hence these elaborations resulted in the peculiar forms that I have described. What I have in mind is a concept of political culture which considers the subject matter itself from a different perspective, and which thus serves to organize data differently.

Early *definitions* did not position political culture inside of culture; but the elaborations that immediately followed on the heels of these definitions usually did. It is my contention that separating the two more definitively will solve a number of problems in political culture research - and hence, mine is a *non-cultural approach* to political culture. This separation, in turn, also permits or is complemented by a number of other revisions of assumptions that I propose, which permits in turn the proposition of my alternative approach. Unraveling out the broader culture to a degree which would probably not be accepted by early partisans nevertheless leaves a great number of nodes of compatibility between my approach and theirs. Consider, for example, the following quotation from Verba's 1965 theoretical discussion.

Political culture forms an important link between events of politics and the behavior of individuals in reaction to those events; for, although the political behavior of individuals and groups is of course affected by acts of government officials, wars, election campaigns, and the like, it is even more affected by the meanings that are assigned those events by observers. *This is to say no more than that people respond to what they perceive of politics and how they interpret what they see* (1965: 526; my emphasis; syntax in original).

⁶ For many, the term "converts" would perhaps be more suitable, as Almond's initial formulation was designed replace (or at least improve upon) national "character" or "ethos."

The principal incompatibility between this approach and Verba's lies in the degree to which the broader culture is involved in the tryst of meaning (not reflected in this quotation; but the emphasized phrase in the quotation reflects the essence of political culture that my approach is designed to explore.

Although I would in no way claim that such an approach will eliminate all ambiguity in the relationship between data and analysis, I do suggest to seek data which bear more specifically on a more tightly defined concept of political culture, one characterized by clearer boundaries and clearer analytic goals than the conventional concept. For the ambiguity that remains, I can merely link with the predecessors in pleading implicitly that an ambiguous subject requires an ambiguous concept; nevertheless, the anticipation is that research adhering to the model proposed will soon integrate data which themselves will erode ambiguity.

CRUCIAL WORKS CONCERNING POLITICAL CULTURE

Researchers in political culture studies, almost consistently begin by providing a compact definition of political culture, usually either quoted from or modeled after the seminal definitions formulated by Almond (1956), Almond and Verba (1963), and Pye and Verba (1965). Both the concept and the definitions seemed reasonable and promising, and immediately struck intuitive chords among political scientists of all stripes; almost as soon as it was presented to the pasture, political culture generated a great deal of excitement and research activity. For comparativists engaged in an effort to build theories that would help to clarify developments in Europe in the recent past and contemporary developments in the Third World, the concept seemed especially promising.

In this brief chapter, I will provide an assessment of the definitions offered in the seminal political culture works; tracing the concepts evolution from one definition to the next in the first few years. What can be discerned in this development is not the maturation of a theory, but rather an embryological, vehement struggle, towards viability; each early definitional enhancement seems to have been designed to equip the concept with the means to thrive in the world of social science research. The lengths to which the some of parents of this ill-adapted offspring would go to ensure its survival will be illustrated amply later on, especially in the chapters devoted to *The Civic Culture* and to Inglehart's *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (1990). Here, though, I merely review the early definitions in order to show that their general foundation and expression appear both sound and useful, and thereby to lay the groundwork for my contention that the initial impulse of political cultural theory and analysis was derailed in elaborations performed on the concept as it has been applied to research; in other words, the concepts that have been engaged in research have only distant relationships with those that have formal "definitions."

The concept and the expression political culture were introduced to political science by Gabriel Almond in his 1956 article as the start of an effort to develop for comparative politics a concept less "diffuse and ambiguous" than "attitudes toward politics," "political values," "ideologies," "national character," or "cultural ethos."

Implicit in the nature of this endeavor is Almond's commitment to the burgeoning behavioral approach; as is in the behavioral approach to political science is the quest for macro-micro linkages that would satisfactorily connect individual with

political system. Borrowing, *inter alia*, from anthropology some variant of "culture," and from sociology Parsons' pattern variables, he wrote:

Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientation to political action. I have found it useful to refer to this as the *political culture* (1956:396; emphasis in original).

From there, the concept was developed, by Almond and others, primary into the promising definitional forms that became standard, but then, in application, constantly elaborated beyond that, into forms that were less clear, less meaningful, and ultimately less useful.

Almond's initial formulation (and consequently his later efforts) had decisive limitations built into it, for his political cultural typology resulting directly from a more general categorization that he had already devised.

One of his initial objectives was to produce for students of comparative politics a classification system more relevant and therefore more useful than existing ones. Previous to developing his concept of political culture, he had divided the world's political systems into a fourfold classification: the Anglo-American, the Continental

European, thus, also Serbian, and the non-western preindustrial or partially industrial, and the totalitarian political systems. But this was an transitional step; as Almond put it, his classification produced only "the grossest discriminations between types of empirical political systems operative in the world today" (1956: 392). In essence, the theoretical role of the concept of political culture was then to equip this general classification with an analytic apparatus, namely, a scheme by which to study systematically a nation's "particular pattern of orientations to political action." Therefore, "the Anglo-American political systems are characterized by a homogeneous, secular political culture;" the Continental European by fragmented political cultures; the preindustrial by mixed political cultures (usually a mix of traditional and modern); and the authoritarian by a largely non-consensual political culture (1956: 398; 400; 403; 405-406).

The preliminary limitation in this approach, then, lay in the way the transcendent exploration question was framed by Almond's path to conceptual formulation: explorations of political culture, as well as its theoretical development, were to proceed from the general question of what differentiates these four types of political systems.¹ In a performative stance, Almond's articulation itself of the concept built into political culture research the assumption that political culture was endowed with a immense (though not sole rights) of explanatory power, and the related assumption that this explanatory power could play an important role in the burgeoning field of comparative politics.

Although Almond and some of his colleagues used the term political culture (as a roughly sketched concept) liberally for the next several years (e.g., Almond, 1958; Almond and Coleman, 1960⁷ ⁸), the next step in its progress was in Almond's efforts with Sidney Verba to operationalize the concept for their cross-national study, *The Civic Culture* (1963), where the conception of political culture takes a quantum leap in sophistication.

⁷ (e.g., Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954) and in the various community power studies (e.g., Dahl, 1961), all reflected an approach in which the ostensible *point de départ* for democratic theory was the reality of politics as it is. On the face of it, this approach is perfectly reasonable; however, as has been pointed out innumerable times during the past three decades, it tends to beg the question of *why* politics is as it is. Pateman (1980) and Gendzier (1985) discuss this point vis-à-vis *The Civic Culture*, but it is addressed more generally in, *inter alia*, Pateman, 1970; Purcell, 1973; Ricci, 1971 and 1984; and Gendzier, 1985).

⁸ There is tireless salesmanship here. Almond and Coleman, co-editors of the 1960 volume *{The Politics of the Developing Areas}*, are clearly comfortable with the term at that early date, and so its usage figures most prominently in their introduction and conclusion that sandwich all of the other contributions (including their own regional chapters); there, the following definition is provided: "Political socialization is the process of induction into the political culture" (1960: 27; 544). Their coauthors, however, are apparently not "up to speed" yet, and tend not to mention political culture in their discussions of political socialization. Nevertheless, the salesmanship even reaches into the index, where "culture, political" bids the reader to "see socialization, political."

DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Almond and Verba note that, despite the unclear boundaries between political and non-political attitudes and development outlines, the two must be separated analytically.

They "employ the concept of culture in only one of its many meanings: that of *psychological orientation toward social objects*," and they assume that this orientation is acquired through socialization (1963: 14; emphasis in original).

Seemingly as references to psychological phenomena, alone it is not adequate to the task of analyzing much more than a small group, and certainly not a "polity," they formulate the microanalysis-macroanalysis link as follows:

The political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation (1963: 14-15).

Through a selective adaptation of Parsonian sociology, they are able to elaborate further. The "orientations" to which they refer are "the internalized aspects of objects and relationships," and have cognitive, affective, and evaluative components, and the objects to which these orientations refer are organized according to an adaptation of Parsonian structural-functional categories; together, these two sets of variables can form a two-dimensional table or matrix. Thus:

Characterizing the political culture of a nation means, in effect, filling in such a matrix for a valid sample of its population. The political culture becomes the frequency of different kinds of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations toward the political system in general, its input and output aspects, and the self as political actor (1963: 17).

From there the authors propose three broad types of political culture - parochial, subject, and participant political cultures - and provide a discussion of the different possible mixes among these cultures in a society.

The "civic culture" itself is a "particular mix," in just the right proportions, of the three types of political cultures, with the added ingredients of allegiance (derived of "congruence between culture and structure" [1963: 22- 23]), and a belief in the "democratic myth" (1963: 481, 485). Operationalization, however, proved to be problematic, which I illustrate at length in chapter 3.

Verba. 1965

The next step in the definitional and theoretical development of the concept was Verba's, in his concluding essay in Pye and Verba's *Political Culture and Political Development* (1965).⁹ There he writes:

⁹ Pye's treatment of the concept is presented below, in the next section. Although Pye's contribution

The political culture of a society consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics. (1965:513).

He notes too that, although many other aspects of politics are crucial to understanding the workings of a political system, the concept of political culture is especially useful in part because it "forms an important link between the events of politics and the behavior of individuals in reaction to those events;" the significant component of this link lies in "the meanings that are assigned those events by observers" (1965: 516). Thus political culture represents a system through which political interaction is "regulated" (1965: 517).

In substance, this definition differs only slightly from the previous one, since it serves largely as a summary, but the implications for its application are more extensive. Indeed, Verba is quick to point out that because his essay is designed to "direct attention to a general area of concern," namely, political development (1965: 518), "the term refers to a rather general approach to politics and some imprecision is probably not too crucial" (1965: 513n). Hence:

Political culture is very broadly defined in this essay. The term refers to all politically relevant orientations whether of a cognitive, evaluative, or expressive sort. It refers to the orientations of all the members of a political system; and it refers to orientations to all aspects of politics (1965:518).

This all-encompassing approach is, of course, based on pragmatic grounds. The research for *The Civic Culture* had depended entirely on the generation and interpretation of data through survey research, and so political culture had been treated in terms compatible with this variant of quantitative data. As this was impractical or impossible in development studies characterized by a far broader geographic scope, the looser approach taken in the essays in

Political Culture and Political Development promised to broaden the conceptual utility of political culture.

Pve. 1965

Lucian Pye's introductory essay to the same volume represents another step in the development of the concept.

As does Verba, Pye begins with Almond's original definition of political culture, noting as well that the concept "was developed in response to the need to bridge a growing gap" between macro- and micro-analysis (1965:8), and that the concept "holds such great promise" for this challenge (1965:9). He, too, departs from the

appears as the introductory essay of Pye and Verba's volume, I find that the developments in Verba's piece may be understood to precede Pye's.

original conception through restatement and elaboration, but broadens the concept substantially, ultimately to unmanageable proportions.

Emphasizing that political culture "may be peculiarly well adapted for comparing and classifying political systems in terms that are relevant for understanding the character of political development and change" (1965: 6), he proposes a general approach to political culture research. Elaborating on Almond's 1956 summary definition, Pye writes:

This is to say that in any operating political system there is an ordered subjective realm of politics which gives meaning to the polity, discipline to institutions, and social relevance to individual acts. The concept of political culture thus suggests that the traditions of a society, the spirit of its public institutions, the passions and the collective reasoning of its citizenry, and the style and operating codes of its leaders are not just random products of historical experience but fit together as a part of a meaningful whole and constitute an intelligible web of relations (1965: 7).

Pye's amplification is rather sweeping; it not only expands drastically the range of phenomena that the original conception embraces, but also, in the references to "an ordered subjective realm" and to "an intelligible web of relations," it attributes to the concept a far greater cohesiveness and a far more prominent element of systemic qualities than had previously been implied. Moreover, the attribution of cohesiveness and systemic qualities in turn implies qualities of both endurance and determination. If political culture includes "the traditions of a society, the spirit of its public institutions, the passions and the collective reasoning of its citizenry, and the style and operating codes of its leaders," all presumably bound together both through the historical process and in the *conscience collective*, then, indeed, we can expect it neither to go away, nor to change very rapidly, if at all. In the same vein, the sweeping inclusion of so many aspects of human existence implies that Pye's "political culture" is not merely an influence on politics, but is actually an independent and systematic determinant of the political process. Indeed, he goes on:

For the individual the political culture provides controlling guidelines for effective political behavior, and for the collectivity it gives a systematic structure of values and rational considerations which ensures coherence in the performance of institutions and organizations (1965:7) .

This passage, in turn, is followed by a quotation of Verba's initial definition. Pye seems to be using his own amplification of Almond's basic definition as a bridge to Verba's, in effect expanding Verba's definition as well.

The importance (and indeed, the credibility) of Verba's initial definition, however, lies in the notion that the various aspects of a political culture define "the *situation* in which political action takes place;" from there, the question of how political action interacts with the situation in which it takes place is left open, and therefore no

undue emphasis on determinative capacity is attributed to political culture. Pye's expansion of the concept, in part by including sweeping, yet far more concrete aspects of political reality, and in part by attributing to them an elaborate cohesiveness, turns political culture into an integrated (and, through the vigor of his language, an almost inexorable) agency.¹⁰

Early Research

The concept of political culture very quickly acquired a legitimacy in the social sciences that was far out of proportion with the results it had been able to produce - and the same legitimacy lingers today. Intellectual and academic entrepreneurship¹¹ certainly played a role here. Early proponents (largely those mentioned above) were aggressive and liberal in their use of concept, even before it had been given concrete definitional form. Almond especially was a forceful salesman. Beginning in his 1956 article, in which he provided only a brief definition for political culture, he used the term frequently and fluently.

By 1960, he had the conviction to assert, on grounds rather more thin than he implied, that political culture and various other recently coined terms "have acquired a certain currency among scholars in the field. Perhaps their utility may be said to have been tested" (Almond and Coleman, 1960: 4). In comparing "the new terms with the old," he wrote:

[I]nstead of "public opinion" and "citizenship training," formal and rational in meaning, we prefer "political culture" and "political socialization." We are not setting aside public law and philosophy as disciplines, but simply telling them to move over to make room for a growth in political theory that has been long overdue (1960:4).

Along with its apparent legitimacy (again, by 1960, before it had been tested empirically), the concept was appealing as a basis for empirical research because of the abstract and generalized nature of these original definitions: they left ample room for idiosyncratic interpretation, elaboration, and operationalization; indeed, their degree of abstractness made such transformations necessary. Researchers whose approach leaned toward the historicist or interpretivist could proceed with a very general notion of what political culture is, while those whose approach was more empiricist or quantitative could operationalize the concept according to whatever was their own notion of political culture - or whatever variables they felt to be manageable. What this meant in practice, of course, was that researchers were now armed with a concept that

¹⁰ There may be reason to attribute the exhaustive nature of Pye's initial definitional reformulation almost entirely to the use of over-enthusiastic language, for the tone of the discussion that follows in his essay is far more judicious. In fact, several years later, in an article on 'some methodological problems in political culture studies, Pye is much more cautious (Pye, 1972).

¹¹ The first refers to pushing the idea, and the second refers to making a career out of it.

appeared to be sound, powerful, scientific, and legitimate - and so a great deal of political culture research was conducted before the body of criticism had developed sufficiently to mandate a closer examination of the concept. It also meant in practice that the process of definition, with or without some initial elaboration, was often only marginally related to the applications that would follow, in which elaborations tended to shift the ground on which the concept is based. Indeed, the very early criticism of the treatment of the concept seems to have been ignored. Kim (1964) criticized Almond and his colleagues on several grounds, including the sometimes cavalier use of the concept:

The abstractness of the concept of political culture is accepted by political scientists without much ado as they conceptualize political culture in terms of values, norms, beliefs, symbols, etc. This perhaps reflects the underdeveloped stage of methodological sophistication, for an empirical inquiry that attempts to obtain political culture data would have raised the question of the place of artifacts and other externally observable behaviors in the conception of political culture (Kim, 1964: 334).

As the political culture approached developed, however, it became apparent that what Kim had anticipated as "methodological sophistication" would not, in substance at least, surface. Not only would political culturists continue to seek political explanation in "values, norms, beliefs, symbols, etc.," but also, because of the broadness and generality with which scholars continued to treat the concept, and because they tended not to connect political culture with other aspects of the political system, Kim's critique still holds:

One is left with the overwhelming impression that political culture somehow greatly "affects," "conditions," or even "determines" political behavior (1964: 335).

Although Kim's article appears to have been drafted (publication dates notwithstanding) before the appearance of Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture*, his critique applies in many ways to their study and to studies that followed in the same tradition, and is echoed repeatedly in the critiques of others.

Before I go on to examine *The Civic Culture*, a few words are in order about the essays collected in *Political Culture and Political Development*. As Ruth Lane has recently pointed out (1992), the two works "are less similar than they have been considered" (1992: 364), the later work representing something of an "unnoticed tradition" (1992: 365). In addition to the theoretical essays by Pye and Verba, the volume contains ten country studies by nine additional contributors. To some extent, the result may be characterized as ten different conceptions of political culture. There are, however, certain similarities among most of these works, to which I will return in a moment, for they may provide some insight into the nature of the concept.

Among the different authors, the level of engagement with (and fidelity to) the formal definitions is very uneven. We find, for example, a somewhat bemused Robert

Ward awkwardly stirring his deep and extensive knowledge of Japan into the "recipe" for political culture provided in *The Civic Culture* - he looks at cognitive, affective, and evaluative components of political culture, and traces parochial, subject, and participant strands. Ward does not adhere to Almond and Verba's causal recipe, however. His account of Japanese political culture, rather, conforms to the *basic* definitions; in emphasizing the subjective perception of politics, he relies on his knowledge of what the political system presents to the different strata of population both historically and in contemporary Japan - political culture thus comes from political structure and process, and itself has little to do with the control of politics, let alone with affecting political structures.

Ward's embarrassment is signaled in his introductory remark that his "essay is a highly tentative and experimental attempt to examine a single aspect of Japan's experience with the modernization process, her political culture" (1965: 27). It becomes more obvious as the essay unfolds, however, for the sophistication of his understanding of Japan politics is substantially higher than the relatively simplistic categories and classifications suggested by the pioneering political culturists.

Some of the authors choose to ignore entirely the approach previously taken by Almond and Verba, proceeding on the basis *solely* of the basic definitions (e.g., Dankwart Rustow on Turkey, Myron Weiner on India, Donald Levine on Ethiopia), and some combine their area knowledge with cues from *The Civic Culture* (especially in cases in which the country is part of Almond and Verba's research - Verba on • Germany, Richard Rose on England, Joseph LaPalombara on Italy).

All ten of these essays represent fine, solid research, and most of them do in fact provide credible accounts of political cultures, it is clear, however, that the different authors do not have a common conception of political culture. Reading these separate studies creates the distinct impression that what political culture actually is, conceptually, depends on the country in question. Nevertheless, certain features distinguish most of these studies from later came to be the "conventional approach" to political culture. An exceedingly important starting point is that the authors of these studies are area specialists: they know their area countries very well, which no doubt prevents them from losing track of what factors are important in a wide array of social, political, and historical forces and events; moreover, an area specialist is not likely to subordinate an extensive knowledge and understanding to the relatively simple and abstract taxonomy of a new theory. Secondly, in accounting for what they conceive to be political cultures, they all focus on forces with which the carriers of political cultures must contend, namely power, political structures, and political processes - in short, the "way things work" in those countries. Thirdly, although many of them refer to cultural resistance to change, they tend not to adhere to the assumption of cultural continuity that characterizes the conventional approach;¹² these authors trace the sources of change (largely in terms of development) to specific forces, and in doing so they acknowledge the obvious fact that change may occur very

¹²I address the assumption of cultural continuity at length in later chapters.

quickly, and that the rate of cultural or political-cultural adaptation to change is dependent upon the manifestation of structural change in people's actual lives.¹³

In sum, while the studies in Pye and Verba's volume are of a very high quality, they do not collectively indicate a single conception of political culture, let alone one that may be applied more generally. Their lasting value, however, lies in the fact that most of them do provide credible accounts of political cultures, to which we can attribute the authors' area expertise, their attention to the workings of politics and power, as well as how these are manifested in the lives of the mass of the populations, and the authors' general resistance to subordinating empirical reality to theoretical constructs. The model that I introduce in later chapters overlaps to some extent with this approach.

Theory of Change

The first, and most influential, major political culture research project was, of course, *The Civic Culture*, which itself provided not only the most widely adopted definition of political culture, but also the most widely adopted methodology of political culture studies. The study is ambitious, creative, rich, and erudite, but it is deeply flawed in numerous respects. What follows below is a close examination of certain aspects of *The Civic Culture*, the purpose of which is not to provide a judicious appraisal, many of which have already been written, but rather to explore the flaws of the study, as well as their sources, with an eye to their effects on later studies. Although thirty years' accumulation of criticism of *The Civic Culture* threatens to condemn to redundancy any further comment, its continued influence on political culture studies is so great that the conceptual and methodological development of the concept are hindered by the constant reproduction of the errors that marred the original work. Many of the assumptions and many of the conclusions contained in *The Civic Culture* have manifested a remarkable endurance over the years; the text (and often specific conclusions which then become assumptions in newer studies) is frequently cited as an authority, rather than as the pioneering (in the true sense of the word) study that it was.¹

The Civic Culture represents an interesting collision of theory-building, methodology, policy concerns, and ideology. Methodology interfered with theory-building, and policy concerns and ideology interfered with both theorybuilding and methodology. The study was designed with numerous purposes in mind. A methodological goal was to conduct a large, cross-national, comparative study, and to do so employing recent developments in survey research and statistical analysis. The

¹³Ruth Lane's analysis, concentrating on different issues, goes deeper than this, providing a very convincing reconstruction of the tradition represented by these works. Although her excellent article is to be highly recommended, indeed as *required* reading for students of political culture, I do not recount her argument here, for it includes a strong general-cultural component, which, I contend as part of my thesis, must be thoroughly disentangled from political culture.

authors describe several theorybuilding goals. In integrating methods, concepts, and findings from sociology and anthropology, they hoped to establish political culture as micro-macroanalytical link. Secondly, they hoped to contribute to the development of a "scientific theory of democracy" (1963: 12). In the ¹⁴ authors' goals of discovering what sorts of political cultural traits contribute toward democratic stability and providing grounds for speculation on how these traits can be fostered, theory-building appears to be intertwined with policy concerns and ideology. Questions about democracy raised by the advent of fascism and communism in Europe were now joined by concerns about the post-war trend of colonies emerging as nations, raising "questions of the future of democracy on a world scale." "The central question of public policy in the next decades is what content this emerging world culture will have." Clearly, it would be in part a participatory revolution - and "the emerging nations are presented with two different models of the modern participatory state, the democratic and the totalitarian" (1963: 3-4). For the most part, though not exclusively, my analysis will address the theoretical and methodological aspects of the study, particularly where they refer to the relationships between political culture and the structures and processes of the political system.

Culture. Structure and Theory-Building

The culture-structure nexus, one of the most important aspects of political culture theory, is treated ambiguously in *The Civic Culture*, and hence has drawn a great deal of criticism.¹⁵ The book itself begins as follows:

This is a study of the political culture of democracy and of the social structures and processes that sustain it (1963: 3).

Causal direction is thus implied in terms of structures' sustaining culture. On the other hand: Much of this book will offer an analysis and description of the [civic] culture and of the role it plays in the maintenance of a democratic political system (1963: 31).

Here the implied causal direction is reversed, with culture playing a role in maintaining the system. Of course, these are not mutually exclusive. Lijphart (1980) has posited the general relationship suggested by various statements in *The Civic Culture* as follows:

[T]he argument is structured around three variables or sets of variables: the independent variables (social structures and processes), the intermediate variable (political culture, especially the degree of "civic virtue" or, as it is usually called, civic culture), and the dependent variable

¹⁴It is not uncommon to find again and again in political science publications, especially in political cultural and related literature, phrases to the effect of, "As Almond and Verba found...," followed by some conclusion of *The Civic Culture* which can be substantiated neither by the data in the study, nor by logical deduction from other "facts," but only by the force of the rhetoric in the text itself.

¹⁵For example, Barry, 1970; MacIntyre, 1971; Pateman, 1971, 1980; Pye, 1972; Elkins and Simeon, 1979.

(democratic stability) (1980:37-38).¹⁶

More generally, Almond and Verba themselves point out:

The most productive research on political psychology in the future will treat childhood socialization, modal personality tendencies, political orientation, and political structure and process as separate variables in a complex, multidirectional system of causality (1963: 35; my emphasis).

Lijphart points this out (as does Almond, 1980, 1990) in response to Pateman's (1971, 1980) and Barry's (1970) criticism that causality in *The Civic Culture* is presented as unidirectional.¹⁷ This defense, however, is somewhat "legalistic," for, despite the "multidirectional system of causality" clause in the first chapter, and despite several fine-print disclaimers here and there, the culture-causes- structure configuration is put forth repeatedly and consistently in the bulk of the text - in theoretical discussions as well as in interpretation of the data - as the primary mode of explanation. The reasons for the authors' attachment to that thesis are fairly clear. One is that political culture is treated as a part of the broader culture, and what the authors are seeking in their study is some form of *cultural* explanation of democratic stability.

If political culture is a part of that broader culture, then structural explanations would appear to be inconsistent with general characteristics they assume culture itself to have.

Another reason is that the hypothesis that there is a civic culture and the hypothesis that this civic culture is necessary for the stability of democratic political systems are not hypotheses at all, but rather assumptions underlying the entire study. As Pateman has put it:

That the civic culture is a mixed culture is both an assumption or a premise which structures the argument of *The Civic Culture* as a whole and a conclusion. The empirical evidence presented in the body of the study confirms the assumptions about the civic culture with which we begin in chapter 1 - and these assumptions are then presented in chapter 15 as conclusions about the proper role of the citizen in a democracy (1980:67).

Indeed, these conclusions had already taken shape in Almond's 1956 article. The object of the study, then, appears to be to produce plausible descriptions of this

¹⁶Lijphart also notes that in the argument apparently manifested in Almond and Verba's analysis itself, the independent and intermediate variables seem to be fused "into a single set of independent variables" (1980: 38) - an issue which I will address directly later on.

¹⁷Lijphart also finds that the relatively "cursory attention" devoted to political structure in *The Civic Culture* is not a problem; since the components of political culture are "less well known" than political structure, they deserve "a more thorough examination" (1980: 38-39). The balance of his defense of the neglect of political structure addresses only the question of measuring democratic stability, in response to one component of Barry's (1970) criticism.

"civic culture" and plausible explanations of how it helps• to sustain democratic political systems. In the end, although Almond and Verba broke new ground in methodology and in the integration of the social sciences, the explanatory component of their study cannot withstand scrutiny. Nevertheless, on publication it acquired very quickly a compelling mantle of legitimacy because of its roots in the contemporary, revisionist, empirical school of democratic theory, to some degree repackaging what have become the well-known aspects of the work of Berelson et al. (1954) and Dahl (1961).¹⁸

Despite its cloak of scientific inquiry, *The Civic Culture* is highly polemical, and the arguments within it are often pressed aggressively, endowing it with a powerful rhetorical appeal; but the argument is sustainable only at the high cost of fidelity to empirical reality, sometimes of logical coherence, and sometimes of even the appearance of objectivity. For a close reader of *The Civic Culture*, the effect is sometimes unnerving; some examples will help to illustrate.¹⁹

The chapters entitled "The Obligation to Participate" and "The Sense of Civic Competence" address directly some of the core issues in any theory of political culture, contained generally in the question: what are people's attitudes toward participation in the process of government? The authors begin with the data on their respondents' "participatory norms," which they treat first as what people feel to be their obligation to participate in their local communities.

The local community seemed to be a good place to begin, since political and governmental problems tend to be more understandable, the organs of government less distant, the chances of effective participation for the individual citizen greater on the local level than on the level of national government (1963:164).

It is quite obvious that local government plays a very different role in each of the countries in the study, and of course the authors are aware of this:

In interpreting the responses to questions about the local government, we are faced with the problem that the structures of local government differ from nation to nation and within the nations as well. And *these differences in structure partially explain differences in attitudes found among the nations....* It is important that these differences be kept in mind

¹⁸For a nice analysis of *The Civic Culture's* conformity with the "mid-twentieth-century version of the liberal theory that developed as, and continues to be, the political theory of the Anglo-American system," see Pateman (1980:59) . Gendzier (1985) provides a similar treatment of *The Civic Culture* as an integral part and a result of "the new look" in American democratic theory (1985: 119-124).

¹⁹I have selected examples partly on the basis of their power to illustrate the mechanics of theory-building, argument, methodology, and polemics in *The Civic Culture*, and partly on the basis of the significance of their content to the interconnection of premise and conclusion in the study. Hence, although the examples will in some cases be examined closely, my scrutiny is limited in scope.

(1963: 164-165; my emphasis and underscoring).²⁰

They discuss some of the possible differences, referring generally to "the degree of local autonomy and the degree to which local structures foster citizen participation" (1963: 165), even noting at one point, for example, that "local government in Mexico has rarely been of great significance" (1963:167). In summing up, they speculate that:

In general, one would expect that the extent to which the local government is open to citizen participation in decisions would be closely related to the extent of local autonomy (1963:168).

Despite these explicit references to the possible, and indeed, likely, explanation in which the causal direction is that of structure-affects-culture, it is apparent in the discussion in general that these questions are addressed more because of the authors' concern with the methodological issue of cross-national comparability than because of their interest in the theoretical issue of the sources of political culture. Indeed, they state:

Consequently, in interpreting the data in this and the next chapter, we shall have to keep in mind that one reason why individuals differ in the frequency with which they adhere to participatory norms is that the structure of government and community organization changes from one nation to another (1963: 168).

Yet, despite all they have said thus far, their resistance to structural explanations is plain:

This does not make the attitudinal data any less significant. As we have suggested earlier, even *if* the attitudes we describe are *in part determined* by the structure of government and social system in each nation, this does not remove *the fact that* these attitudes in turn affect these same structures (1963: 168; my emphasis).

They add that they will attempt to show in the same chapter that:

attitudes toward local government cannot be explained solely by the relation between the individual and the local government structure (and the same point can and will be made about the national government as well).

And that:

the extent to which individuals believe they can influence the government, and in particular the ways in which they would attempt to

²⁰In numerous quotations for these illustrations I have, added emphasis, but frequently do not comment on the emphasized portions until several pages later. In any event, as will become apparent, I usually add emphasis in order to highlight phrases containing or indicating assumptions, logic, or statements having to do with the culture-structure nexus which I find questionable or objectionable.

exert that influence, *depend, not only on the governmental system, but upon certain social and attitudinal characteristics of individuals* (1963: 168; my emphasis and underscoring).

This form of logical and verbal contortionism represents a pattern that recurs throughout the analysis in *The Civic Culture*: the possibility is raised of structures' affecting attitudes (and hence political culture), and is then minimized in favor of cultural explanations.²¹ But this illustration raises numerous other questions as well, and demands closer scrutiny.

The authors justify their initial focus on attitudes toward local government, rather than national government, in terms of accessibility; local government, in manifold ways, is simply more accessible to the people. Yet they are fully aware that in Mexico, in much of Italy, and in parts of Germany, local government has a narrow purview and little autonomy, and provides citizens with little or no opportunity to participate. If local government in Mexico, which the authors have asserted to be insignificant, provides little opportunity to participate, then would it not be bizarre for citizens of Mexico to respond to survey questions on that subject in the same way as, say, American citizens, whose local institutions have had a long history of autonomy and (albeit within stark limits) citizen participation? Naturally, the authors expected very different sets of answers from these different groups, but expected them as well to be useful for comparative purposes.

The issue of comparability, upon which their discussion hinges, actually has two dimensions. If the goal is solely to *characterize* political cultures, then there is a case to be made for comparability among the nations (though this case is undone in *The Civic Culture* by methodological flaws, which I will address further on); but characterizations alone are not the purpose of the study, and nor are they useful. If the goal is to use such characterizations to *explain* anything, including "democratic stability," the case for comparability fades markedly, for the characterizations themselves are made with structural differences "kept in mind," rather than evaluated for their significance. Comparing political cultures is then bound by the same limitations as comparing constitutions. The fable of the tortoise and the hare is a story about character; but if the hare had won the race against the tortoise, would we have attempted to explain the outcome in terms of the hare's character?²²

A striking aspect of the authors' analysis in this illustration is that, in noting that there obviously must be structural effects on citizens' participatory norms and sense of civic competence, they convey as well some judgment, if not actually of how much

²¹This example, it should be noted, is a relatively rare case of structural effects' being presented as a probability rather than a possibility. More typically, the *possibility* of structural effects is mentioned as a secondary or tertiary explanation, often in a footnote.

²²Welch's (1993) critique provides a highly cogent discussion of the tension between the "comparative project" and the "sociological project" in *The Civic Culture*, which I will address briefly at the end of this chapter.

effect structure has, at least of its relative effect. Some of the italicized portions of the quotations above are an indication both of this attitude on the authors' part and of their tendency to minimize the importance of structural effects. When they state that "differences in structure *partially explain* differences in attitudes" (1963: 165) and that these attitudes "*cannot be explained solely* by the relation between the individual and the local government structure" (1963: 168), how do they know that? Are these conclusions' or assumptions? The data generated by their survey research *may* provide a statistical case for "explanation" (i.e., some form of statistical correlation²³) of political attitudes in terms of more general social attitudes; but, whether or not this is the case, the authors have made no evaluation of structural effects, and they have used no control variables to test for spurious relationships among the variables they find to be associated.

The logic in their following chapter, on their respondents' sense of civic competence, is similar. The data show that the American and British respondents are significantly more likely than respondents of the other nationalities to report that it is possible for them to influence government. Furthermore, when asked the open-ended question of what they might do to that end, they are significantly more likely (with the Americans far in the lead), to mention joining or enlisting the aid of some sort of "informal group" (a category in which the authors include petition-signers and friends and neighbors).⁵¹ This becomes a central element in the argument in *The Civic Culture*, and in the "civic culture" itself, for it represents "a propensity for cooperative behavior," rather than, say, ²⁴ solely for apathy, or dependence solely on formal organizations and institutions (including the electoral apparatus), or individualistic favors from particular government officials.²⁵ I will return shortly to this aspect of the argument, for the following is closely related.

²³As I will discuss briefly further on, *The Civic Culture* presents no statistical measures of relationship - only frequencies and percentage distributions, which do not provide a statistical case for causal relationships among the variables.

²⁴However, when a similar question is posed in closed - ended format, the differences among nations narrow significantly. Respondents were asked to choose, from a list of five tactics for trying to influence the government, the one they thought would be the most effective. The choices were: "Working through personal and family connections;" "Writing to government officials;" "Getting people interested [and] forming a group;" "Working through a political party;" and "Organizing a protest demonstration" (1963: 529; Appendix B). The results were not reported in this section of *The Civic Culture*, but the proportions of respondents who selected "Getting people interested, forming a group" are reported in another section of the text (1963:278) .

²⁵Moreover, it represents, for Almond and Verba, *active* participation in politics. The portrait of political structure and political action with which they unconsciously begin is interesting in this respect. A person who is an "active" participant would "attend meetings, join organizations involved in community affairs, and the like;" one who is more passive would "be interested in local affairs, try to understand them and keep informed, [and] vote" (1963: 169-170). It is interesting, and perhaps revealing, that Almond and Verba classify voting as a passive means of participation. More generally, though, it is unclear precisely how attending a meeting is more "active" than voting, or how trying to keep informed is more "passive" than joining an organization. It is apparent that Almond and Verba's unconscious, idealized portrait of democratic life corresponds exactly with the contemporary American

The authors further analyze their data according to educational achievement, and draw conclusions:

Education, our data suggest, may lead individuals to believe that they can influence their government, no matter what country they live in [emphasis in original] (providing, of course, that there is at least some institutional structure to support this attitude)... But education does not necessarily increase the potentiality that individuals will create groups to support them.

