Univerzitet u Beogradu –
Fakultet političkih nauka

Udruženje za političke nauke Srbije

Zbornik radova
sa međunarodne
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»Nova Evropa
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NOVA
EVROPA
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Uredili: ILIJA VUJAČIĆ i NIKOLA BELJINAC

Zbornik radova sa međunarodne naučne konferencije
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»Nova Evropa i njena periferija«
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EU cultural policy and political outcomes in ex-Yu states[15]

Although these seem to be different issues, as, to paraphrase Habermas, culture can be seen as a stand-in and interpreter for other things, most notably politics, the ineffectiveness of EU cultural policy is contributing to the ineffectiveness of politics in ex-Yu, as we witnessed recently. My claim, though, is stronger, I claim that the very fact that the leadership, and by democratic procedures, the most popular part of the political elite, is such as it is, crypto-nationalist and openly and proudly primitive, because the European cultural policy, at least unwittingly, encourages us to play parts in the charade of multicultural Europe, where we play people with traditions that are not quite European, but should be respected in line with the multicultural ideal, so those traditions are pretend respected, while, in the same time, promise of membership in "European family" is also pretense. Paradoxically, it can mean that non-European behavior (pressure on media, lack of transparency in governmental business) at home is tolerated (after all, it is not **really** in Europe), while no aberrant behavior is tolerated towards other nations (we are not really **family**): fostering authoritative puppet regimes.

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My argument is that cultural policy in EU, in its lack of scope and insight, actually aids non-European political culture in its periphery, contributing to election of regimes that do not foster European values.

Politics in ex-Yu is based on identity, memory, promise, expectation and geographical confusion about Balkans, Middle Europe and EU, so we see rise in popularity of right wing, traditionalist, and populist pro-European political options.

European culture has a mixed bag of tasks a) as a stand in for true belonging; b) as interpreter for political and worldview orientation, as in pro-EU or anti-NATO.

First political culture in EU, one of self-appointed excellence, high standards in cultural and human rights issues is reserved for what is known as Old EU, the core countries, with more years in the organization, founding members, establishers of European values, coincidently, richer and more powerful.

Second political culture, one of high aspirations, implies identity as Europeans, not only geographically but culturally, consequently economically; this is assigned to New EU, countries that joined later, that are somewhat European in customs and traditional way of life, but ‚suffer' from other influences, coincidently, poorer and less powerful.

Politics in periphery is constrained not on by conditioning but also by association. Countries that are in their various stages of candidacy to join EU are on the border, even if they are not on a geographical border (Serbia, having member states Romania, Bulgaria and Greece to the East, for instance), belong to the cultural space of Mitel Europa bordering the Orient. That makes them suspect of not truly belonging in the European family.

STATEHOOD

Philosophy busies itself with the investigation of concepts; it takes concepts as seriously as natural phenomena and analyses them to death. I do not mean to advance only a metaphor. There is a sense in which to analyze a concept completely and exhaustively is to eliminate the need for its existence because now when we know all about it; it no longer appears to us as a big lump of undifferentiated material. The destiny of the concept of "nation" has been something like that. Starting as a synthesis of the floating need for a unifying factor, as a clever gimmick to express the idea of domination, it outlived the attempts at unifications of all sorts and transformed itself into something as potent and identifiable as a blood type. The connection between nation as a notion and nation-state as an actual entity is manifest again in the constitutions of the new nation-states in Eastern Europe, which all try to base citizen loyalty on some appeal to their nationality. The importance of statehood as something the denial of which can hamper growth and even threaten existence is seen as exceeding the importance of prosperity and peace.

The responsibility for prosperity cannot be left only to those in power. The barbarians are at the gates. (Those are the people we still ignore successfully, but not for long, because they will survive more mistreatment, more goods will trickle down to them as a result of our need for markets, and, if we were simply to kill them, everybody would see this in graphic detail on television and think, thanks to the democratization of education, that it cannot be quite right.) So the seeds of destruction (or of retrenchment? perhaps for the better? am I so optimistic?) were inside our civilization. Decadence is inside the high towers of the mighty, those glass castles, making us less interested in using the remote, much less doing something else. There is saturation and overload.

