MUSLIMS OF THE UK AND EUROPE VII

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Introduction by Dr Paul Anderson, Assistant Director

This volume offers selected papers presented at the seventh post-graduate conference, "Muslims of the UK and Europe" organised by the Centre of Islamic Studies at the Moller Institute at the University of Cambridge on 22/23rd June 2023. As in previous years, the aim of the gathering was to provide an arena for emerging scholars to discuss findings from their graduate research and offer constructive but critical feedback on others' work. The finalised papers are presented here without editorial intervention. Alongside earlier volumes in this series, they present a snapshot of current scholarly trends in this field. Discussions of the papers were shaped by the insightful input of the participants, as well as the keynote speaker (Dr Abdallah Rothman), the chairs-discussants (Dr Julian Hargreaves, Dr Iman Dawood, Dr Emanuelle Degli Esposti, Dr Amine El Yousfi, Dr Egdunas Racius, Dr Paul Anderson), and thanks also go to Neil Cunningham and Ludmila Applegate for organising and managing the event. The papers were presented under five panels: *Gender and Sexuality*; *Media and Public Policy*; *Islamic Texts and Textuality*; *Islamic Economy / Marginalisation*; and *Heritage and Art*.

Two papers in this collection address questions of discrimination or marginalisation by studying the relationships that people with Muslim backgrounds and identities forge with different kinds of spaces. Sbyea offers an analysis of workplace discrimination faced by Muslim women in France and Britain. She interviewed 30 professional women in France and three in the UK in a variety of sectors (IT, marketing, medicine, higher management, journalism and finance), who wore hijab, about their experiences. Her paper observes the different legislative contexts for

workplace discrimination: while in France laws since 2004 have banned religious symbols in schools and the civil service, and permitted private companies to introduce similar bans, legislation in Britain appears at first sight to provide for more religious freedom. However her interviewees also noted the significance of non-legislative exclusionary practices: such as expectations of after-work drinking in order to access opportunities at work, and comments among job interview panellists that wearing hijab impedes the capacity to work professionally; and all but one interviewee described experiencing workplace discrimination and/or micro-aggressions. As a result, educated veiled women were "as members of racial and/or religious minority groups" less able to "find fulfilling positions in accord with their motivations and qualifications". Conscious of stereotyping by employers and colleagues that associated them with docility, domesticity and lower qualifications and language skills, they reported having to make an extra effort to prove themselves and use their personality to "step out" of those associations. Among French interviewees, there was little confidence in institutional recourses against discrimination. Many had considered emigration; some had turned to self-employment; they also used networking and private online groups to share information about opportunities and more congenial workplaces or teleworking. In Britain, participants were more likely to mobilise collectively, or draw on the support of advocacy organisations, for example through a mosque-based event on how to respond to workplace discrimination.

Spatial relationships, affects and strategies emerge in Sbyea's paper as a diagnostic of power relations. While some Muslim women facing workplace discrimination mobilise through gathering in mosque-based workshops, others seek to find more congenial workplaces, while still others opt to work from home or even consider emigration. Space also emerges as a key research

problem in Ulhaq's study of emotional geographies. Ulhaq conducted a pilot study with sixteen British Muslim women from various regional backgrounds, and including students, stay-at-home mothers and working professionals, to understand the emotions they experienced in different social spaces. Her paper draws on the notions of emotional geographies, which highlights the "spatial and temporal dimension of emotions", as well as racialised emotions, whereby groups racialised as minorities tend to experience negative emotions as a result of discrimination and everyday encounters of racism. While negative feelings, such as "paranoia, guilt, shame, annoyance, and melancholy", may often be seen as unrelated to race, in fact they are intimately connected to socio-historical racial inequality and Islamophobic discourses and hostility. In seeking the map the emotional geographies of her interviewees, she also contended with expectations on women to suppress negative emotions, i.e. perform emotional labour, and with the particular expectations on Muslim women to do so in the name of modesty and politeness. Her interviewees reported feeling emotionally vulnerable and unsettled in work, educational and social spaces which they experienced as mainly white and in which they experienced their own position as that of an isolated minority. They felt "emotionally unsafe" in spaces in which they felt their faith and lifestyles were not fully respected, and in which as a consequence they were unable to be themselves. They could also experience marginalisation in male-dominated Muslim spaces. By contrast, they found a sense of safety and acceptance in ethnic neighbourhoods among women who resembled them, and in "community hubs specifically created for Muslim women, charity groups initiated by Muslim women, networks led by Muslim female leaders, Quranic/study circles, and dhikr gatherings" as they "fostered connections with other Muslim women".

Space is also a guiding analytic in Searle's discussion of a transgender person's attempt to find her place within family, local Muslim community and ummah. Searle's contribution presents an excerpt from the life narrative of a person who identifies both as transgender and Muslim, and discusses the ways in which she has been able to "accommodate and even harmonise" these two identities. The process, she argues, is one of disorientation and effortful reorientation. Having grown up in Britain, of Bengali heritage, Sadhana realised as a teenager that her long-felt sense of difference was because of her gender-identity. Having already internalised community understandings of sinfulness, this realisation was disorienting. Seeing no way to reconcile her gender identity and her faith, she experienced suicidal thoughts. However through a process of self-education about historical gender-variant subjectivities in Muslim societies including in what are now Pakistan and Bangladesh, she started to reorient herself and find ways of reconciling her Muslim and transgender identities. Another facet of this process was re-reading the Quran in a way that emphasised core ethical values of love, justice and resisting oppression – values which she found easier to embrace and express as a transgender person. Her mother similarly engaged in a process of reorientation: having initially been troubled by her daughter's self-expression in part anticipating the wider community's response, she later came to foreground her duty as a mother to protect her daughter, including her mental health, and to see this as a "task…given to her by Allah". However, while Sadhana was able to harmonise her Muslim and transgender identities in certain vital contexts, by renegotiating her kinship relations and her understandings of Muslimness and sacred texts, she was unable to find the same possibilities within other communal religious spaces. Sadhana's attempts could be framed in terms of how emotional geographies are experienced, co-constituted with kinship relations and interpretations of the

Quran and Muslim history. But Searle opts instead to describe this period of Sadhana's life in terms of disorientation and reorientation, which suggests that the concept of emotional geography may be too static to account for the ways in which individuals sometimes lose a sense of bearing within the spaces where they had developed a sense of self and an emotional relationship to their environment.

The next two papers in the collection address issues of media representation, from quite different perspectives. Shareef offers a theoretical reflection on the figure of the "imperilled Muslim woman", as first proposed by Sherene Razack. She analyses the way in which Malala Yousafzai, who was shot in the head at the age of 15 by a Taliban gunman, has been positioned in Western media as a symbol of Muslim women deprived of freedoms and victimized by oppressive gender regimes. Lost in this portrayal is the fact that Malala was already a powerful advocate of girls' education before the attack. The circulation of images of Malala as a gender victim, Shareef argues, reinforces a "regime of truth" which limits how Muslim women can be spoken about in "Western consciousness". Other widely circulating discourses – such as about forced marriage, polygamy, and female genital mutilation – have a similar effect, and find a wide audience in best-selling autobiographical accounts by Muslim women recounting their victimization "at the hands of Muslim men and Islam". Such discourses, which can be traced back to colonial travel writing and wider knowledge production through the late 19th and early 20th centuries, figure women's dress as a symbol of female subordination, and find contemporary expression in "restrictions on the hijab and niqab" in a range of Western countries. Taken together, the discourses and policies animated by the figure of the "imperilled Muslim woman" are a form of governmentality seeking to define "good" Muslim subjectivities

according to liberal ideals. Such projects are often met with suspicion, especially when conducted within the framework of counter-terrorism. While campaigns to protect Muslim women's rights are vital, Shareef calls for a greater recognition of those that already exist within Muslim frameworks and epistemologies.

Shareef's argument notwithstanding, empirical study also shows that the discursive frames used to represent Muslims can shift significantly when put in the context of relations with other minorities – an issue which Haji Naif's paper addresses. Haji Naif presents the results of a comparative study of Arabic news media articles about Muslims and Jews in Britain, in Al Jazeera online (16 articles) and the Times of Israel (22 articles), during the period 2013–2022. Only articles which discussed both Muslims and Jews were analysed. One prominent theme in both publications was anti-Semitism, but while Al Jazeera focused on accusations of anti-Semitism against individuals and organisations, the Times of Israel focused on the resurgence of anti-Semitism in Britain. Islamophobia was another prominent theme, but while Al Jazeera focused on rising levels of Islamophobic violence and hostility, the Times of Israel focused on the interconnection with anti-Semitism. While both publications discussed the existence of common issues and threats faced by Jews and Muslims in Britain, notably hostility led by the far-right, Al Jazeera raised the issue of commonality in relation to proposals to monitor religious schools and courts, asking whether Judaism would be affected as well as Islam. By suggesting that religious freedoms were a concern for Jews as well as Muslims, Al Jazeera sought to legitimise Muslim concerns by situating them in this broader context. In reporting on the relationship between Jews and Muslims, both publications focused on themes such as elections, state policies and surveillance that could be categorised as "political" rather than solely "religious".

Moreover, in contrast to wider media coverage of Muslims in Britain, portrayals of Muslims in reports on Muslim-Jewish relations "[do] not depict Islam and Muslims as "others" or solely in terms of terrorism and other negative portrayals".

Two papers address experiences of, and responses to, economic precarity among British and European Muslims. Chaudury writes from an openly committed perspective, noting the "unprecedented levels of inequality that exist today, which disproportionately affect Muslims" and calling for the abolition of economic exploitation and class in line with an Islamic critique of capitalism. His paper draws on interviews with activists at a food bank and an anti-gentrification organisation in two districts of London, which work, respectively, to address economic marginalization and to call for affordable housing and community spaces in their local areas. The paper presents activists' critiques of what they see as accommodationist forms of Islam, which either tacitly endorse or actively espouse the status quo of capitalist class relations. One such accommodationist position, they argue, detaches religion from politics, in part out of fear of being labelled as extremist, and thereby encourages individual rather than collective engagements with society and religion; another more openly espouses capitalist values, celebrating private property and commerce, and encouraging adherents to work hard within the system rather than striving to change it. In centring these critiques, Chaudury does not merely offer and account or commentary from the outside, but seeks to build a liberation theology alongside the activists. This is in line with the Marxist and liberation theology notion of praxis, in which liberation theologies are not abstract or uninvolved forms of knowledge, but "are produced in the struggle, coming as the 'second act', after political involvement". Implicit in notions of struggle and involvement is the question of what it means to work for radical change within the constraints of existing economic

and political structures. One way in which activists addressed this question was through interpreting almsgiving (zakat) and charity (sadaqa) not just as donating money, but also time and energy, bringing about a "mentality change" which foregrounded justice and political engagement. They saw their activism not as providing welfare and thereby leaving the socioeconomic structure intact, but as challenging underlying logics of profit and hyper-individualism.

Jovanovich's contribution is a statistical analysis of the likelihood of Muslim immigrants (relative to non-Muslim immigrants) in Europe being exposed to different kinds of precarity. He considers different dimensions of precarity: economic (such as vulnerability to poverty and hardship); cultural (vulnerability to marginalisation and being placed outside the imagined national community) and legal (having undocumented or temporary immigration status). He draws on data from European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU MIDIS II) which surveyed over 25,000 people from various migration and ethnic minority backgrounds. The sample included both immigrants and "decendants of immigrants" with a variety of residence and citizenship statuses. He found correlations between being of Muslim background and certain factors of precarity such occasional or part-time work or unemployment, and suffering religious discrimination in the workplace and when job-seeking; however, he did not find correlations between being of Muslim background and other factors of precarity such as temporary and informal work or suffering discrimination at work due to skin colour. This reinforces previous studies showing that Muslim immigrants to Europe face greater levels of precarity because of their religion: compared to non-Muslim immigrants, they are more likely to be unemployed as well as engaged in domestic work, and more likely to face work-related discrimination.

Jovanovich also found that alongside Muslim background, other factors correlate more strongly with indicators of precarity, such as length of time spent in the country and level of education.

Last but not least, Majothi's paper offers a corrective to the widespread notion that the expansion of Salafism in Britain has largely been funded by the Saudi government. By tracing the history of English-language Salafi publishing initiatives in Britain, he argues that many of these activities were either self-funded or supported by local donations and markets, and responded to local home-grown concerns. He identifies three periods in the formation of Salafi printing in Britain. During the 1960s–1980s, post-war migration saw the arrival of members of the Ahl-e-Hadith movement from South Asia, some of whom had studied at the Islamic University of Medina; they established both Urdu and English magazines and publishing houses aiming at preventing cultural assimilation. During the late 1980s and 1990s, second-generation South Asians who lacked proficiency in Urdu and Arabic provided a growing market for Anglo-Islamic texts. One leading Salafi organisation, established in Britain, "increasingly bypassed the Ahl-e-Hadith's South Asian roots in favour of a more "authentic" Arab articulation" and connected with scholars in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Since the 1990s, British Salafis have established growing numbers of bookstores and printing houses, especially in London and Birmingham, and have sought to respond to demand by publishing lesser-known texts, which has somewhat diminished the authority of Saudi-based scholars. While the largest Anglo-Salafi publisher, Darussalam International, was set up in Riyadh, it has received only limited funding from the Saudi government; while some Saudi monies have fed into this field, publishing mostly has been funded locally, by subscription and personal investment.

Aligning in some ways with Majothi's argument, and to reflect the analyses presented at this and previous conferences, as well as

the opinions expressed at and around the 2023 event, the Centre of Islamic Studies has revised the long-running title of this series from "Muslims in the UK and Europe" to "Muslims of the UK and Europe". The former title was first established in May 2014 and has been used, within the Centre, mainly as the acronym "MUKE" over the last ten years. I hope that the conference will, under the new title, continue to draw high-calibre participants and papers over the next decade and beyond.

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A comparative analysis of workplace discrimination of hijabi Muslim women in France and in the UK

MAROU SBYEA

Introduction

The subject of Muslim women wearing the hijab has been a long-standing issue in Europe and has been tied to the stakes surrounding the integration of Muslims in different national contexts. Extensive research has focused on the construction of a "Muslim problem" (Meer 2010, Modood 2003, Hajjat and Mohammed 2013) in Europe, and on the generally negative opinions expressed on Muslim communities living Europe (Shankley and Rhodes 2020 ; Ahmed and Sardar 2012). Veiled Muslim women are the main recipients for restrictive legislation and are targeted by the rise in Islamophobic acts and discourses (Triandafyllidou 2010, Tariq and Syed 2017, Ghumman and Ryan 2013). As for their access to employment, Muslim women, as minority women, face the biggest obstacles in joining the labour market: they report high degrees of discrimination in recruitment processes compared to natives (Simon 2021, Khattab and Johnston 2014), and are less likely to rise to high-profile positions in private sector companies (Heath and Martin 2013).

France and the United Kingdom appear, at first glance, to be opposites when it comes to discriminations faced by Muslim women. While the British context takes root in multiculturalism as the primary integration model for immigrants, France favours a universalist 'colour-blind' approach (Mazouz 2018 ; Hunter-Henin 2015 ; Beaman and Petts 2020), confronting Muslim women to difficulty when it comes to the acknowledgement

of discrimination in the case of employment (Escafré-Dublet et al. 2023). As a key visual symbol of Islam (Chakraborti and Zempi 2012), veiling has crystallized the tensions around the integration of Muslims in the British society, perceived as a representation of a failure to assimilate and a signal of cultural difference (Meer, Dwyer and Modood 2010; Meer and Modood 2009), with a rise of mainstream anti-Muslim sentiment since Brexit (Shankley and Rhodes 2020). Veiled Muslim women are reportedly targeted by a significant proportion of hate crimes against Muslims in the UK due to their visibility (Allen 2014, Chakraborti and Zempi 2012) and their gender. Women wearing the niqab or burqa, as well as the hijab are the targets of street harassment through dehumanizing slurs and attacks, to which they have to choose how to respond. The recourse to the police or other official institutions to signal hate crimes, however, are rarely seen by Muslim women as good, dependable options (Zempi 2020).

An ever-growing literature on the subject veiled Muslim women's discrimination has developed analysis of their daily experiences of gendered discrimination, with a focus on experiences of Islamophobic acts concerning their veil. As for labour discrimination, the literature on the UK context focuses on quantitative data analysis to study workplace discrimination (Shankley and Clark 2020), while the French literature sets to analyse experiences of discrimination much more focusing on qualitative methods. This research aims to mobilize the literature dealing with the factor of "Muslim penalty" (Sweida-Metwally 2022, Khattab and Hussein 2018) as applied to the specifically intersectional category of veiled Muslim women. Indeed, if the concept of "Muslim penalty" has been mainly employed as a stand-in for religious belonging's role in the context of workplace discrimination and lack of opportunities for Muslims, its use in the case of veiled Muslim women aims to shed light on the specific intersection at which they stand: that of gender, race and religious affiliation. Precedent research has shown that the construction of identity of Muslim women, while complicated by transnational identities as second-generation or third-generation immigrants (Tariq and Syed 2017), relies heavily on Islam as a "guiding principle" (Jahan 2011) to navigate their personal experiences in Western societies. I would like to feed upon a similar logic in this research by showing that veiled Muslim women in France and in the UK rely on their intersectional positioning and religious affiliation to navigate discrimination in the workplace and difficulties of access to jobs. In other words, how do Veiled Muslim women's experiences of discrimination raise the question of a Muslim penalty, in the labour market, complexified by the intersectionality of their positioning?

Methods

This research is based on interviews, conducted with hijabi Muslim women in France (N=30) and in the United Kingdom (N=3), as well as on participant observation during specific events. In France, 28 interviews were conducted with women based in Paris, as well as in other cities in the south of France, and in the north-east of the country. As for the interviews in United Kingdom, they were so far conducted in London, Slough and Nottingham, and others are planned in Leeds, Bristol and Birmingham in the following weeks. Two instances of field observations focused on the activities of a local Women's network in the city of Nottingham, although further observations are planned in London. Interviews lasted between an hour and two and half hours and were conducted face-to-face and -in rarer instances- through Zoom depending on interviewees'

availabilities. Interviewees were aged 18 to 49 years-old, with a significant proportion of younger women aged 18 to 35. In terms of ethnicity, interviewees in France are of varied descend, mainly North-African and Middle Eastern, all of French citizenship. As for the women met in the UK, they are mostly of Bangladeshi and Pakistani descent, with a smaller proportion of women from the MENA region.

The effects of legislation on experiences of discrimination in the workplace in the French context

To analyse experiences of discrimination in the workplace, one must first analyse the underlying circumstances in which these dynamics occur. In the case of veiled Muslim women's access to the labour market, the comparison between France and the United Kingdom would lie in the significantly different perspectives on anti-discrimination policy in the two countries.

In France, the emergence of debates around veiling in the public goes back to 1989, with the legal case summarized by French media as "l'affaire du foulard" ("the case of the headscarf"), during which the principal of a state high school excluded three hijabi students because of a supposed incompatibility between Islamic veiling and the principle of "laïcite" (Fernando 2014). A few of the older French interviewees recall the public debates surrounding the ban of hijab in high-schools and feel strongly about their consequences in terms of exclusion of hijabi girls from education. The first most important piece of legislation, with heavy consequences in matter of human rights is the law of 2004 (Marshall, 2008). It implemented a ban on "conspicuous religious signs", including and targeting veiling in state schools and with a ban on veiling in civil servant positions. A following legislation, in 2010, banned full face-veiling, or the burqa in all public spaces, and was presented as a safety measure regarding ID screenings. The 2004 ban, and subsequent legislation can be summarized to have had a particular adverse effect in terms of autonomy for Muslim women, sometimes with overspilling effects on other minority groups (Hennette-Vauchez 2017). Hatice, a 42 year-old French woman of Turkish descent, recalls well the sense of vulnerability relating to the debates around the hijab and remarked the differences between her own generation and that of her younger sisters and acquaintances, all concerned by the implementation of the law.