The ability to create political structures through cooperation with one's fellow citizens in time of stress seems to be typical of some nations and not of others. It is an element of political style, not a result of educational attainment (1963: 209; my emphasis, except where otherwise noted).

Hypothesizing "that local competence varies with social grouping, while the use of informal groups as the strategy of influence is much more dependent upon national political style" (1963:209), they control for occupational status and sex and find that the relationships seem to hold. They conclude:

Political competence thus grows with higher education or occupational status, but cooperative competence seems to be rooted in specific national political cultures (1963:213).

In this chapter, the authors have gone further than in the previous chapter in their efforts to play down the hypothesis that structural effects may be decisive. They are quite direct in attributing to political culture the "creation of political structures," and their intentional stretching of the point seems to be clear in several ways. For example, in their general category of "enlisting the support of informal groups" they include "arousing their neighbors, getting friends and acquaintances to support their position, [and] circulating a petition" (1963:193). Yet it seems rather obvious that these sorts of "informal groups," even when the word "group" can legitimately be applied, can be considered to be "political structures" only in the loosest of senses.

It seems rather obvious, too, that in a political system in which such temporary groupings (or even potentially more enduring citizen interest groups) cannot hope to have any impact on the decisions of a centralized government permitting little local autonomy, there would be little reason to mention neighbors and petitions in response to these survey questions. Because this is a distinct likelihood in some of the countries in the study, it simply does not make sense to attribute national differences in mentioning "informal groups" to political cultures rather than to political structures.

The authors are well aware of this, and in fact address the point directly, but they do so in a lengthy footnote appended to a section which itself serves to press the

Pluralism model. This becomes more apparent later in their analysis when they evoke Tocqueville's "buzz" of activity (more about which later).

culture-creates-structure argument. I will quote at length, from both text and footnote, in order to preserve both the context and the texture of the argument.

That a large proportion [i.e., 56% in the U.S., 34% in the U.K.] of people in a country perceive that the informal face-to-face groups of which they are members can be rallied to their support in time of political stress represents a significant aspect of the political culture of that nation. It means that some of the most basic building blocks of the social structure have been incorporated into the political system. An individual's role as citizen, particularly as a democratic, influential citizen, fuses with his other social roles (1963:197).

Almond and Verba believe that "this propensity toward cooperation with one's fellow citizens" is extremely important because they "feel it is a type of behavior that can best be understood and explained by the type of study contained in this book."

In the first place, the frequency with which individuals talk of cooperating with their fellow citizens to influence the government is *not as dependent* [my emphasis] on the structure of government as is the frequency with which they say they can influence the government... But the difference between the individual who responds that he would write a letter to the local council and the one who responds that he would write a letter to the local council *and try to induce his friends to do likewise* [emphasis in original] cannot be explained by national differences in the structure and powers of their respective local councils (1963:198).

Despite the certainty with which this statement is made (and the complete absence of evidence one way or the other), the footnote affixed to it begins with, "This is not completely true." The authors point out that governmental structure in different places may well foster or hinder group efforts to influence policy.

Structures where power is diffused among a large number of autonomous or semi-autonomous boards and councils and the like (especially elected boards and councils) are more likely to foster such protest than are structures dominated by a centrally appointed official whose domain includes a larger area (as with the Italian prefect system).

Then they hedge:

But this is an example of the general proposition that interaction will occur between political orientation and political structure. In this case, however, to explain the origins of this group-forming attitude in terms of formal political structure alone would be unconvincing.

One has to look beyond the structure of the local government (1963:198; Footnote 12).

The footnote continues by pointing out that "the legal systems of nations differ in the extent to which they ban, regulate, or in other ways make difficult the formation

of non-governmental associations," adding that "legal systems on the European continent have been more hostile to such groups than has the Anglo-American legal system" (1963:199; Footnote 12).²⁶

Certainly the coincidence cannot have escaped the authors: the Anglo-American legal system has been less hostile to group-forming, and British and American respondents are more likely to mention group-forming as an influence strategy. Obviously, this is not enough to pinpoint explanation or to decide causal nature or direction, but it constitutes a serious question that must be addressed directly. The placement of this important point in a footnote, despite its being sufficiently substantive and lengthy to have been included in the text, makes clear, again, that the possibility of structural influences is intentionally minimized in favor of cultural explanations of politics.

Their argument itself, however, is structured such that it becomes difficult (although they almost succeed from time to time) to admit into it even explanations in which aspects of political culture, *having been formed by* the functioning and processes of political structures, now have significant effects on the political process, or even on "democratic stability." The problematic aspect of their argument is that they are anxious to attribute democratic stability to a civic culture congruent with its political system, and, as noted in some of the quotations above, to attribute the civic culture to "certain social and attitudinal characteristics of the individuals" (1963:168) and to the incorporation into the political system of "some of the most basic building blocks of the social structure" (1963:197) - the fusion of social and political structures. Only then can social structure and "psychological orientation toward social objects" (1963:14) "explain" the development of both a civic culture and its congruent political system.²⁷ I will return to the counterpoint of structural effects shortly, after addressing some other aspects of this section of *The Civic Culture*.

The intentional stretching of the culture-affects-structure argument appears to be manifest as well in the authors' interpretation of some other features of their data. For example, in their analysis of the results of controlling for education in the propensity to mention "informal groups" as an influence strategy, they note that "only in the United States does the frequency with which such activity is mentioned vary directly with educational attainment" (1963:208). "Well-educated German respondents," however, "are no more likely to talk of such activity than are less

²⁶A similarly structured footnote, on the same topic, appears in a later chapter on "Civic Cooperation" in *The Civic Culture* (1963: 278).

²⁷Pateman has pointed out the circularity in Almond and Verba's argument that congruence, or degree of "fit," between political culture and political system is a crucial aspect both of democratic stability and of their research of the relationship between political culture and political structure. They insist that congruence not be assumed, but rather be investigated (Almond and Verba, 1963:34).

However, in selecting the Anglo-American systems as their *models* of stable democracies, they proceed from the assumption that the United States and Great Britain *have* political structures congruent with their political cultures (Pateman, 1980:67). It is ironic, of course, that it was the authors' explicit intention, in not assuming congruence, to *avoid* circularity (Almond and Verba 1963:47).

educated ones" (1963:208-209). In fact, according to their data, "well-educated German respondents" appear to be *less* likely to mention such activity. Among those who claimed that they could do things to influence local government ("local competents"), "informal groups" were mentioned by 22 percent of those with primary or less education, by 22 percent with some secondary education, and by only 14 percent with some college education. In Mexico, local competents with some college were slightly less likely to mention "informal groups" than those with secondary or primary education, and those with secondary were slightly less likely than those with only primary education. In Italy, those with only primary education were the least likely, but those with some college were less likely to mention "informal groups" than those with secondary education (1963:207; Figure 2).

The question presents itself: What is about college in Germany, Mexico, and Italy that makes people less likely to mention these "informal groups" as an influence strategy? Similar questions are raised by the distribution of data when the authors control for occupational status, for a similar, though less pronounced and less consistent, pattern is produced (1963:211; Figure 4) - which is perhaps quite natural, as the holding of a high-status occupation is no doubt highly correlated with educational achievement. In Germany, Italy, and Mexico, local competents who are in the "professional and managerial" occupations are less likely to mention "informal groups" than are their subordinates in the "skilled" and "white collar" occupations. What, then, is it about the professional and managerial occupations that causes this trend?

I do not believe that the data in *The Civic Culture* support any conclusions about the possible effects of high education and high occupational status on the propensity to mention "informal groups" as an influence strategy. What is striking, however, is that the authors, in their haste to put forth the culture-creates-structures argument, neglected even to pose the question of why these data distributions occur. Many hypotheses present themselves. It could be, for example, that education or involvement in professional and managerial occupations expose their beneficiaries to knowledge that fosters cynicism; or fosters realism; or fosters a certain class solidarity in which members understand that their interests are not in jeopardy. In the case of Italy, an interesting contemporaneous insight into the attitudes of some of the high-status occupations, and on the consequences of these for everyone else, can be found in some of Joseph LaPalombara's work. His comments also will serve to bring us back to the structural-effects counterpoint that Almond and Verba dismissed.

LaPalombara recounts briefly the antagonistic history of industrialist-labor relations, in which the industrialist backlash against socialist and worker movements included support of the Fascist party and thence, "once the industrialists got into the political driver's seat," government crackdowns and restrictions on basic freedoms. Consequently, the industrialists can expect little success in the electoral arena.

Thus the industrialist and his professional associations prefer political activities that have low visibility: financing reliable individual candidates and political parties, intervening in the bureaucratic labyrinth

rather than in the legislature, placing certain high-level bureaucrats and politicians on hidden retainers, and so on. It is the proliferation of this kind of activity in recent years that leads increasing numbers of Italians to speak disgustedly of *il sottogoverno* - the under-government - as the pervasive morass in which political institutions are corrupted (1965:294).

Not only might this help to explain why it would be unlikely for some Italians in high-status occupations to mention "informal groups" as influence strategies, but also it is largely a structural explanation. LaPalombara's research strategy is different from Almond and Verba's, in that he attempts to explain the sources of Italian political culture, rather than merely to characterize it; what is important here is that in doing so he tends to produce structural explanations, of which he provides a variety.²⁸

For example, LaPalombara attributes the widespread antisystem attitude of Italians in part to the way government has actually worked in Italy.

To some extent these are deeply engrained [sic] attitudes born of centuries of arbitrary action from governments far removed from the people and scarcely in a position to understand their needs.

For many Italians the government remains the heavy-handed police, the tax collector, and the omnipotent prefect. For others it is an inefficient and insensitive bureaucracy heavily featherbedded and staffed by men and women who prefer to think of people as subjects rather than citizens (1965:289).

He also traces the Italian distrust and hostility toward government, which Almond and Verba prefer to attribute to social structures and traits, more to political structural than cultural features. Noting that many respondents in

Almond and Verba's study "report that they never discuss politics with other people," he writes:

This attitude which is essentially endemic in Italy ... is natural in a society in which jobs are awarded or denied, business with the government expedited or impeded, passports and emigration permits issued or refused, and other values distributed or subtracted in part on the basis of one's political affiliation (1965:290).

²⁸Sani (1980) makes that point that the major interpretations of Italian politics by Italian scholars (a group to which LaPalombara, who is American-born, presumably does not belong) do not employ cultural explanations, but rather "they identify the causes of the malfunctioning [of the Italian political system] in a variety of structural characteristics, such as the presence of antisystem parties, the byzantine nature of the party system, the lack of rotation of political forces in power, the influence of constraints from the international environment, and the like" (1980:280). As an aside, consider how closely, in general content, though obviously not in degree, this description conforms with more recent explanations of the "malfunctioning" of the American political system.

As LaPalombara points out, this helps to explain why a large proportion of Italians, as Almond and Verba discovered, refuse to provide pollsters with any political information at all. Sani (1980) goes further, stating that it is very likely that the large number of "don't know's" (including those of respondents who claim not to know whom they voted for in the last election) in Almond and Verba's survey data is a reflection not of ignorance, but of "reticence" (a point which I will evoke again below) (1980:282-291).

LaPalombara discusses other sources of Italian political culture which are structural in nature, but one which should be mentioned here is the role of Catholic Church, for in Italian politics the Church can be regarded equally as a cultural and a political structural factor.

LaPalombara makes no explicit judgment about how to classify the Church, but his discussion makes clear that the structural component cannot be denied:

In the years since World War II Catholicism has loomed as the dominant force in Italian politics.

The party over which the Vatican exercises often uneasy control [the Christian Democratic Party] has led the country, alone or in coalition, uninterruptedly since 1946; a vast network of Catholic interest groups is active in every conceivable political arena; within each diocese it is widely believed that nothing can happen politically that does not have the bishop's sanction; the extent of the Vatican's involvement in social welfare activities and in the vital economic and financial activities of the country is generally conceded to be vast; overt attempts by the clergy to orient the political attitudes of the masses - even to dictate legislative, administrative, and judicial decisions - often reach alarming and widely publicized proportions (1965:300-301).

These examples of structural sources of political attitudes do not all refer to aspects of the "formal political structure" that Almond and Verba believe would, alone at least, be unconvincing as an explanation of the "group-forming attitude" in some nations. Although a great ambiguity obscures the term "structure" in *The Civic Culture* (as well as in other political culture studies, including criticism), the term "formal" is fairly clear - and indeed, few would suggest that formal political structures alone could go far in explaining political attitudes. The legal and procedural regulations of a bureaucracy constitute an aspect of its formal structure; long waits and standing in line, the way bureaucrats treat the people who come into contact with the bureaucracy, and consequently the way relations between the two develop - these constitute aspects of its informal structure. Both, however, as sources of attitudes and ultimately of behavior, are structural in nature. In the case of Italy, the structural effects that LaPalombara describes seem to go a long way toward explaining attitudes and behavior.

My discussion thus far has addressed some of the theory-building aspects of *The Civic Culture*. It has no doubt been apparent that some of these are inseparable

from some of the methodological aspects of the study. The following section is an extension of the foregoing, but the emphasis is shifted temporarily to methodological issues.

Structure, and Methodology of culture

Two general methodological issues, each encompassing a number of more specific components, marred the research undertaken in *The Civic Culture*: the misuse of techniques of quantitative analysis, and the misuse of survey data. In the analysis that follows, these two general issues will be connected further on in a discussion of what Lijphart (1980) has called "the structure of inference."

Some of the methodological shortcomings of *The Civic Culture* were inevitable and natural, for some of the techniques used were relatively new, untried, and in some cases, poorly understood. Almond, commenting years later on some of the analytical limitations of the study, bemoaned the costly and cumbersome logistics of large-scale survey data analysis in the early 1960s, noting that only shortly thereafter the computer technology and the methods for such analysis developed rapidly.

Leafing through the pages of *The Civic Culture* fifteen years after its publication gives one something of a sense of archaism. The tables, charts, and graphs report or represent raw percentages and simple one-level associations for the most part (1980:26).

I have already mentioned in passing the problem of statistical explanation in *The Civic Culture*; no correlation coefficients are calculated to provide some indication of the magnitude and direction of any relationships that might actually exist among associated variables. Because there are no calculations made of the proportional reduction in error when one variable is used to predict another, we cannot ascertain whether or not the apparent covariance among variables (which Almond and Verba report in the form of frequency and percentage distributions in tables) does in fact amount to statistical relationships. The same applies to cases in which one variable is assumed to be caused by another, and even in cases in which apparent association is assumed to indicate covariance. Obviously, there are many cases in which a glance over the data in the tables can provide enough information to make an educated guess about relationships among variables, or to draw reasonable conclusions, but educated guessing and drawing reasonable conclusions do not amount to the scientific inquiry that the authors of *The Civic Culture* present the study to be. Moreover, quantitative rigor is only a part of genuine scientific inquiry. A more serious failing in *The Civic*

Culture lies in the various ways in which the authors misuse their survey data, from its generation to the inferences they draw from it.

Later on (chapter 7), I will provide a detailed discussion of some of the fundamental problems of survey research. The gist of my argument there is that so many unknowable factors may affect survey responses that we frequently have no way of knowing what is actually being measured. In the end, researchers who use surveys to measure political beliefs, attitudes, and opinions appear to believe, usually in good

faith, that this is precisely what they are doing, when in fact it is not. In discussing the "data-gathering revolution in the social sciences," Almond and Verba write that those who use the "new approach" have "a new attitude toward the use of data," which includes "the origination of data by the researcher."

He does not rely necessarily on that which is written or that which is known by savants. He may go out and "create" data that did not previously exist. The usual way this is done is to ask people questions as the survey researcher does (and as we did to prepare this book); questioning them, not as one might question a book or a man particularly learned in a specific field in order get expert opinion on the subject, but *in order to find out at first-hand what their own attitudes are on the particular subject* (1963: 43-44; my emphasis).

Elsewhere, Almond and Verba mention again their intention to "examine attitudes" (e.g., 1963:12) or "to look directly, if we could, at political attitudes" (1963:47). Lijphart states, in his defense of *The Civic Culture*, that "these data constitute hard and detailed evidence?" however, although he notes that Almond and Verba's measurements and characterizations of the civic culture or other political cultures are strictly impressionistic, he defends these characterizations on the basis of the plausibility of the authors' inferences - and of his own impression that "the subjective judgment that the authors make does seem to be in rough agreement with the detailed empirical data" (1980:41). He also defends the use of survey data against Erwin-Scheuch's charges²⁹ that they are liable to generate the individualistic fallacy - that "'ego's responses are treated as an observation of one's environment,' or as 'expert judgments'" (quoted in Lijphart, 1980:46). He acknowledges that Almond and Verba use their data in this way, and rationalizes as follows:

Two points can be made in defense of this practice. One is that when Almond and Verba ask questions about the individual's environment, they are primarily interested in his subjective view of the environment instead of in its objective condition. Second, to the extent that they do use individual's responses as indicators of objective realities, this can be justified on the practical grounds that interviews with individual respondents are, as Scheuch himself admits, "vastly more economical" than direct observations of the units involved (1980:46; quoting Scheuch, 1969) .

This is rather feeble. In what follows (again, along with the previous section), I will show not only that such economy proves to be fruitless in *The Civic Culture*, but also that respondents' "subjective view the environment" is itself not a dependable result of survey questionnaires - and that surveys probably do not even dependably measure attitudes.

²⁹Lijphart's reference is to Erwin K. Scheuch, "Cross- National Comparisons Using Aggregate Data: Some Substantive and Methodological Problems," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

Even though many scholars who use survey data deploy, as do Almond and Verba, a fistful of *caveats* about its potential pitfalls, the tendency to reify responses to survey questions as actual beliefs, attitudes, opinions, and even behavior, is nonetheless exceedingly widespread, and perhaps nearly universal. In the case of *The Civic Culture*, there is an entire chapter that quite thoroughly addresses many of the thorny methodological issues (chapter 2), but in the course of the analysis itself (i.e., in the rest of the book), gravity-defying inferential leaps are nonetheless made with a vigor that, by today's standards, borders on the bizarre.

The dependence on, faith in, and abuse of survey data have been more damaging, I believe, than any other factor to the credibility of political culture studies. In sum, as the following will help to illustrate, the survey questions used in political culture research usually do not measure • what the researchers claim they measure, and even if they did, the inferential path leading from such measurements to the researchers' conclusions is a long distance indeed from a check mark on a questionnaire. Before examining some specific examples of the inferential leaps in *The Civic Culture*, I will run quickly through various ways in which the possibility of valid inference is hindered more generally by certain features of their survey data themselves: sampling techniques, linguistic equivalency, and the timing of the surveys.

Sampling. Sampling for a study as large in scope and size as *The Civic Culture* is difficult, as the authors discovered. Sample size itself was a problem. Drawing samples of 1100 to 2000 people or households from each country,³⁰ the authors obtained completion rates between 59 percent and 83 percent,³¹ providing them with a dataset that includes national samples ranging from 963 to 1008 respondents. In the course of analyzing their data, however, they often found that the national sample sizes were too small to permit closer analysis of certain variables, particularly in attempting to make intra-national distinctions (for example, in educational, ethnic, or regional groups).^{32 33}

³⁰Almond and Verba's dataset was assembled with different sampling techniques employed in each country. The sample sizes they obtained, including people or households' in which interviews were not conducted or completed, are as follows: United States, 1164; Germany, 1296; Italy, 1572;

Mexico, 1680 (inferred, on the basis of the authors' reporting that the proportion of completed interviews (1008) was sixty percent of the sample; United Kingdom, 2080 (including 1600 individuals, but also 480 households from which field workers were to attempt to interview nonelectors — more about which below, in the next footnote and in the text.

³¹United States, 83%; Germany, 74%; Italy, 63%; Mexico, 60%; United Kingdom, 59%. These numbers do not all match up with those reported by Almond and Verba in Appendix A of *The Civic Culture*. I have calculated the percentages to include

³²People in the sample who were unavailable, away, unknown, too ill, dead, etc., which the authors did not do in each case. The case of the United Kingdom is unclear. The completion rate calculated here is based only on the 1600 individuals selected for the sample, of whom 937 completed interviews. Of the 480 households at which field workers were to cold-call looking for nonelectors, the authors report that 450 were "unproductive calls;" this implies that thirty such calls were "productive." If "productive" means "completed interviews," then they would have a total of 967 completed. However, the tables throughout the text imply a total of 963 useful interviews. If the completion rate for the United Kingdom sample were calculated with the inclusion of these 480 additional households, then the figure

The sampling methods used to obtain the data for *The Civic Culture* cannot yield representative or comparable samples. Numerous critics have commented on this feature of their data in detail, but a perusal of the methods themselves in Appendix A of *The Civic Culture* reveals a number of built-in errors. For example, the Mexico sample includes no one under twenty-one years of age, and no one in rural areas; the United Kingdom and Italy samples were drawn initially from electoral rolls, and depended on chance - systematized chance, to be sure, but not sound sampling method - to include nonelectors.

The sample mortality rates present fundamental problems in interpretation, though the authors assure us that such rates as the United Kingdom's completion rate of 59 percent, Mexico's 60 percent, or Italy's 63 percent are perfectly normal and to be expected - but so is "phantom itch" in an amputated limb. The methodology employed in a randomly drawn sample is crucial: it is the only means of ensuring a high probability that the sample will be representative of the population from which it is drawn. High rates of interview failure threaten the probability of representation with systematic error. For example, those who refuse to be interviewed are self-selectively excluded; and some of those who are "unavailable" or "dead" may actually be refusals. Although known refusals account only for a portion of interview failure rates, they are nonetheless significant, running from 10 to 16 percent. The question of why some people refuse to be interviewed is itself significant; whatever the set of answers to this question we may produce (and which we could do solely on the basis of speculation),³⁴ and however different non-respondents may be from one another, we could classify them on the basis of this single trait as distinct groups within their populations.

Language. In their chapter on methodological issues, Almond and Verba include a discussion of "The Problem of Equivalence" in which they address the question: "Can one' translate an interview from one language to another so that it represents an equivalent instrument in both languages?"

would drop to 46 percent.

³³For example, in the United States sample, there were approximately 100 non-whites and approximately 80 respondents with four or more years of college. In the Italy sample, only 54 respondents had any university education, and in Mexico, only 24. When variables such as these are crosstabulated with other variables, the results often include sub-samples too small to have any significance.

³⁴"Speculation invites hypotheses: George Orwell has noted that if there is anything an English person cannot stand, it is a "Nosey Parker." In the case of the Italians, the passages quoted above from LaPalombara's analysis would indicate that they might feel the same way, but for very different reasons. In all countries, the interviewers were instructed to inform their subjects that the interview would take an hour; that in itself would be usually be enough to dissuade any busy person from participating. Almond and Verba mention, not as a potentially significant datum, but as part of the lore of the study, that in the state of Louisiana and in Mexico interviewers actually landed in jail (1963: 49). Aside from what this might indicate about the structures of government, to which ordinary people can hardly be oblivious, it also raises the question of how the latter might have perceived interviewers, if the local police were suspicious enough of them to jail them.

The answer is probably no" (1963:57). The issue is discussed frankly and in detail, the authors concluding that there will be inescapable error in attempting to conduct multi-linguistic, cross-national surveys; but they do not appear to believe that the error can be sufficiently large to affect any fundamental aspect of their analysis.

However, an example from the case of Mexico indicates that area specialists might disagree with them, as do Craig and Cornelius (1980); the example itself is elucidated below as part of a broader illustration, but the essence of it is that Craig and Cornelius find the wording of certain questions to have undermined an important enough component of Almond and Verba's analysis that it might have influenced their characterization itself of Mexican political culture.

Finally, the issue of literacy can also be included under the category of language. Again and again, subjects were presented with printed lists from which they were to select statements.³⁵ Needless to say, in the case of respondents who cannot read, the data generated by those questions will be flawed - and hence those variables themselves, some of which play fundamental roles in the authors' analysis and conclusions, are tainted. It may be assumed, perhaps, that at that time in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, actual levels of literacy were high enough that presenting written lists to respondents would yield only a marginal rate of error, but no such assumption can be made in the cases of Mexico and Italy, and thus the comparability of the data is hindered.

Timing of the Surveys. The timing factor is inevitably bound up with numerous other factors. Almond and Verba note in their chapter on methodology that "the time at which the survey is carried on" is another "possible source of nonequivalence," and that it is impossible to "standardize the situation in the several nations" (1963:59). Recent and current events in the different countries may have a significant effect on respondents' attitudes, and therefore on how they respond to survey questions. The authors enumerate several contextual factors. In the United States and the United Kingdom, there were elections coming within months. In Mexico, the survey was conducted in the year after an election; more significant, there were rumors (in the press at least) of possible war with Guatemala. Nevertheless, the authors cavalierly insist that, "though it is impossible to dismiss the possible contaminating effects of these events, there is little evidence that these events had any effect on the interviews" (1963:59-60; Footnote 18).

A more general contextual factor, and one which has received a great deal of attention in ensuing years in the case of Germany, is that the interviews were conducted fifteen years after the end of the second world war, which ended with Germany and Italy defeated, and the United States and the United Kingdom as victors. Fifteen years, of course, may seem a long time,³⁶ but in this context it is not.

³⁵The interview includes eleven in all, though several of these were contingent on responses to previous questions, and thus did not figure in all of the interviews; on the other hand, several lists were used in more than one question. In one case, the elements of a list were read aloud by the interviewer.

³⁶Though it is less than the interwar period, during which period it is widely believed that German attitudes, rooted in part in the defeat of World War One, developed toward the set of attitudes which

Indeed, the impact of those events on the authors themselves helped to guide both the design of their study (including the selection of countries) and the interpretation of their data; the war, the events leading to it, and the implications of these are among their foremost concerns in their search for the causes of democratic stability.

These various problematic features of *The Civic Culture's* data are cumulative. The numerous uncertainties inherent in survey data, the complexity and sensitivity of sampling (and sampling methods), the impossibility of achieving cross-national (and often even inter-regional or inter-class) equivalence, and the vagaries of timing, setting, current events, and so on, all add up to an enormous degree of uncertainty. Any inferential chain composed of data concatenated with as many weak links as this can support only the most tentative of conclusions (Hristic:39).

Had the data been treated so gingerly in the analyses in *The Civic Culture*, the book would likely have drawn only minor criticisms, and would not have come to represent, for some, the reason that political culture studies are to be dismissed. The following section provides some illustrations of Almond and Verba's fragile inferential structures.

The context of Inference³⁷

One of the most significant methodological problems in the analysis in *The Civic Culture* is that the authors are frequently unable to measure through their data what they wish to measure in order to test their hypotheses; their research generated a great deal of survey data, but, as they recognized, the data do not mean much without inferential analysis. Leaving aside for now the broader question of connecting culture and structure, there is the more basic question of how the authors attempted to characterize political cultures. A look at their extraction of cognitive and affective orientations of political culture from their data reveals inferential leaps too large to be admissible as valid "measurements."³⁸

For example, in order to probe one aspect of their respondents' cognitive orientations, the authors included in the survey "a political information test intended to get at differences among countries in the amount of political information their adult populations possessed" (1963:80). This test included two questions: one which asked respondents if they could name three leaders of each of their country's various

permitted the onset of World War Two.

³⁷ I have expropriated the title of this section from Lijphart's chapter in *The Civic Culture Revisited* (1980), for his analysis does not actually explore the "structure of inference" in *The Civic Culture*; it is rather a nearly uncritical defense.

³⁸ MacIntyre (1971) has pointed out that we cannot legitimately study political culture or political attitudes without having identified the *object* of the relevant attitudes, namely the political "institutions and practices toward which these attitudes are directed.... The notion of political culture is secondary to and parasitic upon the notion of political practice." Moreover, employing the concept in a *comparative* study further requires the objects of these attitudes also be comparable — which in the case of *The Civic Culture* they frequently are not (1971: 261- 263). This section will illustrate these points.

political parties (the names of the parties were supplied by the interviewer), and another which asked if they could name some of the cabinet positions and ministries to which a new prime minister or president would make appointments (1963:95; questions 53 and 73, pages 533 and 535, Appendix B). It is quite plain that these alone are not adequate measures of "political information;" and for cross-national comparison they are quite useless. The authors are aware that the questions have limitations, but 'the questions' utility is nonetheless justified:

These are simple measures of quantity of a certain kind of information. They tap only a limited aspect of the dimension of knowledge, and they tell us nothing about the capacity to use knowledge intelligently. Furthermore, since the governmental and party structures of the five countries differ, we cannot assume that these quantitative measures are strictly comparable. ²⁴

The ability to identify leaders of the smaller parties in Italy and Mexico may represent a higher order of cognition than the ability to identify a larger number of leaders in the American two-party system. However, when we compare the proportions at the extremes - those having either no correct information or a great deal of information - these structural differences are of less significance and our comparisons are more reliable (1963:95).

Comparisons are then made in terms of the more or less dichotomized categories of "well-informed" on the one hand and "uninformed" or "poorly informed" on the other.

There are numerous flaws in this approach, and numerous flaws derive from it. The statement that comparing the extremes makes their comparisons more reliable is unfortunately worded, for it is simply untrue; if that were the case, it would mean that there was some feature of the middle-range data that would limit the reliability of their comparisons - which cannot be true either. Either way, the significance of the effects of "structural differences" cannot be statistically reduced by any means other than to take them into account, empirically, in the statistical analysis.

Craig and Cornelius (1980), studying the case of Mexico, have criticized Almond and Verba's analysis in this example on several grounds. The Mexican respondents in the survey, despite their "poor cognitive performance" (only five percent could name four or more party leaders [1963:96]), are found nonetheless to be fairly willing to express political opinions (rather than to respond that they "don't know") when asked six political questions that require opinions for answers. Almond and Verba use this as evidence to support their hypothesis that Mexico's political culture is "aspirational" in character, which means that Mexicans aspire to participate in government more than they actually can or do - that there may be "a tendency toward overestimating the competence of the self; a tendency to confuse aspiration with performance" (1963:415).

Craig and Cornelius point out that the political information questions on which Almond and Verba's analysis is in part dependent appear to be inappropriate for the case of Mexico.

The (question on party leaders] is a rather esoteric piece of information, since the president of Mexico is also the de facto head of the official party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional - PRI), and the strength and visibility of opposition parties are more regional than national (1980:332-333).

As for the question on cabinet or ministerial appointments:

[0]ccupants of most ministerial posts are not key political personages for most Mexicans, but even some of the reasonably well-informed respondents may have been confused by the uncommon word usage ("*gabinete*") (1980:333).

In the United States, on the other hand, the question on party leaders probes a far more basic kind and degree of political knowledge, especially during an election year. Political news and often political information itself have long tended to be framed in terms of the two-party system (consider, for example, the meanings the parties came to carry in the New Deal era). Moreover, "party leaders" as an informal term means in the United States that the naming of any four well-known political figures - including president, vice-president, and any number of perennial presidential candidates - would net a respondent a high political information score (Hristic:40). What would have been the results if respondents had been asked to name the *official* party leaders in the United States?

In the case of Italy, the trait of "reticence" comes up once again: a large number of Italians did not respond to any political questions at all in the interviews. But this pattern (which, as the authors noted, is an important component of Italian political culture) naturally extends to the political information questions, whereupon the Italians are, naturally, classified as poorly informed or uninformed; this inferential "datum" is then given its place among a dozen other non-facts in the crude mosaic that is Almond and Verba's exceedingly bleak portrait of Italy's "alienated" political culture.

Another, more complex illustration of the problems of inference in *The Civic Culture* can be found in the authors' treatment of respondents' affective orientations, which are explored largely in their chapter 4, "Feelings Toward Government and Politics," though also in chapter 5, "Patterns of Partisanship." I will address the latter first and briefly, only to note why it is not a useful chapter.

The most general point to be made about Almond and Verba's "Partisanship" chapter is that its purpose is to seek out and identify in the different countries the "positive" trait of attenuated partisanship and the "negative" trait of intense partisan conflict, thus enabling the authors to evaluate the democratic viability of political cultures in part on the basis of the contemporary "pluralist" consensus in American political science.

However, the instruments employed to evaluate these traits are invalid. The authors' determination of partisan affiliation, from which all the rest is derived, is based, in the United States, "on responses to a question asking respondents whether they were 'members,' or 'supporters of,' or 'leaned toward' the Republican or Democratic party." In the other countries, "party affiliation was determined by the respondent's statement of the party voted for in the last national election" (1963:125; Table 1, Footnote a). Needless to say, even in the United States neither of these can comprise a measurement of party affiliation. It is probably superfluous as well to point out that the roles of parties, and hence the meaning of party affiliation and partisanship itself (and even more so, the meaning of *membership* in a party) differ radically from nation to nation.³⁹ The authors are aware of class-based differences, among the parties in all five of their case studies, and they are aware of the class-based nature of the parties in some of the countries. And yet, "psychological distance between parties," a "measurement" vital to their assumption and proof of the salutary effects of attenuated partisanship, is determined according to respondents' reported feelings toward a hypothetical son or daughter's marrying across party lines. Would it not have made sense to control for socio-economic status in this case? In short, the data and the analysis in the "Partisanship" chapter cannot support the importance that the authors place on it in their ensuing analysis (Hristic:44).

One important and fundamental variable in both the conception and the analysis in *The Civic Culture* is that of "system affect," which refers to "feelings about the political system" (1963:15). However, as the chapter on "Feelings toward Government and Politics" opens, the authors now define it as the "generalized attitudes toward the system as a whole:toward the 'nation,' its virtues, accomplishments, and the like" (1963:101). This is clearly in error; the "nation," in Almond and Verba's schematic for political cultural analysis, cannot be equated with the political system. The error is compounded by a second one when, in operationalizing "system affect," they equate it with national pride (1963:101-102). Rapidly a third error enters the equation; the question they ask of their respondents in order to measure national pride does not actually measure national pride. After a long series of political questions, they ask:"Here is a different type of question. Speaking generally, what are the things about this country that you are most proud of as [an American, Mexican, German, etc.]" (1963:529; Appendix B). This question may

³⁹ indeed, although they make no mention of it in the "Partisanship" chapter, the case of Mexico, for their purposes, cannot provide any data of comparative value.

They conduct their analysis, addressing the case of Mexico numerous times, drawing conclusions from it, without commenting on the fact that only 58 percent of their Mexican respondents provided them with the data to "determine" partisan affiliation, and less than eight percent of their Mexican sample was "affiliated" with an opposition party.

It is more than one hundred-fifty pages later that they point out that "Mexico is essentially a one-party nation" (1963: 292). What is remarkable is that when this is pointed out later, it is done so specifically in terms of interparty affect, which is a pivotal variable both in the "Partisanship" chapter and in their consequent analyses and conclusions.

stimulate respondents' feelings of national pride, but it can in no way be considered to be a measurement of it. Moreover, even if we were to stipulate that what counts in the results are the extremes, the word and the concept of "pride" signify quite different things in different countries and in different languages, and so the only potential comparative value in it would be in an inquiry into the different understandings of the word "pride" in different countries and languages.⁴⁰

When we encounter yet *another* error in this chain, it becomes clear what all this *legeredemain* is about. The fourth error lies in their attempt, in the interpretation of the results, to bring this series of implicit inferences back full circle, transforming it into a *political* system affect variable:

In replying to this question, the respondents were not directed in any way to select political characteristics. When they *gave political responses*, we may assume that the expression of political pride was spontaneous (1963:102; my emphasis).