The attitude of the West towards the East was, even at the height of communist military power, condescending and colonial with regard to cultural and economic matters. It was not blown away by clearing rubble that was left of the Berlin wall. Even in Germany, ethnicity did not succeed in bridging the colonial gap.

Success comes in the guise of proud identity as a member of EU, not the world, no universal values are enough, because identity as Europeans is like a snobbish pretense of having better manners by birth. Lack of ability to choose which values are truly universal, and which identify Europe as a continent with a specific history, identity and purpose is a failure to construct a union of nations which is more than an administrative treaty. Instead of liberte, egalite, fraternite we have incarceration, domination, exploitation. However, I think that the concept of equality is one that is, in the core of its meaning, under attack of social policy that diminishes its content by substituting historical ideal of equality with something more like equity, therefore implicitly dependent on the notion of natural right.

The ideals of *liberte, egalite, fraternite* or right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, even Rawls's strange idea of veiled ignorance, informed consensus, etc., share something of essence, they contain a promise of minimal solidarity. The long and rich tradition of liberalism, labor movements, etc. provided welfare state as, some (Habermas) would say, legitimation of capitalist state. The upset in the balance of the cold war, of the idea (more than is commonly admitted present in everyone's mind) that the world is neatly divided not only between two different power spheres, but also between two different ideologies, one favoring liberty and the other equality (less about life, brotherhood and pursuit of happiness) creating the (politically useful) illusion that the two are in tension and not the necessary components of the great emancipatory idea.

CULTURE AND IDENTITY

Cultural policy of EU that should bring its members closer is not working. Members are not closer nor are acting in a more European way, because cultural policy of EU that should bring its members closer is contradictory, weak and

does not address the issues of European identity. It addresses high culture and education, also identity culture that is always in danger of collapsing into ghetto inducing paternalism.

European identity is a concept that is at best derivative and at worst empty. EU identity is based on an association of disparate states, not paying enough attention to non-members, even very influential and present in Europe in presenting its identity. Linguistic policy, quoted later, shows a certain self-important insistence on members only communication, and no recognition of value of the fact that universal humanitarian ideals are not only European. The most important failure of EU is that there was never any effort at state-building, much less nation-building, because Europe is not a nation. EU could have a function as transnational organization, but it is more than that, so it should aspire to more togetherness than, say World Trade Organization. The best and least painful way to integrate Europe more would be trough creation of a common cultural space, but, due to its structure as a union of fiercely independent, consensus dependent nation states, which try to keep their cultures isolated as if it was possible, disintegrative processes are actually aided by cultural policies of member countries and EU as a whole.

European agenda for culture in a globalising world[16]

The cultural sector plays a key role in terms of its numerous social, economic and political implications. Consequently, culture has a fundamental part in the process of European integration.

The objectives of the new European agenda for culture are built around **three priorities**:

A: Cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue;
B: Stimulating creativity within the framework of the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs;
C: Culture as a vital element in international relations.

In line with the Unesco Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, ratified by the EU and most of its countries, the new agenda for culture proposes to reinforce the cultural dimension as a vital element of EU external relations. This priority is accompanied by a number of measures to, among other things, pursue political dialogue in the field of culture and promote cultural exchanges between the EU and non-EU countries.

Each year, 2 cities are picked as European capitals of culture; this enables them to, among other things, celebrate their European identity. The EU's multi-lingualism policy is striving to protect Europe's rich linguistic diversity; there are

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16   From official EU website, www.europa.eu

currently 24 EU's official languages: Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish and Swedish.

As an EU citizen, you have the right to use any of these languages in correspondence with the EU institutions, which have to reply in the same language. EU regulations and other legislative texts are published in all official languages except Irish (only regulations adopted by both the EU Council and the European Parliament are currently translated into Irish).

In the European Parliament, the people's elected representatives also have the right to speak in any of the EU's official languages.

The EU provides general information about its policies in all its official languages. More specialized content is provided in the most widely spoken EU languages. The EU is home to over 60 indigenous regional or minority languages, spoken by some 40 million people. They include Basque, Catalan, Frisian, Saami, Welsh and Yiddish.