> *"The 2004 law rejected a whole generation from schools. A bunch of my friends stopped their studies during high-school. Many girls, in their twenties, found themselves at home even if, in my time, a lot of us fought in the Turkish community to deter women to marry too young. (…) It was much worse at work for me. I felt so vulnerable, and completely pushed to depend financially on my husband. With a Bachelor's degree, I couldn't see myself working as a cleaner. I felt the violence, of being told to depend on my husband, and to accept that, because women like couldn't do it. The only way out is higher education. I tried it all: entrepreneurship, working for other people, working in jobs out of my field of skills… What am I actually good for?" Hatice, 42, student.*

By excluding the hijab from these spheres, the legislation seemed to have undermined one of the main feminist arguments invoked to defend the ban: Muslim women, expected to pursue emancipation from the patriarchy and a supposed submission to fathers and brothers (Fernando 2014, Keaton 2006), are at the same time robbed of the possibility to choose whether or not to keep the veil. Additionally, they are marginalized in the public debates around the hijab, to which they are often reduced (Fernando 2010, Selby 2012, Beaman 2017) by transpartisan opposition, with many French people in favour

of the enforcing of the ban (Beriss 1990). Opponents to the ban, a minority at the time of the implementation of the law, argued the legislation on the hijab could be viewed as just another way of controlling how women dress by a patriarchal society in a colonial perspective (Scott 2007). Safe to be said, the ban created the perfect conditions for discrimination in the workplace against veiled Muslim women, first directly through the ban of the hijab in public office, but also in the private sector, through extension of the legislation to the private sector (Hunter-Henin 2015), by allowing private companies to explicitly ban the hijab in their corporate rules of procedure in 2013, after a significant yet controversial ruling by the French High Court (Cour de Cassation). This additional exclusion of the hijab in the workplace, has had disastrous effects according to interviewees on all aspects related their careers. The first obvious effect concerns experiences of discrimination during recruitment processes, with a majority of French interviewees recalling the significant hardships they faced while looking for a position, whether as interns or as employees. Esma, 22, enrolled in a business school with a major in Communication, confided her confusion at the lack of prospects in her field, despite her studying a very sought-after specialty.

> *"To be completely honest, I struggled a lot, much more than my classmates, to get an internship. So I feel that it's probably related to my hijab and to my foreign name. It has to be the reason. I did test out the market a bit, by sending resumes without a picture for instance. It still didn't work much, because you could tell that I spoke Arabic on my resume. Even as I was looking for work in a very growing industry, I couldn't understand why I had so few offers." Esma, 22, junior trainee in Communication.*

Discrimination based on resume screening in France has been thoroughly studied in the past decade, and research has shown

how, even by attempting to by-pass entry barriers due to the hijab, Muslim women tend to be excluded on the basis of race because of other identifiable characteristics on their resumes. Anissa, a 26 year-old woman working for a big consulting firm, recalls the changes in perception surrounding her involvement in work-related events and how her lack of participation to after-work events hurt her career evolution within her team.

> *"Other Moroccans, who came to France after high-school, didn't have the same up-bringing as we did. Their religious education is more of a given, whereas for us, it's very much a choice. People blamed me for not going to afterwork events, to parties, because I didn't drink alcohol. I also felt that these events had more to do with who hooked-up with whom, much more than with networking. (…) Still, afterworks conditioned your place within the team, and people didn't shy away from reminding me that. They said that to be on the short-list for project opportunities, you had to attend the afterworks and parties." Anissa, 26, Consultant and entrepreneur.*

Anissa's wish not to engage in work-adjacent events, oftentime with alcohol served, seemed to have been misconstrued as an effort not to engage with her peers, and puts her in a compromised position in which she cannot engage in strategies that would further her position in the company (Hargreaves and Anderson 2014). Further exchange during the interview revealed notably how her choice of wearing the turban, even if it was met with positive reactions at the office, seemed to have put a distance between her and her peers when it came to work-adjacent events and limited her ability to blend in more in the group. Other interviewees spoke of the noticeable distance that their hijab seems to have put between them and their work peers, with the necessity for them to be representatives of the Muslim modern "working girl", while still trying to uphold expected standards of modesty and demureness attributed to hijabis as a group.

The case of 'ordinary discrimination' and the Muslim penalty in the UK labour market

In the United Kingdom, if the Muslim community seems, at first sight, to benefit from much more religious freedom than in France in terms of practices, the reality of a pluridimensional discrimination is still very much prevalent (Ganesh and Abou-Atta 2016). The Equality Act of 2010 offers a comprehensive set of protections from discrimination on the basis of gender, race, age, belief, and thus theoretically prohibits discrimination against Muslim women in the UK, whether in education, access to services or in the workplace. However, Muslim women, veiled women in particular, still report high levels of discrimination, and various quantitative studies have relayed their perception of reduced professional prospects. In many ways, in spite of anti-discrimination regulations implemented in the UK, hijabis and niqabis face more under-stated ways of discrimination. Shireen, a 47 year-old niqabi of Pakistani origin, recalled the difficulties she faced, as a woman and especially as a Muslim, in her endeavours to find work as a general practitioner for the NHS. After the birth of her children, she had decided to go back to her field of studies, Medicine, and complete a "Return to work Scheme" that would allow her to open her own practice after a few training internships.

> *"So, I had gone for a few interviews for general practice training, and I wasn't getting it and I didn't understand why. And then after one of the interviews, there was one Muslim consultant on the interview panel. He told his junior doctors to tell me that the panel had had a conversation about the way I was dressed in the interview and said stuff like "Oh, can she work like that?" At that time, I was wearing, like, my hijab, you know, long at the front and at the back. And then just a normal abaya, and it wasn't like black or anything. Just ilke normal colours, they had thought "you should tell her. She needs to know that they're thinking that maybe she can't work.*

> *Maybe she can't be a good GP" or like this, you know. And that was then. So from that time, you know, I thought, okay, this is an issue. People are saying they're not thinking about whether I could be a doctor. They're thinking about, what they thought it's going to be like for me, you know, how can this person be a doctor? Nothing to do with my skill as a doctor." Shireen, 47, GP.*

The question of veiled women's skill at their job, especially niqabis is a prevalent one even in highly skilled sectors of employment. When, in France, the exclusion of veiled Muslim women seem to rely mostly on the legal barriers to their integration in various sectors, the case of Muslim women in the UK seems to rely on other factors to explain the experiences of discrimination they have relayed. Multiple aspects explaining the high unemployment rates of Muslim women, among which race (Pakistani and Bangladeshi women in particular) and geography (living in poor, disenfranchised areas) are main factors invoked (Ganesh and Abou-Atta 2016). In the case of educated veiled women, the focus of my research, they are less likely, as members of racial and/or religious minority groups, to find fulfilling positions in accord with their motivations and qualifications (Battu and Sloane 2004). Furthermore, they are more likely to face greater difficulties in securing employment (Khattab and Johnston 2014), due to stereotyping associating them to domestic life and docility, and fears of employer regarding their qualifications and language skills (Fearful and Kamenou 2010). Marina, a 20 year-old student on a gap year, currently working as an aide in nurseries, felt that these stereotypes were particularly prevalent during her interviewing process for her current job.

> *"So before I got the first agency that I was with in December before I switched, that was a referral, I had another interview and I feel like you have to really prove yourself more when you are hijabi because they already have a pre assumption of what you are like. So I feel like your personality has to really be on*

show when you're going through interviews. There is just that initial judgement and it's like you kind of want to step out of that judgement. So you have to like, say 'This is who I am'. I feel like we kind of have to do more when we're applying for jobs. » Marina, 20, Student and Nursery assistant.

The private sector in particular, lags behind the public sector in terms of employment perspectives for Muslim women. Generally, studies and testings have shown ethnicity-based discrimination in the private sector (Wood et al. 2009), particularly for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women (Bell and Casebourne 2008) and in higher level positions, positions of leadership and at the head of organisations or as board members (Tariq and Syed 2017). Of course, the intersectional position of veiled Muslim women explains in part their vulnerability in the face of discrimination, as they usually accumulate factors of discrimination such as race, gender and affiliated religion.

Nevertheless, it is their perceived belonging to the Muslim community that seems to lessen their opportunities of employment, as the margins within which hijabi women operate to occupy the labour market are much tighter and reduce their employability. In France, the arbitrary power given to private sector companies to ban the headscarf has rendered it quite difficult for Muslim women to navigate career opportunities with as much leeway as non-hijabis, with very little opportunities to maintain themselves in salaried work, let alone highly skilled positions. As for the UK, if anti-discrimination policies allow hijabi women with higher education to navigate the job market much easier, experiences of discrimination are still prevalent in recruiting processes, and are visible in the lack of Muslim women in top-management positions. However, the variety of options available to Muslim women in the face of discrimination greatly differ between the UK and France, with an extensive arsenal of individual and collective strategies.

Individual and collective strategies of integration and maintaining in the workplace: Between negotiation and assertion

This research, focusing on veiled Muslim women working in private companies, has so far shown the difficulty in maintaining a strong course within the same company, despite the high qualifications of the hijabi women I have interviewed, in a variety of sectors (IT, marketing, medicine, higher management, journalism, finance). All interviewees (except one) have described varying degrees of workplace discrimination, or at least daily micro-aggressions, and have described a level of expectation from their superiors concerning their appearance in the workplace (makeup and business suits mandatory, request for them to wear a turban rather than a traditional hijab, etc.), often culminating in their contract not being renewed or, for some of them, escalation in discrimination until they quit themselves.

Among other strategies, significant part of them turn to entrepreneurship (Karimi 2018) and developed small businesses with varying degrees of success and without avoiding the economic precarity. The others negotiate constantly with the boundaries raised in traditional salaried work, in a variety of companies that allow them to work with the hijab or envision expatriation as a solution (even if temporarily) to access better career advancement opportunities. Almost all French interviews, and one British interviewee, see immigration in another country as a strong possibility for job opportunities. From French women, the most popular options evoked are the United Kingdom, Canada and countries with a Muslim-majority population. Esma, for instance, sees expatriation as a better option for her to pursue a career in communication.

"Corporate culture today is all labour inclusivity. But not for hijabis. I don't live in Paris, where hijabis like me have more

opportunities, so if I find an opportunity in Turkey or the UK, I'll go there. But it's terrible, because I'm French, I grew up in France, I don't see myself working abroad on the long term." Esma, 22, trainee in communication.

Faced with continuous attempts by authority figures, veiled Muslim women deploy diverse attempts to resist and negotiate the boundaries of the law, whether through individual paths of resistance (individual recourses to contest misuses and abuses of the current legislation), or by organizing collectively in an attempt to defend their right to wear the veil in specific settings. Such strategies have strongly varied depending on certain characteristics (age, field of work, available income, etc.), and attitudes in facing discrimination have shown interesting disparities depending on the country where the interviewees lived.

Focusing on individual strategies first, the case of the interviewees met in the United Kingdom have so far all expressed the importance of pedagogy in dealing with inappropriate and insensitive behaviours at work. Marina, 20, who works in close proximity with children in a nursery, insisted on the necessity of not making a scene in a professional environment.

"Like in most situations. I've just tried to educate as best I can, and if I can evidently see that it's not getting anywhere, then I'm just like, I don't want to have this conversation anymore because I could say something valuable and they might be like "Oh, okay, you know, look at that perspective and Let me look into Islam and see what it says". I feel like if I behave aggressively, for example, that it could just backfire, they'd be like this is why I don't like Muslims or something, for example. And it could just be like a big problem." Marina, 20, Student and nursery assistant.

This non-confrontational attitude, relayed as much by French interviewees, does not stem only from a de-escalation of conflict in a professional setting. In the same vein as the demure attitude

evoked earlier in this research, a polite and calm reaction seem to be often expected from veiled women in their dealings with workplace conflict. Some interviewees expressed their recourse to administrative fail-safes in the face of discrimination, but almost all of them have expressed discomfort at the idea of going to the police or other instances of the justice system, thus expressing a lack of faith in anti-discrimination institutional recourses (Escafré-Dublet and Hamidi 2023, Hargreaves 2015), as Shireen clearly stated while recounting an incident with another medical professional she visited as a patient.

"This was the first time she'd seen me with niqab and she made a big fuss: "I can't see you like that. Take that off your face. I can't talk to you." This sort of thing. I don't think that would happen now. I don't think people would talk about it, but I don't know. But yeah, I mean, I did complain. And she did write a letter of apology. But, you know, that was tough. (…) So I think if I need them to help with a third party… I think yes, they would follow the protocol, you know, things like that. But in terms of if the police were to come to you about it I don't feel protected from that point of view because they can basically do anything. And, you know, I don't trust them to behave properly." Shireen 47, general practitioner.

Other indirect ways of improving one's prospects when in search for an open position is networking, as evoked by various interviewees, who garnered support and opportunities through groups dedicated to Muslim women on social media. These private groups, oftentime on Facebook, Instagram, and LinkedIn allow Muslim women to have access to listings of jobs in companies that would be hijab-friendly, or jobs that allow telecommuting. If, in the case British interviewees, these groups are more often an opportunity to share experiences of discrimination and micro-aggressions, it is the networking and job-searching aspects that dominate French interviewees' preoccupation with such groups and pages. Some of them will use these platforms as opportunities to promote

entrepreneurial activities and share inspirational content. As for the UK, larger-scale events seem to be the preferred collective strategy to face discrimination by hijabis and niqabis. An instance of field work I had the opportunity to attend was a women-only "Tea Party" organized by the East London Mosque, which was an opportunity for Muslim women to gather and exchange tips and advice in a variety of workshops and keynotes. One, titled « Mental health at work », was an opportunity for women to exchange advice about difficult interactions at work concerning the headscarf. The participants gave accounts of experiences of discrimination and micro-aggressions, and a panel of speakers (specialized in social work and psychology) gave advice on how to communicate discomfort and set boundaries in the workplace. In the face of discrimination, Muslim women in the UK are however more likely to benefit from the help of advocacy organisations dedicated to the intersectional discrimination they face (Joly and Wadia 2018), and are more likely to develop direct strategies of mobilization through community organizing and reporting to Muslim women networks than veiled Muslim women in France, who have to adopt more indirect strategies of negotiation of the boundaries to veiling posed by the legislation. Observations conducted during in-person events targeted at Muslim women have shown the importance of social media in relaying these events as not only networking opportunities (Grine 2014), but as well as safe spaces.

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A Qualitative Study of the Emotional Geographies of British Muslim Women's Safety in Social Spaces

AYESHA ULHAQ

In contemporary British society, there are many different social spaces, ranging from institutionalised environments to the intimate spaces of everyday life where we live, work, socialise, and coexist. Studying these spaces is essential for understanding our experiences, perceptions, behaviours, and interactions within the social world (Wassermann & Faust, 1994). Recent studies have demonstrated that British Muslim women face challenges in various spaces within modern British society and Muslim communities (Contractor, 2012). Research from the U.S. and limited studies from the U.K. indicate that Muslim women have established third spaces, such as community hubs, religious study groups, and women's networks, to connect with those who share their interests and background, providing a sense of safety (Mahmood, 2016; Ahmad and Sardar, 2012). Nevertheless, more critical studies are necessary to gain a better understanding of British Muslim women's experiences of spaces, their sense of safety, and the issues they confront. To address this research gap, I conducted a pilot study with British Muslim women in the UK to explore their experiences of social spaces and better understand the significance of third spaces. The pilot study revealed that emotional experiences in connection with space were frequently cited by participants, emphasising the importance of investigating emotional geographies of space. For example, participants reported feeling emotionally and physically unsafe, experiencing fear and anxiety in predominantly white spaces and sometimes emotional unsafety in male-dominated Muslim spaces. This paper focuses on the empirical research presented in the pilot study's findings, focusing on three key aspects. Firstly, it establishes the research context by providing an overview of essential concepts such as racialised emotions and emotional geographies. Secondly, it delves into a detailed analysis of the pilot study's findings, offering valuable insights into the topic at hand. Lastly, it outlines the future steps of the study, indicating the direction for further exploration and investigation.

Racialised emotions

Emotions are seen as crucial in questioning or reinforcing dominant discourses and practices concerning race and ethnicity in society (Ahmed, 2004). Research on racialised emotions shows that negative emotions such as fear, distress, and grief are frequently discussed in conversations about racial and ethnic matters (Ahmed, 2004; Zembylas, 2011). The social and political systems of privilege or oppression that each person lives in are formed by all social identities, whether self-ascribed or not. According to the most recent census on Muslims in Britain, the majority of Muslims in Britain belong to various ethnic minority backgrounds, with Asian heritage making up the majority (MCB, 2015)1. Muslim women in particular experience prejudice, discrimination, abuse, and isolation in British society, mainly on the intersection of race/ethnic background, religion, and gender (Contractor, 2012: Ganesh and Abou-Atta, 2016). Different settings and interactions can elicit different emotions and identities, particularly among minority communities, and therefore, it is important to explore the emotions of such groups. Studies on racialised emotions have found that negative emotions such as anger, hatred, fear, distress and grief are frequently discussed in conversations about racial and ethnic matters (Ahmed, 2004: Zembylas, 2011). Emotions are therefore, seen as crucial in questioning or reinforcing dominant discourses and practices concerning race and ethnicity in society (Ahmed, 2004).

Cathy Hong's concept of "minor feelings" sheds light on the Asian American and minority experience in the United States (Hong, 2020). She explores the presence of negative emotions associated with racial discrimination and marginalisation, drawing from her own life experiences (Kim, 2020). Hong also critically examines the emotional and sociological significance of childhood from a minority perspective, highlighting how deviating from the majority culture's normative narrative can lead to feelings of shame and other negative emotions (Kim, 2020). These minor feelings, including paranoia, guilt, shame, annoyance, and melancholy, are described as a racially constructed emotional spectrum arising from the challenges of everyday racial encounters (Hong, 2020, p. 55). Sadly, both within and outside their communities, these feelings are often disregarded and seen as unrelated to race. Similarly, Sianne Ngai (2005) argues in her book "Ugly Feelings" that negative emotions, including those experienced by minority groups, are interconnected with ongoing socio-historical issues, including racial inequalities.

While Hong's work primarily focuses on the Asian American experience, its applicability extends to other minority groups. For example, exploring the understudied negative emotions experienced by Muslim women in Britain, and how these emotions intersect with issues of class, gender, ethnicity, and socio-political factors, would be both important but also interesting to study. Syed and Ali's (2006) study on emotion regulation among Muslim women highlights the complex and evolving nature of this concept. Researchers recognise that complete repression of emotions is neither desirable nor successful personally or socially. The appropriateness of moral principles and social interactions in shaping emotions remains debatable. Society often encourages tight control of emotions, even in religious communities where expressing negativity is discouraged. Young Muslim girls internalise the practice of suppressing their genuine negative emotions, believing it aligns with the desired Islamic social traits of shyness, inhibition, and politeness. These early encounters shape temperaments that limit the expression of specific emotions such as anger, self-assurance, and confidence (Whiting and Child, 1953). Suppressing negative emotions is

a prevalent practice among women, not only in Muslim and minority communities but also in society as a whole. Hochschild (1983) highlighted the additional emotional labour women must undertake to maintain a socially acceptable facade. Simpson and Stroh (2004) conducted quantitative research on emotional labour among men and women in professional and management roles, investigating the relationship between gender, emotional expression, and mental health. They found that women are more inclined to conform to feminine display standards, which entail suppressing negative emotions and feigning positive ones (Syed and Ali, 2006). Consequently, the connection between gender, religion, and negative emotions remains understudied but holds the potential to provide valuable insights into the emotional experiences of British Muslim women and beyond.