In the tabulated results of the question and in the discussion that follows, we learn how the final connections are to be made. Two (of eleven) sets of categories in the table are important: in one set is reported the proportion of respondents who spontaneously mentioned "Governmental, political institutions," "Social legislation," and "Position in international affairs;" in the other set is reported the proportion of respondents whose answers fall into the category of "Nothing or don't know" (1963:102; Table 1),⁴¹

As is to be expected, the Americans and the British figure prominently in the first category, the Italians in the second, with the Mexicans in both ("aspiring" again) and the Germans finding their pride in the economic system.

What is most striking about this inferential rockskipping is that no commentary accompanies it; the authors make each skip - from "[political] system affect," to "nation", to "national pride," to the implausible survey question, and back to political system affect, squaring the circle - with no explanations, no rationalizations, no justifications, no *caveats*, no excuses, no apologies.

Having arrived at their destination - and having sent their luggage ahead - they breeze right on to the analysis with • all the insouciance of the international traveler who has nothing to declare.

⁴⁰ Alasdair MacIntyre has noted that in Italy pride and honor are linked in ways that would be fundamentally alien to, say, English people; he emphasizes that under these circumstances, reliable comparability is nil (1971: 262- 263).

⁴¹ The other categories report responses which refer to the characteristics of the people, spiritual values and religion, contributions to the arts or to the sciences, and the "physical attributes of the country." The final category, called "Other," may well be significant, for one - fifth of the Italian respondents reported that they were proud of something or other that Almond and Verba placed in this category. The question did permit and elicit multiple responses, so we may assume that some of the respondents who expressed pride in "Other" items also expressed pride in items in the more specifically reported categories.

In order to measure "output affect" (how respondents feel about the output processes of government, which in turn is defined as "that process by which authoritative policies are applied or enforced" [1963:16]), Almond and Verba asked respondents, in separate series of paired questions, what ²⁷ sort of treatment they expected at the hands of government officials and police: if there were some question that they had to take to a government office, or if they had some minor trouble with the police, "would you be treated as well as anyone else?" If the respondent were then to explain his or her point of view to such officials, "what effect do you think it would have? Would they give your point of view serious consideration, would they pay only a little attention, or would they ignore what you had to say?" (questions 34, 35, 37a, 37b, Appendix B [1963:529-531]).

There are two fundamental problems with this series of questions; one is that it cannot measure respondents' "output affect,"⁴² the other is that, in Almond and Verba's schematic for political cultural analysis, these questions do not belong in the category of output affect, for they represent measurements of *cognitive* and not affective orientations (cognitive orientations are "knowledge of *and belief about* the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs" [1963:15; my emphasis]).⁴³ In the case of a Utopia in which people are all treated in the same way by government officials and police, and in which that treatment is uniformly good, and in which such officials do pay attention to what all people have to say, then perhaps an inferential case could be made for those questions' serving as a sort of Rorschach blot onto which people might project their affect (but even then, we would not yet have any evidence whatsoever that the variation in responses is actually a reflection of affect and not of something else). In Almond and Verba's analysis, however, these Utopian conditions hover generally as an assumption;⁴⁴ as Pateman puts it (in a more general discussion), "this assumption is precisely that the system is responsive to the demands and needs of all citizens" (1971:299). In this case, rather than to search for a possible basis in the structures and processes of government for their respondents' expectations of what sort of treatment they might receive, the authors misclassify the variations they found in this (albeit diffuse) cognitive measurement as "affect," later to bring them out again abstracted, reified into affective components of individual national political cultures.⁴⁵

⁴²The authors' reasoning is as follows: "The feelings that people have toward governmental authorities may be inferred from their expectations of how they will be treated by them. In constructing our interview we assumed that most people preferred to be treated fairly and considerately when in contact with officials. If they expected fair and considerate treatment, we could safely assume that at least in these respects they were favorably disposed toward governmental authority. And in the opposite case, we could assume that they were unfavorably disposed" (1963:106).

⁴³Pateman (1971) has pointed out the frequent confusion of cognitive, affective, and evaluative dimensions in *The Civic Culture*.

⁴⁴Indeed, similar conditions are listed, almost explicitly as such, in another section of the text; see 1963: 277.

⁴⁵The other measures of political system affect used by the authors are subject to similar analyses and

I have mentioned the nature of Almond and Verba's argument, its restricted goals, and its consequent structuring into narrow and unlikely inferential channels, one of which is the insistence that political culture is contingent on *social* structures, traits, and attitudes, and therefore that democratic stability is contingent on certain configurations of social variables. I have also mentioned the importance that the authors place on the propensity toward civic cooperation in the characterization of political cultures, and therefore, for Almond and Verba, in the evaluation (and, indeed, in the prospects) of the democratic stability of the nations in which those political cultures are embodied. It is apparent that the reason the authors make the impossible inferential leaps outlined above is that they are insistent on arriving at their predetermined destination even though they do not have enough evidence to warrant the conclusions required to get there. The result is that in the course of their journey their movements are evocative of a pair of stowaways on a train, moving back and forth between cars, sometimes between the wheels, sometimes on the roof, sometimes invisible in the darkness of a tunnel, but all the while succeeding in avoiding the conductor. It is apparent, too, that their journey is an ideological, polemical, and rhetorical one. A final illustration from the text, combining various elements of the foregoing and providing numerous corollary examples, will illuminate this more thoroughly.

Almond and Verba apply their findings on "propensity toward civic cooperation" (i.e., "group-forming"), which were examined at length earlier in this chapter, to a later section of their study in which they attempt to root them more firmly in the social landscapes of the different countries (chapter 10, "Social Relations and Civic Cooperation"). The authors first construct various nonpolitical social variables.

One such variable is the extent to which social interaction is valued in a society, for which Almond and Verba use their respondents' answers to the question of what activities, aside from work and family, they like to engage in during their free time.⁴⁶ The mention of "some activity that brings them into social interaction with other people" is then the authors' measure of the degree to which social interaction is valued in that society. Obviously, this measurement cannot even approximate the variable and is invalid. This error is compounded by that of lumping together hobbies and sports (along with an "etc."), creating the largest single category in their tabulated results. Hobbies, typically, tend not to be social. Sports activities, on the other hand, are almost purely social, whether engaged in by participants or by spectators.⁴⁷ Thus

conclusions. For the most part, they consider their respondents' reported willingness to "talk politics" with others in general and their actual willingness to do so with interviewers.

⁴⁶Interviewers encouraged multiple answers with probing, and deflected the "no free time" response with the rephrasing, "If you had more free time and opportunities, which activities would you like to engage in?" (1963: 263;526) .

⁴⁷This seems not to require any elaboration, but consider nevertheless the degree to which sports in the United States provides a form of social currency among Americans, especially males, of all ages. And this exchange is certainly not eschewed in the academy; among political scientists, before 1990, what

the value of their findings for this question, though the data themselves have potential value in other contexts, is nil. What they found is that those who mention "social" activities tally to 40 percent in the United States; 30 percent in the United Kingdom; 16 percent in Germany; 11 percent in Mexico; and 7 percent in Italy. Their conclusions have an oracular quality about them:

These data suggest that in the stable democracies there is a higher incidence of social interaction outside of the more or less compulsory relationships of family and work group.... One may infer that the pattern of voluntary social interaction is relatively well established in the stable democracies, and that this in turn reflects feelings of confidence and safety in the social environment. Thus in those countries where there is a higher incidence of cooperative civic competence [i.e., "group-forming"], there also appears to be a higher incidence of social interaction in other than political contexts (1963:264).

In order to measure the next variable, the degree to which people value "outgoing character qualities," the authors use their respondents' answers to a question in which they are asked to choose from a list of eight "statements describing different character qualities" the two characteristics they most admire.⁴⁸ The hypothesis is as follows:

If an effectively functioning democracy requires a high incidence of civic competence, and if this in turn is based on a capacity to join with others in seeking civic and political goals, then we would expect to see a high value placed on character qualities that are related to cooperating and working with others (1963:265).

The only results reported in the text are the proportions of respondents from each country who selected "generosity and considerateness of others" as the most admired trait; these figures are also broken down by education, with which the variable appears fairly clearly to have a direct correlation (in the text they describe also a lesser correlation with occupational status). Respondents from the United States and Great Britain chose this trait significantly more frequently than did the others (1963:265-266). The results are interesting, but the hypothesis linking them with "propensity to form groups" is implausible, not least because the survey question is not valid as measurement of social values.

had students of former-soviet domestic affairs to discuss with those specializing in the American judiciary branch?

⁴⁸ The list includes the following: "Does his job well;"

"Active in public and social affairs;" "Ambitious, wants to get ahead;" "Generous, considerate of others;" "Thrifty, saving;" "Lets no one take advantage of him;" "Keeps himself to himself;" "Respectful, doesn't overstep his place" (1963:527; Appendix B). Again, this question requires literacy.

In order to measure "feelings of safety and responsiveness," they use respondents' agreement or disagreement with various statements about trust-distrust, self-interest, and cooperation.⁴⁹ There is a great deal of variation in responses from statement to statement, within national groups as well among them (which indicates that the response to one question is unlikely to be usable as a predictor of another question - thus failing a basic test of validity), but a rough overall pattern emerges which is similar to, though far less pronounced than, what the authors have typically found: respondents in the United

States and United Kingdom are more trusting, or less mistrustful, than the others.

These "social relations" variables established, Almond and Verba note that, whatever the social values in a country, before people can evince a propensity to civic cooperation in the medium of group-forming, other requirements must be met.

There must also exist no severe impediments to communication among individuals. Whereas these informal political groups we have been considering may be created on the spot for political activity, group formation can probably only take place if there are pre-existing channels of communication among the potential members of the group; if there has been some previous contact among them (1963:279).

Almond and Verba infer "previous contact" from the question asked of their respondents about whether or not they engage in political discussion. Tabulating "local competents"⁵⁰ who "mentioned a group-forming strategy" into two groups, on the basis of whether or not they report discussing politics with others, the authors find that a "pre-existing *communications network* helps explain the existence of group competence" (1963:279, my emphasis; Table 6, p. 280): those who report that they do discuss politics are slightly more likely to mention group-forming strategies than those who report that they do not discuss politics. The correlation is clear, but the relationship, as the authors acknowledge, is weak. In any event, even though the hypothesis and the inferences are not valid, the authors are able to impute causal power and direction to the variables.

The existence of a political communications network (as roughly measured by our question on political discussion) does *make it more likely than not* that an individual will think of using his *primary group* relations in an attempt to influence the government. At best, however, the relationship is a mild one (1963:279; my emphasis).

⁴⁹The statements include questions 7 and 21 in the interview, which are not strictly "agree-disagree" questions, and elements B, E, and H from question 72, in which the respondent is instructed to agree or disagree with various statements read by the interviewer (1963:527, 528, 534-535; Appendix B).

⁵⁰Again, local competents are those "who say there is something they can do about an unjust local regulation" (1963:187). This group is selected because the belief that something can be done is a *sine qua non* of doing something.

Having thus "established" cross-national variations in, and the importance of, primary groups, pre-existing political communications networks, and the value for "sociability," Almond and Verba begin to tie it all together. Hypothesizing that the social attitudes embodied in valuing generosity and considerateness in others and in believing others to be cooperative and trustworthy "would open the way for the individual to turn to his fellows for political help" (1963:281), they tabulate each of these variables with that of the propensity to mention groupforming strategies. In the case of the first, even though they find an avowedly weak relationship, they conclude that in the United States and the United Kingdom:

Interpersonal consideration is highly valued and appears to be *translated into* a positive evaluation of the efficacy of cooperative activities in relation to the government (1963:282; my emphasis).

In the other countries, there is either no relationship, or a reverse relationship, between the variables, which is then interpreted creatively, while earlier data enjoy creative restatement:

In the three countries where group formation is a relatively smaller part of the dominant political style, not only are interpersonal cooperative virtues *less frequently admired*, but admiration for them is *not translated into political behavior* (1963:284; my emphasis).

In the case of the trust variable, after indexing the various questions that comprise it into a single, three- value variable (high, medium, and low "faith in people"), they find that there is a direct relationship between these variables in the United States and the United Kingdom, but • no relationship at all in the other countries. Again, the interpretation is creative:

In contrast with the pattern in the United States and Britain, *faith in people does not increase one's propensity to form political groups* in the other three nations....

In the United States and Britain the belief that people are generally cooperative, trustworthy, and helpful is frequent, *and it has political consequences*. Belief in the benignity of one's fellow citizen *is directly related* to one's propensity to join with others in political activity. General social trust *is translated into* politically relevant trust (1963:285; my emphasis).

They explain the absence of any relationship between the variables in the other countries - Germany, Mexico, and Italy - as follows:

A gap remains between general social attitudes and political attitudes. Politics appears to be a separate, independent sphere of activity for which one has a set of political attitudes not particularly grounded in general social attitudes.

In the United States and Britain one's view of the realm of politics

appears to be closely related to one's view of social life. In the other three nations there is *less fusion* between social and political attitudes (1963:285-287; my emphasis).

On the basis of a relationship which is "at best" "a mild one," Almond and Verba induce variables which are "closely related" or "directly related" - where one "translates into" another, ultimately "*fusing*" with it.

This means of extracting some confirmation of their hypotheses out of these apparently poor relationships is truly remarkable, and stretches the boundaries of methodological soundness well past breaking point. But, that barrier broken, interpretation is no longer bound by facts, and their analysis soars. The inferential chain described above is followed by one in which inductively generated values are reified, in which overstatement leapfrogs overstatement, suggestion is overtaken by certainty, appearance crystallizes into reality, and mild correlation hardens into fact, such that in the end we have an integrated, complex, definite, unequivocal statement of the way things are.

For example:

The above data go a long way in explaining why there is a 'buzz' of group activity in Britain and especially in the United States, and why this activity is not as apparent elsewhere (1963:287).

In fact, however, the data, with their weak correlations derived from invalid measurement, do not "go a long way in explaining" anything. The data *can* be employed in speculation and the generation of hypotheses, but Almond and Verba present both of these exercises as fact. Secondly, the authority for the "buzz" of group activity is, of course, Tocqueville, writing on the United States of 1830; whether or not such a "buzz" actually existed then or in 1960, Almond and Verba have in their actual data no indication at all of the frequency or intensity of group activity in the United States and the United Kingdom; respondents' reports that they *would* engage in some groupforming activity (which, we should recall, includes circulating a petition and talking to neighbors) *if* they wanted to influence local government appears now to have been converted into *actual activity*. Moreover, even though the proportions of respondents willing to speculate that they might employ some "group activity" in an attempt to influence local government are not particularly high (56 percent in the United States and 34 percent in the United Kingdom), the frequency and intensity of this hypothetical "activity" are rhetorically elevated to a "buzz."

Another example of Almond and Verba's rhetorical pitch lies in the notion of "political communication networks." Although the authors are able to discern the existence of such "networks" only in the tea leaves of rudimentary survey data on willingness to engage in political discussion, they attribute it to the existence of pre-existing "primary groups." Later in the analysis, political communications networks and primary groups merge with propensity to mention group-forming strategies to become "propensity to invoke one's primary group in time of political stress," which is then bent back around and connected (at first in the form of a hypothesis),

simultaneously to the integration of the social and the political worlds in the stable democracies, and to the nexus of political structures and attitudes, complete with causal direction:

This tendency to use one's primary associations in political influence attempts, *we suggested*, represents a *close fusion* of the basic primary group structures of society with the secondary structures of politics; a fusion that led to a more integrated political system (1963:287; my emphasis).

The political "structures" to which they refer are, as noted earlier, the "groups" themselves. In the next sentence the plausibility of this "suggested" fusion between social structures and political structures is bolstered by a related fusion, the existence of which is now affirmed by categorizing it as a "discovery:"

That the use of such primary groups does represent a fusion of this sort on the structural level is strongly supported by the *discovery* of a parallel fusion on the level of attitudes in the same nations where the integration of primary and political structures was most complete (1963:287; my emphasis).

Finally, after deploying similar Rube Goldberg contraptions to show how attenuated partisanship in the United States and the United Kingdom (and the absence of it in the other countries) fits into the theoretical- inferential mosaic, the authors conclude:

Thus the "buzz" of group activity in the United States and Britain, this characteristic tone of their politics, appears to be rooted in some fundamental characteristics of the social system.

That people can so easily cooperate with each other in political activities is *based on the fact* that, despite political differences, they are tied to their fellow citizens by a set of interpersonal values, and these values overarch the political and nonpolitical aspects of the system.... The "modern" political system has within it the seeds of great fragmentation - among political structures, along partisan lines, between polity and society. But in Britain and the United States this fragmentation is impeded by the force of shared social values and attitudes, which permeate all aspects of society (1963:299; my emphasis).

Thus, before the dust has settled from the passage of their inferential and speculative caravan, all is resolved into "fact."

Conclusion

The foregoing has illustrated amply why *The Civic Culture* has been the object of a great deal of criticism; this was not, however, my purpose in presenting a critique anchored so heavily in the text; nor have I covered the range of existing criticism - and nor can *The Civic Culture* be reduced to its errors. Rather, as I indicated at the outset, the continued influence of *The Civic Culture* in spite of the accrual of a vast body of criticism suggests that a closer examination might be required to gain some insight both into the durability of its theoretical and methodological elements and into the tendency among later political culturists neither to address these issues meaningfully nor to correct or avert the errors inevitably generated by Almond and Verba's approach. A close reading of *The Civic Culture* is rewarded with more than just the revelation of errors of logic, methodology, and judgment. Indeed, both the volume of criticism produced and the level of abstraction that is attained in some of the foremost critiques of the text reveal its complexity - and in that complexity lie several different, powerful, appealing elements.

Welch's (1993) critique,⁵¹ the most recent and in many ways the most enlightening, has significant ramifications both for criticism of political cultural works that followed *The Civic Culture* and for vital theoretical guidelines for any future political cultural study. After having examined closely both the text and the body of criticism, Welch transcends a great deal of argument by taking "the study's protean quality and the resulting diversity of the critical response as the major target of explanation."

This [protean] quality is the product of the attempt to combine two distinct and not fully complementary projects. The *comparative project*, in summary form, amounts to an attempted explanation of the presence of stable democracy in some countries and its absence in others in terms of pre-existing political cultural conditions. It is a comparative explanation with political culture as the independent variable. The *sociological project* consists in an investigation of the social conditions under which democracy functions. It is a contribution to the "empirical theory of democracy" in which a range of sociological variables is taken to be explanatory (1993:14-15; my emphasis).

The comparative and the sociological projects are "in tension" with one another, both in Almond and Verba's theory and in their interpretation of data; moreover, the comparative project is seriously undermined by the minuscule size of the country sample (i.e., five countries). The results include both empirically unmanageable complexity and chronically shifting loci of explanation and object of explanation.

⁵¹His study, entitled *The Concept of Political Culture*, devotes a chapter to *The Civic Culture*, but covers the range of political cultural studies conducted since then as well. Welch's analysis is comprehensive, and constitutes the single best text and critique of political culture.

In Welch's account (as in mine), we may sometimes get a glimpse of Almond and Verba boldly stepping forth after having inadvertently tied their shoelaces together: the ambitiousness itself of their theory, their attempt to incorporate so much so glibly into a theoretical framework too sparse to accommodate it all, left them with explanations sometimes, as in the above examples, "sufficiently complex to be in principle impossible to verify" (1993:18). In that complexity, however, lies some of the appeal of their approach, for culture, politics, and democracy are exceedingly complex phenomena; accordingly, explanations linking them would be expected to reflect that complexity - with the theoretical dictum of parsimony perhaps exchanged for the theoretical desiderium of elegance. If Almond and Verba's data were insufficient to establish the empirical linkages they sought, then so be it: more data are required. Many contemporary (and later) readers no doubt believed that more variables and more surveys in more countries, eventually permitting time-series analyses, would pull together many of theoretical loose ends in *The Civic Culture*, in turn proving or disproving many of Almond and Verba's "conclusions."

For many, the data themselves within the text are compelling. Welch cites several later applications of the data, including that found in Pateman's trenchant critique, in which she focuses not on the validity of the data themselves, but rather on Almond and Verba's interpretation. "That this, and the many other reuses of Almond and Verba's data to different effects, may occur, tells us something about the supposed 'hardness' of statistical evidence" (1993:29). Indeed, in my own critique above, which emphasizes the near-total failure of legitimate operationalization, numerous instances can nevertheless be found where I offer alternative explanations of the data - implying that it is not the data I dispute, but rather Almond and Verba's interpretation. The sheer volume of data in *The Civic Culture*, the first study of its kind, no doubt held a certain promise to aspiring number-crunchers; with computer technology developing rapidly, the management of far larger amounts of data than Almond and Verba's would be vastly simplified. And again, data and statistics are compelling; even for those who could not agree with Almond and Verba's interpretations, the generation of more data and more statistics was its own reward; more data represents not only a greater capacity to analyze, but also more *knowledge*.

As should be apparent in both the content and the tone of my critique, however, my strongest objection to Almond and Verba's approach is to the vigor with which they attempt to "make the case" for their theory (Hristic:50), findings, and conclusions - and it is to their success in making the case that I attribute the ensuing years of relatively unproductive political culture research. The concept of political culture itself was and is highly compelling. But it is the combination of an attractive theoretical complexity (even if difficult to manage), a wealth of "hard" data (and the ease of gathering more of the same), and Almond and Verba's sustained rhetorical pitch that launched into political science the political culture approach in the mold of *The Civic Culture*. Although many elements of Almond and Verba's *theory* were rapidly left by the wayside, their *approach* has dominated empirical political culture research. By this I mean that Almond and Verba established apparently credible precedents not

only for the liberal application of rhetoric in ostensibly "scientific" endeavors, but also for omitting questions of falsifiability - an approach in which even thin plausibility becomes an adequate basis for conclusions, and alternative interpretations offering perhaps greater plausibility are ignored if they do not fit nicely into the agenda.

Almond and Verba's initial definitions, including their statements concerning the "multidirectional system of causality," are reasonable and appealing, but are also very difficult to operationalize. It appears, though, that they did not consider operationalization to be a problem - and this must certainly have set the tone for later political culturists. We have seen, too, that Almond and Verba deliberately played down the causal direction in which structures have effects on culture; but, after all, they had to do so, for the sociological project in their operative theory (initial formulations notwithstanding) held that stable democracy is the result of cultural factors. The legacy of *The Civic Culture*, then, is a dual one: Almond and Verba were dauntless pioneers who, through force and will, opened up new regions; but the same glib, fast-and-loose, optimistic bravado that enabled them to attempt such a vast, multifaceted, and impossible project also introduced to those new regions an interesting way of playing cards.

PART TWO: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL CULTURE

INTRODUCTION

After Pye and Verba's *Political Culture and Political Development* (discussed in chapter 2), there has not been a great deal of theoretical development in political culture. There are several notable exceptions, however, of which the subjects of the next three chapters are representative. The accumulating and compelling criticism of the late 1960s and early 1970s did much to direct political science research in directions other than the exploration of political culture, and hence the theoretical developments thereafter tend to reflect either alternative approaches, or configurations in which the significance of the criticism could be rationalized away.

In the next chapters I discuss three examples of relatively recent political culture studies, each of which represents an approach different from the others. This divergence is testimony to the breadth of political culture's applicability (and, indeed, the three cases are only barely comparable to one another), but it is also testimony both to the broad range of conceptual possibilities and to the broad range of conceptual pitfalls inherent in political cultural application. The studies I examine are: Eckstein's theoretical piece, "Culturalist Theory of Political Change" (1988); Inglehart's empirical study, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (1990); and Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky's Cultural Theory (1990).

THEORY OF CHANGE

Eckstein's "Culturalist Theory of Political Change" (1988)⁵² is a relatively brief outline of an approach to political culture, designed to respond to the often cited criticism that current conceptions of political culture have not been able adequately to deal with political change. The following analysis will show that, although Eckstein's approach brings to light a number of points crucial to the building of a viable theory of political culture, it does not fully address the question of change. The most important contribution of his outline may lie in his insistence that the usually implicit assumptions of political culture theory be made explicit - which itself can help to eliminate an entire category of errors in political cultural conceptualization and interpretation.

Eckstein's *point de départ* is that the most significant shortcoming of earlier political culture studies is that the models contained within them seem able to address change only in an *ad hoc* manner; he sets out from there to show that adherence to culturalist assumptions need not result in such theoretical "*ad hocery*." What this means in his statement of a viable, or at least testable, approach is that: 1) the issue of change is both the only significant criticism he addresses and the principal focus of his theoretical outline; and 2) a fundamental object of his approach is not only to make explicit the generally implicit assumptions of political culture theory, but also to test such theory *with* its assumptions.

Eckstein first identifies and analyzes a set of assumptions or "postulates" contained in cultural theory that imply cultural continuity and thus make it difficult to produce a culturalist account of change. He points out that while these assumptions lead us to *expect* cultural continuity, they need not be so rigidly treated:

The saving grace of culturalist theory here is that continuity is, so to speak, an ideal-typical expectation - one that holds in an *abstract*, parsimonious cultural world. It is an expectation akin to that of inertia in the Galilean conception of motion (1988:793; emphasis in original).

In other words, in the Galilean model, a moving mass is assumed to have inertia, but in reality a variety of external forces can act upon it to change its direction or velocity; similarly, in the cultural model, culture is expected to have continuity, but in reality a variety of external forces can cause cultural change. However, Eckstein says, because the assumptions of culture theory that imply continuity are typically

⁵² For further reading on the different concepts of political stances, See: Boskovic, Aleksandar, "Liberalizam, pragmatizam i zdrav razum." *Kultura polisa* 13/14, str. 145-163. 2010.

unquestioned and implicit, the tendency is for researchers either not to address change at all, or to address it in an *ad hoc* fashion in which change is treated as exceptional, indicating "special" conditions or deviant cases.

The remedy is to develop an explicit general culturalist theory of change, consistent with culturalist assumptions, in order to prevent ad hoc tinkering with culturalist postulates and their implications. Such a theory should state, prior to explanations of specific changes, the characteristics of change that the political culture approach can logically accommodate and those that do not fit its constraints (1988:793).

Eckstein's remedy thus contains two central components. The first, obviously, is simply to make explicit and to incorporate into his theory the assumptions that have tended thus far to be implicit in culture theory. He identifies and discusses four interrelated assumptions, or postulates. The first and fundamental of these is the "postulate of oriented action," which refers to the assumption that actors have orientations that pattern their behavior (Hristic:54). The "postulate of orientational variability" refers to the assumption that "orientations vary and are not mere subjective reflections of objective conditions;" in other words, actors' perceptions are not strictly biological, or rational, or superstructural, or infrastructural - which would imply formulaic or mechanical, universal predictability - but rather are mediated through the *variable* conditions defined by culture. The third postulate is that of "cultural socialization," which is simply the assumption that people do, in fact, internalize culture. The fourth is the "postulate of cumulative socialization," which refers to the twin assumptions that later learning is conditioned by earlier learning, and that all learning is conditioned by the need for cognitive consonance (1988:790-792).

The second component of his remedy is to append to that set of assumptions another, derived in part from the first, which prescribes what sorts of cultural change, *if the culturalist assumptions are correct*, should be expected to occur in various conditions of situational or structural change. Eckstein offers no comment on the fact that this very set of assumptions has been the object of a great deal of convincing criticism (*inter alia*, Pateman, 1971, 1980; Barry, 1970) ; to readers who take those criticisms seriously this omission may make his efforts to incorporate them in yet another elaboration of political culture theory seem quixotic or misguided. On the other hand, his frequent inclusion of the "if the assumptions are valid" condition in his discussion of what we should "expect" provides grounds for interpreting his theoretical framework not just as a remedy to the problem of "ad hocery," but also as a means by which we can test the set of culturalist assumptions, in which case speculative criticism may be superseded by empirical testing. However, whether or not Eckstein meant it as such, his approach does not itself comprise a valid test; to test the explanatory capacity of a theory built on a particular set of assumptions does not necessarily amount to testing that set of assumptions. Secondly, the derivation of specific culture change "expectations" from general assumptions will necessarily be idiosyncratic until an acceptable model is developed of what sorts of change can be considered to be *cultural*

change - and more specifically, *political cultural* change. Eckstein's own discussion of cultural change provides a clear illustration of the potential confusion. The problem he proposes to address is that of "how political change, and every kind of such change, occurs" (1988:790); but the model in his theoretical sketch focuses on what sorts of cultural changes we might expect from certain types of political structural change - the reverse of the formula implied by the problem.

His model, then, may more accurately be called "a culturalist account of *culture* change."

Eckstein considers two broad types of cultural changes:

those arising "naturally" from changes in situations and structural conditions and those that result from "artifice" - deliberate attempts to transform political structures and behavior (1988:793).

He includes three specific types of "natural" change: "pattern-maintaining change", "change toward flexibility," and "cultural discontinuity." Under the category of changes resulting from "artifice," he includes only one specific type of change, which he calls "political transformation," and by which he means deliberate attempts to implement radical change. Each of these, in its present form, serves to limit the viability of Eckstein's theory.

The first type of "natural" change is adaptive cultural change designed for cultural pattern maintenance in the face of novel situations. Although the Parsonian concept of pattern maintenance has potential value in political culture theories, Eckstein's illustrative case, "Tory concessions to British working class voters and interests" (1988:794), reveals not this potential, but rather some of the conceptual pitfalls in cultural theory-building. He describes the Tories facing sociopolitical change (presumably in the working class, but reflected in class relations as well) and reacting by making concessions designed to preserve the feudalistic form of "deference upward" and "obligation downward;" the function of these concessions ultimately "was to maintain Tory hegemony" (1988:794). It is clear that the cultural patterns supposedly being maintained in this example are the "feudalistic forms" - but several questions present themselves. By whom are they being preserved, and in whose interest? In other words, where is the significant agency in this social equation? Obviously, it is the Tories preserving the feudalistic forms, in their own interest.

But more to the point, is the principal goal one of "cultural pattern maintenance," or of "Tory hegemony?" Obviously, the *principal* goal is hegemony; maintaining upward deference is a means to that end, and perpetuating downward obligations (i.e., making concessions) is in turn a means to *that* end. In other words, "cultural" pattern maintenance appears to be only incidental in this example. Other, more general questions present themselves: What might be the various (and perhaps numerous) cultural (or other) patterns that are *not* being maintained as these sociopolitical changes occur? What is the relative political significance of these patterns? Is some maintenance of the "form" of deference-obligation more significant than other "forms"? Is this actually a cultural form? What of the cultural (and other)

changes that accompanied the working class's ascendance to a position in which the Tories felt compelled to make concessions? The point is that Eckstein's example illustrates, among other things: the easy elision between "culture" and "behavior" in political culture theory; the propensity to label any and all behavior patterns, including interest aggregation, as culture; and the tendency to confuse political institutions with cultural institutions. Although the question of cultural pattern maintenance is an important one, it appears⁵³ to be a concept exceedingly difficult to explore empirically and objectively.

The second "natural" cultural change that Eckstein discusses is modernization, which he describes as a shift toward cultural flexibility. This scenario is itself based on two assertions: a) that "situational and structural change tend to occur with great frequency and rapidity in modern societies;" and b) that "as societies become more changeable, the elements of culture increasingly become 'forms' that can subsume a variety of 'contents'" (1988:795). The first assertion, on which the second is theoretically dependent in Eckstein's schematic, is dubious, at least insofar as *political* situations and structures are concerned (for example, consider the United States Congress - despite its biennial elections). "Social mobility, vertical and horizontal," which Eckstein cites as "the most obvious cause" of rapid change in modern societies (1988:795), certainly has important political ramifications, but the assertion that it causes, or even amounts to, more rapid and frequent situational and structural change requires some substantiation. The second assertion, aside from its dependence on the first within this theoretical schema, has two further problems. One is that, its sociological lineage notwithstanding, it remains extremely nebulous, and thus offers no apparent nodes with which the political could be connected; Eckstein offers no illustrative examples of flexibility in terms of cultural forms' assuming greater importance than their content. The second problem is that the theoretical shift of emphasis from the content of culture to its forms makes it far more difficult objectively to identify culture and its boundaries (let alone those of *political* culture) and to distinguish it from other patterned behavior. In short, although the notion itself of cultural flexibility is tenable, it must be elaborated further before it can be incorporated into a theory of political culture.

The third type of "natural" (though not "normal," as were the first two types) cultural change that Eckstein addresses is that which would result from social discontinuity, which itself would be the result of rapid industrialization, war, massive inflation or depression, or other conditions that create social upheaval. Since culturalist assumptions preclude rapid reorientation, he says, what we can expect instead is formlessness, which is equivalent to Durkheim's *anomie*, or Merton's

⁵³The latter is a point on which I will elaborate below. In response to a critique of his theoretical outline, Eckstein mentions the example of the French bureaucracy as "a prototypical example of cultural inertia" (1990: 254).

The fundamental question raised by the use of this example that of the nexus of culture and structure; Eckstein's choice of words here is a reflection of the confusion surrounding that relationship.

deinstitutionalization, and he uses Merton's categories of deviant behavior as a basis for predicting what might be people's political behavior "if political culture is highly formless" (1988:797). Eckstein assumes (erroneously) that "governmental authority will, of course, survive cultural discontinuity," and so we can expect ritualistic or self-serving, opportunistic conformity; or, "more commonly than conformity, one should expect what Merton called *retreatism*," which involves withdrawing from the 'alien' larger society into the smaller, more familiar worlds of family, neighborhood, village, and the like. In Almond and Verba's scheme of concepts, it should show up as increased "parochialism" (1988:797).

Rebellion, intransigence, or violence against authority cannot be ruled out, he adds, though since these are "always likely to be costly and call for much energy," the other contingencies are more probable. Over time, we can expect "new culture patterns and themes to emerge."

But if [as culturalist assumptions hold] dispositions are formed by cumulative learning, they should emerge only slowly (over generations) and, in the transitional period, at great costs resulting from raw power, withdrawal, and (because of withdrawal) forced mobilization and rebelliousness against it (1988:789).⁵⁴

There are numerous problems with this third category of "natural" cultural change. Once again, the condition of correct culturalist assumptions may serve to narrow down unrealistically what can be expected to occur in certain circumstances of sociopolitical change;⁵⁵ but Eckstein's own narrowing down of the options makes his theoretical framework even less useful than it might otherwise be.⁵⁶ In this case, certainly the culturalist would not expect rapid cultural reorientation in response to social trauma; but why is it that if cultural continuity is broken, i.e., if "social upheaval ... overcome[s] cultural inertia" (1988:796), the polar extreme of "formlessness" should be expected instead. The answer may be that there is yet another culturalist assumption that underlies cultural theory: even though Eckstein insists that "cultural entropy can never be complete" (1988:796), it appears that culture is treated, ideally at least, as an organic, integrated whole which breaks down completely in conditions of

⁵⁴Eckstein points out that intergenerational differences in reaction to change would be a test for the culturalist assumptions connected with this longer-term change. If such differences can be discovered empirically, then "the cultural perspective upon theory would be enormously strengthened over alternatives" (1988: 798). This test is one of the bases of Inglehart's study, which will be considered in chapter 5.

⁵⁵Again, although formal adherence to culturalist assumptions may help to test them, the elements of such a test must be clear.

⁵⁶This particular type of change is potentially important to the construction of a viable political culture theory. Conditions of social, political, or economic discontinuity, and indeed, any conditions resulting in social trauma and a pressing need for significant adaptation, may be the most productive terrain from which to glean an understanding of political cultural dynamics, because it is in conditions of rapid change that we may be able to discern the *ways* in which political culture is transformed.

social discontinuity. If Eckstein does, in fact, hold such an assumption, this "organic" nature of culture would be an ideal, just as is the assumption of cultural inertia itself. The next logical step, however, which would be to treat cultural integrity and Eckstein's formlessness as ideal extremes on a continuum, is problematic in Eckstein's schematic, for he has provided no clue as to what lies between the two extremes; for example, are there discernible relationships between degrees of social discontinuity and degrees of cultural integrity or formlessness? We are left only with Eckstein's explicit schematic, which treats formlessness as an ideal type, and which thus leads him to expect from social discontinuity responses of conformity, retreat, or rebellion - all of which, in turn, are based on yet another assumption, which is that governmental authority will survive and perhaps even grow more powerful. Moreover, each of these responses is discussed in terms of individual responses, at the psychological, behavioral level; although they are almost certainly related to culture and political culture, it is not clear just how. In other words, despite the plausible (albeit incomplete) nature of Eckstein's scenarios, we have logically neither a valid test for culturalist assumptions, nor a valid set of possible responses to cultural discontinuity. Worse, culture and political culture are treated synonymously.