While it is national governments that determine these languages' legal status and the extent to which they receive support, the European Commission maintains an open dialogue, encouraging linguistic diversity to the extent possible.

EXCLUSION

National states that are members of EU have maintained the need for use of their national languages as a matter of national pride, regardless of practicality of translation or availability of information in widely spoken languages like Chinese, Arabic or Russian. This is just one of the signs of the exclusivity of European perspective in EU policies. That is insured by two strategies of intolerance, intolerance of a presence by exclusion through emphasizing the difference, and intolerance of a difference by forced inclusion in terms of annihilating the difference, two strategies exemplified in majority/minority dynamic in national policies.

INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE

Intercultural dialogue is, essentially, the exchange of views and opinions between different cultures. Unlike multiculturalism, where the focus is on the preservation of separate cultures, intercultural dialogue seeks to establish linkages and common ground between different cultures, communities, and people, promoting understanding and interaction.

With 28 Member States and even more cultural groupings and identities within the European Union, intercultural dialogue is essential for avoiding conflict and the marginalization of citizens on the basis of their cultural identity.

Through its *Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Project*, the Council of Europe – and more specifically the Cultural Policy and Action Department – intends not only to analyze the sources of intercultural and inter-religious conflicts and the mechanisms leading to them, in order to prevent such conflicts, but also to define cultural actions of a preventive nature, and to consider reconciliation measures to be taken in the post-conflict phase. The objective is to help policy-makers at all levels (local, regional and national), civil society and actors in the field to define a policy of dialogue integrating all expressions of cultural diversity.

Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention[17]

" [...] have agreed to base their action on the principles and shared values listed below:
   i: affirmation of the concept of cultural democracy and cultural citizenship, which implies rights and obligations;
   ii: respect for cultural identities and practices, and the expression of the corresponding forms of heritage, provided that these comply with the principles upheld by the Council of Europe;
   iii: the safeguarding and protection of both tangible and intangible heritage;
   iv: fair treatment for all cultures and all beliefs or faiths [...] "

NATIONAL IDENTITY

National identity is often a substitute for a more complex and complete identity in a time of identity crisis instigated from within and /or from without. Identity within a small or a large group is feigned, artificial or real which depends on the rigidity of the concept of national identity, and identity per se and nation as such.

Often the identifying characteristics described from within and from without seem to correspond to a felt identity. A need for identity comes from a weak position or from a doubt in a strong one.

Crisis pervading the modern era of integrative processes is often constructed as a crisis that is generated from national conflicts, although the opposite is in evidence: massive conflicts, heightened and more confronted national identities as a result of new regional regrouping.

In a situation of disintegration of accustomed belonging to citizen, class, professional or gender group, national identity is a substitute for citizenship identity,

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17   Adopted by the European Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs, Opatija (Croatia), 22 October 2003. http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/Ministerial-Conferences/2003-Culture/declaration.asp

class identity, and even gender identity, either through mythical properties of men and women of a certain nation or through gathering strength usually found in a properly felt gender identity which is failed through general social crisis.

External factors in reinforcing overemphasized national identity are facilitating certain geopolitical and/or economic interests through cultural stereotyping. One example recently attracting some of the attention of global media is the Balkans.

The basic ingredient of EU cultural policy, witnessed by treatment of languages, is identity as nationality of blood and soil, not political or pragmatic considerations. So, Gaelic is an official language of EU, as well as Croatian, but Russian, Mandarin, Turkish and Arabic are not. On the other hand, meetings and documents are in English and French, and two tiered cultural valuing is omnipresent.

Balkans is a place of confused identity, periphery of greatness, but special charming periphery insistence on alliance with the greatest winners.

Lack of any guidelines in participation, education, knowledge about universal values.