Emotional Geographies

The concept of 'emotional geographies' has gained significant traction in human and social geography, examining the spatial and temporal dimensions of emotions and their intersections within specific contexts (Davidson, et al., 2005). It delves into how emotions shape our conscious and unconscious behaviours in the places where we live and engage with our lives (Hallman and Benbow, 2007). By contributing to the existing body of research on emotional geographies, I aim to highlight the significance of feelings and emotions in the realms of human, social, and cultural experiences.

While researchers and interviewers explore emotions and the experiences of individuals in specific spaces, there is often a lack of detailed examination regarding the concept of self or person that shapes emotional dynamics (Wood and Smith, 2004). Geographers have described emotions as "intimate structures of feeling" and emotional geographies as the temporal and spatial conceptualisation of our affective experiences of self and others (Anderson and Smith, 2001, p.9). Emotions are interconnected, serving as the foundation for context, practices, self-perception, interactions, and our internal and external worlds (Wright, 2012, p.1128). In the pilot study, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, interviews with British Muslim women revealed that women expressed a sense of comfort or feeling 'good' in spaces where they can truly be themselves and bring their full identity to work, school, or other settings. They emphasised the contrast between spaces where they are a minority and experience isolation, both internally and externally, and spaces where they can authentically connect with others who share their identity. This highlights the interplay between emotions, self-perception, identity, and space, emphasising the significance of studying emotional geographies that link these concepts.

Pilot study – Empirical Research

The primary objective of this study initially was to gain a deeper understanding of the experiences of British Muslim women within social spaces, particularly third spaces. Additionally, it sought to investigate the significance and need of these spaces, as well as to examine the intricate connection between space and gender. In the initial phase of the empirical study, sixteen British Muslim women were recruited to take part in an unstructured interview, with each interview lasting between 45 minutes to 1.5 hours. The unstructured interview approach allowed for a natural and organic exploration of the views and experiences of British Muslim women in social spaces. The participants were recruited from various regions of the UK and represented diverse backgrounds, including working professionals, students, and

stay-at-home mothers. Although the interviews did not follow a predetermined set of questions, there were occasional prompts to facilitate the flow of conversation, if needed. These prompts encouraged participants to reflect on the influence of different spaces on their mental wellbeing, the impact of social spaces on their daily lives, and their experiences within these spaces. Prior to the study, participants received an information sheet and consent form to ensure their understanding and voluntary participation. The information sheet outlined the research's objective to investigate the experiences of British Muslim women in both social and online spaces. It also highlighted the study's aim to analyse the interplay between gender, space, and religion in the everyday lives of Muslim women, including their utilisation of third spaces. The information sheet was explorative but brief, preventing participants from responding to the questions in a way they believed was appropriate or leading.

During the interviews, a recurring theme emerged regarding the lack of emotional safety experienced by participants in work and educational settings, as well as in social environments where they were the minority. They expressed feeling vulnerable and felt that these spaces did not fully embrace or respect their lifestyles, faith, and choices. It became clear that such settings were not considered safe spaces where they could authentically be themselves. In contrast, participants highlighted various third spaces where they found a sense of safety and acceptance. These included community hubs specifically created for Muslim women, charity groups initiated by Muslim women, networks led by Muslim female leaders, Quranic/study circles, and dhikr gatherings. Participants emphasised that these third spaces evoked positive emotions such as inspiration, pride, and interest, as they fostered connections with other Muslim women and provided a sense of community where they could truly be

themselves. Additionally, they discussed their engagement with online platforms supporting Muslim women, such as websites, podcasts featuring Muslim women, social media influencers, and virtual spaces. However, they also acknowledged the risks associated with social media, including the potential for abuse and trolling, which could lead to negative emotions. Despite the insightfulness of what was mentioned about online spaces, this study will solely focus on physical spaces to gather in-depth and comprehensive data, avoiding potential complications that could arise from studying too many topics simultaneously, which may obscure the findings.

Moreover, participants openly discussed mental health, trauma, and their struggles with anxiety, depression, and relationship abuse. They emphasised how third spaces played a vital role in evoking positive emotions and providing a sense of safety in their daily lives. These spaces offered a supportive environment where they could freely address the aforementioned issues. This reveals that British Muslim women often experience emotional challenges that are not adequately addressed in mosques (Contractor, 2012; Nyhagen, 2019). Furthermore, mainstream mental health services or spaces fail to adequately meet their needs or provide a sense of safety (Hussain, 2009). Therefore, preliminary research indicates that third spaces offer British Muslim women a platform for meaningful conversations with like-minded individuals, contribute to their religious and spiritual growth through Islamic study groups, and encourage participation in outdoor activities, all of which evoke positive emotions.

In summary, participants' discussions highlighted the emotional challenges faced by British Muslim women, the limitations of existing support systems, and the positive influence of third spaces on their emotional well-being. The decision to focus on emotional geographies and safety stemmed from the pilot

study findings. Notably, participants expressed feelings of insecurity, fear, and anxiety in predominantly white spaces, as well as emotional vulnerability in Muslim male-dominated spaces. Conversely, they described positive emotions associated with the safety and self-expression found in third spaces among Muslim women. This shifted the interview focus towards exploring participants' emotional states in various settings such as workplaces, educational institutions, parks, health services, mosques, and community spaces. Through these discussions, themes of identity struggles, social integration, and self-perception emerged, shedding light on feelings of isolation and marginalization experienced in both Muslim male-dominated spaces and broader British society. The lack of comprehensive investigation in this area emphasises the importance and urgency of delving deeper into the connection between safety, emotions, and the experiences of British Muslim women in different spaces.

Emotional Boundaries: Mapping Safety, Risk, and Fear

The pilot study revealed that participants shared their emotional experiences concerning physical and emotional safety within different spaces. Emotions are intricate and multifaceted, with various layers that manifest based on circumstances and contexts. For example, sadness can coexist with shame, guilt, despair, anger, or pessimism. Similarly, the emotion of safety is complex, encompassing multiple dimensions. Research by Rodriquez et al. (2014) suggests that individuals belonging to social, or minority groups often feel intense anger when faced with negative opinions from others, as anger serves as a response to unfair treatment. Additionally, sadness can arise from negative social perceptions or preconceived notions about personal beliefs. Participants discussed feeling a combination of these

emotions when they felt unsafe. However, they expressed a sense of safety in ethnic neighbourhoods and among women who resembled them. This feeling of safety extended across various spaces, including educational settings, public spaces, transportation, and workplaces. Participants consistently highlighted a heightened sense of physical and emotional safety when they were not in the minority, leading to a sense of comfort, ease, and a strong feeling of solidarity.

Moreover, there are mismatches between what safety means for the Muslim community and the wider community at large. The Muslim ummah2 essentially reframes the bounds of what constitutes national identity in Islam and represents the growth of a strong collective identity among Muslims around the world, which cannot be properly articulated merely within the framework of religious fellowship (Zempi and Chakraborti, 2015). In Western society, the Muslim ummah faces unique experiences and challenges related to safety, primarily due to their religious affiliation and group membership. These experiences shape their perception of safety differently from the broader population. More generally, victimisation motivated by Islamophobia has an impact on broader society since it excludes Muslims, promoting fear, hostility, and distrust of the Muslim other. The exclusionary nature of Islamophobic hostility perpetuates the framing of 'us' versus 'them,' defining who belongs and whose norms are deemed legitimate (Zempi and Chakraborti, 2015). It is therefore unsurprising that Muslim communities have distinct and compromised perceptions of safety, necessitating a comprehensive analysis to identify ways to improve their safety. However, even within Muslim communities, there are different emotional experiences of safety for Muslim women compared to men and for visibly Muslim women especially. Navigating several and frequently conflicting political narratives about their

bodies, dress, and religious beliefs in their daily lives, Muslim women face challenges with mobility, security, and violence (Hyndman, 2004). Daily interactions with political ideologies that limit women's social and geographic mobility as well as those that define and securitise Muslim womanhood shape how they develop as political subjects (Farris, 2017). Therefore, it appears that Muslim women are viewed negatively by broader Western society. However, this affects Muslim women's sense of safety since it is Muslim women who experience insecurity because of these misconceptions about what it means to be a Muslim woman.

Conclusion and Next Steps

This paper highlights the significance of investigating the emotional experiences of British Muslim women's encounters in different spaces. It not only emphasises the importance of such research but delves into the rationale, progress, and the newfound emphasis on exploring the link between safety, emotions, and space. The analysis of the pilot study has uncovered a range of emotions and feelings associated with safety, including fear, vulnerability, comfort, and emotional security. This ongoing study will focus on deepening our understanding of the intricate relationship between risk, safety, and emotions as experienced by British Muslim women. By exploring the everyday experiences of British Muslim women across different spaces, the study aims to assess the friendliness and perceived safety of these environments. Additionally, it seeks to uncover the emotional geographies of safety in public, private, and third spaces, while also identifying avenues for improvement. Potential areas of study may include outdoor spaces, third spaces i.e., women's organisations, and the home. Through a grounded approach and further fieldwork, the specific spaces to be examined will be determined, allowing for a more comprehensive and focused exploration.

Given the ethnographic nature of this study, a range of methods will be considered to collect data for the next phase of research. These methods include emotional mapping, where participants visually express their emotions related to different spaces, photovoice for capturing and sharing perspectives through photography, participant observation to observe community activities first-hand, and semi-structured interviews for in-depth insights. This research aims to be participatory, actively engaging with the community to determine suitable methods that align with their preferences and to involve them in the process. This approach enhances the validity of findings and empowers the community. By employing these methods and incorporating community voices, the study seeks to gain a comprehensive understanding of British Muslim women's experiences, emotions, and safety concerns in different spaces. This iterative process will contribute to a better understanding of safety-related emotions for British Muslim women and help improve their experiences in various spaces.

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Disorientation and Reorientation: Negotiating Gender Variance within a Muslim Lifeworld

RIA SEARLE

This paper takes a broad interpretation of the 'religion and conflict theme' by exploring conflict within an individual's identities and how this may be overcome, namely between gender-identity and faith. Using a life narrative methodology (Zeitlyn, 2008; Frank, 1995) this work explored the tools and relationships that one individual who identifies as simultaneously transgender and Muslim has used to negotiate her identities in the view to accommodate and even harmonise them. What was evident when analysing the transcript from the interview conducted with my participant was that she experiences an ongoing process of disorientation and subsequent, effortful, reorientation. Therefore, I employed scholar Sara Ahmed's Queer Phenomenology (2006) as the framework, as her focus on orientation, particularly disorientation and reorientation encapsulates my observations. In Ahmed's work disorientation denotes a displacement and unsettling of one's grounding, while reorientation indicates an arrival or inhabiting of new positions and orientations (Ahmed, 2006).

In this paper I will focus on just a few themes from this anthropological project.I am aware of the controversial nature of transgender identity both in British society and in Islam. For clarification, I do not seek to comment on the permissibility of gender variance, especially transgender identity. In contrast, my work is an anthropological observation and analysis of one person's lived experience. Furthermore, although gender variance or transgender identity is often considered alongside sexual orientation, the latter was not a concern of this project and thus I make no comment upon it. However, due to the availability of existing scholarship around this area on Muslims in Europe, it was necessary for literary research to draw upon work pertaining to sexuality. Notwithstanding this, I speak only of my interlocutor's negotiation of embodied knowledge of her gender-identity and her Muslim faith. Today I will focus on this negotiation within herself and her family unit. My central

contention is that negotiation of belief and ritual practice generates a process of disorientation and reorientation. Disorientation results from embodied knowledge in conflict with traditional community notions and initial familial reactions. Reorientation has been possible for my interlocutor following efforts to accommodate both identities. In this talk I touch upon distilling theological teachings and kinship encouragement to remain Muslim that has enabled my interlocutor to 'live out' both identities.[1]

Before diving into these topics for exploration, I must briefly explain my methods and introduce my interlocutor. Through a process of literary research, an one-off semi-structured interview, and lengthy email chain, I arrived at a life narrative piece of work. Literary research included general work on Muslims in Europe, feminist movements, anthropological work on LGBT, gender and Islam, and culture-specific gender diverse subjectivities.[2] The latter focused predominantly on Islamic societies in Asia, for example hijra communities in India and Pakistan (Gannon, 2009, 2011; Pamment 2019a, 2019b; Hamzić, 2011, 2016) and other gender variant subjectivities in Indonesia (Davies, 2007, 2011). Interestingly, some countries that criminalise same-sex sexuality under Islamic law, at the same time may allow Sex Reassignment Surgery in very select cases. For example, in Iran and Egypt this is the case following the fatwās of Ayatollah Khomeini and Sheikh al-Tantawi respectively (Alipour, 2017). As I have explained, I do not wish to comment on the permissibility of this, I merely wish to explore how one individual enacts, accommodates and 'lives out' identities in the UK today. My research questions were formulated through this literary research and informed the questions I agreed with my interlocutor for our semi-structured interview.

My interlocutor identifies as a British, Bengali, Muslim, transgender woman. She comes from a *Sunni* background and has grown up in the UK. This makes the present research unique,

with much existing research, aforementioned, focused through the lens of migration or specific to societies elsewhere in the world. Sadhana, a pseudonym chosen by my interlocutor, reported feeling different from a young age, with her earliest memories around seven years old. By early adolescence she came to realise this feeling of difference was due to her gender-identity. However, a lack of visibility and already learnt community notions of sinfulness, led Sadhana to foresee no way of expressing how she saw herself in adolesence and early adulthood, generating a level of disorientation.

In the rest of this talk I will highlight a few key themes from my interlocutor's life story, linking them to the processes of disorientation and reorientation, before indicating some areas which this research was unable to fully explore, and thus may be an opportunity for further study.

Sadhana reported feeling different from at least the age of seven, but foresaw no way to express or disclose her self-image. Of course, this is a very young age to have strong conviction of one's difference, and was not necessarily linked to her gender-identity at the time. By early adolescence, Sadhana had come to realise her feeling of difference was due to her gender, how others referred to and treated her, what was expected of her and how she felt inside. Having internalised community-taught notions of sinfulness, and, as Sadhana recalled " even back then I was intelligent enough to know that it was frowned upon" leading her to rhetorically ask "how could I just go out and say yes I am a girl?". Moreover, she saw no one like herself in her immediate Muslim community, or even in wider British society at this time.[3] In adolescence, Sadhana tried to hide her difference from extended family and her wider community, even partaking in her cousin's homophobic and transphobic jokes, something she has come to deeply regret. As she grew into early adulthood, Sadhana's

internalisation of what she was taught vicariously under the name of Islam left her disoriented and experiencing poor mental health. Unable to see any forward path of accommodating her gender-identity and deeply held faith, and trying to suppress one in order to retain the other. In this case, suppressing her gendered self-image in order to maintain her faith and, by extension, her family. Experiencing depression and suicidal thoughts brought disorientation to a head. Unwilling to leave her faith behind, and unable to contain her internal knowledge of gender any further, Sadhana went in search of new possibilities - looking to Muslims on social media, returning to read scripture independently and exploring gender-diversity in Islamic societies worldwide.

Learning of gender variant subjectivities, for example Hijra and Khwajasara, in societies permeated by Islamic spirituality, particularly in Pakistan and her parents' home country of Bangladesh, as well as some areas of India, was reorienting (Gannon, 2009, 2011; Pamment 2019a, 2019b; Hamzić, 2011, 2016). It opened the possibility for Sadhana of expressing an alternative gender to that she was assigned at birth within her Muslim identity. This self-education was a major theme in Sadhana's voice, aiding negotiating of embodied knowledge that she was at once Muslim and transgender, as well as negotiating kinship as we will shortly consider. She also explained to me what she had learnt regarding colonialism and the attempted erasure of gender diversity that had been, to an extent, in some times and places tolerated (Gannon, 2009, 2011; Hamzić, 2011, 2016; Zahed, 2019). Self-education, therefore, was, and continues to still be, a reorienting tool.

Re-reading the Qur'an and contemplating traditional doctrine, led Sadhana to engage with theological teaching bringing her from a place of disorientation to reorientation. Overwhelmingly, Sadhana saw justice and love as the core of what she was reading

in scripture and had been taught. Doing good in the world, namely through spreading justice, standing against oppression and working for a more equal society, Sadhana sees as thoroughly Islamic and her purpose in life. The value of justice is reflected in her work with the charity sector. The theme of love permeates discussion of many religions, but featured heavily in the literature surveyed in preparation for this work (Hamzić, 2016; Zahed, 2019; Yip and Khalid, 2010). Few would deny the importance of The Almighty and Most-Merciful's love for creation in Islam. For Sadhana, providing she believed in one Almighty God, the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) as His messenger, prayed, spread the love of Islam and stood up to injustice, she believed she could live a Muslim life in her preferred gender. This process of reorientation and accommodation of identities may be considered a distillation of complex doctrines to core values, that are unproblematic and compatible with a gender-variant life world. This can be seen to reinforce embodied knowledge of both identities, and thus oriented Sadhana away from more technical points of doctrine that may well condemn her subjectivity. Thus bringing to an end her constant questioning of whether she would ever be able to accommodate her strongly held religious belief and her embodied knowledge of her gender variance. Arriving at this new orientation, accommodating both identities through living out 'core Islamic values' of love and justice led Sadhana to cease keeping her gendered self-image and expression out of her family's view, which in effect was causing her to live almost a double life, and disclose her embodied knowledge to her family (Siraj, 2011; Peumans, 2020; Boellstorff, 2005). It is to kinship I will now move.

I used the term ongoing disorientation and reorientation earlier for the reason that our orientation as humans can flux throughout life, and may be affected by those or that around us. This is evident in Sadhana's narrative. Having reached a point of reoriented

belief within herself, Sadhana chose to 'come out' to her mother. Before exploring her mothers reaction, I wish to highlight two points regarding 'coming out'. Firstly, I use the term 'coming out' in line with Sadhana's voice, as an event in which she disclosed her gendered self-image to her family and a period in which she began to negotiate her Islamic practice with her new feminine gender expression. I am however aware of issues of such a term grounded in Euro-American understandings of sexuality and gender, and problems it provokes when applied to those of religious or ethnic minorities in Europe (Papantonopoulou, 2014; Peumans, 2020; El-Tayeb, 2012). The term does not account, as anthropologist Wim Peumans suggests, for the, quote, 'the multiple meanings and practices' surrounding the closet (Peumans, 2020, pp.57-59). Secondly, coming out as a linguistic phrase can have multiple denotations. Aside from identity disclosure, it is possible to see Sadhana's reorientation in belief and prioritising of core values over detailed doctrine, described before, as a 'coming out' of traditional faith interpretation.