Eckstein's other broad category of change, that in which change occurs as a result of "artifice," includes only one specific type of change, which he calls "political transformation:"

By transformation I mean the use of political power and artifice to engineer radically changed social and political structures, thus culture patterns and themes: to set society and polity on new courses toward unprecedented objectives. Transformation, typically, is the objective of modern revolutions. It can also be the objective of military conquerors and of nation builders or other modernizers (1988:798).

Because revolutions "provide the most unambiguous and dramatic cases," he confines his "remarks to them - though what is said about them should also apply to transformation attempted in other ways" (1988:798).⁵⁷ Revolutions, he says, should result in the same sort of formlessness as other social discontinuities, but since the purpose of revolutions tends to be transformation, they can also be expected to have other effects. Again, if the culturalist assumption of continuity is valid, then we cannot expect any rapid reorientation; and since revolutionaries tend to insist on creating change, they will attempt to replace the disrupted social and political structures with their visions through sheer coercion (despotic power) or through law and administration (legal prescription), neither of which is likely to result in fulfilling the

⁵⁷We might also note in the above quotation that "radically changed social and political structures" are implemented specifically *in order to* effect radical changes in "culture patterns and themes." However, the tenor of the article and the text that follows imply that the structure-changes-culture thesis is unrealistic - and the province of misguided revolutionaries. As I will discuss shortly, this reflects, I think, some of the confusion surrounding our conceptions of the relationship between culture and structure.

revolutionaries' intentions. Although a number of changes will obviously occur, reconstructed culture patterns and themes will diverge widely from revolutionary visions and will tend to diverge from them in the direction of the patterns of the old society and regime (1988:800).

It is not clear why Eckstein considers this second broad type of change, "political transformation," only in terms of attempts to implement *radical* change. In the conclusion to his article, after summarizing the cultural changes that we can expect in response to the various types of contextual changes that he posits, he adds:

Note, however, that nothing here rules out engineered change, so to speak - attempted *structural* reforms of politics. In the modern world, political tinkering, on small or grand scales, is endemic. The theory simply states what should result from such tinkering (1988:801; my emphasis, for later reference).

It may be, then, that Eckstein would fit this small scale "tinkering" - i.e., change that is not radical - into his first category of "natural," pattern-maintaining change; and it appears that the sorts of cultural changes that might be expected to result from small scale "tinkering" would be the same as those to be expected from pattern-maintaining changes. But whether or not "tinkering," whatever the scale, can be considered to be "natural" in Eckstein's scheme is unclear; in any event, "tinkering" cannot be placed in his category of "political transformation," which he defines in terms of attempts to engineer *radical* change.

In short, we can agree with Eckstein that nothing in his model actually rules out less-than-radical social or political engineering - but nor can it be accommodated without just the sort of "ad *hoc*ery" that Eckstein is attempting to correct.

The shortcomings of this model have roots deeper than the loose ends that Eckstein leaves in his elaboration. The most significant reason for the model's remaining unconvincing is that the concept of culture itself is, as in earlier models, both overburdened and underelaborated. Eckstein includes an Appendix in which he places his "use of the term [culture] ... in its conceptual context" (1988:801), but what culture actually is, what its boundaries are, remains ambiguous. His definition of culture may be summarized as: "the aggregate of the modes of understanding and valuing prevalent in societies or subsocieties or both, acquired through socialization, which invest situations with meaning" (adapted from Eckstein's discussion, 1988:802).

He adds that the general, cultural-anthropological definition to which his use of the concept comes closest is that in which "culture is the distinctive, variable set of ways in which societies normatively regulate social behavior" (1988:803). Yet another indicator of his conception of culture is mentioned in passing, in a parenthetical comment, in which he notes that "culture" is very similar to Durkheim's *conscience collective* (1988:795). As general definitions of culture, these are, of course, acceptable and adequate. But they seem really to comprise not useful, applicable definitions of culture, but rather something more akin to shorthand summaries of general ways of conceiving culture; in other words, though Eckstein provides *definitions* of culture, he

does not actually *define* culture. At best, the definitions Eckstein provides are only a starting point for theoretical elaboration. Eckstein explicitly leaves to the future the testing of his theory against reality and the operationalizing of concepts to do so; but operationalizing the "modes of understanding and valuing prevalent in societies" or the "ways in which societies normatively regulate social behavior" or Durkheim's *conscience collective* represents a task substantially more elaborate than just working out the details.

The overriding problem in Eckstein's conception, then, is that culture itself remains the quintessential instrument of theoretical "*ad hocery*" - which, along with the fast- and-loose treatment of change which Eckstein attempts to address, was an object of early criticisms of political culture theory; to overstate a bit, "culture" is not only used to "explain" anything and everything, but it also *becomes* anything and everything. An example of this is provided by Eckstein's response to some criticisms of his theoretical sketch.

Werlin (1990) criticizes Eckstein's theory on several grounds, focusing largely on the issue of culture change and modernization. His most general criticism is that the notion of cultural inertia endows culture with powers of deterministic agency which both ignore and contradict political reality and experience. Moreover, he says:

The primary thrust of Eckstein's article is to suggest that while slow cultural change is normal, understandable, and perhaps useful, rapid cultural change is unusual, unsustainable, and dangerous (1990:250).

Werlin provides numerous examples of successful, "engineered" changes in what could be called political cultural traits in developing nations, and points out that even though there may be cultural barriers to change, "their immutability is a myth. Ultimately, politics is more powerful than culture" (1990:252). According to Werlin, cultural change can and does occur when certain political requirements are met that enable the political system itself to function properly. These requirements include: a balance between centralization and decentralization; accountability and autonomy in crucial roles; power exercised more as persuasion and incentive than as coercion; a legitimacy based largely on inclusion; and flexibility in policymakers' thinking. He enumerates several cases of development projects which not only were successful, but also promoted positive culture change. "These cases," he writes, "as well as many others, show that people will respond to favorable political relationships under otherwise adverse circumstances" (1990:253).

In Eckstein's response to Werlin's article, his most straightforward defense of culture theory is "realism;" development activities are "laudable," but "should be pursued without illusion."

Engineers achieve results effectively by adapting well-established theories (or in lieu of theory, reliable experience) to the conditions with which, willy-nilly, they must work. It is *both possible and likely that culture is one of the givens to which social engineers must adapt*, whether in management, project design, implementation, or obtaining governmental support. It is

also likely that culture will rule out certain objectives in certain contexts. If social engineers [in the developing world] are serious, then, they should welcome culturalist theories as possible aids to achieving effectively results and defining realistic, however limited, goals and means (1990:254; my emphasis).

In Eckstein's view, the political requirements that Werlin specifies (enumerated above) are put forth as "methods" by which politics can achieve desired results; of these methods, most of which are indisputably structural features, Eckstein asserts that: "They are without exception, just ' the sort of things that are the essence of political cultures!" (1990:254; punctuation in the original). Presumably, what he means is that successful change occurs precisely because the "methods" used and the goals toward which they are employed are congruent with the prevailing political cultures. But in explaining this point he introduces an appearance of circularity that illustrates perhaps the principal conceptual problem that plagues discussions of political culture, which is that the interaction between culture and politics (and political structure) is so underexplored that the cultural cart constantly runs roughshod over its structural horse. For example, to Werlin's point that a balance is required between centralization and decentralization, the realistic part of Eckstein's response is that such a balance in a developing nation may take a long time indeed. But he also cites the apparent immutability of "Switzerland's highly decentralized cantonal system" and of "France's equally ancient centralized bureaucracy," which, "long in the making, has remained virtually unchanged through monarchies, empires, and republics." In the case of France: "The system is a prototypical example of cultural 'inertia'" (1990:254). Why this long-standing structural, institutionalized centralization, which is also a centralization of state power, is treated as a "cultural" phenomenon is not difficult to explain: Eckstein's use of the term "culture" is broad enough to accommodate structural institutionalization. Whether or not the functioning of the French bureaucracy has been imprinted onto French political culture, it is cavalier at best, and probably incorrect, to attribute the endurance of such a structure to cultural factors.

Therein lies the fundamental confusion in political culture analyses: though culture cannot credibly be considered apart from its context, from the social and political structures, institutions, and processes with which it interacts, and without which it would not exist, nor can its context be analytically absorbed into culture. To merge the two makes "culture" a very broad phenomenon indeed - and leaves the concept devoid of valid explanatory power. Certainly it can be argued that in reality culture and structure are merged, or that they are integrated in a dialectical relationship. But culture cannot be linked with the process of politics unless it is analytically separated from that process and from the structures with which it interacts. In other words, because integration subsumes linkage, analytical boundaries must be defined for both culture and objective structures and processes, and points or nodes of linkage between them defined as analytical substitutes for the integration that presumably occurs in reality. Otherwise, we cannot talk about culture.

Eckstein's model is also weakened by his not distinguishing between culture and *political* culture. He uses the term "political culture" several times in his article, but usually refers only to "culture," and indeed, much of his discussion refers to a broader notion of culture, which implies that culture and political culture are equivalent and interchangeable, though with the latter presumably narrower in focus. The lack of conceptual differentiation between the two is fairly common in political culture studies, even when the researchers conducting the studies begin with specific definitions of political culture. It is possible that, as in the case of some of the other conceptual transformations described earlier, the reasons for this fuzziness lie in an unconscious commitment to the older concept of "national character" and in the methodological difficulties in investigating culture or political culture empirically; and in Eckstein's case, these may be combined with his explicit commitment to reproduce the implicit assumptions of his predecessors. More likely, however, is that Eckstein and others do not distinguish between culture and political culture simply because they are not interested in doing so. Indeed, Eckstein seems to be more interested in the interaction of culture itself and political change, and seems to see no need to define the more narrow boundaries of a specifically *political* culture - in which case his error may lie in using the term "political culture" at all. Moreover, his conception of culture, again, is so broad and comprehensive that it would be difficult analytically to separate from it the specifically political components.⁵⁸

As did many of his predecessors, Eckstein also weakens his theory by incorporating into it one of the conventional research agendas when he draws a fundamental distinction between traditional and modern culture. In response to Werlin's (1990) criticism on this point, Eckstein's brief and parenthetical response (to what he mistakenly calls one of Werlin's "minor points") is that, in fact, although I use the words [tradition and modernity], I have always been concerned with development as a continuous dimension, not a dichotomy; see, esp., Eckstein 1982 (1990:253).

This actually dodges Werlin's point, which is to question Eckstein's assertion "that modern societies are more flexible than traditional societies" (Werlin 1990:249; Eckstein 1988:795), and which is not at all a "minor point." Some of the theoretical shortcomings of this distinction have been addressed above; a further problem is discernible, however, when Eckstein's theoretical sketch is viewed as a whole. Because he has *built into* the theory the "shift to flexibility" as one of the three "natural" cultural changes in response to situational or structural change, he has *built into* it a conceptual difference - a dichotomy, or at least extremes on a continuum - between culture in modern and in traditional societies.

⁵⁸On the other hand, if Eckstein actually does, as he says, find Durkheim's notion of the *conscience collective* itself to express a good definition of culture, then "political culture" may automatically be obviated, for Durkheim explicitly and definitively excludes "judicial, government, scientific, industrial," and other such functions from his *conscience collective* (Durkheim, 1964:80).

In Eckstein's scheme, "to become modern" is a culture change response to structural and situational changes.

Although such a shift may well exist in reality, it is conceptual "*ad hocery*" in this theoretical construction, for two reasons. First, Eckstein's set of cultural responses to contextual change is asymmetrical: 1) normal, incremental contextual change results in pattern-maintaining change; 2) contextual change involving modernization results in a shift to cultural flexibility; and 3) contextual change that is more extreme, involving social discontinuity, results in formlessness.

The second type, changes involving modernization and cultural flexibility, simply does not fit into the pattern. Thus, modernization, as has been the case in many political culture studies, is treated differently; it is a "special case," inserted *ad hoc* into Eckstein's theoretical sketch.

Secondly, with such a differentiation between culture in traditional and modern societies, "culture" comes to refer to something different in the two types of society.

In traditional society culture is, at its logical extreme, highly prescriptive and inflexible. Modern society, on the other hand, because it is less prescriptive, more flexible, and defined more by abstract forms than their content, has an entirely different set of features attributed, and assumptions attached to it. Eckstein's understanding of modern society includes the possibility of: 1) a culture in

which a greater rationality is related to structural conditions, perhaps with the former a result of adaptation to the latter; 2) a culture which may, when it is "highly modern," actually be "intrinsically acultural" because of a high degree of cultural flexibility and abstractness; and 3) a culture which inevitably moves toward *greater* flexibility, including through "reinterpretations of old dogma [in ways] that make it increasingly pliable" (1988:795-796).

If we push the two types of culture a bit closer to their extremes, a fundamental difference emerges: in the process of modernization traditional culture can change only in the direction of becoming modern culture (i.e., toward becoming more flexible), and modern culture can only change in the direction of self-obliteration (i.e., toward such a degree of flexibility that culture per se becomes lost in the abstraction of forms and in flexibility, and is no longer discernible; in short, toward becoming "acultural"). What Eckstein describes, then, although it may be perceptive and pragmatic, is not theoretically sound; it is a model with two different conceptions of culture, with two different sets of roles for culture, and with two different sets of cultural relations with social and political structures - - one set for traditional societies, and one set for modern societies. The key element distinguishing the two, perhaps not surprisingly, is rationality. Whether or not it is treated as a causal or independent variable, the implication seems to be that rationality is eventually substituted for culture. If this is a correct reading (and a valid pushing to the extreme) of Eckstein's premises, then the question presents itself: why is the case of modernization the only one in which rationality is a factor? Although the culture change expectations Eckstein posits for his other types of change by no means exclude rationality on the part the actors involved, his expectations are based on the irrational premises inherent in each

of the culturalist assumptions he incorporates into his theory. Moreover, the case of modernization, or of the shift toward flexibility, is also the only type of change that seems not to depend on the culturalist assumptions' being correct. Thus, in short, the set of contingencies for cases of modernization appears once again to be inserted *ad hoc* into Eckstein's theory.

The focus on change, in Eckstein's theory as well as those of his predecessors, represents another case of incorporating into political culture theory one of the conventional postwar research agendas, and has been yet another of the fundamental problems in attempts to construct a viable theory of political culture. Indeed, the focus on change has been a constant companion of the development issue in political culture studies; the two are frequently included as central components of theory so that researchers can address questions concerning such issues as whether or not Germany or Russia can change, what the prospects for democratic development might be in Burma or Malawi, and so on.

However, it may be that the problems researchers have had in addressing change in political culture studies is as much the result of the culturalist assumptions Eckstein identifies (though these have certainly been problematic) as of theoretically premature attempts even to address change. The sort of change that culturists have wished to address necessarily assumes a secondary focus in the building of a viable theory of political culture; if cultural continuity' is assumed, then change cannot be addressed adequately until after the effects of culture on *politics in general*, rather than (prematurely) on *political change*, have been considered.⁵⁹ The theoretical reason for this is that the former (politics) is general, and the latter (political change) is a specific case of the former; we cannot think about how a system will change until we have an idea of how it works. The practical reason is that in order to study change, a researcher must employ cases in which there is or has been change - and these cases comprise a subset of all cases. But if this approach is followed, how are the remaining cases to be treated? Logically, they can either be ignored, or they can be treated as cases in which politics itself is somehow configured in such a way that it inhibits change. Neither option is satisfactory, and both amount to theoretical "ad hocery." To ignore cases in which there is no change is methodological sloth, and to attribute to political culture their lack of change without investigating the cases, let alone investigating them in the light of a more general theory of political culture, is clearly invalid. The point, obviously, is that until we construct a theory of political culture that addresses first the question of how politics and political culture interact, it is absurd to leap right into how political culture and political *change* interact.

⁵⁹Assuming, of course, that the research has also taken into account the effects of political structure and process on political culture.

Taken as a whole, then, Eckstein's theory seems best suited not really to explain, or even to address political, change, but rather to show that politics and culture interact, and that culturalist assumptions need not force culturalists into *ad hoc* explanations of change. The result, however, is an unsuccessful effort toward theoretical integrity at the expense of relevance, not least because it is, ultimately, a modernization approach.

CULTURE SHIFT

As the title implies, Inglehart's thesis in *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (1990) is that political culture in advanced industrial societies has been changing, and that the change has assumed a similar form and direction in otherwise culturally disparate societies. The shift, he believes, can be characterized as one from "materialist" orientations to more "postmaterialist" orientations, a thesis he has pursued since 1970. To his earlier work, however, he has added in this study that the rise of postmaterialism "is only one aspect of a much broader syndrome of cultural change, involving the decline of traditional religious orientations and conventional social and sexual norms - along with the emergence of distinctive patterns of economic and political behavior" (1990:7).

What most distinguishes *Culture Shift* from earlier studies is that Inglehart employs a vast quantity of data from surveys conducted systematically over an eighteen-year period (including the metronomic Euro-Barometer surveys), and is able to analyze a large number of variables consistently generated over time. What is most compelling about his findings is that he uncovers empirical evidence that there has been change in value priorities among given populations over time, and that this change may be due largely to a progressive, *intergenerational* shift of value priorities; as later generations gradually replace their predecessors, their different value priorities become increasingly representative of the population.

Inglehart's study is rich, well-informed, coherent, and remarkably broad in scope. His thesis is not as well-supported by his data as he believes, however, for both his theoretical framework and his methodology are significantly flawed. His approach in general is unfortunate, for his efforts to substantiate his thesis have the effect of streamlining much of his analysis, in somewhat Procrustean fashion, to address the "shift toward postmaterialism."

What makes this frustrating for the close reader is that his discussions contain much of the raw material for alternative, and possibly more compelling, interpretations which contradict his thesis. Indeed, at times, when his discussion is directed to topics that have been treated more convincingly by other students unfettered by Inglehart's thesis, we find postmaterialism insinuated anomalously into the picture, Zelig-like, perhaps disguised to show some family resemblance.

Culture Shift, taken as a whole (and read quickly) is very convincing, largely, I think, for three reasons: a) it is well written and well organized, and contains intelligent analysis; b) it is a not only the foremost successor to Almond and Verba's work, but also improves a great deal on it; and c) it includes perceptive discussions of politics in Europe and the United States, and weaves into them new empirical confirmation of

trends which have long been bandied about by journalists, but have hitherto not been endowed with scientific validity.¹

In the following sections I will: examine Inglehart's conception of political culture, relate it to earlier treatments, and evaluate its validity; examine his theory and methodology in defining "materialism" and "postmaterialism" and in constructing the index designed to measure them; explore the validity of that index; and propose an alternative interpretation of his data.⁶⁰

Political Culture

Although the scope and depth of the analysis in *Culture Shift* place it solidly at the top of cross-national attitude studies, its contribution to the development of the concept of political culture is limited. Inglehart argues that changes in values in industrial societies are, and will continue to be, reflected in the politics of those societies, and that the gradual, intergenerational shift of values is accompanied by the rise of new politically prominent - and politically divisive - issues and even by the development of new political parties, such as the (West) German Greens and France's National Front. Although these may not be particularly original observations, the significance of Inglehart's study lies in his attempt to codify measurable manifestations of these dynamics in an empirical rooting deeper and more elaborate than has been achieved before. The most significant empirical finding in his study, as I have said, is that the data strongly support the thesis that there is in fact an intergenerational shift in value priorities. This in turn lends strong support to the thesis that some attitudes and values themselves, and consequently some behavior, can be found empirically to be rooted in early socialization, which then affects later perception, learning, thinking, and values; however, because of the difficulty in operationalizing "early socialization," this empirical link has yet to be made.

Inglehart's conception of political culture in *Culture Shift* is descended directly from Almond and Verba's in *The Civic Culture*. The content and texture of his hypotheses were formed toward the end of political culture's heyday, in research and publications dating from 1970; *Culture Shift* is in many ways a continuation of that research, improved and justified largely by the availability of the data that have been generated in the interim (1990:4-7). Although Inglehart does not employ the political cultural typology of *The Civic Culture*, he begins with, and in some cases improves upon, many of Almond and Verba's assumptions, premises, and methods. The results are mixed.

Inglehart addresses several of the commonly cited shortcomings of the tradition launched by *The Civic Culture*. One of these refers to the static, "snapshot" nature of one-shot data collection, which afflicted Almond and Verba's study and many later ones, simply because data of the sort used by political culturists had not yet

⁶⁰However, as I will show, the empirical confirmation tends to be weak. The basis for journalistic analyses - daily contact with, and reflection and discussion on politics and culture, rather than data coding and printout interpretation - may be far more solid than anything "science" can yet provide.

accumulated over time. Naturally, Inglehart's use of cross-national, longitudinal data serve substantially to remedy this problem. A significant corollary benefit of his use of longitudinal data is that sample size cumulatively becomes extremely large, which means that small variations from cohort to cohort, or even among educational or class groupings within cohorts, can be detected with statistical reliability.⁶¹

Inglehart also addresses the related criticism concerning the theoretical handling of culture change, which I treated at length earlier, in my discussion of Eckstein's (1988) theoretical sketch. Inglehart quotes Eckstein's position on this issue, which holds that cultural predispositions, though not immutable, are nonetheless enduring, and that new learning is conditioned by early learning. He points out that his own study responds to Eckstein's observation that "empirical work pertinent to the [culturalist] expectation [of intergenerational change] ... is oddly lacking" (Inglehart, 1990:19, quoting Eckstein, 1988:798). This, of course, is a core element of Inglehart's study, to which I will devote ample attention below.

Although Inglehart addresses the critical issue of the relationship between political culture and structure, his resolution of the problem is reasonable, but not theoretically or methodologically satisfying. He presents the question, somewhat irrelevantly, in terms of an ideological debate concerning social problems:

Traditionally, partisans of the Left tend to view social problems as caused by defects in the social structure; accordingly, they see the solution in government programs. Conversely, conservatives tend to place the responsibility for social problems on the individual, rather than society (1990:18).

He nevertheless makes the important point that:

In fact, most [social] phenomena seem to reflect the interaction of both individual-level and structural-level factors, and the relative importance of these factors can vary a great deal (1990:18).

His theoretical solution to this problem is again empirical, and is again enhanced by the availability of longitudinal data; in his study he considers macrophenomenal data (largely economic and demographic - e.g., per capita GNP; proportion of women in parliament; years of continuous democracy since 1900) which can provide some indication of general social change over time. However, even though such data are inherently more reliable than survey data and generally provide an extremely important source of contextual information, they provide no basis at all for genuine structural analysis, or even for political analysis.

Despite Inglehart's addressing and attempting to remedy some of the shortcomings of the traditional political culture approach, and despite the far-reaching advances he makes in other aspects of his study, the resulting theoretical, conceptual,

⁶¹This is one feature of Inglehart's data that differentiates *Culture Shift* from his previous studies, in which he was forced, for statistical reliability, to pool his national samples, making the attempt to detect crossnational differences problematic.

and methodological improvements to the study of political culture are quite modest, for his approach is bound by many of the same limitations as that of his predecessors. Most important is that the old theoretical and methodological impediments to a concrete conception, treatment, and understanding of political culture remain because the questions of what it is, what it means, where it comes from, and what are its effects, are not addressed plausibly: political culture remains a nebulous term that encompasses some broad, intertwined array of attitudes and behaviors, only some of which are enumerated. Even the question of the boundaries of political culture remains; indeed, Inglehart makes even less effort than do many of his predecessors to draw an explicit distinction between culture and political culture.

Though Inglehart does not explain what political culture actually is, he does provide a definition of culture:

Culture is a system of attitudes, values, and knowledge that is widely shared within a society and transmitted from generation to generation (1990:18).

The culture of one generation is not necessarily passed entire to succeeding generations, however, for culture changes (slowly) as the collective formative experiences of successive generations precipitate modifications. From this definition, and from Inglehart's treatment of culture and political culture in the text, we can reasonably deduce that his operative definition of political culture is the same as that of culture, but narrowed to include only the politically relevant. However, the politically relevant includes, as it does in *The Civic Culture* and in Eckstein's model, a great deal indeed, only some of which can be measured and analyzed; it may be for this reason that Inglehart makes no show of drawing distinctions between the two. As does Eckstein (1988), he frequently seems to use the terms interchangeably, and actually uses the term political culture only rarely.⁶²

Inglehart views culture as a means by which societies attempt to adapt to change (1990:3-4), and thus places it more squarely than do many of his predecessors as an intervening variable in a model which posits objective conditions generally as an independent variable and, in turn, certain aspects of those conditions generally as a dependent variable: systemic conditions affect culture, which in turn has some effect on some systemic conditions (1990:13, 22; see also 429-430). A potentially powerful innovation on Inglehart's part, and the foundation of his study, is the inclusion of "two key hypotheses" underlying his materialist/postmaterialist thesis:

(1) a *scarcity hypothesis* that one's priorities reflect one's socioeconomic

⁶² Welch (1993) has noted, however, that Inglehart uses the term "political culture" only in the "comparative project" of *Culture Shift*; in the "sociological project," he tends to refer to "culture" or "values." The first chapter of the text, which appeared earlier as a journal article (Inglehart, 1988), has the appearance, really, of a separate study with a separate thesis, namely that Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture* may now be evaluated with longitudinal data; Welch notes that this chapter refers almost exclusively to the comparative project. Critiques of this separate thesis may be found both in Welch's text (1993: 25-26) and in an article by Muller and Seligson (1994).

environment so that one places greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply; and

- (2) a *socialization hypothesis* that, to a large extent, one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's preadult years. Taken together, these two hypotheses imply that, as a result of the historically unprecedented prosperity and the absence of war that has prevailed in Western countries since 1945, younger birth cohorts place less emphasis on economic and physical security than do older groups, who have experienced a much greater degree of economic insecurity, and that, conversely, the younger birth cohorts tend to give a higher priority to nonmaterial needs, such as a sense of community and the quality of life (1990:56; elaborated 68- 70) .

The scarcity hypothesis is a solid theoretical means of including structural factors in the analysis of culture and values, but because its scope is confined to material conditions (which themselves can only be approximated empirically), its possible referents are confined to a limited set of values and a narrow strand of culture. Of course, it must be acknowledged that material conditions form one of the broadest and most significant bases and objects of politics itself, and therefore have a critical role in political cultural analysis. On the other hand, the complexity of culture and political culture, and of their interaction with social and political reality, demands that a broader array of factors be included in theoretical construction and analysis. Inglehart's own materialist/postmaterialist construct illustrates the problem: how can we identify and analyze the importance of the *material* bases of what he calls "postmaterial" values"? (As I will illustrate below, this is not merely semantic quibbling.)

The empirical links that Inglehart employs in operationalizing his model are weak. As I have mentioned, the measurements of systemic conditions that Inglehart uses are extremely general and only vaguely integrated into his model, and they reflect nothing at all of the political conditions prevailing at the times of the surveys in the various countries in which data were gathered. Inglehart is fully aware of this, and although he indicates that his focus is streamlined to consider only phenomena relevant to the "broader syndrome of culture change," his analysis is conducted almost entirely through the prism of his materialism/postmaterialism perspective.

To put it very generally, the "values of Western publics have been shifting from an overwhelming emphasis on material well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis on the quality of life" (1990:5). Consequently, the single most important *conceptual* independent variable in his study is economic growth or prosperity, and the most important *empirical* independent variable, it turns out, is simply the passage of time, which is employed implicitly as a variable reflecting the (to some extent legitimately) assumed long-term economic growth in industrial nations.⁶³ Hence, even

⁶³At various points in his analysis, Inglehart does include other independent variables, but for the most

though the role of structures is admitted into Inglehart's theory, there is virtually no attempt in his study to incorporate it empirically; in this sense, *Culture Shift* duplicates a principal weakness of *The Civic Culture*.

By definition, Inglehart's conception of culture is inevitably operationalized as an aggregation of values (and again, in practice it is streamlined largely into the materialist/postmaterialist construct). That values are a part of culture is, most would agree, incontestable; but the way in which values are incorporated into cultural explanations is crucial to sound theory-building. For Inglehart, several theoretical linkages serve to connect values with their manifestations in culture. The primary one is contained in the definition of culture quoted above, which explicitly includes values as a part of culture. Thus values, like the broader culture of which they form a part, are enduring (though not immutable), and they are sufficiently aggregated within a population to be considered to be "widely shared."

It appears, then, that Inglehart employs three implicit criteria for transforming aggregated values into culture.

If values are *enduring* (hence the use of the implicit passage-of-time variable) , and if they are *widely shared* within a society, and if they *vary cross-nationally*, then they are cultural. Indeed, these assumptions are expressed explicitly at several points in Inglehart's study. For example, after noting that "there are substantial and enduring cross-cultural differences in certain basic attitudes and habits among the publics of given societies" and that the roots of changes in such orientations can be traced in part to long-term economic development, Inglehart develops his argument by conflating "cross-cultural differences" and "political culture," using the latter as a name for, or at least in the place of, the former (1990:22). In other words, the assumption is revealed that there is *identity* between "enduring cross-cultural attitudes" - which empirically are *cross-national* attitudes - and political culture.

This identity is made more explicit shortly thereafter. After reviewing some survey data reflecting cross-national differences over time in respondents' reports of their sense of well-being, Inglehart continues:

Our conclusion is very simple but very important: There is a *durable cultural component* underlying these responses. Virtually any survey response is influenced to some extent by the context in which it is asked, and this question is no exception. Responses reflect both short-term fluctuations (resulting from immediate economic, social, and political events) *and a long-term cultural component*. Through statistical procedures it is possible to distinguish between the underlying cultural component and the shortterm disturbances (1990:28; my emphasis).

part the passage of time represents the implicit independent variable. It is interesting to note, too, that the passage of time has multiple duties in his analysis. Obviously, it is an indispensable component of any culture-change theory, and is employed in this way to evaluate change and continuity. Its third function, also an implicit one, is to serve as one of three fundamental criteria employed to distinguish the cultural from the non-cultural, more about which presently.

These "statistical procedures" are not complicated: eliminate the short-term fluctuations, and the long-term trends that remain are cultural. This, of course, is not valid.

Another link is forged between the materialist/ postmaterialist thesis and political culture through the concept of "cognitive mobilization" and its implications for the potential for political participation. Although Inglehart does not attempt to integrate "cognitive mobilization" theoretically into a formal political culture model, the (partially causal) linkage of socialization, values, cognition, and participatory potential comprises a fairly explicit and direct political cultural perspective, each step presented with independent empirical grounding. However, both the empirical grounding and the linkage from step to step contain methodological and theoretical problems which help to illustrate the problematic nature of political cultural analysis.

"Cognitive mobilization" is descended directly from Almond and Verba's "political cognition," and is "measured" just as vaguely; Inglehart generates a cognitive mobilization index with only two indicators - reported rates of political discussion and education levels, neither of which is shown to be related to political cognition, let alone to "cognitive mobilization." The first may be unrelated to cognition, and the second to things political; together, then, the two indicators admit only the *possibility* of indicating political cognition, forcing us to rely largely on the assumption that as the rates of political discussion and formal education increase, so too will the level, coherence, and accuracy of cognition.⁶⁴ Only by these steps and assumptions can we arrive at "cognitive mobilization," whence it should then be yet another step to participatory potential - but there is a shortcut. While the overland route from political discussion/education to "cognitive mobilization" is punctuated by uncharted spaces⁶⁴ between landmarks, an alternative air route connects political discussion with participatory potential, for Inglehart believes that reported rates of political discussion "provide a relatively accurate indicator of the potential for political activity among Western publics" (1990:342). His logic is obvious, but it is also obviously not sound logic. The difference - and the potential distance - between "discussion" and "activity," between talking and doing, is rather vast. Moreover, the conceptual diffuseness of a "potential" complex social phenomenon (unlike, say, the case of electrical capacitance) limits the likelihood of our developing "accurate" indicators for it; in this case, the generality of the operative definitions of "discussion" and "activity" make the task more elusive.

⁶⁴The assumption of cognition based more in knowledge than in vague perception may not be explicit, but consider the differences we would expect in popular discussion in pre-modern and modern ages. In our imagination, serfs tilling soil might bemoan the king's insulation from the people ("If only he knew...") and preoccupation with distant and expensive wars, the factual details of which are altered in the passage from mouth to mouth. Modern citizens in advanced industrial society, on the other hand, "cognitively mobilized," and with the benefit of education, mass media, and free speech, would be expected to conduct the same guns- and-butter discussion at a higher level. The likelihood that they do not indicates one of the problems with the concept of "cognitive mobilization."

Another theoretical problem appears in the linkage of value change (i.e., postmaterialism) with "cognitive mobilization" and potential for activity. In connecting the two, Inglehart temporarily confuses values with material conditions and material limits on cognition. Because his thesis attributes the shift toward postmaterialist values to formative experiences generated in the conditions of relative affluence in the postwar era - i.e., to material conditions - it may not seem sufficient for him propose a link between postmaterialism and greater participatory potential solely in terms of formal education, media exposure, the expansion both of suffrage and of the role of governments in ever more aspects of life, and the expectations in turn generated by government's greater scope of activity. Although these non-material factors may otherwise - and alone - present the most plausible "causes" of greater participation and participatory potential, they threaten to undermine Inglehart's thesis that changes in *values* have augmented participatory potential. His solution is to concoct a means of incorporating into the model the progressive shift toward postmaterial values:

If this trend [toward postmaterial values] has indeed been occurring, it too should tend to raise the political participation of mass publics.

Being freed from *the need to focus their energies* primarily on the struggle for economic and physical security should *enable them to devote more attention* to Postmaterialist concerns - such as politics (1990:335; my emphasis).

Inglehart finds support for this argument in his data, for the more "cognitively mobilized" - who, by definition, have greater participatory potential - tend to evince postmaterialist values.

The argument is confused, circular, and invalid; moreover, it is deceptive: while it plausibly explains greater participatory potential in terms of greater leisure time, it does so only in passing, only in order to gain passage for the postmaterialist-values thesis, which enters the argument as a stowaway, like a burr clinging to the robes of a legitimate supplicant.

Inglehart at his word, then we cannot tell whether the change in "values" has come about because the conditions of relative prosperity characterizing the experience of postwar generations left them *psychologically* free of preoccupation with material concerns, or because postwar prosperity was accompanied by a parallel trend of growing leisure time, which left them *materially and cognitively* free to pursue non-material concerns - such as politics. My impression is that, if pressed, Inglehart would have it both ways, which of course is legitimate, but which presents the theoretical problem of positing two competing (phenomenologically complementary but theoretically incompatible) explanations for value change. Inglehart's actual thesis is that values have changed because affluence and safety have formed people's attitudes; his *ad hoc*, transient thesis is that values have changed because affluence and safety have afforded people more time and energy to "devote more attention to Postmaterialist concerns" - which seems to imply that those concerns have always

been there, but people were just too busy to engage them. But if this is so, then just what is it that somehow continues to consume the "energies" of older generations who retain their materialist orientations? Are they still bound to the sixty-hour work week? His argument seems to confuse values derived of formative experience with the reality of how much of one's time and energy are actually expended tilling soil, hoisting lumber, feeding steel to a crucible, adding figures in a ledger, or yanking the levers of an industrial machine; it temporarily substitutes the change in values for the advent, among other things, of the thirty-five or forty hour work' week.