CULTURE AS A STAND-IN AND INTERPRETER

In an old piece by Habermas: "Philosophy as a stand-in and interpreter" in *After Philosophy*, by Thomas McCarthy et al., MIT, 1987, philosophy is seen as a stand-in an interpreter for particular sciences – stand-in while they develop and interpreter between ordinary people and experts in those sciences. Since imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, I will paraphrase his work and find the concept of cultural policy similar to the efforts of social scientists instead of philosophers in understanding life. Culture, especially from the viewpoint of creators of cultural policy is a stand-in for real and/or universal, new, modern, civilized, ordinary, bland, neutral life, which can be achieved through learning and constructive dialogue, and it is also an interpreter between the administrators/intellectuals (ministers of culture, science and education typically) and the yet unenlightened public. Similarly as Habermas finds the role of philosophy indispensable nonetheless, and efforts to reduce one kind of philosophy to science and another to literature, I find that it is difficult to discipline culture by cultural policy into enforced politically correct positive attitude about society and cultural products functioning as sources of refined entertainment.

Society is like a house which you build based on sincere, although maybe faulty beliefs about sustainability and functionality, comfort and durability, and then you can decorate it in many different ways and indeed redecorate at whim that is – you can introduce non-essential elements of different cultures.

Culture is defined by language, symbols, values, types of insights and beliefs, norms, manners and material culture. Cultural identity is one of the identities that

closely define us, and it largely shapes our way of life, although it is sometimes less spoken of than our sexual, national or professional identity.

I am in sympathy with the goals of cultural administrators, which are enumerated in their resolutions, and I have no quarrel with their methods, and I join them in their hopes for the results of the same. However, I am skeptical of the cleanliness and simplicity of the task. Cultural policy works best with oppression (witness the extinction of forbidden Native American languages, Serbo-Croatian, Yiddish, etc.) and is very moderate in results when it comes to encouraging, cajoling, etc.(witness efforts at multiculturalism in Kosovo and a distinct lack of success in creating multicultural environment for African Immigrants in Europe).

Considering culture in the convergence of its three meanings: as a material and symbolic production of a group or nation, superstructure of society in sense that it adds the aesthetic and playful to life and a particular lifestyle, it is encompassing most of life's content, importance and meaning. Culture is anchored in cultural space, cultural history and cultural identity, creating an environment that is the totality of living space around us.

Biologists have always referred to the growth of a strain of bacteria in circumstances disallowing it to be contaminated by some other strain as "isolating a culture", so some small cultures are kept isolated, in reserves, as a reminder of exotic places we can no longer visit. Apart to those cultures that are isolated, we all belong to the web of cultures defined by education, sex, class and geography, age and ethnic background.

NEED FOR CULTURAL POLICY

When there are social – local, regional or global problems that are already solved or deemed unsolvable by other, more serious means (political, diplomatic, monetary technological or military) cultural policy is introduced as comparatively painless and likable way of improvement. Cultural policy is especially volatile in a floating cultural space, and sustained efforts of cultural, linguistic, educational and media policies were instrumental in: efforts to build, then enmesh, then deconstruct, then revive Yugoslavia, and finally to rewrite its history. Right now, a super nation in expansion, European Union, is also interested in enforcing a few rules to increase its cohesion.

It seems that legitimation of positive discrimination, undoubtedly a thing of cultural policy, which is based on concerns about the past – in compensation for historical injustices; present – in reaction to lingering discriminatory attitudes and practices, and future – in providing positive role models for coming generations should work for less politically correct cultures also, because of the right to history, to remembrance and to mourning and/or celebrating, the need to be same and different in the same time, to belong to a community and to mutiny against belonging, and the right to a future of diversity.

YUGOSLAVIA

There is a tension between spontaneous cultural expression and the products of carefully constructed cultural policy. It is particularly strong in the reconfigured cultural space of the countries of ex-Yugoslavia.

Cultural space has more dimensions than geopolitical space. Aside from living space, it is a space in which life is lived a certain way, with certain material and spiritual content. Cultural policy as one of the main ingredients of nation building and reasserting has been very important in the region. Creators of cultural policies have used those dimensions differently.

The problem between culture as a free, spontaneous and much needed expression of life of people(s), groups, sexual orientations etc. and cultural policy is that cultural policy cannot encompass all the meanings inherent in the culture as a lived expression.

Culture is often seen as divided into "high culture" and "popular culture", and it is usually assumed that "high culture" is supported through cultural policy while "popular culture" is something that grows spontaneously, but actually, they both have two ways of coming into being and sometimes those ways are not transparent.

