The Problem of Distinction of the Ideas of Things from the Ideas of Nonthings in Descartes

Milidrag, Predrag (2012) The Problem of Distinction of the Ideas of Things from the Ideas of Nonthings in Descartes. Filozofska istraživanja, 32 (2). pp. 261-278. ISSN 0351-4706 eISSN 1848-2309

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Abstract

The paper begins with the analysis of Third Meditation, and it is shown that there is no difference between any objects of the representations as such. Descartes’ understanding relies on Late Scholastics concept of simple conception. By the example of two ideas of sun and the idea of self it is shown that Descartes could argue that some ideas certainly do not represent just beings of reason, but that is not enough. Using his other writings the conclusion is that, in fact, there are two problems: how to distinguish between the essences of things from beings of reason and how to make a demarcation within very beings of reason between possible and impossible constructs. In the second part of the paper, Leibniz’s critique of Descartes’ ontological argument is analyzed. The historic cause of the problem is Descartes’ use of mutually irreconcilable concepts of human mind and divine ideas, and the cause within his metaphysics is dualism and his insufficiently clear notion of clarity and distinctness of ideas.

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