Interestingly, Sadhana first chose to come out to her mother within her family unit. Research suggests that siblings and cousins are more commonly used, as testing grounds before disclosing to elders (Siraj, 2011; Yörükoğlu, 2014). Sadhana did not feel she needed to explain her gender-identity to her three sisters, as she perceived that they already held this knowledge having accepted her as one of them growing up and calling her a feminine nickname since adolescence. 'Coming out' to her mother initially shook Sadhana's reorientation journey, providing some level of disorientation again. Sadhana's mother responded to the disclosure with a negative reaction, which was, perhaps, slightly unexpected by Sadhana. Her mother had never stopped her dressing up in bangles or sarees with her sisters at home. However, upon disclosure, her mother expressed fear at

what others would say, as Sadhana recalled a phrase in Hindi meaning 'What will other people say!', and affirmed what Sadhana had been taught growing up - the two identities were incompatible, sinful and would lead her to hell. Rather than rejecting her mothers fears and reaction outright, Sadhana sensitively acknowledged her mothers reaction and fears, explaining what she learnt about gender diversity in other Islamic societies globally and historically, as well as the spiritual importance of androgynous individuals in some traditions and histories (Pamment, 2019b; Dutta et al., 2022). She also explained her mental health struggles and how she felt inside. After a short period of contemplation, Sadhana's mother experienced her own reorientation in regard to her daughter, which, in turn, has enabled her to support Sadhana in her faith. Using her religious belief, Sadhana's mother reasoned that her purpose as a mother was to protect her children - this task was given to her by Allah. Protecting her children from harm included their mental health. Therefore, she had to help her child in whatever they were going through. While existing research suggests parents may support their children even if their identity is contrary to traditional faith teachings, this reasoning was uniquely phrased compared to the research consulted (Yörükoğlu, 2014).[4] Realising the struggles Sadhana was going through her mother pleaded 'as long as you remain Muslim and do your prayers you'll be who you are'. This was a clear indication that remaining Muslim, a practising Muslim, was the most important consideration for Sadhana's mother. From this point, Sadhana and her mother were able to build stronger their kinship, rather than negate or reject it. In itself, this may be considered a reorientation. Sadhana once foresaw no way to express her gendered identity within her existing family and faith framework, however this statement brought into reach that very possibility.

This encouragement is particularly interesting when considering the process of reorientation and subsequent support kinship provided Sadhana when negotiating gendered ritual practice. Sadhana's mother's encouragement for Sadhana to continue practising Islam within her new gender-identity was not merely expressed in words. As time went on, Sadhana's mother and sisters modelled to her their standards of female piety, praying five times daily and veiling in prayer, encouraging her to do the same. Although, this did not remove all disorientation for Sadhana, as she explained she still questioned whether she was insulting her faith by engaging in prayer as they did. However, they kept reminding her that if she was a Muslim woman like them, then this is what she should be doing. Eventually Sadhana has reoriented her practice praying at home with them daily. This is a significant change from her previous engagement, having visited mosque every week for Friday *Jummah* prayers with male family as a child and adolescent, to now not visiting mosque and solely praying at home. Having said this, Sadhana recognises she could be more pious in the future, admitting she sometimes fails to make all five prayers, especially when at work. Following Liza Debevec's 'Postponing Piety' (2012) work with Muslim's in Burkino Faso, I enquired about future prayer and ritual aspirations. Sadhana expressed the belief that her prayer life will become more routine, as she sincerely wishes to pray but, like Debevec's interlocutors, work gets in the way, suggesting again an ongoing reorientation that does not negate present identification (Debevec, 2012). Therefore, it appears kinship holds the capacity to disorient individuals, reinforcing teachings in the wider community, meanwhile able to reorient individuals, bringing them to engage in religious practice in adapted ways and modelling expectations around feminine piety. Reorientation occurs, in some sense, for both the individual directly negotiating their own identities and for kin around them, negotiating background and kin relation.

This work concludes that accommodating identities that may be considered contrary to one another generates a process of disorientation. However, the interlocutor at the centre of this work indicates a range of potential tools available to those attempting to negotiate religion and gender-identity. Today I have shared self-education, distilling doctrine to core values and kinship relations, as tools used by my interlocutor to negotiate, accommodate and even harmonise her identities.

Following Sadhana's kinship support and the vital role this has played in her continued engagement with Islamic ritual within the home, that has been explored only briefly in this work, it would be beneficial to further investigate the tools at parents disposal to accept their child within their own worldview, culture or faith background. Doing so may enable support to be provided to parents who do not wish to negate their relationship with their children due to traditional teachings, or the children with their family's faith, as many anthropological works attest (Yörükoğlu, 2014; Peumans, 2020).[5] In addition, following Sadhana's reoriented practice and suggestion she no longer wishes to visit the mosque for fear of her safety, I suspect this theme may be common across diverse individuals' in Abrahamic faiths. Exploring 'double discrimination', discrimination in both sacred and secular space by individuals of faith who diverge from societal expectations, and thus are subject to discrimination in multiple spheres due to their intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991, 2019), would be interesting.

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The Imperilled Muslim Woman—Revisited

AMINA SHAREEF

Introduction

On October 9, 2012, the fifteen-year-old, Malala Yousafzai was shot in the head by a masked Taliban gunman as she was returning home on a school bus in Mingora, Pakistan. The bullet skimmed her skull and lodged into her neck. The images of Malala wrapped in bloodied-bandages, lying on a stretcher or in a gurney after her surgery inundated blogs, social media sites, and newspapers circulated around the world, spurring an outpouring of sympathy and efforts to rescue her (Khoja-Moolji, 2015). Vigils were organized and thousands of people gathered to pray for her recovery (Hesford, 2014). Pakistani and American officials had discussions about relocating Malala to an American military hospital in Germany (Hesford, 2014). U.S. Congresswomen Gabby Giffords and her husband even proposed to bring Malala into United States to receive treatment (Hesford, 2014). And an undisclosed celebrity offered to pay the fuel costs for her transportation (Hesford, 2014). In the end, after initial emergency care in Pakistan, she was flown to Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Birmingham, England, a hospital that specializes in gunshot wounds and head injuries. Following three months of hospitalization, Yousafzai was released to her family who had taken up residence in the West Midlands.

Malala's shooting gave fodder to the existing narratives of the savagery of the Taliban and the subordination of Muslim girls by Muslim societies. For example, *New York Times* reporter, Decan Walsh, wrote that the fact that the death of schoolgirl was seen as necessary illustrates the brutality of the Taliban regime (Hesford,

2014). Former Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, described Malala to a group of Girl Scouts as "very brave in standing up for the rights of girls" and the Taliban as "threatened by that kind of [female] empowerment" (Hesford, 2014). After she received the Nobel Peace prize in 2014 as its youngest recipient, former US president, Barak Obama, praised Malala for trying "to make sure girls everywhere can get an education" and for responding to the Taliban's "brutality" and attempts "to silence her" with "strength and resolve" (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2014).

Following her shooting, Malala was elevated into a global icon. *Time* Magazine featured Malala on the cover of its December 2012 issue and designated her No. 2 person of the year and runner-up to Barak Obama. Former Prime Minister of England, Gordon Brown and U.N. Envoy for Global Education, launched the "I am Malala" petition which urged its signatories to fight for the rights of sixty-one million primary aged, Pakistani school children deprived from universal education[i]. And the U.N. Secretary General at the time, Ban Ki-moon, made November 10, 2012 Malala Day. Malala's autobiography, *I Am Malala,* became a New York Times bestseller (The New York Times Best Sellers, 2013). Malala's name became a household name. A symbol for the West.

I offer Malala's story here because Malala offers an example of the Muslim woman who is "fixed in the Western imaginary as confined, mutilated, and sometimes murdered in the name of culture" (Razack, 2004). This representation of Muslim women is a prevailing representation in the West, one that shapes the context within which Muslim women experience poorer educational achievement, reduced chances of employment, and increased likelihood of living in crowded housing, of facing the premature death for their newborns, and of being racially assaulted on the street. Given the importance of this context,

research exploring Muslim women's lives has paid attention to the dominant representations of Muslim women. The research literature has a tendency to conceptualize these representations through the framework of the stereotype. One exception is the framework offered by Sherene Razack (2008). Razack names the representation of Muslim woman as gender victim as the "Imperilled Muslim woman," defining her as an "allegorical figure." In this chapter, I theoretically extend Razack's description of the Imperilled Muslim women. In contrast to an allegorical figure, I offer that the Imperilled Muslim women is a discursively produced subject-position who acts as a technique of power.

Conceptualizing representations of Muslim women

A wide range of research scholarship pays attention to the dominant representations of Islam and Muslims, giving special attention to how Muslim women are popularly constructed. One of the most prevailing notions of Muslim women circulating in the public imaginary is one that constructs her as an abject victim of Muslim and Islamic patriarchy. This view of Muslim women has been predominately conceptualized in the research literature as a stereotype. The concept of stereotype comes from the discipline of social psychology and refers to a generalized belief that is held about a social group and that is thought to be made through a cognitive process of taking the characteristics of a particular group and generalizing them about a larger category. For example, the claim that all Muslims are terrorists would be seen as a stereotype in this framework because it takes the actions of a particular group of Muslims who have committed acts of violence as representative of the larger category of Muslim. The problem with the framework of stereotype is that it locates the

origins of anti-Muslim representation *inside* the pathological psyches of socially deviant individuals. That is, it suggests that anti-Muslim views and ideas originate from the faulty cognitive reasoning of wayward individuals who are inclined towards prejudicial views. Tethering the cause of anti-Muslim representation to *individuals*, the concept of the stereotype draws attention away from *institutions*—those public sites involved in the production of anti-Muslim representation such as school curriculum, policy, literature, and various forms of popular media (newspaper, radio, television, film, broadcasting, etc). As such, it does not allow us to consider the possibility that anti-Muslim representation might be a product of public discourse.

There is one notable exception to the dominant orientation that conceptualizes representations of Muslim women through the framework of stereotype. It is the conceptualization offered by postcolonial and feminist scholar, Sherene Razack (2004). Razack does not interpret the construction of Muslim women as victims of gender oppression as a stereotype. Instead, she conceptualizes this representation as an "allegorical figure" which she subsequently names the *Imperilled Muslim woman*. Razack develops the notion of the Imperilled Muslim woman in her analysis of Norway's policy initiatives in the early 2000's to ban forced marriage amongst Muslim communities. Razack writes that the Imperilled Muslim women allows for the conduct of Muslim communities to be regulated. That is, the Imperilled Muslim woman, she writes, is deployed by the Norwegian state as a means of constituting a new kind of Muslim youth, one who has progressed into complete personhood by becoming autonomous from tradition, family, and community. Writing that Muslim women's bodies are the terrain on which Norway manages its racial population, Razack offers a ground-breaking perspective of how race, gender, and power come together in

anti-Muslim racism. I am immensely indebted to Razack whose work has informed my thinking on the relationship between anti-Muslim racism and the management of Muslim populations. It is in appreciation of Razack's contributions that I develop the figure of the Imperilled Muslim woman here.

While Razack identifies the Imperilled Muslim women as a construct made by public policy and discourse, she does not explicitly define the Imperilled Muslim women as a subject-position constituted by discourse. As mentioned earlier, Razack refers to the Imperilled Muslim woman as an "allegorical figure." Thinking with Foucault's work on discourse and power, I take Razack's figure of the Imperilled Muslim woman and theorize her as a discursively produced subject-position who acts as a technique of power in the War on Terror.

The terms—agency, voice, rights, and freedom—through which Muslim women are articulated make clear that the Imperilled Muslim woman is a construction of a set of discourses underwritten by white, liberal feminism. Having her origin in a set of discourses, the Imperilled Muslim woman is a figure constituted by a particular "regime of truth" about what a Muslim woman is that circulates through a broad range of western media, newspaper, magazines, film, television, social media, etc. That is, she is a subject-position brought into existence through the collection of statements that name, represent, signify, and circumscribe how Muslim women can and cannot be spoken about (Foucault & Gordon, 1980)(Hall, 2001). The Imperilled Muslim woman is a subject-position that represents the set of rules that govern how Muslim women are made intelligible in the western imaginary (Hall, 2001).

As a subject-position made by a knowledge system that governs how Muslim women can be known, the Imperilled Muslim woman is technique of power. Power, according to Foucault,

produces truth and truth in turn consolidates power. "We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth," he writes (Foucault & Gordon, 1980). That is, power produces knowledge, knowledge constitutes power, and power always exists in relation to some field of knowledge. From this perspective, I take the Imperilled Muslim woman as a form of knowledge about Muslim women for subjecting Muslim people by power. The theory of the Imperilled Muslim woman as a technique of power allows scholarship on Islam and Muslims to move beyond the framework of stereotype and begin to consider how institution are involved in the production of anti-Muslim representation and racism. An institutional focus allows us to see anti-Muslim representation as part of a biopolitical project which has as aim the management of population. Thinking of the Imperilled Muslim women as a technique of power allows research to explore those policy initiatives that sought recourse to the notion of Muslim women's gender abjection—bans and restrictions on the hijab and niqab, counter-terror and counter-extremism practice—as racialized governmentality, as efforts to remake Muslim subjects and constitute "good Muslim" subjectivities that are amenable to liberal rule.

The Imperilled Muslim woman: A discursively produced subject-position

Malala's case exemplifies the claim that I am making, that the Imperilled Muslim woman is a subject-position constituted by a set of discourses. Malala was narrated as a Muslim woman who is deprived of the voice and the right to education, freedom of speech, political freedom to organize and advocate for a given cause. Her story was narrated as a story of immobilization and exclusion

from education. Erased and obscured was the fact that Malala was, prior to the attack, a powerful advocate for the educational rights of girls in the global South. Malala had been prominent both in the region and internationally for her work. Regionally, she had given interviews on national radio and television. And she had headed a UNICEF sponsored delegation of children's rights advocates to Peshawar to speak to local politicians (Hesford, 2013). Internationally, Malala had become well known for a blog she had written in 2009 for the BBC on her lived experiences under Taliban rule and had even been nominated by Desmond Tutu in 2011 for the International Children's Peace Prize. In spite of her history of political agency, Malala was made known following her shooting in relation to a regime of "truth" in which Muslim women can only ever exist as abject figures of female subjugation. The construction of Malala as gender victim demonstrates that the Imperilled Muslim woman is a subject-position produced in relation to discourses of female subjugation, notably accounts of arranged, forced, polygamous, child marriages, marriage to terrorists, forced veiling, female genital mutilation, and honor killing (Razack, 2004). These discourses talk about the Imperilled Muslim woman as immobilized, as held out of public spaces such as malls, parks, schools, universities, and prevented from playing sports, participating in physical education, swimming, performing arts, dance, and music (Alibhai-Brown, 2014). These discourses narrate the Imperilled Muslim woman through a central theme: the violation of her subjecthood.

The Imperilled Muslim woman steadily streams into the Western consciousness through the autobiographical accounts written by Muslim women who suffered gender subordination at the hands of Muslim men and Islam (Hirschkind & Mahmood, 2002). Topping best-selling lists and filling Highstreet bookstores, these personal accounts have a common style and character:

the protagonists are "plucky individualists with feminist ideals. They desire freedom. They denounce Islam and Muslim men as the cause of women's oppression. And they are co-authored by American and European journalists" (Khurshid & Pitts, 2019). An example is Malala's autobiography, *I am Malala*. Her text includes themes common across these memoirs such as arranged marriages, veiling, hypersexual men, flogging and selling women, and the emancipatory promise of education (Kurshid & Pitts, 2019). These lurid autobiographies, through the lives and voices of Malala and others like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Mukhtar Mai, Irshad Manji, Carmen bin Laden, Azhar Nafisi, Fadela Amara, Loubna Meliane, and Samira Belil, make a "truth" about Muslim women. They make the Imperilled Muslim woman the only subject-position by which Muslim women can be known. Of course the autobiographies were not the first to produce the Imperilled Muslim women. Indeed, the Imperilled Muslim woman first appears in colonial writings of the Orient.

However, the Imperilled Muslim woman is not a modern figure, having first appeared in the colonial knowledge production of the Orient that took place in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Over the period of a century and a half, from 1800 to 1950, roughly sixty thousand books were published on the Arab orient alone for Western readers (Hoodfar, 2001). The central objective of these writings was to represent the Arabs/Muslims as racially inferior, savage, and in dire need of the progress brought to them by the colonial enterprise (Hoodfar, 2001). In these writings, Muslim women featured as an object of intense interest. Hidden behind walls and veils, the Muslim women frustrated the male colonial gaze who had come to the East to see. As one travel writer wrote, their "eyes cannot always be seen but are always seeing. I have the feeling of being naked" (Mabro, 1996). Frustrating the colonial male's urge to

know, the Muslim women was subjected to a knowledge project to make her visible; she was relentlessly narrated, painted, and photographed. In colonial travel writing, she was made knowledgeable as the possession of Muslim men, living a life akin to death: she lives "in a complete state of captivity," as "slaves to their husbands," "luxurious animals," "clothed in the garments of the grave" (Mabro, 1996). Colonial knowledge produced the Imperilled Muslim women.

The Imperilled Muslim woman is immediately identifiable through her clothing—*niqabs*, *hijabs*, *abayas*, *burqas*, *chadors, etc*. Clothing is the master signifier of her lack of agency, voice, rights, and freedom. As Al-Saji (2010) argues in her analysis of the racialization of the veil in the French context, Islamic clothing is overdetermined as a hypervisible metaphor par excellence of the gender domination of Islam. That is, it is made to exist in the same grid of gender relations as female genital mutilation, honor killings, and arranged/forced/child/polygamous/terrorist marriages (see for example Namazie, 2004). As such, her clothing is made to visually stand in for these forms of gender violence and their endemic status within *that* culture (Al-Saji, 2011). In Malala's case, the photographs taken of her while lying in a hospital bed, post-surgery, attached to various tubes, including a nose tube, picture her in a headscarf. The scarf invokes the image of Muslim women as a suffering collective. It inserts Malala's story into the already circulating narrative of the violence experienced by Muslim women within Muslim societies. Malala's scarf narrates the Imperilled Muslim women. The Imperilled Muslim woman is recognized by it.

The hijab, niqab, and other forms of female sartorial dress offer the best illustration of the Imperilled Muslim woman as a technique of power. The Imperilled Muslim woman is often present in policy-making that has as effect the regulation of expressions of

female Muslimness through the regulation of Muslim women's sartorial practice. Take for example the legal institutions that prohibit the wearing of the hijab or niqab in public spaces in unveiling regimes present across the Western world such as France, Germany, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, and Denmark. In the case France, the 2004 prohibition of conspicuous religious signs in public schools was facilitated by the "metonymic identification of veiling…with gender oppression" (Al-Saji, 2010). In the case of England, the 2017 mandate established by the English Office for Standards in education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted) that requires English school inspectors to question primary school-aged girls Muslim girls for their motive for wearing the hijab was facilitated by the view that the hijab represents the "sexualization[1]" of Muslim girls and woman. In the case of Belgian, the ban on face veils in public spaces followed parliamentary debate which equated the niqab with a "prison" and a violation of the dignity and humanity of women (Howard, 2012). These unveiling institutions offer examples of how the Imperilled Muslim woman acts as a technique of power to regulate female expressions of Muslimness.

The Imperilled Muslim woman as a technique of power can be evidenced by counter-extremism practices to create "good Muslim women." Counterextremism efforts have packaged themselves as efforts to empower Muslim women. For example, from 2007 and 2009, counter-extremism money funded 133 projects that sought to emancipate Muslim women (Brown, 2019). One project in particular[2] was the National Muslim Women's Advisory Group (NMWAG). MNWAG's activities involved encouraging Muslim women's civic participation and political representation, building Muslim women's faith understanding, and organizing campaigns to liberate Muslim women

from so-called "community" or "Islamic" teaching that constrict women's options on having a career, choosing a husband, and being active in the public domain (Brown, 2019). While crucial are campaigns that protect Muslim women from femicide and violence and protect their right to choose their own spouse and pursue a public life, they should come—*as they already do*—from within Muslim communities. More importantly, these campaigns should be framed through Muslim epistemologies. Campaigns led by the counterterror state and threaded with the language of Liberalism raises suspicion about state concerns for empowering Muslim women. Indeed these campaigns signal a project to make "good Muslim" subjectivities (Mahmood, 2006; Yazbeck-Haddad & Balz, 2008). Counter-extremism practice offers a good example of how the Imperilled Muslim woman acts as a technique of power for making "good Muslim women."