Identification with Europe which is desired mainly for economic reasons is feigned to be meant as cultural, the convergence of values. European cultural identity was formed on the dialectic between uniqueness and variety, the only true one, the first among equals, as a model for non-barbarity and hierarchy of civilizations and cultures, peoples and faiths, attitudes and manners. It is now in a certain quandary between "civilized universality" which should, but does not succeed to, differ from eurocentrism, and "lovable specific difference".

External factors in reinforcing overemphasized national identity are facilitating certain geopolitical and/or economic interests through cultural stereotyping. One example recently attracting some of the attention of global media is the Balkans.

The trend of (re)building of the ex-Yugoslav, and more broadly, Balkan cultural space is a real one. The process has already started on a spontaneous level. The repercussions of channeling it are of significant importance for the successful incorporation of the whole region in larger integration processes.

Building of a positive cultural identity in the region, identity that is not linked to attitudes of intolerance towards other cultural groups, building of a positive culture of responsibility in a given political community and reintegration on the regional level of important cultural structures that would unable policies of democratic and economic reform to have an effect in the general population is a process that drives some of the more overt cultural policies.

This results in reinventing the cultural space that people could inhabit regardless of the geopolitical situation. That would make it easier for them to prepare themselves for the changes that the integrative processes bring on informative, economic and political levels.

BALKAN

Balkans changed its name to South-eastern Europe, as different from Eastern Europe, and, when that is used up, maybe it will be known ‚neutrally, objectively, geographically‘ as West South Eastern Europe, as indeed, the much used phrase Western Balkans, suggests, all to avoid the appearance of impropriety, the use of a dirty name.

Relationship with history and geography is for citizens of "the free world" a question of internal as well as external borders. They have isolated themselves, not only geographically, by living on the island of abundance and comfort; but, most importantly, they placed those dark impulses *outside* themselves, and now they keep in touch with their dark side through horror movies and newscasts from other continents. Balkan is that other continent in Europe, the Indian reservation, national park, part of the Amazon jungle left to the natives, inner city Detroit, "heart of darkness", the evil twin of Europe.

The difficulty in developing an analysis of the shared interests of people belonging to different national movements in Yugoslavia becomes obvious. What would be their common good? Their purpose? It is easy to dismiss the ideology of nationalism and say that any ideology can be persuasive with the right amount of propaganda, but what about the disease of nationalism? Why is it contagious? If we think back to Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason* and imagine the mob going more or less towards Bastille but mainly just going forward so that it can level everything in its path, gaining momentum as it moves like dancers in a crowd, is it conceivable for them to have discussed their goals and reached a consensus? In order for different groups to reach consensus, there need to be shared values, so that there can at least be agreement about the facts (unless we are rigid about the fact/value distinction). But here is the possible problem: how do people who wish for exactly opposite things reach a consensus? How does a person wanting two contradictory and mutually exclusive things (see Freud, Nietzsche or Dostoyevsky if in doubt concerning the possibility of such a situation) achieve satisfaction? Also, how does a person wanting two opposite things mediate between them, using his or her reason through self-expression, etc.? How does a democratic procedure help when exactly half of the people involved want exactly the opposite of what the other half wants? That is the usual case, in fact. It should be noted that most elections split the small number of people who actually choose to get involved almost in half. "Land slide victory of 53%!" the campaign managers scream. McBride, in his article "Rethinking Democracy in Light of the East European Experience," (McBride 1995, 129) actually discusses the even more disastrous effects of democratic procedures in Yugoslavia and voices serious doubts about their effectiveness in general.

Vučić did not win as a nationalist, since he was openly promising a European future at odds with his previous nationalist rhetoric, he was openly economically liberal, glorifying ‚success‘ of ruthless employers, in the same

time, he was also thought of, somewhat illogically, as a protector of Serbs in general, of their traditions and special properties unlike those in EU, as well as people on ‚fixed income', a lovely phrase encompassing wage slaves and welfare (an ironic name, suggesting as it does that they were faring well and/or that someone was interested in their welfare) recipients. His major success was as a European nationalist, superiority in adherence to European values, comfort in adherence to tradition, neoliberal capitalist promise of prosperity and the illusion of social security. European voters are voters in national states, and promise of a national pride has been a formula of success, the more crisis is felt. If EU was more of a political union, it would have to make an effort to educate its citizens to be abstract citizens, impartial to their nationalist interests and – states. The abstract citizen will be a real problem for the nation-state, and Habermas tries to point the way out, at least procedurally, in "Citizenship and National Identity."

