The concept of thing (res) in Descartes

Milidrag, Predrag (2014) The concept of thing (res) in Descartes. Filozofija i društvo, 25 (3). pp. 223-246. ISSN 0353-5738 eISSN 2334-8577

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Abstract

The article analyzes the meaning of the concept of res in Descartes’ metaphysics. The basic meaning is that thing is an essence that could have even real existence. Through the analysis of Descartes’ works that meaning has made more precise against the background of the rational distinction between essence and existence. The relations among the thing and the notions of reality (realitas), the degrees of reality and the modes of reality were shown. The special attention is dedicated to the relation between the thing and the causality, i.e., to the problems how the things could cause and what is the cause of things. The problem of causality is connected with Descartes’ teaching concerning the creation of eternal truths; that connection expresses the difference between his and scholastics’ concept of thing, which is obvious in his concept of the causation of the degrees of reality. At the end the late, scholastics’ notion of supertranscendental meaning of thing is shown in Descartes.

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