The point, of course, is that the correlation in Inglehart's data between postmaterialism and participatory potential is spurious. Although later cohorts do have their "own" political issues, and may well have a greater number and variety of political concerns than their elders, their collective participatory potential here is defined circularly. One of the two indicators in Inglehart's "cognitive mobilization" index is education; but education itself, *like postmaterialist values*, is correlated with generational shifts, for educational levels have increased progressively over time.

There is also some confusion about where the postmaterialist values themselves come from: do younger cohorts tend toward postmaterialist values because they did not have formative experiences of privation, or because they have not had to work as much as their elders - or both? At this point, however, the primary question must be that of what exactly are "materialism" and "postmaterialism."

Definition of Materialism/Postmaterialism

Inglehart's materialism/postmaterialism construct itself is highly vulnerable to questions concerning its validity, which I will address in detail in this section and the next.

Roots in Maslow

Inglehart's conceptual mold for forging an index to measure materialist/postmaterialist orientations lies in the Maslowian hierarchy of basic needs (Maslow, 1970), and it is there that he takes his first significant theoretical misstep. Briefly, the problem with Inglehart's treatment of the Maslowian hierarchy is that he scrambles Maslow's model in refashioning it to accommodate his own theory and his data. He converts Maslow's "physiological needs," which must be understood quite literally and fundamentally, into a "need for economic security" - which represents another phenomenon entirely. Moreover, he misinterprets the model such that Maslow's "higher needs" (esteem, belongingness, self-actualization) lose their meaning entirely: Inglehart treats all three as "self-actualization needs," and throws in with them two peripheral "needs" that Maslow explicitly (and for good reason) excluded from his hierarchy, namely, intellectual and aesthetic needs. Inglehart also dichotomizes the hierarchy; thus the needs for economic security and for safety become his "materialist" needs, and the needs for esteem, belongingness, and self-

actualization, along with the intellectual and aesthetic needs -- i.e., what Inglehart misconstrues as the "self-actualizing" needs - become the "postmaterialist" needs.

Transforming another model to suit purposes of research or theory-building need not itself be a problem. But in this case it is, for Inglehart's tinkering alters the model so completely that the premise of a hierarchical ordering of the "needs" within it loses its standing entirely.

Inglehart compounds his error egregiously by finding that his data show *Maslow's* model to be untenable, when in fact his pseudo-Maslowian model has pushed Maslow out of the picture entirely.⁶⁵

Before exploring the meaning of Inglehart's dichotomy, a brief word at this point about the terminology itself may be useful; I will touch upon the semantic issue again at the end of my discussion of *Culture Shift*, after having explored the substance of the construct itself, for it raises the question of what really has been occurring in industrial societies that prompted Inglehart to name the phenomenon as he did - which in turn casts additional light on the question of its meaning. The terms "materialism" and "postmaterialism" are unfortunate, in part because the words seem not actually to reflect reality, and thus contribute further to some confusion which already underlies the premises of the construct. It is markedly counterintuitive to associate the rise of mass consumption with the decline of materialism, which is what Inglehart must do (albeit implicitly) in rooting his hypothesis in the growing prosperity brought by industrialization. The twin trends are not incompatible, however, because Inglehart's "materialism" is not defined in its more casual contemporary sense; rather, it may be said to resemble more its traditional sense, which distinguishes between the material and the spiritual. Hence Inglehart's "postmaterialist" respondent certainly has not abandoned material values; it is just that these values now coexist with nonmaterial (if not particularly spiritual) values. However, this is not precisely how Inglehart discusses the dichotomy.

Inglehart's focus, and the distinction he draws between materialism and postmaterialism, is actually more specific than merely the coexistence and relative balance of materialist and postmaterialist concerns. The shift "from a Materialist emphasis toward a Postmaterialist one" is a shift "from giving top priority to physical sustenance and safety toward heavier emphasis on belonging, selfexpression, and the quality of life" (1990:66); once certain material needs have been satisfied and appear to be secure, priority shifts from these to the non-material values. Thus he considers, not exactly values, but rather "value priorities," and here enter several different elements of potential confusion.

One problem is that Inglehart uncovers value priorities by having his respondents indicate which they think are the first and second most important items

⁶⁵Maslow's theory does not suffer this mutilation passively; it contains within it a critique not only of Inglehart's pseudo-Maslowian model, but also of some aspects of the political culture approach. I am currently developing an article-length analysis of Maslow's utility in political culture theory.

in three different lists of four different items.⁶⁶ The result is that he obtains a rank-ordering of those twelve items (on a samplewide basis, for the individual respondent does not rank-order all twelve items). But what of the innumerable possible "values" beyond those twelve items? Twelve items might seem to represent a reasonably large number of values to investigate, and might seem to cover a broad range of values; but Inglehart's list is specifically designed to explore materialist and postmaterialist values, and so the list contains six elements for each. An operationalization that produces six materialist items is perhaps sufficient, for, if we forget for the moment his unsuccessful attempt to perform a Maslowian analysis, Inglehart's conception of materialism is not only fairly narrow, but also clear and not unreasonable (i.e., it is likely to be broadly accepted as valid). Six postmaterialist items, on the other hand, may not be enough, for the definition of postmaterialism is far broader - indeed, it may be definable, with little exaggeration, as "everything that is not materialist."

What, then, might have been the results had Inglehart used more postmaterialist items, or different postmaterialist items, or had he used open-ended questions, in which respondents themselves express what their value priorities are? Of course, these alternatives would bring with them their own reliability problems, some of which Inglehart specifically hoped to avoid by employing the forced-rankordering method. However, the problem remains that the results of a twelve-item index are limited to the universe of those twelve items, which may or may not have any relationship with respondents' true concerns. The forced-rank-ordering tactic is designed to define a survey universe in which, *given a choice of items*, respondents will indicate which ones are important to them *relative to the others*. If we could be certain that Inglehart's six "materialist" and six "postmaterialist" items actually do tap the fundamental attitudes they were designed to tap - and not something else - then we could legitimately draw from the data conclusions about materialist and postmaterialist attitudes. But we have no such certainty about the items in the index, which brings us to the second problem afflicting Inglehart's operationalization.

Inglehart's index is constructed by presenting to respondents three lists, one after the other, containing four "goals" each - two materialist and two postmaterialist; from each list, respondents are asked to select the goal which is most important to them, and then the one which is next in importance. Once they have gone through all three lists, they are instructed to review all twelve goals together and to rank the first and second in importance overall, as well as to indicate which one of the twelve is least important. The general instructions are as follows:

"There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. [Hand respondent card A.] On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider

⁶⁶Inglehart developed the twelve-item index in 1973; before that, though, he used a four-item index. And to uncover value priorities in survey data which was generated before he began his own value priorities research, Inglehart must settle for basic clues in variables designed for other purposes.

most important?" (1990:132).

The elements themselves of the three lists provide a clear indication of the texture of what Inglehart is actually measuring. Before examining their content, though, we should attempt to reconcile Inglehart's theory with the way in which the lists of priorities are presented to respondents, as indicated in these instructions, which frame the exercise in distinct ways. The context is established in terms of "the aims of this country." The vision is confined to "the next ten years." The lists themselves contain "goals." The inclusion of "you yourself" is intended to emphasize, to respondents that their selections should be based solely on their own values - perhaps even their self-interest; however, this is offset (apparently unintentionally) by the evocation of the collective, in the phrase, "the aims of this country." What is really going on, then, is that the lists are presented as choices of *national policy goals*: the elements of the lists represent possible national policy goals which may or may not be on current national agendas or in current national political discourse, but which are in any event both assumed and defined as legitimate by the inclusion of the phrases:

"There is a lot of talk these days" and "some of the goals which different people would give top priority" (i.e., *each* of the goals is held in high value by some people).

The necessary theoretical reconciliation, then, entails identifying the linkage between "some" national policy goals and "values" - for the two are obviously not synonymous. Inglehart's intention, clearly, is to tap *political* values; and, clearly, he assumes that political goal priorities (including those framed at the national level) are based on political values. The path from questionnaire back to theory is a long one, though: respondents' rank-ordering of national policy goals is based on their political values; their political values are based on their more general values; their general values are based on formative experiences and socialization, and in the context of this study are arranged in a pseudo-Maslowian, two-tiered hierarchy of materialist and postmaterialist orientations. Or, to make the return trip, via a longer route:

Inglehart's pseudo-Maslowian hierarchy is designed to measure manifestations of economic and physical security needs as "material" needs, and "belongingness, esteem, self-actualizing, intellectual, and aesthetic" needs as "postmaterial" needs. Because he is interested in the political manifestations of these needs, he operationalizes them into an instrument with only political content; because he is interested in the divergence between materialism and ■ postmaterialism,⁶⁷ he operationalizes them such that the two are accorded equal representation (i.e., two of each, in each of three sets of four items - six of each overall); and because he is interested in national political cultures, he operationalizes them in terms of national policy goals.

⁶⁷This is a fundamental methodological and theoretical point which I will explain and explore in detail later.

One way to characterize what is revealed in this delineation would be to say that each step in the path from theory to questionnaire represents a refinement of focus over the previous step; a Venn diagram illustrating this view would show concentric circles of refinement in which the largest contains all, and successive subsets contain progressively less. This representation is rather idealized, however. A less kind way to characterize it would be to say that each step represents a truncation and distortion of focus over the previous step; this Venn diagram would not be so symmetrical, and would have amoebic subsets reaching out, ill-defined and amorphous, into the universe of the possible. This second description seems more apt, for each successive step is a leap of inference, depriving us increasingly of our already thin grounding in empirical knowledge and mounting progressively greater challenges to our common sense. Can we legitimately suppose, for example, that political values will be rooted in a general, psychological hierarchy of basic needs that includes elements such as belongingness, esteem, self-actualizing, intellectual, and aesthetic needs? It does not seem plausible; but even if we were to abandon caution on this point and accept, the supposition, can we then legitimately suppose that political values based on these needs will then manifest themselves in national policy goal priorities? Here, the connection seems even more elusive. While these questions admittedly distort Inglehart's thesis, they do not distort the substance of the theory he employs in support of his thesis, and in linking his data to his thesis.

Before turning to the content of the items in the index, the three lists of goals are reproduced on the following page, for reference.

Inglehart's Survey Lists

List A:

- A. Maintaining a high rate of economic growth.
- B. Making sure that this country has strong defense forces.
- C. Seeing that the people have more say in how things get decided at work and in their communities.
- D. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.

List B:

- E. Maintaining order in the nation.
- F. Giving the people more say in important government decisions.
- G. Fighting rising prices.
- H. Protecting freedom of speech

List C:

- I. Maintain a stable economy.
- J. Progress toward a less impersonal, more humane society.
- K. The fight against crime.
- L. Progress toward a society where ideas are more important than money. (1990:132).

The pseudo-Maslowian referents of these goals are organized and dichotomized as follows (1990:134):

Materialist:

economic - goals A, G, I

safety - goals B, E, K

Postmaterialist:

belonging/esteem - goals C, F, J

intellectual - goals H, L

aesthetic - goal D

The face validity of these sets of goals is questionable in two distinct ways. First, if we examine the individual items singly, in terms of their function as operationalizations of the elements in Inglehart's pseudo-Maslowian hierarchy, we will find them to be inadequate because they often have multiple referents in reality, which makes it impossible to know if, in any given survey, they are measuring what they were intended to measure. Secondly, if we examine them in terms of their roles in the materialist and postmaterialist groupings, we find them to be inadequate as well, largely on the same grounds.

The way in which Inglehart conducts his analysis exacerbates these flaws. Even though he insists that the index should be viewed as a continuum running between the extremes of materialism and postmaterialism, in his analysis he usually considers only the "pure types" of materialists and postmaterialists - i.e., those whose first and second priorities in each set of three goals are *all* from the materialist category or *all* from the postmaterialist category (and in most cases, this group represents less than half of the sample). Therefore a single item that might serve to exclude an important group of people from "pure type" status (e.g., "more say at work" could exclude a large number of employers, some of whom might conceivably have selected all of the other postmaterialist goals), effectively *excludes them from the analysis as well*. I will explore further the ramifications of the pure/mixed types method after considering the index items themselves.

Items in Index

Materialist Items. The most plausible operationalization of pseudo-Maslowian variables among the twelve items is the set of economic variables; they refer clearly to economic phenomena, and respondents assigning them high priority probably believe that economic growth and stability are important. However, the items are not clearly linked to a concern for respondents' own *economic security* (despite the "you yourself" exhortation of the instructions, the import of which is mitigated anyway by other aspects of the instructions). But the economic items turn out to be the least ambiguous of the index items.

As soon as we turn to the "safety" variables, plausibility fades markedly, for each of these items may reflect concerns other than the physical safety concerns that Inglehart is attempting to discern in his populations. The "strong defense forces" item

(goal B), for example, cannot have the same *meaning* in the oft-invaded France, or in the neutral (but nevertheless armed) Switzerland, or in the self-consciously unarmed (but not disarmed) Japan, that it has, say, in the United States - a Cold War superpower during the survey period, but even in the post-cold War era not exactly eager to forgo having "strong defense forces."

In any country, employees of the defense industries and of the service economies attached to military bases, as well as the millions who serve and have served in the military forces, might have a peculiar view. Or, for many, the maintenance of strong defense forces might be bound up in notions of nationalism or patriotism; or it might be linked with an admiration, awe, and respect for firepower, from rifles to nuclear weapons; or it might have correlatives in the various fantasies of chivalry that are inculcated in the young through the compelling mythologies imparted in fairy tales and in stories delineating the narrow range of options for attaining heroic status; or it might even be associated with the wearing of uniforms and the pomp of epaulettes, medals and ribands. None of these has much to do with safety issues. Finally, in some countries, the emphasis on a strong defense has been such a dominating force in national political discourse that it could easily have fused with other factors, such as political party affiliation, or loyalty to particular public figures, or geopolitical notions of *realpolitik*; certainly in many nations the Cold War ideology linkage with defense throws some confusion into any analysis. With these *caveats*, the item may well be an acceptable safety-related goal; on the other hand, it is problematic as one of only three items designed to measure this aspect of value priorities.

The other safety items obviously present similar problems. "Maintaining order in the nation" (goal E) may, for many respondents, refer more to efficiency than to physical safety. For example, striking state workers, though peaceful, may be causing a great deal of inconvenience. Or "maintaining order" may refer to potentially dangerous disorder in other parts of the nation (or in another nation), with no connection to respondents' own safety.

"Fighting crime" (goal K) is equally ambiguous. Does "fighting crime" refer to respondents' safety, or to the security of their property, or to their ideals of justice? Worse, because it is likely to be highly associated with (especially local) crime rates, it seems to be ill-suited to comparative studies. Employing such a variable in a model for cultural explanations is potentially useful - but not if the researcher employs the circular explanation that the culture's relative emphasis on the goal of fighting crime is linked to the culture's means of controlling it, as Inglehart does in the case of Japan. Do Japanese respondents place relatively less emphasis on this item because Japan has relatively little crime, or because Japanese people do not worry much about crime? It seems fairly obvious that the two are related, a point which Inglehart does not miss, but the import of which he deflects in his haste to explain why Japan incongruously appears, on this item, to be "less Materialistic than Westerners." The answer, he says, is that the low crime rate in Japan can probably be traced "to the persistence of a much stronger sense of group affiliation - and consequently more effective social control - in Japan than in the West" (1990:150). In other words, what is treated as an

anomaly is explained by what is treated as a "cultural" explanation; but Inglehart does not pretend to confirm his explanation empirically, and thus the anomaly remains. But if it is an anomaly, is it a cultural anomaly, or a questionnaire anomaly? It seems fairly clearly to be the latter. The "fight crime" item presupposes that a significant degree of crime exists, and that it is a constant:⁶⁸ only thus could we assign changes over time in its relative priority assignment to changes in the respondents' attitudes. Add to this the uncertainty of the degree to which the item is related to Inglehart's actual research objective, which for the "fight crime" item is the relative value for physical safety, and the item appears very weak indeed as a valid indicator for Inglehart's index.

In sum, if the individual items cannot reliably measure the concerns that they are supposed to measure, and if they cannot legitimately be treated as indicators of "materialist" concerns (Hristic:56), then they cannot be employed reliably as indicators in a materialist/postmaterialist index. Even the economic items fall short as indicators of materialism as a cultural phenomenon; indeed, it turns out that Inglehart's index is correlated very closely with inflation rates - which, by itself, would confirm that non-cultural factors control the outcome of index results. However, two significant aspects of the data distribution must be considered before any conclusions are drawn. The first is that there is evidence that *within* the index's close correspondence to inflation rates there are intergenerational variations, a feature which lends support to Inglehart's thesis. The second is that because in conducting his analysis Inglehart usually includes only the polar types, the correlation with inflation rates, as well as the evidence of consistent intergenerational differences within that correlation, may be an artefact of unreliable methodology. Both of these factors will be explored below, after a look at the postmaterialist items in the index.

All of the postmaterialist items are markedly less clear than the materialist items as referents of the pseudo-Maslowian needs they are designed to tap. The goals of "more say in work and community" and "more say in government decisions" (goals C and F) are easily *related* to the "belonging and esteem needs" that they are supposed to tap, but their participatory character implies so many other dimensions that the likelihood of their measuring what they were intended to measure seems rather slim. After centuries of slow - and then increasingly rapid - expansion of suffrage, and a rapid expansion of the responsibilities and expectations of government, the question of participation has become exceedingly complex. Does this century's participatory norm operate in tandem with a growing sense of frustration with the widening chasm between expectations and delivery, which in turn diminishes the legitimacy of political leaders, political structures, and political processes? Certainly this is a broadly used explanation of some salient aspects of current American politics - as well as of contemporary politics in Italy, Japan, India, Russia, and so on.⁶⁹ Or does the frustrated

⁶⁸Constant both temporally and geographically, for the item assumes no differences between urban and rural respondents.

⁶⁹Hans Magnus Enzensberger makes a very convincing argument that Europe in general is undergoing a set of general, deep crises, of which this forms a part (1989, especially pp. 76-83).

norm of participation (in the workplace and in national government, but also in communities which are less stable demographically than in earlier eras) itself incite correlatives in the needs for belonging and self-esteem? Related questions posit themselves concerning centralization of and access to government. The goal of "more say at work and in community," for example, has numerous and potentially contradictory referents. The first part, "more say at work," as I have mentioned, is not likely to appeal to employers, and thus may artificially narrow the appeal of the item itself. The second part, "more say in communities," has a *material* referent in something like Nixon's and Reagan's "New Federalism" in the United States, or in Italy's long-standing regional inequalities, and thus may artificially expand the appeal of the item. In short, my point is that when people are asked to evaluate (or to rank-order) issues that overlap with or are closely related to participation, a great number of different factors may be involved - and so the face validity of those variables in Inglehart's index is very weak indeed (Hristic:60).

Similarly, the goal of "a less impersonal, more humane society" (goal J), certainly seems to be easily (though perhaps distantly) related to belonging and esteem needs, but seems inevitably and definitely to have other, probably more weighty, referents as well. For example, what might "humane" mean to different respondents - less emphasis on money? less hierarchy and more equality? a more rehabilitative (rather than dehumanizing) penal system? For that matter, what might "society" mean to different respondents - does it refer to private life? to life on the sidewalk and in the supermarket? to life in the ⁷⁰ workplace? to relations between government and people? to all of these?

The goals designed to tap intellectual needs are even more questionable. "Protecting freedom of speech" (goal H) can certainly be *associated* with intellectual "freedom" (though only in the loosest of senses with "needs"), but it is obviously very much broader than that. It was sufficiently important as a political tenet in the new United States two centuries ago to have been included as part of the first Amendment to the Constitution. Since then, the words themselves have been so inherently political, and contain so fundamentally as their reference point an antagonistic relationship between government and people, in which the former is unquestionably more powerful, that it seems rather futile as an instrument for tapping "intellectual needs.". Moreover, an argument could be made that if freedom of speech is perceived to be secure and uncontested (Hristic:63), then the likelihood of its being assigned a high priority is slim. In a different vein, an argument could be made that many people view freedom of speech as a *sine qua non* of democratic government, and hence the item might be disproportionately over-represented in the surveys.⁷¹ On the other hand, if this *sine qua non* is under no threat, then it might be disproportionately underrepresented in the surveys. Or, if censorship of the arts happens to figure

⁷⁰Again, the methodology of including only "pure types" in the analysis distorts the results.

⁷¹In fact, Inglehart found that for a sample of European elites (candidates for the European Parliament), "emphasis on freedom of expression is almost universal — hence it

prominently in the day's political chatter, then it could go either way. The point, obviously, is that the reasons for respondents' assigning high priority to this item are manifold. For its pseudo-Maslowian purpose of tapping "intellectual needs," it cannot be considered to be a valid operationalization.

The "ideas should be more important than money" item (goal L) covers a lot of ambiguous ground as well, particularly as the items are introduced, and thus framed, as national policy goals. What are "idea"? Do "ideas" refer to personal development or creativity, or do they refer ideas about how government or welfare policies should be managed? Does the concept refer to something like Michael Lerner's "Politics of Meaning," or to what remains important in Marx after his "ideas" have been erroneously associated with the failure of socialism (and thus overhastily condemned yet again) - or to ideas connected with semiotics, or with deconstructionism, or with the New Criticism in literature studies? There is simply no way to know.⁷²

Finally, as Inglehart belatedly discovered, the item designed to tap "aesthetic needs" (goal D) is entirely ineffective.⁷³ Indeed, it seems rather an odd choice. Presumably, the logic that led to its inclusion in the twelve-item index was that financially and physically insecure people would be sufficiently concerned with economic and safety needs to ignore ugliness in their surroundings; conversely, those for whom these needs have been securely gratified would be free to notice decaying cities and a countryside blighted by smoke-belching factories or strip-mined hillsides, and thence to develop in reaction an aesthetic need.⁷⁴ Obviously, because of the uneven distribution of zones which might benefit from "beautification," the question could not have served to measure much at all in nationally based surveys, and would have even less utility as an instrument for cross-national comparison. Given the other three choices in List A above, would respondents living in bucolic settings, or in apartments overlooking the Notre Dame cathedral, whether or not they were afflicted with "aesthetic needs" having other referents, be likely to assign high priority to beautification campaigns?

But in some of Inglehart's surveys this item is represented quite differently, tapping another, more significant dimension, for he replaced "beautification" with an entirely different item in the American surveys, and yet another item in the Japanese surveys (which further subverts comparability). In the American surveys, the goal is listed instead as "protect nature from pollution" (1990:136-137), and in the Japanese surveys as "make efforts to preserve the environment of this community" (1990:150).

⁷²...does not discriminate between Materialists and Postmaterialists as effectively as at the mass level" (1990: 141) .

⁷³In a factor analysis it failed consistently to cluster with other items in the index, more about which later.

⁷⁴Of course, at the time that Inglehart developed the index, consciousness of urban decay in the United States had developed suddenly and rapidly in the wake of anti-system urban protest and violence, and "beautification of the cities" entered political discourse as a pressing issue.

But as the following illustrates, Inglehart, like many others, has misunderstood the roots of such attitudes.

If the "beautification" question itself, as phrased, is odd as an attempt to tap an "aesthetic need," the pollution/ environmental preservation goals are even more so.

Moreover, although they may have a great deal to do with quality-of-life issues, their rooting in the material is overwhelming, for they can be read both as economic concerns (resources) and as concerns for physical safety (health); and, surely, to some respondents, they would represent concerns about our very survival. Although Inglehart is hardly alone in misinterpreting environmental concerns as an appreciation or yearning for smog-free cities and for pretty nature scenes, none of these items can be accepted as a valid indicator of aesthetic concerns (Hristic:68).

In any event, Inglehart seems to miss the point entirely when he tabulates and analyzes "beautification" and "environmental/pollution" items as though they were equivalent. Worse, because he so frequently places shoehorns his data into an analysis of materialist/ postmaterialist values, rather than to hold them up to the light to try to figure out what they might actually mean, his discussion and analysis are sometimes mystifying. For example, in his analysis of the Japanese data, he notes a "striking contrast between Japan and the West. 'More beautiful cities and countryside,' which was the least emphasized item in the West as a whole," he states, "is the [overall] third-ranking item in Japan." He does point out that, given Japan's circumstances, "a concern for its environmental impact is understandable" - but it is only at this point that he reveals parenthetically that *the question itself is different* in the Japanese surveys (without reminding us that, in terms of this item, "the West" itself is not uniform, for the American surveys also use a different item); but he insists both on attempting to locate differences in the Japanese (lest they prove to be less "materialist" than westerners), rather than in the question, and on analyzing these two very different goals as "corresponding item[s]" (1990:150).

Inglehart devotes a great deal of attention to environmental issues in other chapters of his study (especially chapter 8, "The Decline of Marxism" and chapter 11, "New Social Movements"), where, on the basis of data in addition to the materialist/postmaterialist index, these issues appear clearly to be concerns of respondents who are classified as postmaterialists, rather than materialists. Here we find that Inglehart's misinterpretation of environmental concerns goes further than his misformulation of an index item and subsequent bafflement at the results; it is carried far into his analysis. For example, later on, in discussing the antinuclear movement as a postmaterialist phenomenon, he notes that supporters of the movement associate nuclear power with nuclear weapons; *and* he notes that postmaterialists are "disproportionately active in the antiwar movement;" *and* he notes that after the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island political pressures brought the development of nuclear power plants to a halt in the U.S. - but rather than to attribute antinuclear attitudes to concerns for safety and survival, which are obviously *materialist* concerns according to his theory, he insists on ferreting out *postmaterialist* roots for them: in contrast to materialists, for whom "highly developed science and industry symbolize progress and prosperity," postmaterialists tend to reject nuclear power not only because, of its potential dangers but because it is linked with big business, big science,

and big government - bureaucratic organizations that are evaluated negatively because they are inherently impersonal and hierarchical, minimizing individual self-expression and human contact. The ideologues of the antinuclear movement argue for a return to a simpler, more human society in which energy is used sparingly and what is needed comes directly from nature - symbolized by solar power (1990:269).

Needless to say, Inglehart's data in no way support this characterization, and indeed, his rhetorical overstatement here appears to be a shroud for the weakness of the argument. Perceptions of big business, big science, and big government have not been investigated in his study; nor have perceptions of solar energy or of safe nuclear energy.

To return to the point: If concern for environmental issues is more plausibly rooted in the material than in the non-material or the "postmaterial," why is it that environmentalist respondents tend to assign highest ranking to "postmaterialist" goals in Inglehart's index? I will explore this question more fully in a later section, but suffice it to say at this point that it is not entirely compatible with Inglehart's theory and that it illustrates flaws in the index and in Inglehart's use of it. To elaborate on that, I turn now to the question of the face validity of the index as an operationalization of the materialist/postmaterialist construct.

Analysis of the Index

Inglehart performs a factor analysis in order to find out whether and how the twelve items' rankings, recoded into relative rankings, cluster into factors.⁷⁵ The results, which he finds to be "almost breathtaking," are that the items cluster into two factors, which correspond exactly to the materialist and postmaterialist dichotomy - except for the "aesthetic" item, which in all countries has insignificant correlations

⁷⁵There are several methodological problems in this factor analysis. The factor "loading" statistic is Pearson's correlation (r), which assumes interval-level variables and linear relationships among variables.

Although useful results may be obtainable with ordinal-level variables, the relative rankings into which Inglehart's items are recoded generate a significant uncertainty: the distances between rankings are known not to be equal, because individual respondents do not rank all twelve items. The recoding is performed as follows: the items ranking first, second, and "least important" overall (which respondents decide after they have ranked two items in each of three sets of four items) are recoded to 1, 2, and 6, respectively. The items ranking first and second in each set of four items are recoded to 3 and 4, respectively. *The items remaining are all recoded to 5* (1990: 135). Thus the importance of the first two is highly exaggerated relative to the others, and the relative importance of the items which do not rank first or second in the three sets or "least important" overall is negatively exaggerated relative to first and second ranking items, and nonexistent relative to one another, since they are all assigned the same value. Moreover, the first-ranking items in each set which are not first or second overall, are assigned the same value (3), and the same goes for the second-ranking items (4). Obviously, there may be no alternatives to this sort of recoding, but the distortions it creates in the factor analysis are highly significant. Inglehart insists that the interdependence among the items (the rank of one playing a role in determining the rank of others) is "minor" in a pool of twelve items, but this not the whole story: there are indeed twelve items, but there are only six relative rankings.

with any underlying factor, for obvious reasons.⁷⁶ Leaving aside this item, then, and leaving aside the fact that, in each of the ten countries included in the analysis, the two factors that emerge from his principal-components-analysis provide approximately only a twenty percent proportional reduction in error, or PRE (i.e., "explain" only twenty percent of the variation in the variables),⁷⁷ the factor analysis appears to lend more support to Inglehart's materialist/postmaterialist construct than any other feature of his data or analysis. Although some of the loadings represent rather low correlations, what matters is that the items cluster according to the theory, and that they do so with some cross-national consistency. What this means is that respondents evince a tendency (albeit a minor one, given only a twenty percent PRE) to assign high rankings *either* to materialist items *or* to postmaterialist items.

Factor analysis itself does not provide labels for the factors it reveals, however; it is up to the researcher to name them, and the best factor names are chosen such that the clustering of the elements within them is plausibly explained. In this case, Inglehart's theory itself offers both the explanation and the names: the items form two clusters because the value priorities measured tend to cluster according to materialist or postmaterialist orientations. But is this the most plausible interpretation of the factors? In my opinion, it is not, as I will elaborate toward the end of this chapter; here I will continue with the question of the face validity of Inglehart's index.

The questions raised by the validity of the index as an operationalization of the materialist/postmaterialist construct overlap somewhat with those concerning its validity for the pseudo-Maslowian hierarchy (especially on the materialist side of the dichotomy). Here, though, the index or scale itself is the "variable," and the items comprising the scale are "indicators." However, because respondents assign only first and second priority rankings for each of three sets of four items, and then two items

⁷⁶One principal use of factor analyses, it should be noted, is to test indices. An item that has no correlation with the factor with which it is theoretically associated should be modified and retested, or else rejected.

Inglehart does neither, perhaps because he believes that in the long run this item eventually will find a place in the postmaterialist factor. After all, its factor loading in the 1978 surveys had shifted slightly closer to the postmaterialist factor than in the 1973 surveys (1990: 141). Moreover, in another analysis, the Rokeach item "world of beauty" loaded into the postmaterialist factor with a barely acceptable correlation (1990: 138). And, of course, there is the environmental connection made in using environmental questions in the place of the beautification question; as an ostensibly postmaterialist concern, this substitution yields results that seem to conform with other aspects of Inglehart's theory.

⁷⁷The range for ten countries runs from 17% to 23%, with a mean, a median, and a strong mode of 20%. A twenty percent PRE represents a feeble correlation; it means that the use of the underlying factors to explain the variation in the rankings of the items in the index yields twenty percent fewer prediction errors than would be made if one used the mean of an independent variable to predict variation. That leaves eighty percent of the variation "unexplained." Even though the nature of social sciences data is such that we might be very pleased to attain a PRE as great as twenty percent, we cannot escape the fact that the remaining eighty percent is, collectively at least, far more significant. In other words, we are left with the question: What are the causes of the variations in the rankings of the items in the index?

overall, the question becomes a bit more complicated. What might be the effects of this particular "forced ranking" method? Does the method yield a valid scale? Are there any structural features in the questionnaire that might affect results? What, finally, do these aggregated priorities mean?⁷⁸

Each of the three sets of four goals contains an economic security item and a safety item. The ideal-typical materialist, theoretically, has an easy time of it, and assigns first or second priority to each of these six items. The ideal-typical postmaterialist actually confronts a different task in assigning rankings, partly because the postmaterialist items represent a more diverse array of choices - which in turn is due in part to there being only two materialist, but three postmaterialist, pseudo-Maslowian "needs," but also in part to postmaterialism's broad scope: the ideal-typical postmaterialist, whose preferences potentially span the universe of the nonmaterial, may not find in Inglehart's index any ideal "postmaterialist" choices. Moreover, the importance of some of the materialist items, such as a stable economy, is difficult to dismiss, for anyone. Consider, for example, the plight of postmaterialists facing the first set of four items. "More say at work and in community" (goal C) might be an obvious, theoretically ideal first choice, but then what? The "beautification" item (goal D) is not really part of a "postmaterialist" orientations, and its factor loading implies that the values of (empirically adjusted) ideal-typical postmaterialists would not lead them to this item in the same way as to the other postmaterialist goal in that set. A respondent who lives in a beautiful urban or rural setting might see the beautification goal as somewhat frivolous in comparison with the goal of high economic growth (goal A), which presumably would benefit everyone in the nation; hence economic growth, a "materialist" goal, might turn out, even for a "postmaterialist" respondent, to be the best candidate for second priority. Or, in countries in which there is either a potential military or paramilitary threat from other countries or a perception of strong military obligations, the strong defense item (goal B) might present a more likely alternative. My point is that since the materialist goals, and particularly the economic ones, are difficult to dismiss, their importance to the ideal-typical postmaterialist may hover just beneath that of the postmaterialist goals, surpassing them from time to time.⁷⁹

⁷⁸Moreover, even when the results are aggregated, Inglehart's practice in his analysis of considering only the polar types - pure materialists and postmaterialists - complicates matters further, for the mixed types comprise more than half of most samples.

⁷⁹The following paragraphs contain similar analyses for each set of goals presented to respondents. Although the gist of the critique is same - i.e., the possibility of interaction among the items is unacceptably high - I labor through each one anyway, at the risk of belaboring the point, in order to show very clearly that this is not an anomalous phenomenon in afflicting only one set of goals; it is a systematic feature of the lists, and therefore systematically built into Inglehart's index. Of course, going through each one also provides a sense of the potential complexity of survey-respondent interactions, as well as a sense of how, in company with one another, and in the context of forced ranking, the meaning of the items may lose face-value specificity.

Consider a different sort of conflict in the second set (List B). For the ideal-typical postmaterialist the most likely first-ranking item would be "more say in government decisions" (goal F), in part because of the framing of the exercise in the instructions given to respondents: this item takes the form of "aims" or "goals" of the country, i.e., national policy goals, more than does the other postmaterialist item, the more diffuse "protecting freedom of speech" (goal H). On the other hand, a respondent might reason, "more say in government" seems rather to be dependent on "freedom of speech." To which, then, to assign highest priority? Another respondent might see the same issue differently: if people *did* have more say in government decisions, then the protection of freedom of speech might be securely in the hands of the people, thus reducing its perceived importance as a goal - and with the importance of materialist goals hovering only a short distance away, it might make sense to assign second priority then to the "fight rising prices" item (goal G), particularly if there are high inflation rates; indeed, the likelihood of such a scenario is supported by the close correlation between the index and inflation rates. Yet a fourth postmaterialist respondent, alarmed over popular calls for the censorship of art, might reason that, at all costs, let us preserve and reinforce the freedom of speech, but let us also keep it remote from the meddling of the puritans - effectively eliminating the "more say" item; this respondent might then assign first and second rank to "freedom of speech" and "fight rising prices," respectively.

In the third set, there may be significant interaction between the two postmaterialist items. As I have mentioned, the meaning of "a less impersonal, more humane society" (goal J) is markedly ambiguous. Its ambiguity, moreover, leaves ample room for it to merge substantively with the "ideas should be more important than money" item (goal L); one may subsume the other. If this is so, then, as in the above scenarios, ideal-typical postmaterialists may have to decide, first, which one ranks highest, and then whether to choose the other as the second-ranking goal, or else, reasoning that the other is subsumed in the first, to choose a materialist item as second priority; and of the materialist items, the economic item, "maintain a stable economy" (goal I), would be the most generally attractive as a second choice, particularly if economic instability has recently appeared to threaten the welfare of all citizens.