We can easily find evidence how stubborn is the idea of national interest and national feeling, the loyalty and sublime spirituality, great deeds and beautiful thoughts that only nationalism can inspire. For example, on political institutions that should be backed up by beautiful feelings and not expediency and rationality.

Nationalism is a belief-attitude system that can be expressed as, but cannot be reduced to, an ideology. That is because in the promise of achieving excellence simply through manifesting one's essence, the appeal of nationalism cannot be evaluated through any rationality. Ideologies have as an important ingredient at least a pretense of coherence and consistency; that is why they can be explained away. In nationalism, on the other hand, there is no appeal to ‚thinking in agreement with oneself'. Indeed, there is no appeal to thinking. The answer to any doubt is simply that we (Serbs, Germans, whatever) ‚are' that way.

One of the most boring features of the end of enlightenment we live in is the insistence on the values of human civilization, finally united, manifested by the fall of the Berlin wall and opening of MacDonald's in Moscow, as values that are more important than any values that are only ours. It does not surprise that it leads to many contradictions. To be civilized is to destroy nature and spread imperialism, but we should refrain from personal aggression. Sex is used to define every situation and sell every product, but we insist on Puritanism.

Tradition is not only cultural, but is best exemplified through culture: "Traditionally, religion was a foundation of identity, spirituality, intellectual and moral values, in one word, a lever of development of a people. With the age of Enlightenment, that momentum is taken by the institutions of a developed society. Without neglecting tradition, it is necessary to teach universal human values that do not depend on religion, nation or state." (Mićunović 2001, 1).

Cultural aspects of the times are strikingly gendered in the sense that "the new world culture" is favoring issues, inclinations, attitudes, developments and resolutions which are typically associated with male preferences and masculine

attributes. In the Aristotelian classification of virtues necessary to obtain "the good life", and achievement of "the good life" is one of the most powerful unifying forces of globalization, virtues associated with "virility" take pride of place in going in the right direction.

There is no doubt that: weakness of values and serious consideration of international, national, or at least local community; speed and inarticulateness of globalization and disorientation of marginalized and/or young people have a key role in the terrifying rise, networking and domination of neo-Nazi and chauvinist ideology, atmosphere and lifestyle. Of course, it is not the only way for the marginalized population; we can see more articulate ideas and movements with more solidarity among left oriented antiglobalists. But our part of the world (the Balkans) can never afford to catch its breath and think through in a positive way its own tradition. Instead, there is a prevalence of political and ideological considerations in most of contemporary social theory in and pertaining to South-eastern European context. With the significant political changes in this region the relevance of ideology grew significantly. The hottest debates between nationalists and globalists are giving way to the contest between social democrats and liberals. Involvement with politics and lobbying of different kinds resulted in lack of insight into the real situation, and lack of theoretical understanding of the same among significant portion of very influential philosophers, sociologists, political scientists and other social theorists in South-eastern Europe, and those who are writing about it. Precedence of ideology over theory has dire consequences in the social fabric itself; external and internal stereotyping, neglect of perspective on the recent past, and growth of parochialism in popular culture, to name a few. It is important to catch this fabric before it turns into stone and "spider webs cover the sky".

Members of neo-Nazis, neo-chauvinists, skinheads and other groups that engage in ‚dispersing perverted people' differ from members of real communities in their negative rationale for the bond. If "a family is a group of people who hate each other because they have to live together" as a cynic said, than politically and socially incorrect group is "a group of people who are together because they have to hate". With all assurances from KKK, Obraz and similar groups that they can represent a family to young people who join them. It is not the truth, because there is no connection based on love and affirmative validation (without a necessary confrontation with the enemy) which is essential for a family.