Conclusion

The representation of Muslim women as victims of Islamic and Muslim patriarchy is much more than a stereotype that originates in the faulty cognitive reasoning of socially deviant individuals given to pathological views. Rather, it is a representation that is actively produced and sustained in public institutions such as school curriculum, policy, literature, and various forms of popular media (newspaper, radio, television, film, broadcasting, etc). As a product of discourse, the prevailing representation of Muslim women can be better conceptualized as a subject-position or, following Sherene Razack's terminology, the Imperilled Muslim woman. Conceptualizing the Imperilled Muslim woman as an effect of discourse allows us to further conceptualize her as a technique of power. The framework of the Imperilled Muslim woman as a subject-position involved in the regulation and

making of good Muslimness is vital for developing a description of anti-Muslim racism as a biopolitical project for managing Muslim populations.

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Politics or Religion: What Shapes Muslim-Jewish Relations in the UK: An Analysis of Media Sources in Arabic

RUBY HAJI NAIF

This research paper aims to investigate the media coverage of Muslim-Jewish relations in the UK by analysing articles written in Arabic from two newspapers: Al Jazeera, a Qatari-based media outlet, and The Times of Israel, an Israeli outlet. The study will employ a qualitative analysis to identify the main themes that address the research question: "Politics or Religion: How do the media frame Muslim-Jewish Relations in the UK?" To explore this question, the paper will present the dominant themes and sub-themes of the media coverage of Muslim-Jewish relations in the UK, as revealed through analysing news articles from the two newspapers.

Research Methodology

The study employs thematic analysis to identify the themes and sub-themes in Al Jazeera and Time of Israel's articles about Muslim-Jewish relations. The search uses specific Arabic phrases - "almuslimun walyahud fi almamlakat almutahida" (Muslims and Jewish people in the United Kingdom) and "al'iislam walyahudiat fi almamlakat almutahida" (Islam and Judaism in the United Kingdom) - from the period of 2013-2022 to identify articles that discuss Muslims and Jews in the UK. Articles that discuss Muslims or Jews in the UK separately were not analysed. The study only includes news articles. The study also uses a comparative analysis to compare the two newspapers' dominant themes.

This paper utilise the Framework approach to conduct a thematic analysis of qualitative data (Bryman, 2012, p. 579). This method involves carefully reading and re-reading the data to identify key themes and subthemes (Bryman, 2014, p. 579). These themes and subthemes are recurring patterns or ideas found in the text. After identifying the themes, the data is organised into core themes using the Framework approach and displayed in a format that shows each case's subthemes. The paper also employs framing effect theory as a lens to analyse the themes and related subthemes that emerge from the qualitative data. The framing effect theory is one of the most significant theories in media and communication science, in which it explains how news media can impact people's perspectives by making subtle changes to how they present and report on an issue (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2019, pp. 2).

Findings - Al Jazeera

This study explicitly examines Al Jazeera's Arabic online news outlet, in which 16 news articles discussing Jewish-Muslim relations in the UK have been identified from the newspaper's online archive. Al Jazeera is a media organisation headquartered in Qatar, which began in 1996 and is considered one of the earliest independent news channels in the Arab world. It encompasses a variety of channels, outlets, and research centres that produce news, documentaries, and other content. *Dominant themes - Religion and Politics*.

Religious values and beliefs

One of the sub-themes of this topic is religion's shared values and beliefs. For instance, an article discussing the widespread availability of Halal products reports that some people concerned about this growth argue that 20% of all poultry in the country is slaughtered according to religious practices (Boushieki, 2019, Al Jazeera). In comparison, only 5% of the population needs to buy such poultry, most of whom are followers of the Islamic and Jewish religions (Boushieki, 2019, Al Jazeera). Another article discusses the Islamisation of schools in the UK, emphasises the need to maintain freedom of religion for students and teachers within British schools (Ameen, 2014, Al Jazeera). The article highlights the need to respect religious practices such as wearing a headscarf for Muslim women and the right of those who follow the Jewish faith to wear a head covering. Both articles highlight the increasing scrutiny of the values held by Muslims and Jews in the public sphere. Interestingly, the two religious groups are portrayed as sharing similar values.

Religious practices

There are two sub-themes related to religious practices. The first sub-theme is religion in British schools. One article reports on a discussion in the British media about the Islamisation of British schools and whether this discussion will be extended to other religions, such as Judaism (Ameen, 2014, AlJazeera). The second sub-theme is the religious opinion. One article reports on a call to boycott dates produced in Israel during Ramadan, citing that breaking the fast with dates produced by Jewish settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories may impact "religious sanctity and not just political sanctity" (Dirya, 2013, Al Jazeera). Another article reports on the UK Independence Party's (UKIP) proposed charter that calls on Muslim communities in Britain to sign a pledge renouncing violence, banning the construction of new mosques, and removing verses from the Quran (Dirya, 2014, Al Jazeera). The proposed charter cites a text that it claims calls on Muslims to kill

Jews. However, the article highlights that the correct Quranic text says, "Kill the polytheists wherever you find them.", and not Jews. These articles demonstrate how religion and politics intersect, with religion being utilised to legitimise political agendas.

Politics – Integration

This theme is about the integration of religious minorities, especially Muslims, in the British society. According to one article, more than half of British Muslims want to fully integrate into society as per an extensive survey (Al Jazeera, 2016). However, the same article also reports that British Muslims are more likely than the general population to believe in conspiracy theories about the September 11, 2001 attacks caused by the US government or Jewish influence (Al Jazeera, 2016). Such articles imply that although Muslims are willing to integrate into British society, their attitudes towards Jews may not entirely align with the views accepted by the broader society about the Jewish population.

Politics – Discrimination and Prejudice

One of the sub-themes in this topic is Islamophobia and discrimination against Muslims. Articles related to this theme describe how the Muslim community faces attacks on its mosques, schools, and women by far-right groups and how there has been a significant rise in racism and hatred against Muslims in Britain, especially after incidents such as the killing of a soldier (e.g., Ameen, 2015a; Al Jazeera). These stories also highlight that the Jewish community has shown solidarity with the Muslim community or that they are also a target of far-right groups. Another sub-theme is antisemitism, which mainly focuses on accusations and reports of individuals who are accused of antisemitism, such as the case of Shelly Asquith, a Muslim of Tunisian origin who was dismissed from her position as the president of the National Union of Students in Britain after an investigation into accusations of antisemitism against her (Al Jazeera, 2022). While articles about Islamophobia highlight the increase of hate and violence towards Muslims, articles about antisemitism focus on individuals accused of being antisemitic.

Politics – Elections

Just like the theme of religious practices, politics also intersects with religion here. The first sub-theme focuses on political rhetoric and campaign promises during elections. One article discusses the UK Independence Party's call for Muslim communities to denounce violence and refrain from building new mosques (Dirya, 2014, Al Jazeera). The article later mentions British Labour MP Yasmin Qureshi's response that this call aims to win support from extremist right-wing factions in British society. The second sub-theme is about elections and their impact on Muslims and Jews—many articles on this theme report on issues related to antisemitism within the British Labour Party (e.g., Al Jazeera, 2020). Interestingly, these articles also include the party's stance on Palestinian and Arab issues and its approach to dealing with the Muslim minority in the UK. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, reports of antisemitism tend to focus on parties accused of promoting it.

Politics – State policy and regulations

This theme includes sub-themes related to state monitoring of religious schools, the regulation regarding Sharia courts, and government programs to combat extremism. One article delves into an investigation of religious schools (Ameen, 2014, Al

Jazeera), while another covers Home Secretary Theresa May's review of Sharia courts in the UK, with some women's rights groups advocating for a ban on such courts (Ameen, 2015b; Al Jazeera). The article raises the question of whether this investigation would extend to Jewish courts and other religions or solely focus on Muslim courts.

Comparison

Many articles that explore Muslim-Jewish relations in the UK compare the two communities by highlighting similarities or differences. However, the underlying theme of these articles may be neither solely political nor religious. In one article, the British government's review of Sharia courts raised whether Jewish courts would also be investigated or if the investigation would solely focus on Islamic courts (Ameen, 2015b; Al Jazeera). Similarly, another article discussing the debate around private schools' right to apply their religious beliefs mentioned Islamic and Jewish schools (Ameen, 2014, Al Jazeera). At times, the Muslim and Jewish communities are not compared but are shown to have similar challenges. For instance, one article features a Muslim leader expressing disgust at offensive writings on the entrance of a monastery, noting that such provocations are not uncommon as the Muslim community has also faced similar incidents, such as pig heads left on mosque doors and offensive drawings (Al Jazeera, 2017).

Findings – The Times of Israel

The Times of Israel is a multi-language newspaper from Israel that began in 2012, and is based in Jerusalem. It documents developments in Israel, the Middle East, and the Jewish

community worldwide. Twenty-two news articles discussing Jewish-Muslims relations in the UK have been identified from the newspaper's online archive. *Dominant theme – Politics.*

Politics – Discrimination and Prejudice

One of the principal sub-themes of discrimination and prejudice is antisemitism. For instance, an article about an interfaith debate between a Muslim and a Jewish person reported an example of apparent antisemitism during the war on Gaza (Lipman, 2014. The Times of Israel). The article noted that Twitter saw the hashtag 'Hitler was right' spread, highlighting how blatantly some people express their hatred towards Jews. Furthermore, another article reported how expressions of hate had been directed towards London Mayor Sadiq Khan, who received antisemitic messages after stating that he would not support Jeremy Corbyn in the election for the Labour Party leadership (The Times of Israel, 2016a). Another common sub-theme of discrimination is Islamophobia, often mentioned in articles discussing antisemitism. For example, an article reporting an increase in hate crimes against Jews and Muslims noted a surge in the number of recorded incidents of hate crime in the past year, with an increase of over 70% compared to the year before (The Times of Israel, 2015a). While Al Jazeera primarily focuses on the rise of hate and violence against Muslims, discussions of Islamophobia in The Times of Israel are often intertwined with the broader topic of antisemitism.

Politics – Elections

The coverage of the UK elections has brought to the forefront sub-themes regarding media coverage of the Muslim-Jewish relation. Firstly, some articles discuss the appointment of Sajid

Javid as the first Muslim to hold one of the highest government positions in the UK and his stance on Israel and the Jewish community in the UK. One article reports that Javid has a pro-Israel stance and close ties with the Jewish community, framing his appointment as a significant step towards improving Jewish-Muslim relations and inclusivity in British politics (Filibut, 2018, The Times of Israel). Articles reporting on the appointment of Muslim leaders often delve into their stance towards the Jewish community and how it may impact the Jewish community in the UK. Secondly, several articles discuss the election of Sadiq Khan as the first Muslim mayor of a European capital city, focusing on his solidarity with the British Jewish community. One article highlights that Khan attended the annual ceremony organised by British Jews to commemorate Holocaust victims as his first official act as mayor, framing this act of solidarity as a powerful message against antisemitism (The Times of Israel, 2016b).

Politics – State policy and regulation

This theme focuses on the government's surveillance of religious leaders. One article reports a policy proposal that would mandate all priests, rabbis, and imams to register their names in a "national register of religious leaders" if they intend to work with public institutions (The Times of Israel, 2015b). The article notes the concerns of religious leaders, particularly those of the Muslim community, about the government's interference in religious affairs. It also highlights their apprehension about one aspect of this proposal, which defines extremism as anything that opposes British values. In this context, Muslims and Jews are portrayed as being under surveillance, which could result in government intervention in their religious practices. This focus is similar to Al Jazeera's framing of Muslims and Jews sharing

religious practices; however, in Al Jazeera Jews are mentioned to legitimise Muslim concerns as not just their own but as broader religious issues.

Politics – Attitudes and Opinions

One subtheme is Muslim opinions towards Jews. An article reports on a survey that found over 25% of Muslims in the UK agreed with the belief that Jews are "responsible for most wars," compared to 6% of Britons overall (The Times of Israel, 2016c). The same article mentions that nearly 40% of Muslim participants believed Jews have "excessive control over global affairs," compared to 10% of the general population in the UK. The news frame of such an article highlights concerns about Muslim attitudes towards Jews and the impact of these attitudes on social cohesion.

Comparison

Most articles that include comparisons between Jews and Muslims in the UK highlight the similar threats faced by both communities, especially from far-right groups. One common sub-theme, similar to that in Al Jazeera, is exploring the commonality between the Muslim and Jewish communities and the common threats they face. One subtheme discusses the increased hate crimes facing both communities in the UK. For example, one article reports that Islamophobic incidents increased by 70%, and anti-Semitic crimes increased by 93% in the past year (The Times of Israel, 2015c). Another article highlights that Muslims and Jewish face common threats, referring to a court case where a British man received a five-year prison sentence for calling on social media to kill Jews and Muslims (The Time of Israel, 2017a).

Interfaith relation

This theme is not solely political or religious. There are several sub-themes related to interfaith relations. The first sub-theme is interfaith debate, where articles report on stories about individuals engaging in peaceful debate. One story report on a debate where participants from the Muslim and Jewish communities engaged in what the article called Manazara mohzaba wa hada, meaning polite and sharp debates on antisemitism and Islamophobia (Lipman, 2014. The Times of Israel). Another sub-theme is personal experiences with the other religion, such as a story of a Rabia who fasts during Ramadan as a gesture for interfaith communication (Ya'akov, 2014, The Time of Israel). A third sub-theme is Jewish-Muslim friendship, where articles focus on stories of solidarity and friendship despite challenges. For instance, a story was reported about a Jewish woman and a Muslim man who shared more than ten years of experience and supported each other after the Manchester attack (The Times of Israel, 2017b). Although such stories show coexistence between the two, the fact that entire articles are dedicated to them suggests that they are not common occurrences. Notably, the Times of Israel maintains an archive titled "Muslim-Jewish Relations," featuring articles from various parts of the world that address the topic. Focusing on interfaith relations is a news frame typical in this outlet.

Conclusion

Antisemitism is a dominant theme covered by Al Jazeera and the Times of Israel, albeit with different focuses. Al Jazeera delves into the topic of parties and individuals facing accusations, while Times of Israel explores the re-emergence of antisemitism in society. As evidenced by the literature review, most studies on the

portrayal of Jews in UK media also focus on concerns surrounding antisemitism. Although not all articles about Muslim-Jewish relations in this study revolve around antisemitism, it remains a prominent theme like the literature review on Media coverage of Jews in the UK. Islamophobia is another prevailing theme that receives attention from Al Jazeera and the Times of Israel, but with differing approaches. Al Jazeera reports on the increase in violence and bigotry towards Muslims, while the Times of Israel typically examines the intersection of Islamophobia with the rise of antisemitism.

Comparison is another dominant theme Al Jazeera and the Times of Israel explore. While both news outlets highlight how Jews and Muslims are confronted by a shared danger posed by far-right extremist groups, Al Jazeera incorporates Jews into the coverage when discussing the proposal of reviewing religious entities such as Islamic schools or Muslim courts, questioning whether similar measures will be applied to Judaism. Additionally, it portrays Jews as a category that legitimises the concerns of Muslims, emphasising that religious issues are not solely a concern of the Muslim community. In contrast, The Times of Israel concentrates on highlighting the common threats faced by both Jews and Muslims. State surveillance of religious entities and leaders is another dominant theme in both media outlets. However, articles in Al Jazeera include Jews and Jewish practices to legitimise Muslim concerns as not just their own but as broader religious issues.

Moreover, when analysing the dominant themes in Al Jazeera, two primary ones could be categorised under religion: religious practices and religious values. While discussion surrounding these themes are not exclusively religious, none of The Times of Israel's dominant themes solely relate to religion. Most of the themes discussed in both newspapers, such as elections, government surveillance, and state policies, can be classified under

politics. Even in Al Jazeera, some of the themes categorised under religion intersect with politics.

The research concludes that both Al Jazeera and The Times of Israel frame the relationship between Jews and Muslims in the UK in terms of politics rather than religion. Interestingly, media coverage of Muslims in articles about Muslim-Jewish relations in the UK by both outlets does not depict Islam and Muslims as "others" or solely in terms of terrorism and other negative portrayals, as the literature on media coverage of Muslims in the UK shows. Bleich, Stonebraker, Nisar, & Abdelhamid (2015) argue that most studies on media's coverage of Muslims does not compare the representation of Muslims to that of other identities. Thus, this analysis underscores the necessity of further research that compares media coverage of Muslims in the UK and the West with other minorities or/and religious groups or analyses their portrayal in term of their relationships with other groups. By analysing how the media depicts the relationships between Muslims and other minority groups, researchers studying media representations of Muslims in the UK can gain valuable insights and a more comprehensive understanding of how Muslims are portrayed in the media.

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A Theology of Praxis – How British Muslim Activists Use Islam as a Liberative Tool to Combat Class Exploitation and Economic Inequality

SHARAIZ CHAUDURY

Introduction

In a world of injustice, Islamic Liberation Theology was devised to address and tackle various economic, gendered and racialised systems of oppression. It shows a disdain for all forms of exploitation in human relationships and places emphasis on marginalised and oppressed groups and, recognising their humanity, seeks to make them the subjects of history, rather than simply those that are acted upon by the powerful (Esack 2003). In this sense, it echoes the commitment of Christian Latin American liberation theologians such as Gustavo Gutiérrez (2001, 2007) to elevate the "non-persons" of society, who are not recognised as fully human by social structures. This dehumanisation cannot however be combatted solely by elevating the voices of the oppressed but, as Freire (2017) argues, requires working *with* them to secure their liberation; in other words, praxis.

Due to the multifaceted nature of oppression, Islamic Liberation Theology has by necessity branched into several disciplines and addressed a range of issues, particularly focusing on pluralism, gender and, to a lesser extent, race, with other issues, most notably class, being peripheral.[6] This is not a problem limited to the Islamic context but more broadly applies to religious studies and the social sciences, which have failed to account for the relationship between religion and class (Rieger 2013). This oversight is problematic,

particularly in light of ever-increasing inequality between a rich minority and the masses. In recent years, the COVID-19 pandemic and political and economic instability has resulted in a cost of living crisis, making the effects of capitalism even more acute, even in much of the Global North. Whether in minority settings, such as the UK, or in majority contexts, Muslims overwhelmingly belong to economically exploited classes and therefore are disproportionately affected by this reality. In Britain for example, according to 2021 census data, 40% of Muslims live in the most derived fifth of local authority districts, a real increase of 482,000 individuals over a decade (Muslim Council of Britain 2022). Zooming in further to the London context, 9% of Muslims are unemployed, with 44% of those that are employed paid below the London living wage (Vizard et al. 2013). Such statistics illustrate the extent to which poverty is an everyday reality for many British Muslims and the urgency of addressing economic exploitation.

This paper looks to begin this conversation by answering the question, how do those involved in praxis against class exploitation and economic inequality use Islam as a liberative tool in the British context? The first section briefly defines what is meant by class and how this relates to the problem of inequality. The second focuses on methodology and calls for theological reflections to centre activists and those involved in liberation struggles. The final section addresses the question above and, using data from discussions with London-based activists, produces a theology of praxis, which can be used to tackle the economic exploitation inherent to the capitalist system.

Defining Class

Class is regularly referred to in academic and public discourse but definitions and understandings of the concept are often vague and anecdotal. This section briefly defines what is and, indeed, what is not meant by the term and demonstrates why the Marxist conceptualisation is the most useful to understand the root causes of economic exploitation.