Finally, there remains the respondents' choosing of the top two goals overall, after the three sets of choices have been made. Here, aside from any confusion that might arise from respondents' selecting items that they bypassed in the first round,⁸⁰ the possibility recurs that their choices may be based on the perception that one item subsumes another, or obviates another, or is dependent on another - only now more so, for selection must be made among three economic items, three "safety" items, and two "more say" items.

⁸⁰Presumably, respondents tend to assign overall first and second ranking to two of the goals that they selected in their rankings during the first part of the exercise. However, because respondents do not mark their choices, instead indicating verbally to the interviewer which item they have selected, it is quite possible that the overall rankings include items that were not even selected in the first round.

These various scenarios are not farfetched; since we cannot know a respondent's mind, we cannot assume a black- and-white, face-value reading of the goals or an insensitive approach to the selection of priorities. The scenarios I have described indicate that if we assume that respondents think, then there may be a great deal of uncertainty built into Inglehart's index. Furthermore, they indicate that the instrument very likely lacks sensitivity in measuring differences in values. The forced-ranking method *per se* is potentially very powerful, but its strength is dependent on there being an array of choices sufficiently differentiated from one another that when a choice is made we can be certain that it is a clear choice, even if by a small margin; the interaction among the goals in Inglehart's three lists (as well as the influence of contemporary political issues and discourse) obfuscates differences which amount to more than mere nuances. Consider, for example, the linkage of response distributions with inflation.

The pattern of choices that respondents make⁸¹ is so closely correlated with inflation rates that the graph showing "previous year's inflation rate" standardized, inverted, and superimposed onto the trends in different cohorts' "value indices" over eighteen years is astounding: the postmaterialist/materialist ratio rises as inflation falls, and falls as inflation rises (1990:graph on p. 94),⁸² One of Inglehart's early hypotheses (formulated before the oil price shocks of the 1970s) was that "one's sensitivity to inflation would be a good indicator of Materialist priorities" (1990:94, referring to his work in 1970) . That may be, but because sensitivity to inflation is probably a much better indicator of income, we must wonder what the index is measuring. There are three highly salient features: (1) the relative ratio of pure postmaterialists to pure materialists increases with every cohort, and these relative differences remain generally constant throughout the eighteen-year period; (2) the index fluctuations within the period are very closely correlated with inflation rates; and (3) these fluctuations, though pronounced, are of a similar magnitude in all cohorts - in other words, the fluctuations that appear to be tied to inflation rates occur within a "band width" which is approximately the same for all cohorts. The difference from one cohort to the next, then, is that this band width moves up the scale with each successive cohort. To put it in the language of standardization (though to do so exaggerates the relationship), what this means is that although a one- standard-unit change in inflation rate is associated with a one-standard-unit change in the postmaterialist/materialist ratio of all cohorts,

⁸¹As I have noted, rather than to consider complete or general patterns of materialist and postmaterialist orientations, Inglehart standardizes his comparisons in terms of the difference between the numbers of pure postmaterialists and of pure materialists. He does this in two different ways: one is the ratio of the two, in which case equal numbers of each type means a one-to-one ratio; and the other entails subtracting the number of pure materialists from pure postmaterialists, in which case equal numbers of each type means an index of zero. In the following discussion, for the sake of simplicity, I refer to both of these as ratios.

⁸²The graph also shows unequivocally that there is a distinct, progressive, intergenerational shift in the aall around ratio.

each successive cohort nevertheless⁸³ has a higher postmaterialist/materialist ratio than the previous one.

Inglehart's pure-types analysis substantially complicates matters. Early in his analysis, he writes:

[W]e can classify our respondents as pure Materialists (those whose top priorities are given to Materialist goals exclusively); pure Postmaterialists (those whose top priorities are given to Postmaterialist items exclusively); or mixed types, based on any combination of the two kinds of items. *Though for simplicity of presentation we will sometimes compare the two polar types, we are dealing with a continuum having numerous intermediate categories* (1990:75; my emphasis).“

It may make sense intuitively to conduct inter-cohort or time-series comparisons on the basis of the ratio of the pure types, or of the difference in number between them, but it does not make sense methodologically; nor is it a method entirely compatible with Inglehart's theory. Consider a hypothetical sample of 100 people, and assume a 1970 distribution of 20 pure postmaterialists, 20 pure materialists, and 60 mixed types; the relevant ratio for Inglehart here would be 1:1. Assume that ten years later⁸⁴ the distribution has changed to 40 each of the pure types, and 20 mixed types. Now, even though the number of postmaterialists has doubled, the ratio remains 1:1. The advantage of Inglehart's method is that it simultaneously takes into account changes in the number of materialists as well; the disadvantage is that the ratio has little real meaning. If the theory posits an increase over time in the *proportion* of postmaterialists *in the population*, and a decrease over time in the proportion of materialists, then these two trends must be considered separately, and not in terms of the ratio or difference between them.

Comparison of only the polar types, even if performed correctly, can provide us only with an extremely limited amount of information about the distribution of values among Inglehart's respondents, for, as I have pointed out, the *mixed* types account for *more than half* of almost all of his samples; in other words, more than half of each sample is excluded.⁸⁵ And, obviously, if the numbers of both types have changed in

⁸³As shown above, of materialists to postmaterialists, which is Inglehart's most significant and most powerful empirical finding, and which I will address presently.

⁸⁴This is an exceedingly important methodological point on which Inglehart often remains unclear. For some of his analyses, he informs the reader that the data are based on the polar types (and, in some, on the top two *overall* priorities). In others, however, he provides no information, in which case we are left to assume that he refers to the polar types. When he does provide tabulated data that include mixed types, we only barely attain any sense of a continuum, for there is usually no differentiation within the mixed-type "group" - and in the very few tables where there is, it is sub-dichotomized as "mixed-materialist" and "mixed-postmaterialist."

⁸⁵For example, from tabulated data which Inglehart provides, we can calculate that in the 1986-1987 surveys, only forty-five percent of European Community member respondents (overall), and only thirty-nine percent of the United States respondents are "pure types."

the same direction and magnitude, then Inglehart's method will record little or no change in the survey values of his population.

The problem is worse still, for the pure types represent the most "volatile" grouping of the respondents.

A pure type respondent has to assign highest priority to all six of that type's items; if the survey took place soon after a friend or relative had been robbed, the otherwise postmaterialist respondent might choose the "fight crime" item, and thereby become a "mixed type," excluded from the analysis. The staunch materialist might lose pure-type status by choosing the "more say at work" item the day after the boss had been more tyrannical than usual, or by choosing the "less impersonal society" item after a fruitless encounter with a government or corporate bureaucracy. But this point can be pressed further: centrifugal forces militate against any hypothetical individual from retaining pure type status for long, which means that these volatile "groups," the "pure types," may be neither groups nor types, but rather may be artefacts of the vagaries of recent experience for the individuals in that day's sample.

Despite the insensitivity of Inglehart's index to actual values, then, his restricted focus on pure types makes it inordinately sensitive to unmeasured, and possibly unmeasurable - and possibly even random - factors (inflation, however, which I address below, is measurable). Here, in a game of musical chairs in which the chairs are fixed neither in number nor in place, sampling methodology loses its meaning entirely, and the characterization of a "modal culture," the quantification quest of survey-research political culturists since Almond and Verba, remains slippery indeed.

To return now to the linkage of pure-types distribution with inflation rates, we can consider, in light of the above, an important possible underlying aspect of the marked fluctuations in the ratio of postmaterialists to materialists during the eighteen-year period. It seems highly unlikely that there would be a high proportion of people who would weigh in as pure postmaterialists during periods of high inflation, or as pure materialists in low inflation, and so it makes sense to consider (as Inglehart does) the intra-cohort fluctuations to be the result of mixed types' rearranging their priorities such that they become pure types. Similarly, of course, pure types would become mixed types as conditions changed, since all it takes for a pure postmaterialist to "become" a mixed type (and therefore to be excluded from the analysis) is to assign a high ranking to a single materialist item in the index. In the midst of high inflation rates, such a substitution would be extremely natural, even for a genuinely "nonmaterialist" respondent, if only because it is obvious that many people suffer when inflation diminishes well-being.

The point of all this is that there seems to be a materialist bias built into the index, and for two related, albeit very different reasons. One is that, as I have indicated, the material items of the index are clearer: they are clearer in literal meaning, and they are clearer as legitimate objects of national government policy (as per the suggestive instructions given to respondents before they make their priority selections). The other is that there is a material bias built into life. Growing up in conditions of relative prosperity may well have contributed to the formation of certain

values in the postwar generations of advanced industrial societies, but the inflation the 1970s and the unemployment and homelessness of the 1980s could not have failed to confirm and heighten people's awareness that the world of the material underwrites a great deal of what Inglehart calls the postmaterialist - i.e., life-style issues. The apparent proximity of material values to postmaterial values for many respondents (as reflected in the correlation of the index values with inflation) indicates that economic values are fundamental.

Thus a plausible explanation presents itself for the preponderance of "materialist" values that exists in all of the populations studied, at nearly all times: concerns about economic stability, inflation, crime, and the like, will exist as long as economic cycles exist. Unlike the Maslowian physiological needs, which truly are secure for most people in advanced industrial societies and can thus be virtually ignored by the individual, economic concerns, which are not only an elemental part of the fabric of social and political life, but also are rooted in the principal organizational agency for countless different levels of social life, cannot be ignored by an individual living in society, unless they are for some reason irrelevant - for example, in the absence of a market economy. Hence, as Inglehart learned, his materialist/postmaterialist instrument is unsuited for use in certain countries; when modifications are made (for example, to conform to a command economy), the index is likely to yield anomalous, if not difficult to interpret, results. In Chinese surveys, the researcher⁸⁶ realized that it would be "inappropriate" to include the "fight rising prices" item in a country where prices are set by the government. Also, for obvious reasons, he was not willing to include the "more say in government" item (1990:153-157). In Inglehart's research in the Poland of 1980, the instrument had to be modified as well, and he finds that "Postmaterialism is not the same phenomenon in Poland as in the West," largely because of "the fundamentally different relationship that exists between the state and the economy in Poland, as compared with Western nations" (1990:158).

Our revised [Polish] twelve-item battery does not tap precisely the same dimension as the corresponding battery does in the West. This was more or less inevitable since the social reality that the items refer to is fundamentally different in the two types of societies (1990:159).

Unfortunately, the insight that Inglehart gains and applies to his Polish data does not extend to his analysis of his capitalist-country data. Even though, according to conventional wisdom, the differences in structured state- society relations among western capitalist societies are not as stark as those between the latter and non-capitalist or non-western societies, there are, of course, differences, some of which are significant; the United States, for example, has a set of structures and attitudes quite different from that of European countries, and within West Europe the Scandinavian

⁸⁶Inglehart uses the data of Edric Seng-liang Ho, "Values and Economic Development: Hong Kong and China," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1985.

countries differentiate themselves in clear, structural ways from their neighbors to the south and the east.

Differences in *current* perception alone may be decisive in this sort of analysis. Just as the economic indicators in the scale are not applicable where the economy is centrally planned rather than market-oriented, some of the other indicators, as I have already implied, are for other reasons not applicable at certain times; for example, if inflation rates are low or if freedom of speech is apparently secure, there is obviously less reason for respondents to assign high priority to the "fight inflation" or "protect freedom of speech" items. However, insofar as they are indicators, Inglehart explicitly treats all materialist items as equivalent, and all postmaterialist items as equivalent, which is not valid. His theory implies - and he believes that this is borne out by his data - that individuals with materialist orientations will, as one item in the index loses relevance, replace it with another materialist item. The support he draws from his data for this thesis lies in the consistent preponderance of materialist values over the eighteen-year period despite the return of inflation rates to their 1970 levels; although in the 1973 surveys the "fight rising prices" item had been ranked (in the overall, out-of-twelve ranking) among the top two priorities substantially more often than any other item, in the 1988 surveys it had fallen to sixth place.

It was not replaced by a Postmaterialist goal, however. Instead, the various other Materialist goals took up much of the slack, so that the relative positions of Materialist versus Postmaterialist goals were almost unchanged from 1973 to 1988 (1990:97).⁸⁷

This interpretation is tenuous; it is likely that if we controlled for various contextual conditions (about which I will offer general speculations later) we would confront explanations for the appearance of a materialist "musical chairs" based more on contemporary perceptions of reality (i.e., the way relevant structures and processes operate now) than on entrenched "materialist *orientations*;" indeed, controlling for inflation rates has already provided substantial support for this alternative. The fact that all cohorts are highly sensitive to inflation indicates that the economic concerns among the index items, relative to the others, are fundamental, and the offering of three economic items from which to choose in the index⁸⁸ no doubt serves to ensure that the "pure postmaterialist" will remain in the minority.

⁸⁷It should be noted that he refers here to the *relative* positions of the two value-types of goals. During that period, even though the relative positions of the two types of goals remained much the same, the "center of gravity," as it were, shifted from what I would call "very heavy emphasis" on materialist goals to mere "emphasis" on materialist goals (1990: see Table 2-6, p. 98).

⁸⁸Including the very broad "economic growth" and "maintain stable economy" items, which are difficult to ignore, as they promise universal benefits; indeed, the former was ranked first or second overall (out of twelve) by one quarter of the respondents in *both* 1973 and 1988, and the latter by one fifth.

How valid, then, is the materialist/postmaterialist construct? I have raised questions concerning its validity in two general categories: the face validity of some of its elements and the construct validity of its role as a scale.

Face Validity. I have already discussed the principal issues concerning the index's face validity, arguing that ambiguity in and interaction among some of the items within it leave doubt about what is being measured. Also, I have presented scenarios that raise the question: When respondents are asked to assign rankings to goals toward which the country should strive, is it values that are being measured, or perceptions of what are current issues in politics and economics? The question of the degree to which perceptions are shaped by values is exceedingly important, and seems to have some reflection in the component of Inglehart's data that indicates an intergenerational shift, in priority-ranking tendencies (more about which shortly); but this is yet one more step removed from the index itself, for the index provides no valid measurement of values. The high priorities generally assigned to one or several economic items lend support to the postulate I have put forth that economic concerns are a perpetual and important "current issue," but not necessarily a "value." And, of course, the link with inflation supports the "current issues" thesis, at least for economic concerns, and presumably as well for those concerning crime, defense forces, and the maintenance of order - i.e., all of the materialist items.

This generalized problem of face validity, then, is compounded by another, which is that the postmaterialist items may have referents well outside of Inglehart's model, dispersing "measurement" over a very broad spectrum of possible factors, leaving us with no way of knowing what is being measured, and with little foundation for assuming that we are measuring values, let alone "postmaterialist" values - values which are presumed to develop in the absence of "preoccupations" with economic security and physical safety.

Construct Validity. The absence of symmetry in Inglehart's index makes it difficult to accept it as a "scale," which throws into question its construct validity. Even if we were to accept Inglehart's assumption that it is legitimate to consider all six items of each category to be interchangeable in assessing the degree to which a respondent or a sample or a cohort has materialist or postmaterialist orientations - which I do not - we still would not have a *scale* or a *continuum*; the "index" remains a dichotomy, for it contains only two categories, and the only feature of Inglehart's manipulations that implies progression or "continuum" is the ratio of materialist to postmaterialist items selected (or *vice versa*). This "counting method" would be more convincing if: a) what is being measured were clear; b) the items were demarcated into two *clear* and *credible* categories of values (i.e., materialist and postmaterialist; in this case the latter is not clear); c) the items had no obvious referents in current events; d) the items within value-categories actually could reasonably be considered to be "equivalent," at least in scope of reference (e.g., "fight inflation" is obviously narrower than "stable economy"); and e) the items could reasonably be considered to be structurally equivalent *across* categories as well (e.g., "strong defense" in the materialist

category and "less impersonal, more humane society" in the postmaterialist category have wildly different scopes of reference). This is obviously a tall order.

Inglehart may be aware of the problematic nature of such a scale, for he does not actually use his index as one, usually eschewing his "continuum" in favor of "pure types" analyses. In practice, then, his index becomes a scale for aggregated samples, cohorts, and national groupings *over time*: the ratio of the two pure types varies over time, and this ratio provides a scale of sorts which is subject to far fewer requirements than those I have listed - though it does bring with it a new set of problems, which I have already described (i.e., the improper use of ratios risks meaninglessness). Given the questions being researched, the mixed types simply represent too large a group to relegate to marginal analytical status.

Time

The element of time encompasses another, broader, theoretical-methodological issue that is both problematic and enlightening in *Culture Shift*. Early on in this chapter I mentioned the importance of the passage of time as a principal (albeit implicit) variable in Inglehart's analysis; both his theoretical framework and his analysis depend on it. Its importance invites a closer look at time, in two distinct respects; the first has to do with the strength of Inglehart's findings in his results over time, and the second is the factor of history, both as it is treated in his theory and as it might have been, in terms of development and of change.

Frame

Although his theory is anchored in the postwar period in general, Inglehart's data span an eighteen-year period; occasionally in his analysis he employs earlier data to support his theses or to find indications of trends, but the items in the materialist/postmaterialist index begin only in 1970 (though, again, the four-item index was expanded to twelve items in 1973). Eighteen years is, I believe, a long enough period to trace meaningfully variations of all sorts across cohorts; and Inglehart's data show that different cohorts are consistently differentiated in stable proportions from one another, which means that he can posit intergenerational differences with a high degree of confidence. But is it a long enough period to uncover "culture change"? With a valid measurement of culture (which we do not have in Inglehart's study), it does appear to be a long enough span to do so, albeit indirectly, through the assumption and measurement of population replacement, which is Inglehart's strategy. His data show that *relative* cohort differences: a) remain stable over the eighteen-year period, and b) are distributed such that each succeeding cohort has a larger proportion of postmaterialists than the preceding one. Therefore it is perfectly legitimate to postulate that as older cohorts die off, population replacement effects will ensure that, in the aggregate, the ratio of postmaterialists in successive samples will be progressively higher - hence, "culture shift."

Inglehart's theory holds that people's value priorities are derived both from their experience and from socialization. Early experience is important, though not absolute, and both early and later experience are mediated by socialization, which causes a lag effect in value change. The wild fluctuations within pure-types cohorts indicate that some changes in "value priorities" are caused by the direct experience of quotidian events and contemporary issues, rather than by cultural or socialization factors.⁸⁹ On the other hand, the distinct differences from cohort to cohort, and their progressive nature, would indicate that different cohorts' reactions to current experience are mediated by socialization or enculturation - or, in any case, some feature that cannot be accounted for by current events. Thus, as Inglehart hypothesized, the data show two distinct effects: cohort effects (the intergenerational shift), and period effects. Moreover, his hypothesis that a third possible set of effects, life-cycle or aging effects, should be minimal, is supported by the data: cohorts do not appear to evince more materialist or more postmaterialist orientations as they age.⁹⁰

Inglehart's theory relies only on cohort effects (and not period effects) in order to discern culture change.

Even though both effects are based on responses to the same index in Inglehart's surveys, the difference between them lies in the apparent fact that each cohort (generation) has a smaller core base of materialists in it than the next.

Thus a cohort's apparent aggregate attitude to something like inflation is related to the proportion of its members who will, in the face of rising prices, eschew Inglehart's postmaterialist goals in favor of assigning highest priority to the materialist goals. Put differently, each cohort's tendency to evince postmaterialist priorities is limited by the proportion of its members who, whatever the inflation rate (within, no doubt, certain bounds), will invariably assign highest priority to the materialist goals. Thus, the locus of materialist or postmaterialist "culture," or of Inglehart's measurement of it, is situated in those proportions.

Because Inglehart's data over the eighteen years consistently manifest "materialist" majorities, but evergrowing proportions of "postmaterialists," he implies not just that values are changing, but also that the trend he discerns (which, because he conceives it as *culture* change, he does not conceive as fluid or reversible) has a logical developmental course before it of a continued shift toward "postmaterialist" majorities.⁹¹ However, if material concerns are indeed fundamental, as I have

⁸⁹This is consistent with Inglehart's predictions and findings, but the evidence would probably be more compelling if the fluctuations were less "wild," and if Inglehart's methodology were more meaningful.

⁹⁰However, Inglehart's analysis is not actually sufficient to *confirm* this hypothesis, because the index not only may be too rudimentary to show such effects, but also may be too closely tied to current events to reveal underlying attitudes.

⁹¹Inglehart confirms *overall* change during the period by comparing the proportions in the first year of the period with those of the final year of the period - and there is indeed a "net change," which Inglehart then applies to extrapolation into the future. This is plainly disingenuous, however, for a mere glance at the graphs is enough to recognize that in the context of the wild fluctuations in the intervening years the endpoint measurements are utterly irrelevant (1990:101; see graphs on pp. 94 and 100).

suggested, then such a shift seems logically unlikely. What, then, is going on? What do Inglehart's data mean? In the following section I will build a tentative answer to these questions. The first part considers Inglehart's historical perspective, in terms of development; if we look into the past through the lens of his theory, we find the structural distortions marked enough to cast doubt on what we might find if we attempt to look into the future. The second part seeks to identify the nature and elements of change, both in the reality of the twentieth century and in what can be discerned in Inglehart's data.

History

Development. Inglehart's historical model holds that materialist orientations did not develop until industrialization began to change the structure of society.

[T]he historical growth of Materialism tends to be curvilinear, initially repressed by cultural norms necessary to the functioning of preindustrial society, but gaining widespread acceptance during the phase of capital accumulation and rapid industrialization, and then declining with the emergence of advanced industrial society (1990:148; citing Inglehart, 1977:242-243).⁹²

His scarcity and socialization hypotheses hold that the materialist values of older cohorts in his sample remain much as they are largely because of early experience with wartime scarcity and danger; postmaterialist orientations developed progressively among younger cohorts as the result of postwar prosperity. Both sets of orientations are thus explicitly specific to industrial society, with postmaterialism even more specifically posited as a phenomenon of "*advanced* industrial society." Inglehart has yet another category of value orientations, however: *prematerialist* values, which he mentions only when certain anomalous features of his data crop up, demanding explanation. Hence when he finds that in Japan, China, and even Hong Kong, respondents who are demographically expected to evince largely materialist orientations anomalously assign high priority to certain obviously non-materialist items in his lists, he insists that these items represent not postmaterialist, but rather *prematerialist* values.⁹³ Inglehart's theory thus incorporates three developmental stages: prematerialism, materialism, and postmaterialism.

⁹²The reference is to Inglehart's *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

⁹³For example, in the case of Japan, I have already mentioned Inglehart's struggles with the "fight crime" and "pollution" anomalies; the "belongingness" item presents yet a third. Mistranslated into "a society with harmonious human relations," this item is not only assigned second- highest (overall) priority, following only "economic stability," but also is a popular selection both among young, affluent, or well-educated respondents, and among older, rural, or less-educated respondents. Inglehart insists that although this item appears to be postmaterialist, and although it clusters statistically with materialist items, it represents neither materialist nor postmaterialist values, but rather prematerialist values.

He hypothesizes that the item "attains widespread approval in Japan because it appeals to traditionalists

This scheme makes superficial logical sense,⁹⁴ but it collapses under scrutiny. Certainly, there *may be* values which can legitimately be placed in these three categories, but, as categories, they must be mutually exclusive, which they are not. To assign the Japanese value for consensus to the prematerialist category simply because it originates in preindustrial times invites comparison: Do American and European values for religion reflect "prematerialist" values?⁹⁵ Do wedding, funeral, and graduation ceremonies reflect prematerialist values? Do national holidays, or pilgrimages to national monuments, or elections, or the maintenance of military forces, or the conduct of wars, or an appreciation for music, dance, and literature - all of which, to one degree or another, predate industrialization - also reflect "prematerialist" values? Of course not, which means that Inglehart's criterion for prematerialist values, namely origination in preindustrial times, is plainly not valid.

His classification system fails another crucial logical test as well. The theoretical basis for Inglehart's materialist values lies in the Maslowian hierarchy, which posits that the needs for food, shelter, and physical safety are basic to the human organism. Accordingly, as does Maslow, Inglehart hypothesizes that once these needs are met and secure, individuals are free to pursue higher needs - hence postmaterialism. However, it is only by transfiguring the basic needs into an economic, material, *and social* model that Inglehart can escape the individual organism and link his "materialism" with industrialization: after all, the needs for food, shelter, and physical security certainly predate industrialization.

This transfiguration not only renders void the Maslowian logic that Inglehart believed he was building into his model, and upon which its mechanics are dependent, but also weakens the model by circularly defining "materialism" and "postmaterialism" in his index items on the basis of historical periods. Inglehart's index is virtually meaningless in a preindustrial context. Most of the "materialist" items in his index are referentially specific to the industrial era, and the distance in the past to which they are applicable is reduced substantially by the introductory instructions given to respondents, which frame the items as contemporaneous national policy goals. The index items assume a cash economy; they assume nationstates; and they assume national governments that: a) are active; b) have a scope of activity that is sufficiently broad that it can be understood to include fighting crime, controlling inflation, and fostering economic growth; and c) are democratic, and hence permit of popular participation. And yet, would Inglehart argue that preindustrial peoples were not

as well as modernists" (1990: 146). My impression is that "harmonious human relations" would carry a very nearly universal appeal; what would have been its ranking had it been included in the other countries• surveys?

⁹⁴And it has the same pedigree and profile as other developmental sequences, and is nearly identical to, and as diffuse as, the better known sequence after which it appears to be modeled, namely, that which distinguishes preindustrial, industrial, and post-industrial society.

⁹⁵Inglehart finds that a very large proportion of respondents (a mean of 66 percent, as reported in a table with data from 16 countries in 1981-82) report that they consider themselves to be "religious."

preoccupied with material concerns - such as food, shelter, and security, both immediate and future?

As objects of national policy goals, the postmaterialist items make sense *only* as nineteenth and twentieth century phenomena, and never figured prominently in political discourse until the twentieth century. More important, though, as elements of broadly shared social wish lists, their historical scope of reference is confined largely to advanced industrial society. Their relevance is contingent in part upon the peculiar historical combination of urban-industrialization and advanced communications; the former generated certain historically unprecedented conditions against which people would eventually react, and the latter amplified the awareness of those conditions and the articulation of the reaction against them. In other words, the postmaterialist items' relevance is limited largely to advanced industrial society (I will elaborate on this point in the next section.)

The index is thus defined both circularly, on the basis of historical periods, and asymmetrically, for the character and course of these historical periods are not uniform in all societies (nor even in all advanced industrial societies) - which helps to illuminate Inglehart's treatment of "anomalous" results like those of Japan. Inglehart's is thus a developmentalist model, structured roughly by western historical periods and political experience, and prejudiced by the expectation, in the terms established by the model, of western (and capitalist) countries' being more advanced than others.

The reason definitional circularity is problematic, of course, is that it implies circular explanation: postmaterialism, *whatever it is*, increases in the postwar era *because* it has been defined *ad hoc* in terms of certain phenomena that have grown more prominent in the postwar era. (The method becomes more obviously problematic when we consider other postwar phenomena, which I will do shortly.) The reason that definitional asymmetry is problematic is that it represents conceptual diffuseness. It is the result, in part, of designing the measurement-instrument with the (future) explanation of its (future) measurements already in mind. This is, of course, consonant with aspects of the scientific method, for it amounts to formulating a hypothesis and then testing it. But it is also like hypothesizing that the rooster's crowing makes the sun rise; Inglehart's deviation from scientific method lies in his failure to note whether or not the sun rises in the absence of the rooster and hence rises for reasons unrelated to the rooster. The reason that a developmentalist approach is problematic is that the relative degrees of development are already "known:" the United States and Northern European nations represent the "most developed," while Japan, although certainly no less developed, is "newly developed," and thus has not yet exorcised aspects of its traditional ways. The developmentalist approach builds into the model expectations that are based on the pace and scope of economic development, which is often closely related to the passage of time, when in fact an enormous number of other factors are also related, in innumerable ways, to the passage of time. Certainly economic development (which requires the passage of time) has often in reality implied more generalized development, but what happens to traditional aspects of society in the process has been very much less understood. The point of all this is that the intrusion

of these three conceptual problems has undermined both Inglehart's generation of data and his interpretation of that data, as well as his conception and treatment of change.

Change. Inglehart's data show change, but his model cannot adequately explain it, largely because it is not sufficiently and accurately interweaved with reality to command plausibility. Falsification is too easily wrought, as the following question illustrates: In the terms of Inglehart's index items, what conditions would generate and sustain a substantial postmaterialist majority?

The answer, it turns out, is not Utopia (nor even a logical progression of contemporary trends), but an interim step toward Utopia: it would require that inflation be nearly eliminated; that the economy (such as it would be) be growing and stable; that there be little or no danger or crime or war; and that "order" in society be maintained (whatever that might mean). This sounds very much like Utopia already, but if we were to have significant "postmaterialist" majorities, respondents would have to assign high priority to postmaterialist items - which presupposes that the survey questions would have any meaning to respondents. Thus, our near-Utopia would have room for improvement, manifested in some meaning in, or in referents in reality for, each of the following goals: more say in work, community, and government; maintaining freedom of speech; and "progress toward a less impersonal, more humane society" in which "ideas are more important than money." Oddly, with nothing more than the substitution of "productivity" for "money," this interim "Utopia" has the familiar ring of a nearly successful socialism going awry in totalitarianism - a lingering, chafing, euphemistic "dictatorship of the proletariat" wherein the "proletariat" is the Party cadres. In short, the logical outcome of the trends to be discerned in Inglehart's indicators is not realistic.⁹⁶

The set of values discernible in the portrait of postmaterialists that emerges from Inglehart's discussions is also unrealistic, for it is fraught with contradiction.

At one and the same time, postmaterialists are well-educated and possessed of lofty ideals, but are singularly obtuse.

Societies with higher rates of "postmaterialism" also have higher rates of divorce, abortion, and "illegitimate" births (1990:201-211). "Postmaterialists" are less happy and less satisfied with their lives than are their more "materialist" counterparts (1990:160-161, 238-239). Finally, because "in their careers, Postmaterialists act to maximize prestige, interesting experiences, and the quality of life in general, rather than sheer income,"⁹⁷ they are "economic underachievers" (1990:175-176), causing the erosion of the very conditions that permitted their own self-indulgence:

⁹⁶Here I am merely pressing the logical outcome of the index. Inglehart's own projection into the future is grounded more in common sense. He posits the assimilation of conflicting materialist-postmaterialist values "into a new synthesis," as yet undefined, but based in large part on the "sheer functional necessity" of a material base, which will balance out the potentially self-defeating postmaterialist values (1990: 333-334). This makes sense, of course, logically as well in terms of Inglehart's viewpoint. My argument is that the index does not accommodate this contingency.

⁹⁷The "evidence" Inglehart cites for these traits, I should point out, is not compelling.

The wealthier societies are least likely to produce Materialist publics, but Materialist publics seem to produce high economic growth rates. Or, reversing labels, though wealthier societies are most likely to produce Postmaterialists, after an appropriate time lag, the more Postmaterialist societies have the lowest growth rates. The long-term result is that high growth rates eventually lead to lower growth rates. Prosperity engenders a cultural shift toward Postmaterialist values, which eventually leads to a less intense emphasis on economic growth (1990:57).

The picture we get (however dubious the causal connections) is fairly clearly not a vision of an incipient Utopia; the trends generated by "postmaterialist" attitudes are potentially dangerous to social cohesion, community, economic viability, and ultimately democratic government.

Yet this portrait does not correspond with the ostensibly humanistic perspective of "postmaterialist" orientations, and seems to present an anomaly: is this ignorant, unhappy hedonism the result of their quest for "self-actualization?" How do these "postmaterialists," who assign higher priority to issues of democratization, community, humanization, and the world of ideas, manage to bring upon themselves - more than their more materially oriented elders - the hardships of divorce, single parenthood, abortion, and reduced economic growth?

Part of the problem, of course, is that the relationship between the index items and these particular • issues is impossible to determine, and possibly nonexistent. Rates of divorce, single parenthood, abortion, economic growth, *and* of "postmaterialism" are all determined at the national level; the mild association between "postmaterialism" and the other factors does not indicate whether or not the same subgroups of the populations are involved, and certainly does not indicate that the one has *caused* the others. Here, Inglehart's "broader syndrome" of cultural change plays a greater explanatory role, but this syndrome itself requires *ad hoc* tailoring to any factor to which it is applied.

Hence we still lack sound explanation: How can we explain plausibly Inglehart's mixed results - the intergenerational progression *and* the close ties with inflation rates? the factor clusters *and* the eighty percent of variance that they leave unexplained? the "materialist" majorities *and* the slim probability of there ever being a strong "postmaterialist" majority? the humanistic focus of "postmaterialists" *and* their foolish and selfish behavior?

What seems to be given short shrift in Inglehart's analysis are the causes of what he calls "postmaterialist" *issues*; according to his theory, prosperity has enabled people to shift emphasis to issues concerning the quality of life - as though these issues had lain dormant, awaiting a kiss from the Prince of Prosperity. But are these issues not rather the direct result of the industrial organization itself of society? Consider again the issue of nuclear power.

Inglehart understands that opposition to nuclear power is motivated partly by a perception of the potential danger of nuclear power and the obvious danger of nuclear

weapons, but he plays this down, insisting on emphasizing instead a "postmaterialist" rejection of the dehumanizing and bureaucratic world of big business, big science, and big government. In other words, he does not stop at depreciating the "materialist" bases (i.e., safety and even survival) of antinuclear attitudes; he explains it in terms of a relatively extreme and zealous ideological stance, the substance of which he has not explored, but which can be deduced to be a broad-based antimaterialism. The implication is thus clear: "postmaterialism," theoretically possible only for people whose early experience was not blighted by want, in this case amounts not just to a lessened emphasis on the material in favor of other (nonmaterial) issues, but further, to a *rejection* both of "materialism" *and* of the complex mechanisms of advanced industrial society that made possible the secure childhoods of "postmaterialists" in the first place. Leaving aside the implication that such postmaterialists are spoiled and irrational, we are confronted again by a theoretical anomaly; *if* it is true that proponents of the antinuclear movement also reject big business, big science, and big government, is it likely that this rejection is the *result of* economically and physically secure childhoods? Probably not. If that were the case, then the basic elements of both Marx's humanist and economic philosophies would have appealed more to the privileged than to factory workers existing near the fringes of survival in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. More to the point, is it likely that the rejection of nuclear power and nuclear weapons is a *result of* the rejection of big business, big science, big government and big bureaucracy? Of course not. If that were the case, then we would expect these antinuclear postmaterialists also to reject automobiles, VCRs, modern medications, agribusiness food, and even national political elections; obviously some do, but opponents of nuclear power and nuclear weapons are not all anti-system, commune-dwelling organic farmers, and nor are they all activists.

Is the rejection of big business, big science, big government, and big bureaucracy *related to* the rejection of nuclear power and weapons? Probably it is; if so, then the element they all have in common is rather likely to be the perception that big business/science/government/bureaucracy *and* nuclear weapons and energy are all somehow dangerous.

The materialist/postmaterialist interpretation obviously misses the point.⁹⁸

The more plausible interpretation of survey attitude changes in Inglehart's data, then, is simple, obvious, and well-worn: the development of industrial society brought not only the prosperity that freed the majority of its members from *perpetual and fundamental* preoccupation with basic material concerns (i.e., security of food and shelter), but also a host of new concerns - it would hardly be original to call it a Pandora's box. Industry transformed radically the scale of business enterprise,

⁹⁸The model formulated by Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky in their *Culture Theory* (1990) offers an extremely coherent framework within which to explain especially this sort of phenomenon, for an important part of the foundation of their model is a set of socially-constructed views of nature, each with a concomitant view of nature-management. I provide a full description of their model in the next chapter.

production, bureaucratization, geographical and social mobility, and even pollution; societies changed rapidly from rural-agrarian to urban-industrial, and with those changes had to come changes in values. The standards of success changed both in scale and in structure, and in the move from behind the plow or tractor to the factory machine or paper-piled desk, the newly won and incomplete individual autonomy faded, along with a clear understanding of the meaning both of one's work and of one's role in society. Because the risk of fatal ruin also faded, the transformation went much more smoothly than it would have otherwise: a bargain was struck.