We can use that incompleteness in creating a community that extremists can build and try to use particularities in a positive way: "Redefining the concept of "homeland" allows for a strategy which would apply to real people in their life situations instead some abstract political category, which could significantly help members of minorities to establish/maintain their ethnic/cultural identity in a measure and way that they choose." (Gavrilović 2006, 24)

ACADEMIA

Academia deserves a small section of its own on this issue, because academia in the broader sense, that is, intellectuals, have a key responsibility in this situation. The usual insincere, hand washing wail how people are primitive and illiterate has served as exoneration for far too long. Intellectuals give this black leathered style content — when Matija Bećković, member of Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences and well known and respected poet promotes churches on mountains and general strife then all inferiority feelings about unfinished schools, prizes not won and unfulfilled marital bliss can be cured with someone else's actual physical fighting.

Intellectuals are blurring the lines between what may or may not be done and the state supports it — it is allowed to interrupt lectures, it is allowed to issue threats so state (whether it is national or not) loses power as a sole carrier of the monopoly of violence because violence the state is committing is not enough to provide cure and comfort to the class that is insatiable for gold and honors. Some of them give odes to national unity and pride, while others ritualistically decry it, but they say the others are, after all, ‚nice'. There are no nice nationalists; all nationalists are chauvinists, because chauvinism is a natural pinnacle of nationalism. Together, they allow the state institutions to become entrenched in conservativism, applauded by people. Why? I doubt they know, people think they are conservative not because they actually lead conservative lives or have profited under conservative governments, but because they wish to be like conservatives they see on TV: serene, moral, rich. But it should not be confused with the responsibility of intellectual and political elite for the shape of the state. State should not be clerical and should not be national, but it should be a state, that is, it should exercise control over excesses of hatred — that is the only question of importance for the endurance of Serbian state.

What is it in the intellectual worker that drives him/her towards conservativism? Possibly a class thing, keeping miserable, insecure privileges (consolidation of gains, pulling the ladder, close the door) makes them natural friends of the hate groups, also they are frustrated with having not gotten just desserts (I am so smart yet poorer than Donald Trump/Mišković). Then there is mutual competition/co-operation of intellectuals / tycoons (politicians) on patriotic duty.

Limiting community to certain religious and national groups and belonging to ‚normal' segments of population has a negative influence on social integration and building of a wider community which separates basic values and interests. There is no need to ‚prove' that there is discrimination and hate. There is too much proof, and to prove discrimination is like proving that you are thirsty, that air is polluted, and that that pollution is affecting you, that you mind the cigarette smoke, and there is really too much of it, and you are not overly sensitive. It is important to catch this and react before it is set in concrete, while we still can resist the habit of pollution.

Problems of our academic circles are a gap between margin and elite. Being elite in one's country, but without power and influence allows for internal brain drain, away from academia, into management and business, government and non-government establishment positions outside academia. As well as Serbs are majority in Serbia, minority in Kosovo, so Serbian academics are elite in Serbia, marginal in the world academic circles. Results of bad policy and isolation. Drive towards intellectual isolation ‚to spite the world that rejected us'. Intellectuals everywhere are marginal in the power play of geopolitics.

There is that relationship between economy and dignity, disrespect and violence. Lack of socialization, of any kind of social cohesion, even social coherence. Tit for tat in evil, even with the wrong addressee. Knowledge and awareness of existence and relevance of consequences.

HOW INEQUALITY AND EXCLUSIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE DIMINISH POSSIBILITY FOR GROWTH

There is a contradiction in neoliberal practice of today: the goal is to insure constant growth, abut its policy of increasing educational and income gaps make it impossible. One of the reasons Inequality and political decisions reinforcing it are detrimental to any kind of development is the wider and wider gap between education provided by public funds and education available to the rich. Information, whether through formal education, informal education or media and press releases, is segregated, as is knowledge, becoming more and more the province of the privileged, disabling the general public from any competence in making far reaching decisions.

Our rethinking development, the true understanding of sustainability, is impossible if we keep all matters of international relations, financial transactions, trade rules and commercial practices secret as private deals between powerful wise leaders and complicated expertise of consultants.