Although Marx's work predates Weber by several decades, it is useful to start with the latter's construction of class, which dominates public and mainstream political discourse. Weber's assertion that class represents individuals' positions in the market (Allen 2004) has inspired countless social stratification models, which focus on typologies that demarcates groups according to their job title, salary, consumption patterns, etc. (ibid.). Just like Weber, these models produce a fragmented description of society's economic reality, dividing people into arbitrary groups based on abstract categories. They have little analytical value and provide little insight into the nature of a capitalist economy, people's differing positions within it or the relationship between classes. They present class as a natural phenomenon ordained by fate (or God), which has coincidentally placed people at different steps of the socioeconomic ladder. They therefore fail to recognise (or choose to ignore) the exploitation present in the production process, which is hidden behind a descriptive classification of economic difference.

A Marxist worldview addresses these issues by focusing on the role that relations of production – the relationship different classes have to the means of production (labour, technology, tools, raw materials, etc.) – play in determining the economic, social, cultural and political structure of society. Marx showed how throughout human history, with the exception of collectivist societies, people have lived in classed societies, where a minority exploit the majority through controlling the means of production (Marx & Engels 1974; Molyneux 2012). Under capitalism, this manifests itself in workers having to rely on selling

their labour to survive, while the dominant capitalist class lives of this (Mo Sung 2013). This imbalance of power allows capitalists to appropriate surplus value, which is, put simply, the profit acquired after paying wages. This can be used to accumulate further capital and increase socio-political power, through which the capitalist class structure is reproduced (Marx 2013; Wolff 2013). Conversely, workers have little power over what or how goods are produced and how profits are distributed. Since the structure prioritises wealth accumulation rather than social benefit, this means that capitalists prioritise, among other things, efficient and low cost production without paying attention to the living conditions of the majority (Singer 2000). These foundational Marxist ideas have been developed in various directions. Third World, decolonial or Black Marxists, for example, have analysed the relationship between class and race, while Marxist feminists have related it to gender.[7]

Marxism therefore challenges the Weberian notion that class is a natural phenomenon by highlighting that it is a *product* of social relations and should be seen as a *relationship*, not a thing (Vanneman and Cannon 2018). It highlights how all classed societies are inherently exploitative because of the appropriation of surplus value and concentrate wealth and power in the hands of an ever-shrinking elite, exacerbating inequalities. It therefore provides an analytical framework through which we can understand class and its effects today.

Methodology

Liberation Theology emphasises the importance of praxis and achieving material change for the marginalised. Practitioners do not feign neutrality but acknowledge that oppression exists in the contemporary moment and must be combatted – through praxis. As Freire (2017, p.52) argues, "liberation is a praxis: the action and reflection of men and women upon their world in order to transform it." To achieve this, liberative theologies are produced in the struggle, coming as the "second act", after political involvement (Esack 1997, Boff 2009). Similarly, Petrella (2006) notes that this is not just an academic exercise and therefore must be attached to a historical project, in other words, a means by which ideas can be transformed into a concrete reality, giving them real content.

Taking this praxis element seriously, this paper builds a theology in conjunction with activists that are involved in struggles to combat class exploitation. From a Muslim perspective, and as Esack (1997) argues, this methodology originates in the Quran, where God says, "And those who strive hard for Us, We shall surely guide them in Our ways" (29:69),[8] promising Divine knowledge to those who engage in *jihad*. Activists from two organisations appear in the research[9]: Sufra NW London (hereafter Sufra), a food bank based in Brent, northwest London, that tackles food insecurity and other forms of economic marginalisation in the local area; and Nijjor Manush, a British Bengali activist group that seeks to tackle social issues facing that community, with an emphasis on anti-gentrification struggles and community education. Initial interviews were used to understand more about the activists, their motivations for getting involved in activism and the relationship between religion and politics.[10] This was supplemented by participant observation and open source materials related to the organisations. This process allowed the study to centre activists, giving them the opportunity to articulate a theology based on their beliefs and lived experiences and, concretely, illustrating how Islam and Muslims should intervene in our current moment to tackle class exploitation.

A Theology of Praxis

These discussions laid the foundations for an alternative interpretation of Islam's economic imperatives in the contemporary world. This was developed not only through engagement with religious texts and figures, although this certainly played a key role, but also through involvement in particular historical projects for change. Activists provided a critique of apolitical and reactionary trends within Muslim communities, which upheld the status quo and, on the back of this, provided the theoretical groundings for an alternative. Based on Islam's calls to uphold justice and stand against oppression, this advocates the abolition of exploitative class relations. Finally, they spoke about how this justice could be established and how this liberative alternative could be made a reality.

Competing Islams

One of the key insights Liberation Theology provides is that religion should not be essentialised to mean one thing. Using a Marxist understanding of dialectic materialism, it asserts that religious interpretation takes place within particular social relations and power dynamics, which inevitably influence its content and direction. Ali Shariati (1979, p.109), a foundational figure in Islamic Liberation Theology, for example argues:

> *There has existed throughout human history… a struggle between the religion of deceit, stupefaction and justification of the status quo and the religion of awareness, activism and revolution.*

Using the metaphor of Cain and Abel, he argues that they represent two systems of thought, competing for dominance in human society. The former uses religion to justify reaction and oppressive structures, while the latter encourages revolution and establishing justice (ibid.).

Activists identified two strands of Islam today that compete with a liberative one. The first is an apolitical Islam, which detaches religion from politics. Maya critiqued this "assimilationist" Islam, which imitated the integrationalist attitude of many first-generation immigrants, who feared to become involved in politics because of fears that they would not be accepted as British if they caused trouble.[11] In the post-9/11 era, this conditional acceptance was further exacerbated by the securitisation of British Muslims, which prevents individuals and mosques from engaging in politics for fear of repercussions from the state and accusations of extremism.[12] However, this trend does not only manifest on a social level, but also through what is perceived as religiosity, where disproportionate emphasis is put on ritual practice, often at the expense of good social ethics. Several participants cited examples of individuals that were dishonest in their everyday dealings but were considered religious in the community, for example because of the number of times they had been on *hajj*, *umrah*, or *ziyarah*.[13] Zena summarises this selective tendency in religious circles:

> *I think we fixate on daily practices and we cherry pick the things that we think superficially are Islamic and we push the things that don't fit in with our lifestyle, or with our ambitions, our desires to one side. You're not gonna get an imam in a mosque saying it's haram to work in venture capitalism or in banking, because you know, these banks are funding wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But you will get them saying it's haram to show your hair and you have to pray five times a day, that sort of thing.*[14]

This dominant apolitical Islam refuses to challenge the status quo and encourages individualist engagement with both society and religion. It refuses to tackle issues such as capitalism and in doing so, silently endorses it.

A second, more reactionary, trend within Islamic discourse actively justifies the status quo and espouses its virtues. Aqeel

notes how influential religious figures are "repeating the words of right wing ideologues" and accept capitalist principles within an Islamic framework:

> *Often in passing, what are deemed to be authoritative Muslim public figures… naturalise capitalism as if we can't question that. It's just natural and always existed, even in the Prophet's time. [And so,] the economic question, they just put it away and they deal with social and cultural questions [instead].*[15]

On a theological level, this tendency is reflected in simplistic arguments, such as "Islam allows private property", or "the Prophet was a merchant", which are used to dismiss systemic critiques and reinforce the capitalist mode of production. On an individual level, this encourages Muslims to pursue material wealth, rather than be concerned with structural issues. Maya highlights this trend:

> *I feel like Muslims, from having grown up in this [society], are very much soft capitalists... They very much aspire towards having capital, access to capital and climbing up the class hierarchy... I don't think that's a priority for Muslims, to overturn these inequalities because the focus is very much on the self... and acquiring assets and commodities to basically live what they deem, I guess, a comfortable life.*[16]

This neoliberal ethic of individualism appears in both the apolitical and reactionary trends and is a good example of how hegemonic social forces are reflected in religious interpretation. Consequently, on a macro level these versions of Islam implicitly or explicitly uphold the economic structure and encourage believers to work hard within the system to improve their condition, rather than working for systemic change.

The Case for Class Abolition

Activists however, proposed an alternative to this accommodationist Islam. Several argued that class divisions are contradictory to Islamic principles of justice and so should be abolished. For example, Fahim said, "Islam in its true form abolishes class",[17] while Khalid believed "one could make a reasonable argument that it calls for a classless society."[18] Some provided a theoretical justification for this argument by noting that Muslims must understand how people are made poor, which, as we have seen earlier, is the result of an inherently exploitative economic system.[19] In this sense, the question is not so much about economic inequality, but exploitation, which Islamic principles of justice clearly prohibit.[20]

Aside from this theoretical contradiction between Islam's call for justice and class, other specific evidences also were interpreted to oppose the economic status quo. The Quran, for example, was interpreted as prohibiting the hoarding of wealth, "one of the main reasons why class exists",[21] and having an animosity towards wealth accumulation as an end in itself, as seen in verses 104:1-4 and 107:2-7, for example.[22] Conversely, the Prophet Muhammad and Ali ibn Abu Talib, the fourth caliph and first Shia Imam, were cited as advocates of living a simple life.[23] Wealth accumulation was therefore seen as inherently contradictory to the lives of religious figures that Muslims look to emulate, which, the activists argued, provided further evidence of the need for equality and the removal of class differences.

Establishing Justice

The exploitation that is inherent to a capitalist society, when combined with an animosity to wealth accumulation provides

the foundations for an alternative, liberative Islam that looks to abolish class. Establishing justice in this context, therefore, means to take economic and political power away from the capitalist class, the root cause of this exploitation, and create a classless society.[24] The questions for activists, therefore, was how to navigate today's inequalities and move towards this end goal and establish economic justice.

While Liberation Theology emphasises praxis, the importance of defining these goals is essential as a means to direct activism. This is perhaps best illustrated in discussions around the role of charity and *zakat* in establishing economic justice. Activists criticised Muslims that only engaged with politics through these practices, which, they said, reflected a "neoliberal understanding of the faith"[25] and only "narrow" solidarity with the oppressed.[26] Members of Sufra, which is dependent on donations, interestingly were critical of individuals who thought that giving money was the extent of their social responsibilities. Zena, for example, argued, "it's not just about throwing money at things… your donation has to be your energy, your time. Your mentality needs to shift."[27] Indeed, charity's failure to tackle the structural causes means that it is inadequate to achieve Islam's aims:

> *We can look at the deeper meaning behind [zakat and sadaqah], that there is this duty and obligation towards the made-marginalised. And if you take that deeper meaning, that opens up a completely different kind of politics and engagement that you have with the world. Is it really enough when homeless people are sleeping outside of boarded up houses, when people are drowning in the English Channel, is it really a fulfilment of your duty that every Friday at jummah, you put a couple of quid in the bucket?*[28]

This highlights the importance of defining economic goals and a clear historical project against which particular tactics for change can be judged. As activists highlight, charity has a limited effect in this regard and, although it can alleviate some of the worst manifestations of economic exploitation in the short term, it fails to address the deeper structural issues.

While providing the economically marginalised with dignity was seen as a key Islamic imperative,[29] this has to be combined with praxis that addresses systemic issues and social transformation. This can be articulated through what are called "non-reformist reforms" that, although achieved by working within the system, do not endorse the overall socioeconomic structure.[30] In the case of Nijjor Manush, this is apparent through their involvement in the anti-gentrification Save Brick Lane campaign, which confronts the power of capital by campaigning for the Truman Brewery in London's East End to be converted into good quality and affordable housing, rents and community spaces for the local community, rather than profit-driven alternatives. For Sufra, while their activism primarily focuses on poverty alleviation, they have been instrumental in fostering community and care in the local area, which challenges the aforementioned hyper-individualism that is encouraged by capitalism. As Fahim asserts, "we shouldn't exist… [but] we are here to be a middleman until society rebuilds what is called a community, which we don't have anymore."[31]

Unlike neoliberal practices of charity, activists in both Nijjor Manush and Sufra saw praxis through the lens of a broader worldview, which attaches contemporary struggles to the desire to achieve systemic change. Providing dignity for the marginalised, while also challenging the power of capital in the long term, is essential to achieve liberation, which can only be done by working to end economic exploitation and abolishing class.

Conclusion

For any Liberation Theology to be truly liberative, it has to prioritise praxis and achieving material change for the marginalised and oppressed. Within the Islamic context, class and economic exploitation have not been addressed, which is problematic in the context of unprecedented levels of inequality that exist today, which disproportionately affect Muslims. This paper speaks to this context by seeing how Muslim activists from two London-based organisations, Sufra and Nijjor Manush, envision an emancipatory Islam that can be used to establish economic justice today. It emphasises the importance of having a strong theoretical foundation and clearly defined historical project, which challenges apolitical and reaction trends, while also being used to judge various methods and tools of activism. In this regard, participants advocated for the abolition of class, which contradicted Islam's calls for justice and hostility towards hoarding wealth. Establishing justice however, required balancing this long term aim with the short term need to provide dignity to the economically marginalised. Poverty alleviation, combined with 'non-reformist reforms' that undermine the power of capital and fostering communities of struggle provides the means to achieve this and, in doing so, provides the foundation for a theology of praxis that achieves liberation for the economically marginalized.

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A Comprehensive Examination of Precarity Among Muslim Immigrants in Europe

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Muslim immigration to Europe and their integration happens to be a long-standing question. It was during the economic reconstruction after the Second World War that large-scale immigration of Muslims to Western Europe started, as they were sought as low-paid guest workers who were there to stay only temporarily as long as they were needed to rebuild the war-torn economies of receiving countries. European states expected them to return to their homelands eventually when the need for their labour ceased to exist. The global economic recession that came after the Arab-Israeli war in 1973 and the oil boycott made European countries stop importing workforce. Due to new circumstances, in order to solve the question of unneeded and unqualified immigrant guest workers, some countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and France even offered them financial help to return to their home countries, but it didn't happen. The predominantly male labourers mostly chose to stay regardless of the unfavourable economy (Haddad, 1999). They preferred to stay jobless and live off social welfare in Western Europe, over the risk of going back to their homelands where they would face unemployment in struggling third-world economies. It should be emphasised that these new economic conditions have directly increased resentment of immigrants as they were no longer seen as needed cheap labour but as competition in the unfriendly job market. Eventually, Muslims and other immigrants in Western Europe were allowed to bring their families to join them in Europe. This led to significant shifts as in the 1970s they grew from mostly male temporary guest workers living away from the public eye to become permanently settled family communities. Muslim men were now accompanied by their wives and children. In the following decades, immigration continued with the arrival of those looking for work and better life opportunities, pursuing education, but also those fleeing from turmoil in the Middle East, Afghanistan and other parts of the Muslim world (Haddad, 1999).

Precarity

Before turning to analysis, a brief overview of precarity should be provided. The term precarity comes from the Latin root precor (pray) and precarius (obtained on condition of praying for). Precarity, precarious and other related terms have been in use in European languages for centuries, although not always with current connotation which relates to work and welfare. In general, it has a meaning of uncertainty, insecurity, and unstableness. But in modern academia, the term "précarité" was first introduced by French scholars in the late 1970s to describe a social condition primarily about poverty. Only later its use gradually shifted to denote work-related status (Barbier, 2002).

This new notion of the term came due to changes that the 1970s brought to the labour market and the notion of labour. Even though precarious work existed ever since paid employment prevailed as a primary form of earning a living, it was in the last quarter of the previous century that it became so widespread and raised concern. That differed previous period after WWII which was marked by comparative certainty for work labour (Kalleberg, 2009). This shift occurred due to the globalization of economic markets, which led to the possibility of easily outsourcing work to countries with cheap workforces. These circumstances led to government politics, especially in the West, following neoliberal ideas of 'labour market flexibility' which propagated that if labour markets don't become flexible, costs of labour would increase and that will make companies move their production and investment abroad in order to reduce which would consequentially lead to transfers of large amounts of capital out of the country. The flexibility stood for rising job insecurity and workers facing more uncertainty (Standing, 2011). As governments loosened employment regulations to accommodate big capital at the expense of workers' rights, unions which were providing counterbalance also weakened (Kalleberg, 2009). As a result, the number of workers in precarious forms of work increased drastically and so precariat came to exist like Standing notes, as "class-in-the-making, if not yet a class-for-itself" (Standing, 2011,p:7).

In addition to this understanding, some authors speak of different types of precarity. For example, Shams speaks of "feelings of precariousness based on race, ethnicity, and religion" and "collective precariousness of Muslims … based on global politics", especially in the post-9/11 context (Shams, 2020,p:659&666). Similarly, Eriksen speaks of "cultural precarity" regarding second-generation Muslim immigrants in Norway who "do not belong to the precariat economically speaking … but they belong to a cultural precariat that can … be laid off and expelled from the imagined community whenever the culturally hegemonic see fit" (Eriksen, 2014, p:3). Although this concept is mostly used to refer to non-Caucasian and non-Christian immigrants, it can also be implemented to other cases such as to Polish diaspora in UK (Nowicka, 2018). Another scholarly concept related to immigrants is legal precarity and it primarily concerns "undocumented and temporary immigration status", but lately it has been reconsidered to include also those with permanent resident or citizenship status due to cases of removal of citizenship or nationality by the state, for example in the UK (Ellermann, 2020). The term 'precarity of place' is used as well to describe the precarious residence situation of immigrants (Banki, 2013).

Data

Despite the presence of Muslim communities in Western Europe for decades, members of these communities still face marginalization and precarious living conditions. This paper aims to explore the lifestyle of Muslim immigrants in their host countries in the

European Union and the precarity they face. Using data from FRA's Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU MIDIS II), which sampled 25,515 respondents with different ethnic minority and immigrant backgrounds in all 28 EU Member States in 2016 (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017), we will analyze the experiences of Muslim immigrants from different regions, including Africa, South-East Asia, and the Middle East. The survey included immigrants, descendants of immigrants and recent immigrants regardless of their citizenship and residence status in the survey country. The survey used complex mixed sampling methods and it included immigrants from Turkey (in 6 countries); from North Africa (in 5 countries); immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa (in 12 countries); immigrants from South Asia and Asia (in 4 countries); and recent immigrants from other non-EU/EFTA countries (in 2 countries) Muslim immigrants from different regions constituted 44% of the total respondents. To examine whether immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa experience more precarious lives than other groups, we will compare this data with that of respondents from other immigrant groups. This will allow us to gain insight into the unique challenges faced by this population.

Methods

By examining the experiences of Muslim immigrants from different regions and in various European countries, we can gain a better understanding of the challenges that they face and the factors that contribute to their precarity. The topic of exploring the lifestyle of Muslim immigrants in Europe and the precarity they face is crucial and requires careful analysis of available data. The use of the EU MIDIS II dataset to examine the challenges and precarity faced by Muslim immigrants is valuable as it provides a comprehensive examination of the experiences of this population across a range of domains. The paper will first provide descriptive statistics of variables related to work precarity (main activity status, current work situation and type of work), economic precarity (subjective income) and legal precarity (residence status). This will be followed by the results of eight binary regression analyses exploring work precarity and discrimination when looking for work and at work, as well as two linear regression models examining economic and legal precarity.

Comparing the experiences of Muslim immigrants with those of other immigrant groups is also useful in gaining insight into the unique challenges faced by this population. Therefore, this study contributes to the ongoing dialogue surrounding the experiences of Muslim immigrants in Western Europe and provides useful insights for policymakers and researchers alike.

Results

When it comes to this paper, precarious work has the most important place. Legal precarity is also taken into account, as well as cultural precarity to some extent, through accounts of discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and religion.