The effects of the industrial revolution on society can be followed fairly straightforwardly from its highly exploitative stages - Charles Dickens' London and Upton Sinclair's Chicago - to the beginnings of advanced industrial society, where we find Sinclair Lewis's *Babbitt*.⁹⁹ *Babbitt* cannot be called a "great novel," and yet it was immediately successful, and today remains required reading in many undergraduate curricula; many who have not read the novel nevertheless know the name. Why is *Babbitt* so well known? Because his life is devoid of real meaning; because his consciousness is reduced to a perpetual calculation conducted in terms of the small set of symbols of success in modern capitalist society; because when he strays from this calculus in search of a bit of fun, he suffers for his failure to conform, having to undergo redemptive rituals as well as to re-conform; because there were and are millions just like him; and because he represents the literary prototype member of mass society.^{100 101}

The natural progression from *Babbitt* (to post-*Babbitt*?) is the variegated pathology that comes of the tension between the longing for integrated individual autonomy and the need (both material and social) for conformity: it takes the form of alienation, undirected rebellion, or unconsciousness. For several decades, the pathology of mass society was explored in great detail in a large number of studies by

⁹⁹It is very easy to forget that Sinclair Lewis published the novel over *seventy years ago*, in 1922. Our introduction to *Babbitt* at the beginning of the text identifies the dramatic change that had occurred in socioeconomic organization: His name was George F. Babbitt. He was forty- six years old now, in April 1920, and he made nothing in particular, neither butter nor shoes

¹⁰⁰Nor poetry, but he was nimble in the calling of selling houses for more than people could afford to pay.

¹⁰¹It may be that John Updike's *Rabbit* (*Rabbit, Run*; *Rabbit Redux*; *Rabbit is Rich*; and *Rabbit at Rest*) is *Babbitt*'s successor — an updated *Babbitt*. *Babbitt*'s predicament was defined in part by the incipient modern era, which in the United States was ushered in by the hollow moral victory of the Great War (in the flush of which, as Harding articulated the popular longing for the "return to normalcy," the Prohibition movement succeeded in creating an entirely different "normalcy"). The development and subsequent exposure of Stalinism, the Depression, fascism, yet another World War, and the swift appearance of the Communist Spectre, all worked to undermine the hope of "normalcy," and even the capacity to envision it — the world had changed dramatically. *Babbitt*'s optimism was greater and his options fewer than *Rabbit*'s. Hence *Rabbit*, an updated *Babbitt* introduced to readers in 1960, flits from attempt to attempt at fulfilling one or another vague longing, submitting again and again to conformity and the abandonment of his unarticulated dreams. His moments of happiness are few, brief, and shallow.

social scientists; underlying all of them is the problem of alienation and anomie in advanced industrial society. And common to many of them is the complaint that, as we have developed the technological means to eliminate want, and thus finally to forge in reality the mythical Golden Age of peace, plenty, and genuine, productive freedom, we have also, in manifold ways, subverted our collective will and our ability to do so.

This argument was made explicitly and repeatedly from the 1940s through the 1960s; again and again in these studies, all sorts of wonderful aspects of modern society are enumerated, followed by some statement to the effect of, "and yet something is clearly wrong."¹⁰² Erich Fromm hypothesized in 1941 (and his work continued in the same vein for decades) that even as we gained, through post-Reformation, capitalist development, an unprecedented degree of freedom from external domination, including from that of nature, the same development served to impose a new set of restraints, systematically demanding (and even enforcing) conformity and dulling critical capacity by establishing points of reference that reduce individuals to "a cog in the vast economic machine... - always a cog to serve a purpose outside of (ourselves]" (1941:130). A great many studies followed, both from the Frankfurt School and elsewhere, exploring this theme from numerous different angles, some of them going through dozens of printings: Riesman's *The Lonely Crowd*, 1950; Mills' *White Collar*, 1951; Whyte's *The Organization Man*, 1956; Arendt's *The Human Condition*, 1958; Keniston's *The Uncommitted*, 1960; Boorstin's *The Image Or What Happened to the American Dream*, 1961; Kerr's *The Decline of Pleasure*, 1962; Josephson and Josephson's (eds.) *Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society* (a collection); Henry's *Culture Against Man*, 1963; and so on. However, such work seems to have tapered off dramatically (and, I think, hardly coincidentally) around the time of the "behavioralist revolution" - which brings us back to Inglehart's theory and to the question to which I have alluded in this discussion.

What is being measured in Inglehart's index? My hypothesis would be that his index measures (albeit very roughly, for, as I have shown, the index is exceedingly diffuse) interconnected and overlapping forms of responses to certain conditions of advanced industrial society. Respondents who assign high priority to the "postmaterialist" items are those who feel, to one degree or another, that the misdirection of industrial development has gone far enough, and that it is important not only to recover some of what has been sacrificed (such as clean and safe air, water, and power; meaningful work; and even community) but also to focus on attaining what has remained unfulfilled in the set of promises implied in technological development. As the industrial age developed and matured (accelerated by the rapid development and application of science, technology, media, and techniques of

¹⁰²These words ("something is clearly wrong") are from Keniston's *The Uncommitted* (1960: 370); but in one form or another they appear repeatedly in works such as those listed below. Indeed, such studies usually *begin* with this notion, always make reference to the abundance of contemporary society, and then attempt to discern and analyze the causes for disillusionment.

management and salesmanship), the promise of generalized affluence grew more credible, and so, too (especially after the New Deal, the Second World War, and the Marshall Plan), did the willingness, at least "temporarily," to make certain non-material sacrifices - to withhold social dissent, individuality, creativity, and personal development; to assume the colorations of the "other-directed" culture; to become the "organization man."¹⁰³

The promise of a truly general affluence was also a promise that materially-based distinctions between people or groups would be lessened; such conditions would foster greater equality and reduce the politics privation and of envy. Most important, *general* affluence implied that value and meaning in social life would no longer be defined materially; Hobbes' vision would yield to Mill's. The promise of generalized affluence was the promise of the Good Life, some of the principal features of which directly contradicted those of the required sacrifices. The promise included individual autonomy within a civilized and cooperative community of near-equals, dignity in labor, ample leisure, and the physical and mental health and wellbeing that would follow naturally from these. It therefore included greater democracy ("more say in government"); it included more humane and dignified work ("more say in the workplace"), and, as a corollary, a "less impersonal, more humane society;" and it included the freedom from having to concentrate on money and the freedom to think and talk about other things ("ideas more important than money" and, very loosely, "freedom of speech").^{104 105}

That these promises have gone unfulfilled highlights their rooting in the world of the material; from the perspective of industry, not only does the material base seem to be insufficient for the creation and perpetuation of this Good Life (e.g., it is too expensive to produce clean and safe energy), but worse, continued sacrifice is required (e.g., the Good Life will come later, if we all just work harder now), the delay of which only amplifies the perception of the burdensome nature of the sacrifice.¹⁰⁶ What Inglehart finds in his data to be "postmaterialist," then, may be nothing more than the impulse among many respondents to reject the illusory, shifting goalpost of capitalism's promise of the Good Life, in favor of regaining some of what has been lost or sacrificed - and ultimately in favor of forging a humanitarian compromise with the competitive tenets of capitalism. It does not, however, necessarily indicate an

¹⁰³In the United States at least, the post industrial era presented itself differently to women. While the social and economic role of women was explicitly important during the Second World War, the available channels of conformity narrowed dramatically during in the immediate postwar era.

¹⁰⁴Sally the Riveter was now expected to become a Stepford Wife. Even at the time, the contradiction could not have gone unnoticed.

¹⁰⁵The freedom of speech issue in this context is more poignant in the light of the Red Scare of the 1920s.

¹⁰⁶A related point is discussed in a review by W. Phillip Shively (1991), namely that the relative nature of the perception of scarcity, though acknowledged by Inglehart, is not accommodated in the theory and does not figure in the . analysis.

antimaterialist orientation (though certainly this exists), for, again, the world of the material is fundamental - and the socialist option, which demanded nearly identical sacrifices, progressively lost its allure during the course of the century.

In the light of this interpretation, then, what of the *materialist* items in Inglehart's index? These obviously represent facets of advanced industrialization's promise, and they, too, remain unfulfilled. The promised Good Life included generalized affluence, a stable economy, and little or no inflation, crime, or war - which covers all of the materialist items in Inglehart's index. In other words, the twelve items in his index are all of the same cloth - though obviously different parts of the cloth, because the data show "materialist" majorities and an intergenerational shift toward greater emphasis on "postmaterialist" values.

Why the shift? Inglehart's explanation is that younger cohorts, having enjoyed greater economic security than their elders, are less concerned about it; older people, scarred by the experiences of the Depression and the Second World War, remain acutely conscious of security. However, because his index is so closely tied to inflation; because crime rates have increased rapidly in the postwar era; because the possibility of nuclear annihilation for Americans and West Europeans did not exist before the Soviets developed nuclear weapons; and because it does not make sense to propose that younger cohorts either are unaware that their material circumstances are fundamental or are confident that they are secure, I find this explanation to lack plausibility.

The simple and obvious explanation that I propose is that the generational differences represent worldview differences, but which do not necessarily have as their object economic or physical security, or "materialism" or "postmaterialism."¹⁰⁷ Inglehart acknowledges that there are worldview differences between what he calls "materialists" and "postmaterialists," but he does not fully explore the structure of these differences because he believes that his explanation already does so. I agree with Inglehart that the cohort differences reflected in his data are due to their different experiences, and I agree that the Depression and the Second World War have had important socio-cultural consequences. Indeed, there is likely very little in my interpretation (in the foregoing and in the following) that Inglehart would reject outright, for much of the material for the argument appears in *Culture Shift*. Where we differ theoretically is, I believe, in our treatment of worldview.

I characterize Inglehart's treatment of worldview as a single-factor, material conception. But worldview extends far deeper than material security, interacting constantly with, and playing a crucial role in, how one interprets reality; on the other hand, it is singularly difficult, and perhaps impossible, actually to characterize "worldview" in any detail on a societal level. Nevertheless, it appears that Inglehart's data indicate, very roughly, broad changes in worldview.

¹⁰⁷Of course, "worldview" is not equivalent to culture or to political culture, although in this discussion it should be noted that there must be some overlap among these concepts.

My hypothesis is that cohort differences appear in Inglehart's data because, as the organization of society (and hence the texture of life) changes, so do the ways people both perceive and interpret society's problems, many of which are *new* problems, as well as how they conceptualize the solutions to those problems. During the first part of the twentieth century, the promise of plenty in exchange for sacrifice became increasingly explicit. The postwar era began not just with a quantum leap in affluence (amplified- in its effect by wartime privation and sacrifice) , but also with the explicit understanding that we have very nearly arrived: the Depression had been conquered along with fascism, and the new and forceful encouragement of consumptionism implied that full happiness was at hand. Of course it was not; the delay and the receding goal became increasingly obvious, and the consequences or side-effects of conscious and continuous sacrifice, along with the greater expectation of reward, *and* along with the multiplying stresses of living in advanced industrial society, became increasingly painful. The younger cohorts. were more conditioned than their elders by the new tenor of the promise, for they were raised to the tune of the most optimistic, and explicit, guarantees of happiness. From their perspective, then, without the conditioning of sacrifice (conscious, or forced by privation), the "happiness" was unreal and elusive. From the perspective of older cohorts, on the other hand, material conditions *had* improved tremendously, and hence their sacrifice had apparently paid off (or their forced privation had been rewarded). In other words, what is important psychologically is the meeting of expectations, a phenomenon that Inglehart considers fairly closely in a chapter entitled "Subjective Well-Being and Value Change:

Aspirations Adapt to Situations" (chapter 7). However, he does not address the question of the generation of expectations' being rooted in social and political discourse, which in turn has roots in objective reality.

More recently - say, in the post-1968 era - the promise of happiness based on enlistment as an "organization man" conformist has been far more widely viewed as unrealistic, and social and political discourse have changed accordingly, reflecting a growing skepticism of the material promise itself; in turn, a more modest conception of what is materially possible and even desirable is developing, and is complemented by a demand for greater humanization.

To oversimplify, then (in order to match the explanation to the index), older cohorts, guided by the successes of the recent past, *tend* believe that *if* the economy were kept growing and stable, *if* crime were fought vigorously, and *if* strong defense forces were maintained, then we could control or avert many of society's problems; things would take care of themselves (unfettered, the "guiding hand" could guide freely). Younger cohorts, on the other hand, tend increasingly to sense that many of society's problems are results of strains in democracy and the impersonalization and dehumanization of mass-scale, bureaucratized, ever-hierarchical, capitalist social organization, with too much misused autonomy at the top, and too little autonomy permitted in other strata. Because of the rapid and vast development of mass media, communications, information, and transportation, younger cohorts tend to have a

world-view geared more to a global scale than their elders (fragmented, naive, and kaleidoscopic though it may be). They have traveled to other countries more frequently, have used more products of other nations, and have adopted more foreign cultural conventions, mannerisms, and innovations. Because the nationalism and patriotism of earlier generations appear to have been too readily exploited for the conduct of wars, and because in the modern era, yesterday's despised enemy becomes so quickly, and so much more visibly, today's friend or ally, the provincial or solely nationalistic perspective has become suspect and inadequate; it raises too many questions and it discredits politics. Because scientific and technological innovations have made war far more devastating than it has ever been (and than could even have been imagined in the long eras of "heroic" warfare), and even potentially fatal to the species, the largest cohorts of Inglehart's study have grown up with the possibility and the threat of general nuclear annihilation. The annihilation threat itself, of course, has been framed entirely in terms of economics and politics - a fact not lost on many who would conclude that competition between modes of material organization ("capitalism" and "communism") is pure pathology. Worse, as older cohorts who were caught in this competitive cycle followed their own logic to a policy of "Mutual Assured Destruction" as the best means of preventing mutual destruction, younger cohorts, less bound to the starting point and the premises of that logical chain, were more likely to perceive it to be absurd, and its conclusion to be madness.

Younger cohorts, then, tend to believe that *if* society were more humane, *if* competition and money were less important, *if* politics were addressed more to what is important to people, rather than to what is important to states or to capitalism, and *if* people were permitted sufficient autonomy to foster their creative impulses and make them productive, and to pursue genuine happiness and contentment, then many of society's problems would resolve themselves; the economy would be more stable, community would reconstitute itself, and there would be less incentive for crime and war (if we were unfettered, the "guiding hand" would be humanized).

The point, of course, is that intergenerational experiences differ in non-material ways, which themselves also change over time, and which collectively have a far greater influence on attitudes, behavior, worldview, and general culture than does the degree of economic or physical security in childhood. Where Inglehart's implicit passage- of-time variable really represents economic development, mine assumes economic development, but really represents changes in political structure, changes in politics, changes in political discourse, and changes in expectations - some of which must be consequences of, and reactions to, disappointed expectations of economic development, but some of which must also be reactions to entirely new structural and organizational features of advanced industrial society in the twentieth century, and especially in its latter half.

Obviously, changes in politics during this century have been vast; there have been fascist and communist revolutions, world wars, global economic depression, the disintegration of European empires, the birth of superweapons and superpowers, and consequently the fundamental redefinition of geopolitics. There has been a mass-scale

expansion of suffrage, the success (and in the U.S. the subsequent diminishing) of unionization, a proliferation of political parties, a rapid expansion of the role of government, a vast expansion of bureaucracy - and consequently the expansion of access to political processes, the mushrooming of political participation, and the streaming into the political arena of a babel of popular concerns, which are more or less systematically filtered, translated, and organized into political discourse.

Although all of these are *related* in one way or another to economic development, they cannot be summed up *solely* in terms of economic development, which is essentially what Inglehart attempts to do in attributing intergenerational change to changes in the degree of prosperity characterizing the formative years of successive generations. Despite his occasional reminder that the shift toward "postmaterialism" is "only one aspect of a much broader syndrome of cultural change," explanation *in his model* is restricted to a single factor; his treatment of this "broader syndrome" is slim and spotty, and the single-factor materialist/postmaterialist interpretation is stretched well beyond its capacity. Explanation *in general* in his text does touch upon numerous other factors, but these are usually presented in such a way that they seem less important than the shift to postmaterialist orientations. For example, in his chapter on "Changing Religious Orientations, Gender Roles, and Sexual Norms" (chapter 6), in which is situated his most comprehensive treatment of a "broader syndrome," he offers a generalized explanation of changes in religious, social, and sexual norms in terms of changes that occurred in the shift to industrialization and advanced industrialization - not yet mentioning his thesis; but the discussion itself appears to be geared almost entirely toward bringing in the shift to postmaterialism as the principal factor anyway; and, indeed, the general discussion is followed by the correlation of these social changes with the rise postmaterialism. In the end, it is not clear at all what his "broader syndrome" actually represents. As he begins to wind down his argument, he writes:

The apparent decline of traditional religious and social norms tends to be linked with the shift from Materialist toward Postmaterialist values, and both processes seem to be components of a broad cultural change characterizing the transition from industrial to postindustrial society.

So far, so good; but he goes on:

The shift to Postmaterialism and the decline of traditional forms of religion tend to go together because they share a common cause: the unprecedented levels of personal security of contemporary advanced industrial society, which in turn can be traced to the postwar economic miracle and the rise of the welfare state.

It begins to appear that the "broader syndrome" may be absorbed by the shift to postmaterialism. He goes on:

Postmaterialism and secularization are two distinct phenomena, however, influenced by somewhat different causal factors (1990:205).

It may seem odd that in one sentence Inglehart says that "Postmaterialism and the decline of traditional forms of religion ... share a common cause," and in the next that "Postmaterialism and secularization are ... influenced by somewhat different causal factors." The problem is that he has not thought through the "broader syndrome" thesis, which actually poses a challenge to his postmaterialism thesis.

What he *means*, perhaps, in these apparently contradictory statements is that although these two phenomena do "share a common cause," the factors that *influence* their sway, their course, and their texture are different; but this requires a close reading and a certain amount of deduction (as well as the assumption that "secularization" and "the decline of traditional religious norms" are equivalent). The "broader syndrome," which he added to his materialist/postmaterialist discourse after many years, has not been developed or integrated into his model.

Indeed, the "broader syndrome" of which the shift toward postmaterialism is but one aspect actually goes a long way toward diminishing the meaning and even the credibility of the materialist/postmaterialist thesis.

Since it could not be integrated into his construct, it is rather appended, tacked on, and then lashed to the model *in terms of* correlations with postmaterialist orientations.

Its principal functional role in the model is that of a macrophage, absorbing conspicuous aspects of cultural change that are resistant to explanation based solely on material factors. It represents an informal residual category, but offers no explanation.

Despite the time, the intelligence, and the learning that Inglehart applied to *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, its greatest flaw is the lack of critical perspective, which appears to be the result of two complementary factors: the rise of the behavioralist, quantitative approach to political explanation, and the researcher's natural affection for and attachment to his thesis. The development of the behavioralist approach has led researchers to believe that actual values can be discerned in survey data; there is, of course *some* basis for this belief, but the process of interpretation is seriously undermined by the superimposition of a one-dimensional model onto the data as the reference for the data's meaning. That this is standard practice hardly justifies it - and nor does its derivation from the scientific method, for, as I mentioned earlier, this technique too easily has the rooster causing the sun to rise. Inglehart's *Culture Shift* nevertheless has plenty to offer:

Survey Portraits. The results of his aggregated Euro- Barometer survey data are endlessly fascinating, for in their sheer volume they do present a convincing set of rough national portraits. As long as we keep in mind that a portrait based on mass surveys is even more like a cubist portrait than a caricature, we can employ such data usefully in testing, bolstering, and even rejecting theories of social explanation.

Generational Shift. Although it would surprise no one to be told that generations differ from one another (after all, it was already a truism when ancient Greeks bemoaned the "generation gap"), it is interesting to find empirical confirmation (such

as it is) of general intergenerational attitudinal differences in the twentieth century, and very interesting to find a progressive and incremental, intergenerational shift. Because the shift is discerned and presented in terms of survey data, we know at minimum that it is a "survey shift;" from there we must decide to what degree it is a "discourse shift." And from there, in turn, we must decide: a) what the relationship is between discourse and values - for both are subject in part to (diffuse) social determination; b) what might be the causal roots of changes in discourse and changes in values; and c) what the relationship is between values and discourse on the one hand, and culture and political culture on the other.

Inglehart presents his work as a political culture study because he investigates cultural factors that affect politics. His sketchy treatment of the concept at the beginning of the text, and his apparent reluctance to employ the term *political* culture in the main body of the text, indicate that his primary intention clearly is not to contribute to the theoretical development of the concept.¹⁰⁸ He employs Almond and Verba's basic, original definition and endorses their conception of a "civic culture," but sensibly abstains from duplicating their attempt to elaborate an integration between culture and politics. For Inglehart, changes in general culture cause changes in politics, and changes in politics contribute to changes in general culture. However, because of its material basis, his interpretation assumes a onedimensional and linear conception of human relations with the world of the material, and fails to devote adequate attention to the relationship between discourse and material expectations, to the organizational agency of material conditions, and to power relations. Although not all of these are necessarily indispensable components of political cultural analysis, their importance becomes manifest in the attempt to link values with material conditions:

Inglehart's linkage, namely material and physical security, implies that people are rather simple beasts, reacting largely to the status of the food supply, and unlikely to develop visions of the future, or of the Good Life, or even to develop sets of expectations on the basis of the discourse to which they are exposed in the commingled worlds of politics, industrial and informational production, and public and private intercourse.

¹⁰⁸Recall that the first chapter of the text presents itself as something of an update and elaboration of Almond and Verba's 1963 thesis. The remainder of the text treats an essentially different subject.

CULTURE THEORY

In *Culture Theory* (1990), Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky's approach to political culture represents, in numerous ways, a significant departure from previous treatments. Although the originality itself of their model is striking, the authors are meticulous in their exposition of its very ordinary building blocks. The result is a model which, though apparently plain, is fecund in its generation of insights and of avenues for exploration.

Their model is difficult to describe simply and briefly, I believe for two reasons. The first is that its appearance of simplicity relies on the relative complexity of reality; the authors compel themselves in the course of their discussion to respond to innumerable questions or challenges that might arise - and these "responses" provide for the model both a great deal of its texture and a strong defense. The second is that their entry into the political culture discussion is not through the usual political science turnstile - into which must be deposited certain tokens, certain points of reference, certain conceptual declarations - but instead is through the less frequented and (for the political scientist) less encumbering doorway of anthropology. They do not, however, drag in with them a great deal of anthropological baggage; nor, once ensconced in the edifice of the political cultural discussion, do they insist on hovering close to the anthropology exhibits, or, for that matter, to any other field-specific constructions of culture.

At the outset, the authors explicitly eschew any definition of culture, and they make no attempt to "define" political culture, let alone to discuss it, until near the end of the book (in Part Three), after having laid out their model and illustrated the advantages it offers over traditional social science functionalist approaches.

Instead, at the start, they "hope to gain clarity by distinguishing three terms - cultural biases, social relations, and ways of life."

Cultural bias refers to shared values and beliefs. *Social relations* are defined as patterns of interpersonal relations. When we wish to designate a viable combination of social relations and cultural bias we speak of a *way of life* (1990:1; emphasis in original).

Social relations and cultural biases are inextricably linked, neither claiming causal priority; they "are reciprocal, interacting, and mutually reinforcing:"

Adherence to a certain pattern of social relationships generates a distinctive way of looking at the world; adherence to a certain worldview legitimizes a corresponding type of social relations (1990:1).

Each sustains the other, and each is used by the individual to support the other. By leaving "cultural bias" and "social relations" so lightly defined, they are free to come to their point, which is that "sociocultural viability" can be manifested in five and only five possible "ways of life" - i.e., there are only five *viable* combinations of social relations and cultural biases. The authors are quick to point out that, though this may at first appear to be too small a number of possibilities, functional explanations have hitherto typically offered only two "ways of life," and have thus attempted implausibly to explain sociocultural change in terms of a shift from traditional to modern, from mechanical to organic, from irrational to rational, and so on. (Indeed, a large section of the book (Part Two, pp. 103-212) is devoted to a critique of the evolution of functional approaches, from Montesquieu to Merton.) The model offered by Thompson *et al.* has a far greater capacity to account for sociocultural change than do previous functional models:

Introducing more than two modes of organizing social life makes social change both more difficult and more interesting to explain. If there are just two ways of life, being dislodged from one necessarily means landing in the other. Allowing for changes between five ways of life, we maintain, produces a more powerful and discriminating theory of change (1990:3).

The authors insist as well that in complex societies all five ways of life must be present - the "requisite variety condition" (1990:4) - though one or more of the five may figure so prominently in a nation that the presence of the others is muted.¹ To the oft-heard claim that each culture is unique, the authors respond that "although nations and neighborhoods, tribes and races, have their distinctive sets of values, beliefs, and habits, their basic convictions about life are reducible to only a few cultural biases" (1990:5).

To construct their five ways of life, Thompson *et al.* employ Mary Douglas's "grid-group typology."

Group refers to the extent to which an individual is incorporated into bounded units. The greater the incorporation, the more individual choice is subject to group determination. *Grid* denotes the degree to which an individual's life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions.

The more binding and extensive the scope of the prescriptions, the less of life that is open to individual negotiation (1990:5; emphasis in original).

The five ideal-typical ways of life that can be formulated by dichotomizing (again, ideal-typically) the grid and group dimensions are as follows:¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹They also allow that any number of these ways of life, even all five of them, may coexist in an individual. For example, different ways of life may apply to different realms of a person's life, such as work, family, friendship, public policy, etc. Further, they allow the simple holding of contradictory

-
- low grid, low group: individualist way of life
 - high grid, high group: hierarchical way of life
 - high grid, low group: fatalistic way of life
 - low grid, high group: egalitarian way of life
 - avoidance of both grid and group: hermit way of life

Inextricable from each of these ways of life is a corresponding "myth of nature." The five ways of life represent the ways in which people organize their worldview, their approach to life, and their management (or reconciliation) of needs and resources; the viability of each of these ways of life depends on their adherents' conceptions of physical and human nature. The myth of nature to which one adheres (given, of course, certain social conditions) necessarily plays a vital role in determining the way of life to which one will adhere as a strategy both for achieving consonance between one's worldview and one's conduct in life, and for surviving - for "making ends meet," which, as the authors point out, is one of the most important factors determining social organization (1990, chapter 2). The authors thus describe five basic myths of nature, rooted in an ecological perspective, each with its concomitant nature-management institutional ideology, and each with a prototypical illustration of its concomitant way-of-life adherent (1990:25-33). Myths of nature and ways of life meet here on two axes: the degree to which resources can be managed, and the degree to which needs can be managed; again, in the authors' presentation of the model, each axis is treated ideal-typically, considering thus four polar points, rather than continuous dimensions on two axes. The fundamental goal of needs-and-resources management is to prevent one's resource supply from dipping below one's needs, but the model allows that needs and resources can, theoretically, be managed upward or downward. Finally, since each way of life is to a large degree a rational response to belief in a particular myth of nature, each way of life appears to be irrational to each of the others; i.e., each way of life is to some extent the *only* rational response to its corresponding myth of nature.

Nature Benign is the myth in which nature is extremely forgiving and remains in, or returns to, a state of equilibrium no matter what is wrought upon it by human activity; in this case, a laissez-faire attitude is the natural one for managing institutions to take toward nature-management, and those who embrace it are adherents of the *individualist* way of life. Because the natural supply of resources is virtually unlimited, individualists strive to develop the skills and interactions within society that will maximize both their needs and their resources.

Nature Ephemeral is the opposite of *Nature Benign*; here nature is extremely unforgiving and fragile, and "the least jolt may trigger its complete collapse;" in this case, the nature-management attitude is one of extreme caution, and the way of life that goes with it is the *egalitarian*.

views (which itself represents an advance in cultural theory), though they state that "most individuals find themselves inhabiting one way of life more than the others" (1990: 265-267; quote on 267).

Egalitarians advocate the minimizing of needs, and consider the behavior of people or groups who do not do so to be irrational; since resources are limited, their distribution is zero-sum, and so there should be an equal, if modest, share for each person.

Nature Perverse/Tolerant is somewhere between the first two. Nature is capable of absorbing a great deal, but is vulnerable to larger shocks; this myth is embraced by *hierarchists*, and the nature-management attitude must be one of regulating "against unusual occurrences." For the hierarchist, needs cannot be managed up or down by the individual within the hierarchy; at the collective level, however, the maximization of resources in order to keep supply from falling below needs is obtained by careful regulation and organization, both of resources and of people - and, indeed, of needs as well, for in a complex hierarchy, needs and resources can be prescribed in matched sets to the various groups that comprise it; to groups high in the hierarchy, for example, both a high degree of needs and a large allocation of resources may be "assigned." Justice is presumably achieved in a hierarchy in part because each level within it comprises a community of equals; moreover, in many hierarchies there is the possibility of mobility from one level to another.

Nature Capricious "is a random world. Institutions with this view of nature do not really manage or learn:

They just cope with erratic events." This is the myth of the *fatalist*, for whom "the rational response [to capricious nature] is to keep your fingers crossed and hope that Lady Luck smiles on you - *survive by coping*" (1990:43; emphasis in original). The fatalist has control over neither needs nor resources, but merely hopes that the supply of the latter will not fall beneath the level of the former.

Nature Resilient represents a view in which nature is ever-changing, and thus accommodates, or includes, each of the other four myths of nature; unlike the other myths, each of which must see all the others as irrational, this one gauges the rationality of each according to current conditions of nature. This is the myth embraced by the *hermit* way of life, and can be embraced only because the hermit, who rejects social participation (the hermit neither coerces, nor will be coerced), has withdrawn from society, and does not embrace any one of the conventional, socially constructed views of nature or ways of life. The hermit views both his needs and his resources as manageable upward or downward, but since his principal aim (for whatever reason) is the avoidance of society and social coercion, his needs/resources management is incidental, as long as the latter meets or exceeds the former.

Thompson et al. illustrate convincingly that, despite the need for all five ways of life to exist within a society, and despite the possibility that more than one way of life may be compartmentalized within an individual, the ways of life are, to a high degree, mutually exclusive; for a rational individual, there is only one viable way of life available to correspond to each myth of nature. Again, the authors argue that five is an adequate number of "ways of life" to describe the human sociopolitical experience insofar as it may be considered from the perspective of views of nature and management styles of needs and resources; and they argue that these five are the only

viable ways of life, the only ones that are sustainable in the long term, that can be reproduced indefinitely.

The myth of nature that one embraces is based in part on experience, and in part on social learning; similarly, the way of life to which one adheres as a means of reconciling one's view of nature to one's management of needs and resources is derived from both experience and social learning. "Preferences," then - i.e., what people want, given the array of possible wants - are integrally related to the way of life to which one adheres, and they too are contingent on experience and social learning.

People, we are suggesting, get their preferences from their involvement with others.

Social relations are the great teachers of human life. They provide us with our conceptions of what is desirable, beautiful, horrible, normal, outlandish (1990:56).

The authors imply, too, that the gap between macro- and microanalysis can to some extent be bridged by their treatment of preferences in their theory of sociocultural viability, for "preferences are never just randomly assembled; they are patterned, both within and between individuals." An analytical focus on individual personality renders analysis "too chaotic," while a focus on the larger aggregates "such as societies, tribes, or classes," leaves observable variety unexplained (1990:57).

Preferences are "derived" from ways of life in two analytically distinct senses. First, by putting preferences and ways of life in a means-end reasoning chain, individuals can deduce their preferences from their way of life....

Second, preferences emerge as unintended consequences of attempting to organize social life in a particular way. In choosing how to relate to others, people unwittingly commit themselves to a number of other choices (1990:57).

In other words, preferences are, in a sense, the result of schematic biases which serve as both filter and touchstone for experience and information.

Thompson et al. address cultural change in several dimensions. First, of course, there must be some accounting for the *reasons* for change, and this they address largely at the individual level. Briefly, an individual is likely to shift from one way of life to another when the expectations inherent in a way of life or myth of nature are not met. If unmet expectations generate sufficient "surprise," and if a sufficient number or degree of surprises present themselves, then the individual is compelled to reevaluate his or her biases. Because all five ways of life exist naturally in all societies, the searching individual will always be able to find and adopt another way of life that promises to reduce the likelihood of surprise.

The authors also consider change at the collective level. Here, the theoretical advantages of a model with five symmetrical elements over an asymmetrical

dichotomy become manifest. Whether or not a society or groups within it are moving away from "tradition" toward "modernity," individuals have, according to the model of Thompson et al., four different ways of life from which to choose if they have become disillusioned with the one they have been living. The authors offer examples of twelve different kinds of change (they exclude the hermit way of life in this section, as it represents withdrawal from society, and therefore tends to be unimportant at the collective level), which represent each of the possible permutations of shifting from one of the four principal ways of life to another. Their point in this exercise (aside from providing powerful, plausible examples) is both that, at the collective level, the number of possible combinations of individual shifts that will determine the distribution of the ways of life within a society is virtually infinite, and that the broader array of choices inherent in a five-element typology is far more faithful to reality than, say, the nebulous shift from "traditional" to "modern." Moreover, individual shifts from one way of life to another can proceed constantly within a society, at virtually any pace, with either minor or major transformations occurring at the collective level.¹¹⁰

Two additional points are crucial to the model proposed by Thompson et al. One is that "change is essential to the stability of a way of life;" more broadly, "change is essential to the maintenance of cultural patterns" (1990:80; see also p. 22). However, the authors are not clear in their explanation of why this is so. They do mention that "novel situations" occur in which change is indicated for the maintenance of "familiar pattern[s] of social relations" (1990:22), and explain (unclearly) that a part of the mechanism of adaptation of ways of life mandates that some adherents of a way of life be, as it were, knocked into other ways of life.¹¹¹ The authors' emphasis on the *need* for change seems thus to be rooted more in the empirically discernible fact that societies are seldom static than in any genuine theoretical exigency.

Secondly, at the level of the "system" itself, all five ways of life not only are necessary, but also they complement one another, and this in two ways. Each way of life uses the others to help to define itself (as well as to define rationality and irrationality). But also, implicit alliances form and re-form among the different ways of life, helping to provide the dynamic stability of change (a "permanent dynamic imbalance"). For example, individualists depend on the hierarchical way of life inherent in law enforcement and judicial procedure for order, safety, and the maintenance of private property; egalitarians depend to some degree on fatalists, if only for the latter's not being hierarchists or individualists. More to the point is that each way of life, to varying degrees of explicitness, is in competition with the others for adherents. When the competition is explicit, as, for example, in the political struggles among egalitarians who seek redistribution of resources, individualists who

¹¹⁰In other words, for example, a thousand hierarchists may for whatever reasons become fatalists, but if simultaneously a thousand fatalists become hierarchists, then there is no net change at the collective level.

¹¹¹In both instances, they cite Eckstein, 1988, whose theoretical sketch I have already addressed.

seek freedom to exploit the potential of natural resources, and hierarchists who seek to develop and fortify expert regulation, each group is able to make use of the others in order to develop its own rhetorical struggle to identify itself as the only rational one.

As I mentioned at the outset, the illustrative detail that Thompson et *al.* provide to flesh out their model goes a long way toward bolstering its plausibility. Still, even without the benefit of having its supporting examples and digressions recounted here, the skeleton itself of their model will evoke in readers sufficient recognition of these "ways of life" to provide some semblance of empirical validity to complement its apparent logical validity. For instance, most of us can easily muster from our own acquaintances examples of each of the types of person who adheres to a particular way of life and its concomitant myth of nature. Moreover, the notion that preferences are both patterned (in the sense that they form, to some degree, sets of preferences) and are derived of one's experiences with one's fellows has both an empirical and an intuitive ring to it.