The nature of capitalism is going through a change most profound since the advent of corporate multinational capitalism as a more dominant mode of socio-economic exchanges than the traditional capitalism. The issues relevant to that change are innovations and technology, the change in the understanding of the relationship between representative and participatory democracy, and the understanding of economic equality and economic justice.

In this profound change, concepts of capital and labor, essential for study of capitalism, are transformed. In this paper, I will pose the question of trading influence, and is income thus generated income from capital or income from labor. In connection with that, I will look into questions of groups of influence and their shaping of the concepts of legitimation including social responsibility and sustainable development.

As can be seen through looking through available textbooks, educational texts, on-line information and official press releases, knowledge relevant for informed decision making is less and less available to citizens, and more and more kept in the circles of experts, and parties of influence.

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Innovations and technology are relevant because we cannot pretend that bitcoin or a similar invention will not transform our financial transactions and the very understanding of the role of money in the economy. We can understand the nature of financial products for what they are: constructs in human exchange.

In this profound change, concepts of capital and labor, essential for study of capitalism, are transformed. In this paper, I will pose the question of trading influence, and whether income thus generated is income from capital or income from labor. In connection with that, I will look into questions of groups of influence and their shaping of the concepts of legitimation including social responsibility and sustainable development. Representative democracy is falling short of fulfilling the promises it made: that we will all have a say in decision making and that decisions made will be for the best. As Piketty says in the conclusion of his monumental work on the economic controversies surrounding inequality, *Capital in 21st Century:* "Dynamic development of market economy and private property, left to itself, leads to powerful convergence, especially connected to the development of knowledge and skill, but it also leads to divergence, potentially threatening our democratic societies and values of social justice they are founded on." Participation of citizens in democratic processes linked to informed decision making, and not only in election of representatives; participative democracy and not only representative democracy, is essential for quality citizenship and contributes to real wealth, based not only on GDP, but also on Human Development Index.

Our rethinking development, the true understanding of sustainability, is impossible if we keep all matters of international relations, financial transactions, trade rules and commercial practices secret as private deals between powerful wise leaders and complicated expertise of consultants. Ideological thinking: blind market faith, belt tightening and money fetishism are ruinous; instead, we can value people, nature, resources and history, future and knowledge, above mesmerizing numbers of commas in bank accounts.

It does not surprise that the election choice is not for arguments, for European values proclaimed, but for European values practiced, nationalism, false security in isolation and false prosperity in *laissez faire* capitalism, it is

tradition that is not just the tradition of the Balkans, of socialism or of "enforced union" with other nations, it is intrinsically wound into the fabric of the concept of nation state, and, as such, it is not truly compatible with the welfare EU, EU of prosperity and opportunity for all. The migrant crisis, as it is relentlessly called, although UNHCR asked media in EU to call people fleeing from war, refugees, according to the international agreements that should grant them protection, is showing that according to Sartre, scarcity cannot be overcome by actual sharing, because there is a need for number one place.

Election processes in ex-Yu states actually include Yugo nostalgia in a subtle way that promises have a sound of old party slogans about a benevolent leader knowing best, and, based on that knowledge and support of a few close trusted party mates, he will take care of us (everyone sometimes indulges in a fantasy about an existence without worries, without the need to think for themselves, where sheiks from faraway lands and leaders of powerful countries just shower wealth and all kind of solutions to our problems on us because they recognize the greatness of our leader, who is the greatest, but he is also one of us, he makes our ordinary characteristics great). The problem of lack of any popularity of "European values" of respect for procedures and institutions, plurality of opinions and political diversity, freedom of media and openness of decision making process, transparency of government contracts, responsibility for the environment, social structures, individual freedom and wellbeing and tradition and fairness.

Those values are not only conspicuously absent from the behavior of Europeans, decisions made by their governments and procedures employed by EU bodies, they are absent from the very strategies, projects and declarations that are supposed to ensure their prevalence on the continent. No wonder that no election promise in ex-Yu states ever mentions European values, decent society or culture in any meaning. They are always about a strange and never done to any degree of success, merging of our identity, as often perceived, ethnic, religious and territorial with the identity of Europeans as, often perceived, rich, protected and isolated from bad areas of their own continent and the whole world. And who does not want that?

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