First, descriptive statistics will briefly be provided. EU MIDIS II dataset provides several variables that give insight into the presence of precarious work. When it comes to self-declared activity status, there are noticeable differences between Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants. Most importantly, almost 15% less of Muslim immigrants declared to be employed. That is in part due to a high number of respondents engaged in domestic work. Namely, data shows that Muslim women are much more likely to be homemakers. In addition to that, the unemployment rate is 5% higher among Muslim immigrants.

Self-declared main activity status						
	Employed	Unemployed	Not working due to illness or disability	Domestic work	Retired	other inactive (education, military service, other)
Non-Muslim	60.20%	11.60%	3.40%	4.20%	9.30%	11.30%
Muslim	45.90%	16.70%	2.60%	11.60%	7.80%	15.30%

Understanding of labour precarity is further deepened by reports on work situations. Once again, there are more than obvious differences, the most important being 13.2% more non-Muslim immigrants being engaged in paid work in comparison to Muslim immigrants.

Current situation					
	In paid work	Self-employed	Unemployed	Inactive	Total
Non-Muslim	53.70%	6.50%	11.60%	10.60%	100.00%
Muslim	40.50%	5.30%	16.70%	14.60%	100.00%
Total	44.10%	5.60%	15.30%	13.50%	100.00%

When it comes to full-time, part-time and occasional work arrangements, the situation is practically the same for both subject groups.

Is that full-time, part-time or just occasionally?			
	Full-time	Part-time	Occasionally
Non-Muslim	77.90%	20.10%	2.00%
Muslim	77.80%	19.60%	2.50%

The same goes for subjective household income. Almost the same percent of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants reported each of the six categories noting the degree of difficulty or ease in being able to make ends meet with household earnings.

Thinking of your household's total income, is your household able to make ends meet?							
	With great difficulty	With difficulty	With some difficulty	Fairly easily	Easily	Very easily	Total
Non-Muslim	10.40%	16.10%	25.70%	26.50%	16.60%	4.70%	100%
Muslim	10.70%	16.80%	27.20%	25.60%	16.00%	3.70%	100%
Total	10.60%	16.60%	26.80%	25.80%	16.10%	4.00%	100%

When it comes to so-called legal precarity, namely residence or citizenship status, the analysis showed very weak statistical significance with religious affiliation. Yet, its numbers show obvious differences, most notably, a 13,5% higher rate of national citizens among non-Muslim immigrants, and 11,8% more unlimited residence permit holders among respondents who adhere to Islam. Even though both these statuses are permanent, and therefore can't be considered precarious, this no doubt shows the different treatment of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants in this regard. If only those with limited or without residence permits are taken into account, then 18.1% of non-Muslims stand in opposition to 21.7% of Muslim immigrants. On the other side, it should be noted that more non-Muslim immigrants reported having no residence permit, though it is still a small percentage.

Residence / citizenship status							
	National citizen	EU citizen, but not national	Unlimited residence permit	Limited residence permit, valid for more than 5 years	Limited residence permit, valid for less than 5 years	No residence permit	Other (e.g. currently renewing, don't know)
Non-Muslim	66.50%	4.30%	6.60%	4.40%	11.10%	3.10%	4.00%
Muslim	53.00%	2.60%	18.40%	7.90%	12.90%	1.90%	3.30%

In order to further explore these findings and determine whether Muslim immigrants suffer disproportionately in comparison to those who are adherents of other religions, a series of factors of immigrant precarity were examined through regression analysis. That allowed us to go beyond the basic statistics and simple descriptive accounts of immigration towards deeper analysis and it enabled us to determine which predictors contribute to the state of precarity among immigrants.

The immigrant precarity was examined using eleven variables covering different aspects of immigrant life. The main focus was expectedly put on work and employment and there are several variables concerning this field. First, the self-declared main activity status was included to differ between employed and unemployed respondents. Further, the form of employment was used, that is whether employed respondents are engaged in full-time work or have part-time and occasional jobs. In addition to that, the analysis also takes into account what kind of employment contract respondents have in their main job – is it a permanent or temporary contract and work without a contract.

These three work-related questions were recoded into binary variables and each one of them was used as a dependent variable in regression analysis, while independent variables include being Muslim and control variables, namely gender, age, country, years spent residing in the country, belonging to the first or second generations of immigrants, and highest achieved educational level of respondent. The results indicate that the independent variables used, depending on the specific model, explain between 6.1 and 19.7% of the variance of the three work precarity variables - R2 = .061 for the model related to employment status (In paid work/ Unemployed), R2 = .107 for the model concerning type of work (Full-time/Part-time & Occasionally), and R2 = .198 for the model regarding type of contract (Permanent contract/Temporary & Informal work) judging by the Nagelkerke test.

When it comes to the model where the dependent variable differs whether respondents are engaged in paid work or unemployed, the independent variables tested proved in most cases to be statistically significant predictors. Muslim religious affiliation has a strong effect (Beta=0.464), and analysis has shown that Muslims are more likely to be unemployed than non-Muslims. From the control variables, education is the strongest predictor with those respondents who didn't finish primary education (Beta=1.012) being more than twice as likely to be unemployed compared to those with completed tertiary education. Those with only primary or lower secondary education are also much more likely to be unemployed (Beta=0.492). Furthermore, gender is also a significant predictor, and expectedly there is a greater chance women will be unemployed (Beta=0.378). The number of years spent in the host country is also a statistically significant predictor with the likelihood of being unemployed decreasing with every year spent in the country. Respondents' age and belonging to the first or the second generation of immigrants don't seem to have any importance on the immigrant employment status.

Results are similar for the model that distinguishes between those immigrants who work full-time jobs on one side, and those engaged in part-time or occasional work on the other side. Being Muslim is once again a strong predictor of work precarity, although with somewhat lower intensity (Beta=0.408). Respondents without any formal education (Beta=0.788) and with primary and lower secondary education (Beta=0.386) are much more likely to work part-time and occasional jobs, than those with higher education. It is important to mention that gender has a much stronger effect in this model, with women being much more involved in part-time and occasional work

than men. A higher number of years spent in the host country again reduces the risk of work precarity, as does the higher age of respondents.

The situation is somewhat different with regard to the type of contract. In opposition to previous models, Muslim religious affiliation is not a significant predictor in this case (Beta= -0.022). Also, belonging to the first or the second generation of immigrants which didn't have any importance in previous models proved to be relevant, as first-generation immigrants are much more likely to be engaged in temporary and informal work, compared to those of second-generation (Beta=1.007). Level of education is another strong predictor, with respondents without primary education being by far at the highest risk of working on temporary contracts or with no contracts at all (Beta=1.382). Respondents with primary and lower secondary education are in a bit better position, but still very likely to work without permanent contracts (Beta=0.823), and the likelihood decreases further for those who finished upper secondary, vocational and post-secondary education (Beta=0.328). Once again women face more precarity than men, as well as younger respondents in comparison to older.

Reported discrimination at work and when looking for work in the current country of residence, both in the previous 5 years, was taken into consideration as well. The survey questionnaire included questions on different grounds of discrimination, so respondents could report if they felt discriminated against for reasons such as skin colour, ethnic origin or immigrant background, religion or religious beliefs, age, sex/gender, disability, sexual orientation or other. Analysis of course didn't include all of these, but only discrimination grounds that could be considered relevant to the research topic. Apart from religion or religious beliefs which were inevitable for the analysis, skin colour and ethnic origin or immigrant background were also included since these characteristics can often be considered markers of religious affiliation, even though they can be misleading or wrongly attributed.

Table 1 – Logistic regression results of predictors of work precarity

	In paid work/ Unemployed		Full-time/Part-time & Occasionally		Permanent contract/ Temporary & Informal work	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Muslim binary	.464***	1.590	.408***	1.504	-.022	.978
Years in country	-.022***	.978	-.020***	.981	-.062***	.939
1st or 2nd generation migrant	-.065	.937	-.345	.708	1.007***	2.736
Gender	.378***	1.459	1.212***	3.360	.154*	1.167
Age	-.002	.998	-.016***	.984	-.031***	.970
Tertiary education	***		***		***	
No primary education	1.012***	2.751	.788***	2.199	1.382***	3.985
Primary and lower secondary education	.492***	1.636	.386***	1.472	.823***	2.278
Upper secondary, vocational, post-secondary, short cycle tertiary education	.123	1.131	.171	1.186	.328***	1.388
Constant	-1.044***	.352	-.898***	.407	.218	1.243
Nagelkerke R Square	.061		.107		.197	
Cox & Snell R Square	.043		.071		.147	
-2 Log likelihood	10243.815		6503.198		6969.311	
N	8453		6435		5786	

Note: * = p≤ 0.05; ** = p≤ 0.01; *** = p≤ 0.005.

Table 2 shows the results of binary logistic regression of discrimination when looking for work in the past 5 years. Analysis has been conducted separately for three previously mentioned bases of discrimination - religion or religious beliefs, skin colour and ethnic origin or immigrant background.

When it comes to discrimination based on religion, being Muslim is the single strongest predictor with very high intensity (Beta=2.205). Muslims are extremely more at risk of this kind of discrimination than non-Muslims. Other statistically significant predictors are gender (Beta=0.344), with women being more likely to face religious discrimination, as well as respondent's age and years spent in the host country. As age increases, the rate of discrimination becomes lower (Beta= -0.017). Surprisingly, respondents who have spent more years in the host country are more likely to have experienced discrimination based on religion or religious beliefs when looking for work in the past five years (Beta=0.031). Level of education and belonging to the first or the second generation of immigrants hold no statistical importance in this regression model.

Muslim religious affiliation is a significant predictor in the case of discrimination based on Ethnic or immigrant background and ethnic origin as well. Muslims are more likely to face discrimination on these grounds when looking for work (Beta=0.396). Other statistically significant factors in this model are gender and primary or lower secondary education as the highest completed level of schooling. Interestingly, women are less likely than men to have experienced such discrimination (Beta= -0.366). When it comes to education, respondents who finished primary or lower secondary education are less likely to face discrimination due to ethnic or immigrant background in comparison to those with completed tertiary education (Beta= -0.366), but the same doesn't apply to those without any formal education or those with

Table 2 – Logistic regression results of predictors of cultural precarity

Discriminated when looking for work in the past 5 years						
	Religion or religious beliefs		Skin colour		Ethnic or immigrant background / ethnic origin	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Muslim binary	2.205***	9.071	-.707***	.493	.396***	1.486
Years in country	.031***	1.032	-.002	.998	.006	1.006
1st or 2nd generation migrant	-.106	.900	-.390	.677	-.030	.971
Gender	.344***	1.410	-.351***	.704	-.366***	.694
Age	-.017***	.983	-.010**	.990	-.002	.998
Tertiary education			***		***	
No primary education	-.113	.893	.352*	1.422	-.154	.857
Primary and lower secondary education	-.236	.790	-.048	.953	-.318***	.728
Upper secondary, vocational, post-secondary, short cycle tertiary education	-.041	.959	-.189	.827	-.152	.859
Constant	-3.870***	.021	-.309	.734	-1.095***	.334
Nagelkerke R Square	.122		.035		.020	
Cox & Snell R Square	.055		.020		.013	
-2 Log likelihood	3853.806		6045.136		7585.334	
N	7043		7043		7043	

Note: * = p≤ 0.05; ** = p≤ 0.01; *** = p≤ 0.005.

completed upper secondary, vocational or post-secondary education. Other variables used proved to be non-relevant in this model.

Religious belonging is an important predictor in the regression model analyzing discrimination when looking for work based on

skin colour as well, but it is important to notice that being Muslim has the opposite effect in this case. Namely, Muslims are much less likely to have experienced racial discrimination in comparison to non-Muslim immigrants (Beta= -0.707). As in the previous model, women are less likely to face discrimination based on skin colour (Beta= -0.351). On the other hand, younger respondents are slightly more likely to be discriminated against due to the colour of their skin. Also, having no formal education increases the probability of discrimination, although there is only a small statistical significance ($p \leq 0.05$). The results of binary logistic regression of discrimination at work in the past 5 years are shown in Table 3. These results are similar to those from Table 2. Being Muslim is the single strongest predictor of discrimination based on religion or religious beliefs with very high intensity (Beta=1.777). Once again, more years have been spent in the host country are more likely to have experienced religious discrimination at work in the past five years (Beta=0.030). Also, as the age of respondents increases, the discrimination becomes lower (Beta= -0.025). When at work, gender plays no role in religious discrimination, unlike in the case when looking for work, when women are more exposed to this unfair treatment.

In the case of discrimination based on ethnic or immigrant background and ethnic origin, adherence to Islam is a significant predictor, as Muslims are more likely to face discrimination on these grounds at work (Beta=0.189). Other statistically significant factors in this model are, once again, gender and primary or lower secondary education as the highest completed level of schooling. Women are less likely to experience discrimination than men (Beta= -0.283). Respondents who finished primary or lower secondary education are less likely to face discrimination due to ethnic or immigrant background in comparison to those with completed tertiary education (Beta= -0.348).

Table 3 – Logistic regression results of predictors of cultural precarity

Discriminated at work in the past 5 years						
	Religion or religious beliefs		Skin colour		Ethnic or immigrant background / ethnic origin	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Muslim binary	1.777***	5.914	-.748***	.474	.183***	1.201
Years in country	.030***	1.031	.000	1.000	.000	1.000
1st or 2nd generationmigrant	.130	1.139	-.541*	.582	-.132	.877
Gender	.099	1.104	-.452***	.636	-.283***	.753
Age	-.025***	.975	-.012***	.988	-.004	.996
Tertiary education			**		***	
No primary education	-.087	.917	.093	1.098	-.058	.944
Primary and lower secondary education	-.336*	.715	-.245**	.783	-.348***	.706
Upper secondary, vocational, post-secondary, short cycle tertiary education	-.172	.842	-.184*	.832	-.197*	.821
Constant	–3.642***	.026	-.223	.800	–1.121***	.326
Nagelkerke R Square	.090		.038		.010	
Cox & Snell R Square	.033		.020		.006	
-2 Log likelihood	3921.259		6793.777		8265.943	
N	9239		9239		9239	

Note: * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.005$.

As was the case for discrimination when looking for work based on skin colour, racial discrimination at work is also much less likely to happen to Muslims than to non-Muslims (Beta= -0.748). Gender is also an important predictor, and men are more likely to experience discrimination due to the colour of their skin than women (Beta= -0.452). Another statistically significant predictor is the age of respondents and the older they are, slightly less likely is that they will face racial discrimination (Beta= -0.012). Besides employment and discrimination, the analysis also focused on the legal precarity of immigrants, namely the residence and citizenship status of respondents. Namely, respondents are grouped into six categories based on their legal status: National citizens; EU citizens, but not nationals; Holders of unlimited residence permit; Holders of limited residence permit valid for more than five years; Holders of limited residence permit valid for less than five years; and those with no residence permit. This question was used as the dependent variable in linear regression analysis, while the independent variables were the same as in binary regression analysis – being Muslim or non-Muslim and control variables, namely gender, age, country, years spent residing in the country, belonging to the first or second generations of immigrants, and highest achieved educational level of respondent. The results showed that all the independent variables included in the analysis are statistically significant and when combined they explain 28% of the variance of respondents' residence status (R Square = .280). Muslim religious affiliation is a moderate predictor of legal status (β= -0.032), and Muslim immigrants are more likely to be in precarious residence status than non-Muslim immigrants. When it comes to other variables, the number of years spent in the host country is the single strongest predictor with a longer time in the country leading to more permanent residence status (β= -0.520). Lower educational levels are also strong predictors, and those with no primary education (β= 0.161) or with primary and lower secondary education (β= 0.186) are more likely to face legal precarity than immigrants who completed tertiary education.

Table 4 – Regression results of predictors of legal precarity

	B	SE	β
Muslim binary	-.120***	.031	-.032
Years in country	-.073***	.001	-.520
1st or 2nd generation migrant	-.859***	.137	-.049
Gender	-.236***	.029	-.064
Age	.003*	.001	.022
Tertiary education			
No primary education	1.025***	.062	.161
Primary and lower secondary education	.688***	.045	.186
Upper secondary, vocational, post-secondary, short cycle tertiary education	.151***	.045	.040
Constant	4.972***	.161	
R Square	.280		

Note: * = p≤ 0.05; ** = p≤ 0.01; *** = p≤ 0.005.

Finally, the analysis took into account the economic aspect of life. Subjective income which was measured by reporting to what extent is respondent's household was able to make ends meet, was incorporated into the regression model as a dependent variable. The results showed that all independent variables are significant predictors of economic precarity, except for being Muslim or non-Muslim. Religious affiliation does not correlate with subjective income whatsoever. The strongest predictors are the number of years the immigrant has spent in the host country and education level. Namely, a better economic situation comes with a longer period of time spent in the host country. On the other hand, lower educational levels are more likely to result in economic hardship. Also, older respondents are, more likely they will face economic precarity.

Table 5 – Regression results of predictors of economic precarity			
	B	SE	β
Muslim binary	-.031	.024	-.011
Years in country	.027***	.001	.265
1st or 2nd generation migrant	.450***	.114	.033
Gender	.090***	.023	.033
Age	-.013***	.001	-.126
Tertiary education			
No primary education	-1.015***	.049	-.219
Primary and lower secondary education	-.848***	.036	-.314
Upper secondary, vocational, post-secondary, short cycle tertiary education	-.441***	.036	-.160
Constant	2.998***	.132	
R Square		.096	
Note: * = p≤ 0.05; ** = p≤ 0.01; *** = p≤ 0.005.			

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, the analysis of the EU MIDIS II dataset and regression models of several immigrant precarity factors have revealed that differences in the precarious experiences of Muslim immigrants and those immigrants who don't adhere to Islam differ from indicator to indicator. The regression analysis showed that while religious affiliation, more precisely being Muslim, has a stronger or weaker correlation with some indicators of precarity such as unemployment, engagement in part-time and occasional work, residence status, discrimination at work and when looking for work due to religion or religious beliefs and due to ethnic or immigrant background, that's not the case when it comes to other indicators such as temporary and informal work, work-related discrimination due to skin colour and economic hardship. This to some extent confirms previous research indicating that Muslim immigrants are exposed to a higher level of precarity due to their religion (e.g. Shams, 2020; Eriksen, 2014). It should also be taken into account that in addition to Muslim religious affiliation, other factors such as the number of years spent in the host country and education are more significant predictors in some cases, for example, the former is strongly associated with a lower likelihood of experiencing legal precarity, while the later plays an important role when it comes to employment and precarious work.

The analysis revealed that Muslim immigrants, compared to non-Muslim immigrants, are more likely to be unemployed and engaged in domestic work. They also face higher rates of discrimination at work and when looking for work. Moreover, there are differences in residence and citizenship status, with Muslim immigrants having a higher proportion of limited residence permits. These findings provide a novel insight but further research is needed to delve deeper into the specific factors contributing to precarity among Muslim immigrants.

It is also important to note that this study has its limitations. Although using data from a cross-national survey provided a wider European perspective on the research topic, the data lacked full representativity, since reaching the immigrant sub-population represents a great challenge. Complex sampling methods used for EU MIDIS II data collection are praise-worthy, but they couldn't compensate fully for the absence of reliable sampling frames in some countries.

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Salafism in the United Kingdom... of Saudi Arabia?