Political Culture

Having completed their discussion of their model, and having, in Part Two of the text, compared it with earlier functionalist treatments of society and culture, the authors are now prepared, in Part Three, to discuss "political culture" - and not only do the reasons for the delay now become clearer, but so also does the purpose of their model. Thompson et *al.* run briefly through the principal criticisms of political culture theory, accurately finding some of them to "miss the mark" and others to be right on target. In their discussion, however, the authors introduce three general, though essential, points that have often been ignored in both political cultural studies and criticism, and then show how their own model is designed to address these issues.

Boundaries of the political. The first point, though to some students an obvious one, introduces a remarkably potent question into the political culture discussion - remarkable largely, perhaps, for its poor representation thus far in the debate.¹¹²

What, we begin by asking, does the "political" in political culture refer to? Defining political culture as the pattern of orientation to political action or objects sidesteps the question of what is to count as political (1990:216).

The authors point out that although many students of society and politics have considered, on reasonable grounds, *everything* ultimately to be political, if only because "everything" is ultimately subject to the dynamics of power relations, political culturists, on the other hand, have specifically "attempted to define political culture as orientations toward government (as opposed to, say, the economy, religion, or the family)" (1990:216).

As these competing definitions of the "political" attest, the

¹¹²This aspect of the problem was touched upon by Edward Lehman (1972:364-365).

boundary between political and nonpolitical is not graven in stone, inherent in the nature of things. *Definitions of what is political are themselves culturally biased.* When one person accuses another of "politicizing" a subject, the disagreement is about how far the governmental writ should run. *Constructing the boundary between political and nonpolitical is thus a part of the struggle between competing ways of life.* Rather than join in a debate about what is "really" political, we prefer to show how different culturally biased definitions of the political support different ways of life (1990:216; my emphasis).

Of course, the issue of the shifting boundaries between the political and the nonpolitical has nagged at political culturists and their critics alike during the past thirty years, and the contribution of Thompson et al. is all the more significant for their not just identifying the problem, but actually offering an analytically elegant, if incomplete, solution to it as well. They provide a summary of how the ideal adherent of each way of life views the distinction between the political and the nonpolitical: the egalitarian seeks to reduce the distinction; the individualist seeks the opposite; the fatalists, fearing both, ignore the distinction; and the hierarchists want a well-defined boundary, though they tend to "harbor an expansive view of state functions" (1990:216-217).

Running through these four ways of life shows that the type of behavior or institution that is deemed political, or whether a boundary is even drawn at all, is itself a product of political culture. This suggests that the study of *political* culture (as distinct from culture generally) should pay special attention to the ways in which the boundary between political and nonpolitical is socially negotiated.... If... the boundaries between the political and nonpolitical are socially constructed, then the study of political culture must assume a central place in the discipline (1990:217; emphasis in original).

I will return shortly to the question of the theoretical import of the authors' treatment of this issue.

Culture as "uncaused cause". The second point that the authors make is that political culture theory has suffered credibility problems not because the theory itself is inherently flawed, but rather because its application by researchers has been faulty. For example, political culturists have typically treated culture (and hence political culture) as an unchanging entity, as an independent force of some sort, as a *deus ex machina*, or as "residual variable" to "explain" what cannot otherwise be explained. Researchers have also treated culture as a nearly immutable superstructure into which all members of a society are inducted, a process which begins at birth. Thompson et al. insist, however, that the concept itself of political culture is valid, defensible, and plausible - but that in order to be useful and realistic, it must be viewed as the dynamic, fluid, and complex phenomenon that it is, and it must be rooted in reality. They note that a frequent criticism of "the political culture literature is that it takes

values as a given" and that it ignores the structural features of social and political life that generate, support, and transform values. Citing their chapter on preference formation (outlined above), they insist that their own model is designed both to address and to account for the dynamic interaction between structure and values. Reliance on elements of childhood socialization, long the norm in political culture research, is simply inadequate, for adult experience is important "in shaping individual orientations. Experience with institutions counts." In sum:

Political culture is transmitted from generation to generation, but it is not transmitted unchanged, nor is it transmitted without question or by chance. Cultural transmission is absolutely not a game of pass-the-parcel or musical chairs. It is a lively and responsive thing that is continually being negotiated by individuals. A plausible theory of political culture must not turn the individual into an automaton, passively receiving and internalizing political norms (1990:218).

Critique of "national" culture. The third point that the authors make, one better represented in the body of criticism than the first two, is that political culture studies have tended to treat societies as homogeneous or uniform, if only for their tendency to treat political culture as a phenomenon manifested at the national level.

They attribute this in part to the roots of political culture study in national character studies, and also in part to the social science quest for national *comparisons* - in which social scientists could study a national culture systematically for its (presumably functional) similarities with others, rather than to remain resigned to the appearance of national uniqueness.

Although political scientists contributed to making political cultures comparable, the analytic focus largely remained, as in past works on national character, at the level of the nationstate. Differences between nations, rather than differences within nations, remained the central focus of inquiry. Conflict within nations remained largely unexplained, if not inexplicable.¹¹³

The tendency to attach culture to nations persists despite strong evidence suggesting that variation in political attitudes and values within countries are often greater than those between countries (1990:219).

Obviously, the ways-of-life model, in insisting on "requisite variety" and "sociocultural viability," and in directing attention to the dynamic interaction between people's expectations and the reality against which their expectations can be gauged, offers a coherent means of exploring intranational variations and conflict.

¹¹³However, Almond and Verba's work (1963) did establish the common usage in political culture studies of the concept of "subcultures" within nations (to which the "ways of life" bear only marginal resemblance), as well of the more nebulous expressions, "fragmented political cultures" and "political culture of fragmentation," which were designed to "explain" conflict within nations.

Function

Thompson et al. round out their presentation by devoting several chapters to applying their model to earlier political culture studies,¹¹⁴ and show convincingly that analysis and explanation are made fuller and more plausible when their five ways of life are considered, rather than, say, only two or three. Their concluding chapter, a very coherent and yet relatively brief defense, critique, addendum, apology, elaboration, summary, and unifying account of the model, crowns the text very nicely, and itself concludes with a statement of what would undermine their theory empirically:

Most damaging would be a demonstration that values are little constrained by institutional relationships. If the same cultural biases thrived in dissimilar social contexts or, conversely, if dissimilar biases existed in similar social contexts, then our faith in cultural theory would be greatly weakened (1990:273) .

Here is where the empirical difficulties reveal themselves most clearly. Because it is difficult to measure "values" and "institutional relationships" or "social contexts," a sound, empirical application and test of the theory would be vulnerable to some of the same pitfalls as many previous theories. Moreover, as with the latter, attempting to operationalize such models threatens to turn hitherto unobtrusive theoretical lacunae into unbridgeable canyons. Nevertheless, the model I will develop in later chapters¹¹⁵ may, to some degree, serve in some ways to test the model of Thompson et al.; the two have several nodes of close compatibility, and may ultimately serve to modify one another.

The model that Thompson et al. propose is coherent and logical, and it has the tremendous advantage of addressing directly some of the crucial aspects of culture theory that many of their predecessors ignored, distorted, misunderstood, or furtively swept under the rug. The relative comprehensiveness of their model serves to reduce the number of areas subject to idiosyncratic or even groundless interpretations, but at the same time it helps to highlight the weakest bases of cultural theories, the most important of which are the integration of individual psychology into the theory, and the issue of what, precisely, is being explained.

¹¹⁴Specifically, Banfield's *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (1958), Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* (1963), and Pye's *The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures* (1988). They also devote a chapter to outlining Daniel Elazar's model for studying American political culture, along with research studies conducted by himself and by others applying his model. As his model contains significant parallels with their own (for which he earns great praise from Thompson et al.), they present it as a "competing model" with which readers are invited to compare.

¹¹⁵Although they note the effectiveness of his three categories, the authors themselves believe, with justification, that these studies would be enriched by the substitution of their own categories, which are more fully integrated in a *system* than Elazar's.

Perhaps the most intractable element of cultural theory is the ambiguous role of individual psychology. Because culture itself cannot be described (let alone explained, a point which I will address shortly) without some reference (implicit or explicit) to individual psychology, and because culture theory is designed to some degree to *explain* individual psychology, there may be an appearance of circularity in cultural theories which specifically address psychology, especially if its role is fundamental. The problem, really, is that the two are inextricably linked, they do affect one another, and they can be separated only analytically - which Thompson *et al.* recognize.¹¹⁶ Even if we attempt coherently to treat them separately, however, the problem remains that they are not particularly amenable to "measurement." Certainly, the discussion in the course of the text provides a convincing (if not conclusive, as the authors acknowledge) explanatory argument for the interaction of cultural biases and social relations.

However, if we stipulate this layer of the argument, and then strip it away to reveal the next layer down in the etiological onion, we are confronted with the usual gaps in our attempt to establish the relationship between individual (psychology) and collective (culture?) - even if we direct our principal focus, as do Thompson *et al.*, to the subcollectives that comprise "ways of life."

Explanatory value

The question of what Thompson *et al.* have *designed* their theory to explain is distinct from that of what their theory might *actually* explain - and both questions are eventually confounded by judgments concerning the nature of the empirical evidence required to substantiate any explanation. The authors' intentions are diverse and sometimes far-reaching, but they remind their readers constantly that they are merely proposing a fine theory, implying in turn that there is nothing absolute in their discussion. They wish to "explore" subjective orientations to what goes on in people's lives; they wish to "rehabilitate" functionalism by applying functional explanation to groups rather than to entire societies and by defining those groups in terms of five ways of life rather than two or three; they wish thus also to provide a "more powerful and discriminating" theory of change; accordingly, they wish also to present us with a more dynamic model of socialization and of the shaping and re-shaping of culture - a model which posits plausible mechanisms that comprise a macro-micro linkage between individual and community. In my estimation, Thompson *et al.* are sufficiently

¹¹⁶They just graze this issue, in terms of the chicken-egg aspect of the culture-institution nexus. I mentioned at the start of this section that the authors consider social relations (i.e., institutions) and cultural biases to be "reciprocal, interacting, and mutually reinforcing," to which they add: "As in the case of the chicken and the egg, it is sufficient to show that cultural biases and social relations are responsible for one another, without confronting the issue of which came first" (1990: 1). The implicit reference to individual psychology here lies both in cultural biases, the seat of which *is* individual psychology, and in social relations, which are conducted in the medium of individual psychology. In other words, psychology, the quintessential "black box" into which we cannot see, is an integral part of any system in which human beings interact.

successful in these goals that their work in *Culture Theory* represents a quantum leap in the development of political cultural theory. Yet, as they note in their final chapter, "even our most sympathetic readers may feel we have raised as many questions as we have answered" (1990:261). It is notable, too, that their discussion itself is so fecund that sorting these questions out of the authors' finely wrought conceptual mesh of interconnected ideas and illustrations is itself difficult.

In its current stage of development, which can be characterized in part by the lack of empirical data supporting it, the model can be viewed more as an adjustable descriptive template than as an explanatory model. That is, the five-ways-of-life template can, figuratively speaking, be superimposed onto a society and adjusted such that the ways of life are rendered in proportions approximating what the researcher believes, on the basis either of educated guesswork or of empirical research, to represent the proportions inhering in that society. But even if this effort yields a satisfactory superimposition - one in which nodes of the template and of reality align nicely - we are obligated at this interim point to apply the fundamental social science theory touchstone, namely the question, "So what?" In partial answer to that question, the ways-of-life model suggests at least two general avenues of inquiry:

1) change, and 2) the boundaries of politics.

The model's treatment of change is revealed to favor the past's influence on the present over the present's on the future.¹¹⁷ Not that this is not valuable (on the contrary, it is vital to fruitful political cultural inquiry), but it informs us both that the predictive powers of the model are minimal, and that, if the model is to be employed as a dynamic one, it demands the incorporation of historical research as well; to put it plainly, we can call it a rear-view model. Attempting to squint into the future through the descriptive template shows us only that the distribution of ways-of-life-adherents in a given society *can* change, and that, if it does, redistribution may take any route consonant with mathematical possibility. On the other hand, to view the model less rigidly and more fairly, Thompson et al. hope that by pointing toward the roots of culture and culture change, we may be better equipped to dig them up.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷Two of the authors, Ellis and Wildavsky, have employed the model in historical analysis of presidential "greatness" in the United States. They focus on early presidents "in part because the passions of yesteryear have cooled sufficiently so that these presidencies are more likely to be treated dispassionately," which reduces the likelihood of disagreements among historical analysts over policy issues (1991: 18). The premise of their study is that presidents achieve "greatness" when they are able to resolve "cultural dilemmas" — conflicts between competing ways of life. As far as "testing" the model is concerned, this study seems to confirm that it is nicely suited to historical research, but also draws our attention to the importance within the model of *competition* among ways of life; this, in turn, highlights the fact that politics itself is largely conflict and competition, an issue to which I will return shortly.

¹¹⁸Placement of the shovel in such digging exercises is, of course, important to the results. Welch argues that in the authors' re-analysis of Elazar's treatment of American political culture, which is historically contingent, their own formalism drives Thompson et al. into an ahistorical account (1993: 145-146). The model does drive itself.

Yet another element in the question of change presents itself, however. As I indicated earlier in my discussion of Eckstein's theoretical treatment, we have both analytically to separate political change and cultural change, and somehow to contend with the fact that they are intimately entangled. The model of Thompson et al. largely addresses cultural change, only acknowledging the related political change indirectly, in terms of the struggle among competing ways of life, and in terms of individuals' grappling with "surprise" or unmet expectations. In short, for Thompson et al., culture is center stage, leaving for politics a lesser role.

As for the boundaries of politics, the authors rightly and usefully draw our attention to cultural etiology in the forging of (and conflicts concerning) what is considered legitimately to be subject to political debate or a governmental role - i.e., what aspects of life comprise political objects. But how useful is it, in the end, to say that individualists believe thus, and hierarchists believe such, if in reality the complexity of politics extends its substance well beyond the bounds established by five ways of life - or, for that matter, if several of the five ways of life can be bundled together in large groupings of a population? Or if the ways-of-life distribution in a population would appear to take on different configurations for different issues? The cultural issues that have threatened constantly to dominate American politics since the end of the 1980s (though rooted in the 1960s) provide an illustration: where do issues surrounding race, foetuses, sex, sexuality, and the like fit into the five-ways-of-life scheme? Are feminists egalitarians, or are they individualists? Are those opposed to legal abortion hierarchists, individualists, or egalitarians? Are those favoring legal abortion individualists, or egalitarians?

How shall we classify those for and those against the admittance of women into combat or gays into the military?

These sorts of issues would be difficult to explain in any political culture theory, but here they draw attention to the twin bases of the ways-of-life model: the foundation of ways-of-life mechanics is Douglas's grid-group typology, but the foundation of the substance of these ways of life, which is defined by the myths of nature, is strictly material - and thus the dynamics of the model are limited in scope. Once we determine a subculture's grid-group configuration, we are able, with this model, only to direct our analysis to materially-based attitudes, values, and behaviors. Obviously, the bulk of what goes on in politics is rooted in material issues and the tradition of material analyses of politics can hardly be said to be misguided.

But, equally obviously, politics is also directed to realms of social life other than the material - and certainly there is more to political culture than material perspectives (from the list I presented above, the issues of racial and sexual equality certainly have material roots, but they have other roots as well). Here, then, is the fundamental weakness in the ways-of-life model. As I mentioned at the start of this chapter, the authors delay any attempt to define *political culture* until near the end of their text; and as I indicated thereafter, in recounting their discussion of what is "political" in "political culture," they explicitly divert the question:

Constructing the boundary between political and nonpolitical is ...

part of the struggle between competing ways of life. Rather than join in a debate about what is "really" political, we prefer to show how different culturally biased definitions of the political support different ways of life (1990:216) .

Again, this approach comprises an important innovation to political culture theory, and promises to be extremely useful as theory develops. However, in the scheme of the model, what is "political" in "political culture" has, to some degree, already been defined by the material characterization of the five ways of life. In other words, they have implicitly defined "political" in material terms, via the myths of nature, and so their model offers us a theoretical framework for investigating a vital dimension of political culture, but not political culture *per se*.

In the end, what is lacking in the ways-of-life model is the means to explore the effects of power relations in a community, or a society, or a political system. When the adherent of a particular way of life is "surprised" by unmet expectations, are there no other bases for his or her expectations than what other such adherents believe? It seems rather as though numerous structural-institutional features of government and political processes themselves must have some effect on what people believe and what they expect. In much the same vein, consider the plight of the adherent of one way of life who lives in a society composed almost entirely of adherents of another way of life - say, a hierarchist type in a society structured by egalitarians. Would not this hierarchist's *expectations* be structured less by his or her way of life than by the way the political system actually functions? Of course, this scenario would comprise something of an "exception" to the authors' schema, but my point is that there are bound to be a great number of such exceptions.¹¹⁹

The model proposed by Thompson *et al.* is rich in internal coherence, and presents a powerful aesthetic allure. But it may be that the price of its internal coherence is external coherence: even though the model addresses *more* of reality than previous models, it cannot address *enough* of reality to "explain" it. Theirs is a five-fingered glove squeezed onto a six-fingered hand. The five ways of life, as the five fingers on a normal hand, can be named *because they have names*, and they have names because they are common, visible, and "normal" almost to the point of universality. What is the name of the "extra" finger on a six-fingered hand? It probably does not have one, but the phenomenon itself has a name: polydactyly.

Similarly, the various phenomena of "non-normal" politics - within the reference frame of the model, principally politics characterized by active conflict - have names: war; revolution? occupation; terrorism; state violence and repression; praetorianism; anarchy; and so on. To this list of collective phenomena we can add elements the principal manifestations of which present themselves at the individual ¹²⁰

¹¹⁹The "Communist Studies" school of political culture has shown itself sometimes to be particularly vulnerable to this confusing aspect of perception and motivation. One of the recurring intractable issues is that of what effects obtain from the pre-communist political cultures.

¹²⁰Which little useful data exist. In some studies, however, scholars make the error of assuming that any

level, but which easily assume collective dimensions: alienation; anomie; cynicism; corruption; fear; even anger and despair at unresponsive or destructive regimes.

Thompson et al. by no means pretend that "non-normal" or conflictual political processes do not exist. An integral component of their model is that the ways of life are in competition with one another; at first glance, this may seem to accommodate political conflict; and phenomena such as war, repression, or other applications of power can perhaps be understood as a logical extension of competition. But "competition" in their model is manifest only in two distinct forms: 1) the *abstract* "competition" among ways of life themselves for adherents, which cannot amount to anything more than the passive existence of the ways of life, in which case the ways of life themselves exist solely as choices; and 2) the *active* competition among the adherents of ways of life to recruit converts to their own way. If we were to extend our understanding of this active form of competition such that it included efforts to influence policy (i.e., efforts on the part of adherents ultimately to *impose* their way-of-life on others), our ¹²¹ analysis would still have to reach outside of the model in order to account for the application of, and the competition for power - *and* for the structural features and constraints of power.

Hence their model not only fails to provide a means to analyze power, but also tends to avert its gaze from power, as though implying that if culture is the object of study, then power is not relevant. The net effect, then, to stretch the metaphor, is that of squeezing the sixth finger in *with* any one of the normal fingers in the five-fingered glove. To exaggerate only slightly, hierarchists who respond happily to power exerted from above do so, in the ways-of-life model, not necessarily because they are responding to incentives and constraints built into the system, but rather because their materially-based way-of-life perspective predisposes them to depend on expert administration and structured inequality. To exaggerate again, egalitarians who become revolutionaries bent on killing off a decadent and parasitic aristocracy are, in this model, more concerned with ensuring the uniform distribution of a finite supply of resources than with dismantling a structure of power relations that has virtually enslaved them, circumscribed markedly their range of basic choices, *and also* kept them hungry.

Perhaps a more important question, in the larger view of the study of politics and of political culture, is that of whether or not there is really any such thing as "normal politics." It makes little sense that the phenomena that comprise the most prominent features of history - war, revolution, mass alienation, etc. which are often

political cultural trait that does not conform to the official vision of the "new socialist man" is rooted in past political culture. The debates surrounding this issue are well illustrated in the contributions to *Political Culture and Communist Studies* (Archie Brown (ed.) 1984), especially in the chapters by Brown and by Mary McAuley.

¹²¹ Analysis would be difficult, for competition among adherents must be highly variable, depending as it does not only on context (time, place, distribution of ways-of-life, political environment), but also on way of life itself; hermits and fatalists, presumably, do not actively seek to convert others, while egalitarians, individualists, and hierarchists may at times compete quite actively and vigorously.

treated as "non-normal," while the absence of intense conflict or political pathology is treated as "normal."¹²² And, of course, it makes no sense to exclude systematically such phenomena from political cultural analysis; indeed, if there were no conflict, neither politics nor political culture would be much studied. (I shall consider this issue further in later chapters).

In sum, although powerful, sophisticated, and elegant, the model proposed by Thompson et al. is not complete; it omits too much of what goes on in the world of politics to provide satisfying explanations of the forming and reforming of political cultures. And although their discussion does help, as they intended, to "rehabilitate" functional explanation, it does not succeed entirely. Their formulation of a manageable set of social categories based upon a single set of dimensions (rather than cobbled together asymmetrically as an *ad hoc* set of vaguely related dimensions) has shown that "five and only five" categories can go a long way indeed toward coherent explanation; but it has shown, too, that *satisfactory* explanation demands a greater theoretical animation of the social categories themselves, and hence greater detail concerning the dynamics of society and politics. In this model, however, the problem of detail is confounded by the necessarily general nature of the categories. Inevitably, they are illustrative ideal-typical categories which are appealing intuitively, but for which, in attempting to match them up with reality, we are unable to locate any firm boundaries. The confusion of overlap among the categories remains, despite the authors' reassurances that most people inhabit one of the five ways of life most of the time; and the rise of "issue politics," on a global scale, amplifies this problem, despite the authors' insistence that ways of life themselves define the boundaries of the political.

¹²²Of course, from a normative perspective, our apparently unconscious consensus on what is "normal politics" makes sense. From the standpoint of wishful thinking, our ideals of civic society exclude unmanaged, or potentially violent, or even wasteful conflict completely — and, indeed, for many students of politics the principal motivating factor of conducting research is the hope of discovering humane means to end or avoid conflict.

REFERENCES

- Abramowitz, Alan I. "The United States: Political Culture under Stress," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), pp. 177-211.
- Almond, Gabriel A. "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics* 18, 3 (August 1956): 391-409.
- Almond, Gabriel A. "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," *American Political Science Review* 52, 1 (March 1958): 270-282.
- Almond, Gabriel A. "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), pp. 1-36.
- Almond, Gabriel A. "Communism and Political Culture Theory", *Comparative Politics* 15, 2 (January 1983): 127-138.
- Almond, Gabriel A. "The Study of Political Culture," in Gabriel A. Almond, *A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 138-156.
- Almond, Gabriel A., and James S. Coleman (eds.). *The Politics of the Developing Areas*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.
- Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963
- Arendt, Hannah. *The Human Condition: A Study of the Central Dilemmas Facing Modern Man*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.
- Barry, Brian M. *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
- Barthes, Roland. "The Structuralist Activity," in Richard T. DeGeorge and Fernande M. DeGeorge (eds.). *The Structuralists from Marx to Lévi-Strauss* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972), pp. 148-154. (English translation originally published in *Partisan Review* 34,
- Basic, Goran, *Iskušenja demokratije u multietničkom društvu*, Centar za istraživanje etniciteta, Beograd, 2006.

- Benjamin, Andrew. "Tradition and Experience: Walter Benjamin's Some Motifs in Baudelaire' in Andrew Benjamin, Ed. *The Problems of Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin*. New York: Routledge, 1989.
- Benjamin, Jessica. "The End of Internalization: Adorno's Social Psychology." *Telos* 32 (Summer 1977).
- Bloch, Ernst, Georg Lukács, Bertolt Brecht, Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno. *Aesthetics and Politics*. Trans. Editor Ronald Taylor. New York: Verso, 1977.
- Bloch, Ernst. "Recollections of Walter Benjamin" in Gary Smith, Ed. *On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).
- Bolz, Norbert and Willem van Reijen. *Walter Benjamin*. Trans. Laimdota Mazzarins. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996.
- Boorstin, Daniel J. *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America*. New York: Atheneum, 1985. (Originally published in 1961 under the title, *The Image or What Happened to the American Dream*.)
- Boskovic, Aleksandar, "Liberalizam, pragmatizam i zdrav razum." *Kultura polisa* 13/14, str. 145-163. 2010.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. *Distinction: A Social Theory of Taste*. Trans. Richard Nice. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1984.
- Brandinger, Patrick. *Crusoe's Footprints: Cultural Studies in Britain and America*. New York: Routledge, 1990.
- Brint, Michael. *A Genealogy of Political Culture*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
- Broder, David S. *Behind the Front Page: A Candid Look at How the News is Made*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.
- Broderson, Momme. *Walter Benjamin: A Biography*. Trans. Malcolm R. Green and Ingrida Ligers. New York: Verso, 1996.
- Bronner, Stephen Eric. *Of Critical Theory and Its Theorists*. Cambridge MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1988.
- Brown, Archie (ed.). *Political Culture and Communist Studies*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1984.
- Brown, Archie, and Jack Gray (eds.). *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977.
- Brunt, Rosalind. "Engaging with the Popular: Audiences for Mass Culture and What to Say about Them" in Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson and Paula Treichler. Eds.. *Cultural Studies*. New York: Routledge, 1992.

- Calhoun, Craig, Marshall W. Meyer, and W. Richard Scott
 Citizen Encounters," in Charles T. Goodsell (ed.), *The Public Encounter: Where State and Citizen Meet* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), pp. 102- 125.
- Coles, Robert. *The Political Life of Children*. Boston:
- Common Mistakes in Quantitative Political Science," *American Journal of Political Science* 30, 3 (August 1986): 666-687.
- Coughlin, Richard M. *Ideology, Public Opinion and Welfare Policy: Attitudes Toward Taxes and Spending in Industrialized Societies*. Berkeley; Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1980.
- Craig, Ann L., and Wayne A. Cornelius. "Political Culture in Mexico: Continuities and Revisionist Interpretations," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), pp. 325-393.
- Critique," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), pp. 57-102.
- Dahl, Robert A. *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961
- Dionne, E.J., Jr. *Why Americans Hate Politics*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991
- Domhoff, G. William. *The Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America*. New York: Vintage Books, 1970.
- Domhoff, G. William. *Who Rules America?* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
- Eckstein, Harry. "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," *American Political Science Review* 82, 3 (September 1988): 789-804.
- Eckstein, Harry. Response to Herbert H. Werlin, "Political Culture and Political Change" (discussion of Eckstein, 1988), *American Political Science Review* 84, 1 (March 1990): 249-259.
- Edelman, Murray J. *Constructing the Political Spectacle*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
- Edelman, Murray J. *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967. (Originally published in 1964).
- Entman, Robert M. *Democracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Enzensberger, Hans Magnus. *Europe, Europe: Forays into a Continent*. New York: Pantheon, 1989 (translated by Martin Chalmers).
- Ewen, Stuart, and Elizabeth Ewen. *Channels of Desire: Mass Images and the Shaping of American Consciousness*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982.

- Fromm, Erich. *Escape From Freedom*. New York: Avon Books, 1969. (Originally published in 1941).
- Gamson, William A. *Talking Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Gendzier, Irene L. *Managing Political Change: Social*
- General Theory?" *Comparative Political Studies* 25, 3 (October 1992): 362-387.
- Girvin, Brian. "Change and Continuity in Liberal Democratic Political Culture," in John R. Gibbins (ed.), *Contemporary Political Culture: Politics in a Postmodern Age* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989), pp. 31-51.
- Goodsell, Charles T. *The Public Encounter: Where State and Citizen Meet*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981.
- Hellinger, Daniel, and Dennis R. Judd. *The Democratic Facade*. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1991.
- Henry, Jules. *Culture Against Man*. New York: Vintage Books, 1963.
- Hirschman, Albert O. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.
- Houghton Mifflin, 1987. (Originally published in 1986).
- Hristic, Ljubomir, *POLITICS OF CULTURE AND THE MODERNITY: SOCIETY AND CHANGE*, Institute for Social Sciences, Belgrade, 2014.
- Inglehart, Ronald. "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *American Political Science Review* 82, 4 (December 1988): 1203-1230.
- Inglehart, Ronald. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial*
- Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*.
- Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983. (Originally published in 1955).
- Kavanagh, Dennis. "Political Culture in Great Britain: The Decline of the Civic Culture," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.) *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), pp. 124-176.
- Kellner, Douglas. *Television and the Crisis of Democracy*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.
- Keniston, Kenneth. *The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in*
- Kerr, Walter. *The Decline of Pleasure*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962.
- Klein, Naomi. *No Logo: Taking Aim at Brand Bullies*. Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2000.
- Kopytoff, Igor. "The cultural biography of things: commoditization as process" in Aijun Appadurai, Ed. *The social life of things: Commodities in cultural perspective*. New

- York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Laclau, Ernesto. *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism-Fascism- Populism*. London: Verso, 1979.
- Ladd, Everett Car 11. *Where Have All the Voters Gone? The Fracturing of America's Political Parties* (2nd ed.).
- Lane, Robert E. *Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What he Does*. New York: Free Press, 1962.
- Lane, Robert E., and David O. Sears. *Public Opinion*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
- LaPalombara, Joseph. "Italy: Fragmentation, Isolation, and Alienation," in Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 282-329.
- Lehman, Edward W. "On the Concept of Political Culture: A Theoretical Reassessment," *Social Forces* 50, 3 (March 1972): 361-370.
- Lenhardt, Christian. "The Wanderings of Enlightenment" in John O'Neill, Ed. *On Critical Theory*. New York: Seabury Press, 1976
- Lijphart, Arend. "The Structure of Inference," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), pp. 37-56.
- Lipsky, Michael. *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair. "Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?" in Alasdair MacIntyre, *Against the Self- Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy* (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), pp. 260-279.
- Mann, Michael. "The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy," *American Sociological Review* 35, 3 (June 1970): 423- 439.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.
- Marcuse. *One-Dimensional Man*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.
- Massumi, Brian. "The Autonomy of Affect." *Cultural Critique* 31 (Fall 1995).
- Mattick Jr., Paul. "Mechanical Reproduction in the Age of Art." *Theory. Culture and Society* 10 (1993).
- McAuley, Mary. "Political Culture and Communist Politics: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," in Archie Brown (ed.) *Political Culture and Communist Studies* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1984), pp. 13-39.

- McPhee. *Voting: A Study of Opinion in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.
- Menninghaus, Winfried. "Walter Benjamin's Theory of Myth." Trans. Gary Smith in Gary Smith, Ed. *On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988.
- Mepham, John. "The Theory of Ideology in 'Capital'." *Working Papers in Cultural Studies* 6 (Autumn 1974).
- Mills, C. Wright. *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.
- Mills, C. Wright. *White Collar*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951.
- Moore, Barrington, Jr. *Injustice: The Social Bases of*
- Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships" *American Political Science Review* 88, 3 (September 1994): 635-652.
- Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
- Parenti, Michael. *Democracy for the Few* (5th ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.
- Pateman, Carole. "Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change," *British Journal of Political Science* 1, 3 (July 1971): 291-305.
- Pateman, Carole. *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
- Pekonen, Kyosti. "Symbols and Politics as Culture in the Modern Situation: The Problem and Prospects of the 'New,'" in John R. Gibbins (ed.), *Contemporary Political Culture: Politics in a Postmodern Age* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989), pp. 127- 143.
- Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*. New York: Pantheon, 1971.
- Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. *Why Americans Don't Vote*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1989.
- Popkin, Samuel. *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
- Purcell, Edward A., Jr. *The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973.
- Pye, Lucian W. "Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture," *Social Science Quarterly* 53, 2 (September 1972): 285- 296.

- Pye, Lucian W., and Sidney Verba (eds.). *Political Culture and Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.
- Revisited: Evaluating the Performance of Early American Presidents in Terms of Cultural Dilemmas,”
- Ricci, David M. *Community Power and Democratic Theory: The Logic of Political Analysis*. New York: Random House, 1971.
- Ricci, David M. *The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship, and Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984.
- Riesman, David, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney. *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.
- Rogowski, Ronald. *Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of*
- Rose, Gillian. *The Melancholy Science*. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1978.
- Rosen, Philip. “Adorno and Film Music: Theoretical Notes on *Composing for the Films*.” *Yale French Studies* 60 (1980).
- Rothchild, Donald, and Naomi Chazan. *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*. Boulder:
- Ruling Class Domination in America*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979. (Originally published in 1978).
- Ryan, Bill. *Making Capital from Culture: The Corporate Form of Capitalist Cultural Production*. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1992.
- Sani, Giacomo. “The Political Culture of Italy: Continuity and Change,” in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), pp. 273-324.
- Schonherr, Ulrich. “Adorno and Jazz: Reflections on a Failed Encounter.” *Telos* 87 (Spring 1991).
- Schrank, Jeffrey. *Snap, Crackle, and Popular Taste: The Illusion of Free Choice in America*. New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1977.
- Schumpeter, Joseph A. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (3rd ed.). New York: Harper & Row, 1950. (Originally published in 1942).
- Shively, W. Phillip. Review of Ronald Inglehart's *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. *Journal of Politics* 53, 1
- Slack, Jennifer Daryl. “The theory and method of articulation in cultural studies” in David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen, Eds. *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*. New York: Routledge, 1996.
- Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

- Sociological Perspective," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), pp. 103-123.
- Sombart, Werner. *Why is there no Socialism in the United States?* White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1976 (originally published 1906; translation by Patricia M. Hocking and C.T. Husbands)
- Steinmo, Sven. "American Exceptionalism Reconsidered: Culture or Institutions?" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson (eds.), *The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 106-131.
- Street, John. "Review Article: Political Culture - From Civic Culture to Mass Culture," *British Journal of Political Science* 23, 1 (January 1994): 95-113.
- Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," *World Politics* 29, 4 (July 1977): 552-583.
- Tanur, Judith M. (ed.). *Questions About Questions*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1992.
- Thompson, Michael, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky. *Culture Theory*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.
- Tucker, Robert C. "Communist Revolutions, National Cultures, and the Divided Nations," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 7, 3 (Autumn 1974): 235-245.
- Welch, Stephen. "Review Article: Issues in the Study of Political Culture - The Example of Communist Party States," *British Journal of Politics* 17, 4 (October 1987): 479-500.
- Welch, Stephen. *The Concept of Political Culture*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
- Werlin, Herbert H. "Political Culture and Political Change" (discussion of Eckstein, 1988; see also Eckstein, Westview Press, 1988.
- Whyte, William H., Jr. *The Organization Man*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956.
- Witte, Bernd. *Walter Benjamin: An Intellectual Biography*. Trans. James Rolleston. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991.
- Zaire*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988.
- Zinn, Howard. *A People's History of the United States*. New York:

CIP - Каталогизacija y yblykaciji
Hapodna byblyoteka Srbije, Beograd

CIP

316.7
316.42

HRISTIĆ, Ljubomir, 1976-

Policies and Practice of Political Culture: Theory and Sustainability /
Ljubomir Hristic. - Belgrade : Institute of social sciences, 2017 (Beograd:
Faculty of Technology and Metallurgy, Research and Development Centre
of Printing Technology). - 138 str. ; 24 cm

Tiraž 100. - Napomene i bibliografske reference uz tekst. - Bibliografija:
str. 131-138.

ISBN 978-86-7093-171-8

a) Политичка култура b) Друштвене промене
COBISS.SR-ID 234516492

ISBN 867093171-8



9 788670 931718