AZHAR MAJOTHI

The Saudi government is believed by numerous authors to have a pervasive and instrumental influence on the rise of Salafism in the United Kingdom, particularly in the publishing of Salafi texts in the English language. In the post-9/11 era, this idea has often been repeated in mainstream media, further contributing to the idea of "Wahhabi" expansionism. For example, in 2007, a Dispatches documentary entitled 'Undercover Mosque' claimed that Saudi offers free Islamic literature to Islamic bookstores in Britain and that in some cases, this has led to moderate Islamic bookstores going out of business. This paper argues that while Saudi Arabia has indeed played a role in shaping Salafi discourse in Britain, its influence is minimal in comparison to the efforts of British Salafis who produce Anglo-Salafi works based on their own religious volitions, and at their own expense. Based on a survey of Salafi literature in the English language and interviews with key leaders and publishers, this paper examines three historical and overlapping stages in the development of Salafi print culture in Britain: between the 1960s and 80s, South Asian Salafis published magazines and correspondence courses; during the 1980s and 90s, British-born or educated Salafis formulated their own message through print activism; between the 1990s and leading up to the present, British Salafis have co-established a global network for the diffusion of Salafi ideas in the Anglosphere. At all stages, these human agencies have responded to local concerns affecting British Muslims through self-funded initiatives or commercial pursuits. As such, this paper offers a more nuanced view of "Wahhabi" expansionism in Britain and provides a rare glimpse into the world of Islamic book publishing in the English language.

Introduction

Following the terrorist attacks on American soil on September 11, 2001, the world's media turned its spotlight on Wahhabism as the alleged extremist thought of the masterminds behind the

attacks. A number of anti-Wahhabi books, articles and think-tank reports pointed the finger directly at Saudi state actors for funding Wahhabism inside and outside of its borders. The idea that Saudi Arabia is responsible for the widespread visibility of intolerant, extremist and hard-line religious ideas was soon picked up in British circles.

Not long after the terrorist attacks in London on July 7, 2005, a number of public exposés made this allegation proper. A documentary aired on Channel 4 in 2007 and entitled 'Undercover Mosque', for example, featured a number of controversial snippets from secretly taped lectures inside of British mosques mostly belonging to Salafi communities, as well as troubling passages from Islamic books located within. A number of experts featured explicitly blamed Saudi Arabia for spreading Wahhabism in Britain by distributing petrodollars onto mosques, training British Muslims in Saudi Islamic universities and sponsoring the publication of dozens of Islamic texts.[32] Again in 2007, a think-tank report published by Policy Exchange warned the British government of radical Islamic texts circulating in almost 100 mosques in Britain. The report concluded that Saudi Arabia was responsible for much of the hateful material discovered.[33]

This paper seeks to challenge this narrative by drawing on my thesis on Anglo-Salafi print culture in Britain, drawing on a large body of Anglo-Salafi publications available in British Islamic bookstores, mosques and online spaces as well as over 50 interviews with Salafi leaders, publishers, booksellers and readers. It argues that while Saudi Arabia has indeed played a role in shaping Salafi discourse in Britain, its influence has been minimal in comparison to that of Salafis born or based in Britain. The latter has been instrumental in constructing Salafism in the English language in order to confirm their own religious volitions at their own expense. This following discussion makes this argument by examining three historical and overlapping stages in the development of Salafi print culture in Britain: between the 1960s and 80s, during the 1980s and 90s, and between the 1990s and the present. It ends by taking a brief account of possible avenues through which Saudi funds have transferred onto Salafis in Britain.

Between the 1960s and 80s

Following World War Two, the numbers of South Asian Muslim migrants in Britain dramatically increased. Among these early post-war migrants, a number of members of the South Asian Ahl-e-Hadith movement arrived in Britain and settled in industrial cities and towns. For example, Fazl Karim Asim (d. 2003), an Ahl-e-Hadith scholar and high-school teacher settled in Birmingham in 1962. After working alongside fellow Muslim activists during the 60s, Asim went on to establish Markaz Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (MJAH) in 1975 under which '*khāliṣ* (pure) Quran and Sunnah' would be preached.[34] The same organisation was reinforced soon after when several Ahl-e-Hadith scholars arrived in Britain after graduating from the Islamic University of Medina (IUM). Collectively, Asim and these graduates built a national network of Ahl-e-Hadith mosques and corresponding madrasahs called *madāris Salfia* (Salafi schools).[35] Abdul Karim Saqib, one of the graduates, launched a subscription-based Urdu-language magazine in Leicester called *Ṣirāṭ-e-Mustaqīm* (*The Straight Path*); the same magazine was subsumed under MJAH in 1978.[36] Suhaib Hasan, the only Indian-born graduate, established Al Quran Society (AQS), a madrasah and publishing house, in 1979. Unlike other graduates, Hasan was directly employed by the Saudi embassy as a *mabʿūth* (religious attaché).[37]

Both Saqib and Hasan quickly realised that young Muslim children lacked proficiency in the Urdu language and harnessed print

as a medium of *da'wah*. Saqib launched a counterpart magazine called *The Straight Path* in 1980 entirely in the English language because 'this [younger] generation knows very little or no Urdu.'[38] Similarly, Hasan began publishing booklets and correspondence courses under AQS entirely in the English language.[39] These projects were primarily aimed at "saving" future generations from losing touch with their religion and adopting western values in contradistinction to Islamic and South Asian cultural mores.

Between the 1980s and 90s

During the early 1980s, Saqib harnessed his magazine to mobilise Muslim youth. He established the Muslim Youth Movement and published articles about the necessity of young Muslims taking charge of *da'wah*.[40] He was soon acquainted with Abu Muntasir (Munwar Ali), a Bangladeshi refugee who was part-inspired by the Ahl-e-Hadith and actively engaged in leading Islamic study circles in London.[41] The two established a grass-roots Anglo-Islamic movement called Harakat Islah Shabab al-Muslim (HISAM) in 1984. Saqib placed Abu Muntasir at the helm of the movement despite the latter being self-taught. HISAM appealed to a growing number of young Muslims, second generation South Asians and converts, through its various English-language lectures and pamphlets.

Unlike MJAH, HISAM was a loosely-organised outfit with pockets of young members spread throughout London and Birmingham. Abu Muntasir and his cohort in London were mostly college-educated Muslims discovering what it meant to be Muslim in an often-times hostile environment. Their lack of proficiency in Arabic and Urdu meant that they would often seek out any and all Anglo-Islamic texts, some of which was produced by Jamaat-i-Islami outfits including the Islamic Foundation (est. 1973).[42] Given the generation gap between Saqib and Abu Muntasir, and sometimes different readings about Islamic reform, the two fell out during the late 1980s and Abu Muntasir went on to establish Jam'iyyat Ihyaa Minhaaj As Sunnah (JIMAS). HISAM lost most of its members as a result and soon fizzled out.[43]

In order to distinguish itself from HISAM and MJAH, JIMAS harnessed print in order to reflect its own reading of Salafism.[44] By the late 1980s, this reading increasingly bypassed the Ahl-e-Hadith's South Asian roots in favour of a more "authentic" Arab articulation. Abu Muntasir established ties with American Salafis and various scholars belonging to the Salafi movement in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. Simultaneously, the commercial Anglo-Islamic book market was emerging in Britain. Prior to this time, the bulk of Anglo-Islamic publications were produced in South Asia. During the early 1990s, JIMAS alongside other Arab-centric Salafi publishers began producing Anglo-Salafi books in order to address their perceived information gap for "authentic" Islamic material in the English language.[45] Following the Gulf War of 1990-91, the divide between loyalist and political Salafis in the MENA region transferred into Britain. A large number of JIMAS members broke away to form new collectives in order to reassert "proper" Salafism devoid of political ambitions.[46] By the mid-1990s, the newer Salafi collectives established publishing houses in London and Birmingham and opened dedicated Salafi bookstores thus contributing to the widespread appeal of Salafism in Britain leading up to the 2000s.[47]

Between the 2000s and Present

By the turn of the millennium, alongside *The Straight Path* and JIMAS' few commercial publications, Salafi collectives in Britain had effectively constructed a Anglo-Salafi library. The latter

further harnessed the internet to spread Anglo-Salafi *da'wah* by establishing websites, forums and online bookstores. Unable to compete with the output of newer Salafi collectives, Saqib's *The Straight Path* ended its circulation in or around 2006. Abu Muntasir gradually stopped publishing new JIMAS titles because i) the Salafi collectives 'seized the market' and ii) following 9/11, JIMAS no longer identified itself as an exclusive outfit preferring instead to engage in multi-faith and counter-extremist dialogue.[48]

Following 9/11, Salafism in Britain, often under the misnomer of "Wahhabism", was propelled into the public spotlight. After the London bombings of 2005, media scrutiny on local Wahhabism intensified. As a direct result, a number of Salafi collectives in and outside of Britain began publishing counter-terrorist books and defences of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, the eponym of the "Wahhabi" movement.[49] These efforts, however, were largely limited because they mostly addressed Muslim reading audiences and did not do enough to convince spectators that Anglo-Salafi print culture was bank-rolled by the Saudi government. The idea that the Saudi government was directly funding Anglo-Salafi publishers or subsidising its own publications only to be distributed through British Islamic outfits became widely held in media and government circles. But as Mandaville rightly points out, 'The error comes when analysts and observers start to view all manifestations of Salafism as evidence of Saudi Arabia's influence.'[50]

By the 2010s, conflations between Muslim terrorists and Salafis in countries like Britain subsided. The newly-appointed Conservative government however did implicate Salafis as "non-violent" extremists, which aside from having ideas incompatible with British value, were potential conveyor belts to "violent extremism."[51] The same allusion has since been repeated by a limited number of ex-Salafis in Britain and the United States.[52] Notwithstanding, newer Salafi-oriented articulations

in the Anglosphere appear now to actively shy away from links with Saudi Arabia and its supporters. Nevertheless, the Anglo-Salafi book market in Britain appears to be still dominated by the Salafi collectives and transnational networks who first established its marketplace in the mid-1990s and onwards. They too have adapted to the changing mores of information-exchange and local politics. For example, a number of Anglo-Salafi publishers are actively publishing works by scholars which were seldom-translated in previous decades. Again, this has played a part in diminishing the authority of Saudi born or based ulema in more recent years.[53]

Saudi Riyals and British Pounds

The above discussion is a brief overview of the emergence of Anglo-Salafi print culture in Britain. It demonstrates how Salafis born or based in Britain have been instrumental in translating Salafism into the English language, constructing a library in order to address the information gap for Anglo-Salafi and Islamic texts in post-war Britain, and asserting their religious ideas on their own terms.

How exactly has this been achieved if not with Saudi petrodollars? In the case of *The Straight Path* and its Urdu counterpart, Saqib funded his magazines by collecting donations from locals and by appealing to subscribers.[54] Under HISAM, both Saqib and Abu Muntasir were determined in not accepting gifts and donations from government bodies; HISAM publications were therefore self-funded.[55] Similarly, Abu Muntasir steered clear of government funding when publishing JIMAS publications. According to Abu Aaliyah, a senior figure in JIMAS during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Abu Muntasir was wary of "tied aid" which allowed donors the power to dictate what kind of *da'wah*

and views JIMAS should adopt.[56] The Salafi collectives invested in publishing that I interviewed likewise denied outright that any Muslim government has financed their print projects.

This is not to say that Saudi funds have never found their way into the hands of Salafis in Britain. Hasan, for example, received a substantial donation from Saudi's late grand mufti ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, some of which was spent on publishing AQS books. For the most part, however, Hasan insists that AQS texts are largely funded by locals and personal investments.[57] Hasan was also instrumental in distributing Saudi funds onto a number of British mosques during the 1980s as part of his role as a *mabʿūth*; not all of the recipients however were Salafis.[58]

Saudi Arabia has also staked its influence in Britain by offering scholarships to young male British Muslims – a handful of which are accepted into institutes like IUM every year. Often times these aspiring scholars return to Britain espousing the Islamic sciences they were taught in Saudi Arabia. However, as Farquhar has thoroughly evidenced, this does not always translate into Wahhabism; students study under various scholars of different persuasions and often return to their home-countries only to establish themselves as scholars without further support from the Saudi government.[59] IUM graduates who joined MJAH during the 1970s and thereafter mostly operate independently; despite their collective support of Saudi Arabia, particularly it's born or based ulema, over the years, their main remit has always been addressing the religious needs of their local communities.

Finally, the Saudi embassy in London and affiliated Islamic organisations including the London office to the Muslim World League (est. Mecca, 1982) have indeed published a number of free books and leaflets which are distributed in Britain. Their impact, in my estimation, has been largely limited and minimal in comparison

to the commercial Anglo-Islamic book market which continues to grow in visibility. Put in another way, my findings suggest that Saudi-sponsored literature has not had any significant impact on Anglo-Salafi readers in Britain. Nevertheless, the largest producer of Anglo-Salafi books was established in Riyadh: Darussalam International. It was established by Abdul-Malik Mujahid, a Pakistani Ahl-e-Hadith migrant worker in Saudi Arabia in 1986. A limited number of Darussalam Int. publications have been directly sponsored by the king of Saudi Arabia and found their way into Britain.[60] According to Mujahid's son Talhah, one of Darussalam Int.'s management team, his father's publishing house is an independent business and *not* subsidised by the Saudi government.[61] In any case, the widespread availability of Anglo-Salafi publications stemming from Saudi Arabia, as well as the many publications "made in Britain" containing translations of Saudi born or based ulema has undoubtedly contributed to past assertions that the kingdom is monetarily involved in the rise of Salafism outside of its borders.

Conclusion

This paper has provided a brief history of Anglo Salafi print culture in post-war Britain leading up to the present day. It has offered an examination of how this print culture developed through the decades. At all stages, human agencies, born or based in Britain, have responded to local concerns about the information gap for "authentic" Islamic reading material felt by British Salafis through self-funded initiatives and commercial pursuits. Despite often being conflated with Saudi Wahhabism and/or being largely attributed to Saudi sponsorship, this paper has demonstrated that for the most part, Anglo-Salafi literature found in Britain is the product of Salafis born or based in Britain.

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Endnotes

1 I utilise the term 'living out' from the title of Scott Kugle's 2014 book *Living Out Islam: Voices of Gay, Lesbian, and Transgender Muslims*. New York, New York University Press.

2 For works on LGBT, Europe and Islam see Puar, Jasbir K. (2007) *Terrorist Assemblages Homonationalism in Queer Times.* Durham, Duke University Press; Haritaworn, Jin, and Petzen, Jennifer (2011) Invented Tradtions, New Intimate Publics: Tracing the German "Muslim Homophobia" Discourse. In: Hutchings, Stephen, Flood, Chris, Miazhevich, Galina, and Nickels, Henri (eds) *Islam in It's International Context*. Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp.48-64; for feminism and Islam see Wadud, Amina (2006) *Inside the Gender Jihad: Women's Reform in Islam.* Oxford, Oneworld; for other gender movements see Safi, Omid (2003) *Progressive Muslims on Justice, Gender and Pluralism*. London, Oneworld; for LGBT and Islam see Yip, Andrew K-T., and Khalid, Amna, (2010) Looking for Allah: Spiritual Quests of Queer Muslims. In: Yip, Andrew K-T., Browne, Kath, and Munt, Sally R. (eds) *Queer Spiritual Spaces*. First edition. Farnham, Burlington, pp.81-109, Peumans, Wim (2020) *Queer Muslims in Europe: Sexuality, Religion and Migration in Belgium*. London, I.B. Taurus, and Kugle Scott Siraj Al-Haqq (2010) *Homosexuality in Islam: Critical Reflection on Gay, Lesbian, and Transgender Muslims.* Oxford, Oneworld, and (2014) *Living Out Islam: Voices of Gay, Lesbian, and Transgender Muslim*s. New York, New York University Press, and finally Hamzić, Vanja (2016) *Sexual and Gender Diversity in the Muslim World. History, Law and Vernacular Language*. London, IB Taurus; for Malaysia see Barmania, Sima, and Aljunid, Syed Mohamed (2017) Transgender Women in Malaysia, in the Context of HIV and Islam: A Qualitative Study of Stakeholders' Perceptions. *BMC International Health and Human Rights*. 17(1), accessed in unpaginated format; for Indonesia see the work of Davies, Sharyn Graham (2007) *Challenging Gender Norms: Five Genders Among Bugis in Indonesia.* Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth, and (2011) *Gender Diversity in Indonesia: Sexuality, Islam and Queer Selves*. Abingdon, Routledge; for Pakistan see Pamment, Claire (2019) The Hijra Clap in Neoliberal Hands: Performing Trans Rights in Pakistan. *TDR: The Drama Review*. 63(1), pp.141-151, and (2019) Performing Piety in Pakistan's Transgender Rights Movement' *Transgender Studies Quarterly*. 6(3), pp.297-314.

3 As transgender scholar Papantonopoulou explains the issue of 'not recognising [one's] own sense of gendered embodiment as something legible within the currently existing articulations of gender' can be problematic, Papantonopoulou, Saffo (2014) 'Even a Freak Like You Would Be Safe in Tel Aviv': Transgender Subjects, Wounded Attachments, and the Zionist Economy of Gratitude. *Women's Studies Quarterly*. 42(1-2).

4 Most cite love for their children, as in Yörükoğlu, Ilgin (2014) Acts of Belonging: Perceptions of Citizenship Among Queer Turkish Women in Germany. PhD thesis. City University of New York. Accessed via: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1132&context=gc_etds, (last accessed 21.04.2023), p.83; see also *Tales of the Waria* (2011) New Day Films. Directed by Kathy Huang. Accessed via: https://www.kanopy.com/en/cam/video/144936 (last accessed 19.05.2023); tools from one's ethnic heritage backgrounds may also be useful, see Peumans (2020), pp.43-45, p.45.

5 See also *Tales of the Waria* (2011).

6 While an extensive review of these texts is not possible here, it is worth listing a few notable examples here. On pluralism, Farid Esack (1997) has written on the implications of the multifaith struggle against apartheid in South Africa and what this says about exclusivist notions within traditional Islamic thought. Shadaab Rahemtulla (2018), Amina Wadud (1999), Asma Barlas (2002), Kecia Ali (2006) and many others have written on various topics related to Islam and gender, challenging patriarchal readings of the Quran, hadith and law. Finally, authors such as Sherman A. Jackson (2009), Edward E. Curtis IV (2006) and Ahmad Mubarak and Dawud Walid (2016) have introduced debates around race, particularly in the context of Black America, into Islamic Liberation Theology.

7 On race, see Fanon (2001), C.L.R. James (2001), Roediger (2007, 2019), Galeano (2009), Rodney (2018), Field et al. (2019). On gender, see Davis (2019), Federici (2021).

8 All translated verses of the Quran are based on Ali Quli Qarai's (2004) translation, unless otherwise stated, with small changes made by the author, where necessary, for clarity.

9 All participants have been given pseudonyms, which still reflect their gender, to ensure anonymity.

10 A group discussion with members of Nijjor Manush to discuss Islam's political and economic goals in greater depth was also conducted.

11 Maya from Nijjor Manush, interview with author, 17 November, 2021.

12 Shelly from Nijjor Manush, interview with author, 6 September, 2021.

13 *Hajj* is the annual pilgrimage to Makkah, which is obligatory on all Muslims to complete once in their lives if they meet the conditions. *Umrah* is a visitation to Makkah at times other than the *hajj*, while *ziyarah*, for Shia Muslims, refers to visiting the shrines of the twelve Imams. Akbar from Sufra, interview with author, 27 October, 2021.

14 Zara from Sufra, interview with author, 29 October, 2021.

15 Aqeel from Nijjor Manush, interview with author, 4 October, 2022.

16 Maya from Nijjor Manush, interview with author, 16 September, 2021.

17 Akbar from Sufra, interview with author, 27 October, 2021.

18 Khalid from Nijjor Manush, interview with author, 2 December, 2022.

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23 Akbar from Sufra, interview with author, 27 October, 2021; Zara from Sufra, interview with author, 29 October, 2021.

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