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THEMATIC CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS OF INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

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ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM AS PARA-POLITICAL FORMS

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Abstract: This paper represents a sociological and politological research dealing with the analysis of a social phenomenon of so-called “modern barbarism” as a specific phenomenon opposing the official institutionalized civic politics. Crime and terrorism are recognized to be the most important forms of this “modern barbarism”, identified in this paper as specific para-political forms with their own particular ethics, worldviews, institutions and internal organization. This paper concludes that terrorism and organized crime cannot be regarded as mere social deviations, but they should rather be seen as a complete and integral social phenomenon with a stable and specific structure when we take into account that they represent explicit para-political forms which practice a specific *anti-civic understanding of politics*, thus representing the dominant anti-civic forms of power of our time.

Keywords: organized crime, terrorism, para-political forms, anti-civic understanding of politics

INTRODUCTION

The following scientific paper deals with sociological and politological research of the forms of so-called *new barbarism* that would arise from frustrations of some social groups from the margins of society who would not be able to see any other way, save for that of violence, in order to secure themselves the desired social recognition and influence. In that manner, this *new barbarism* would become a weapon in the hands of the weak, who would, accordingly, get revenge against the powerful whom they would deem responsible for their own marginalization. Paradoxically, however, the birthplace of those “new barbarians” as well as of those institutionalized socialist democrats would be identical. Namely, both would have their distant origins in the French Revolution, since it had not only given birth to the modern civil order, but it also, like a germ, dialectically contained the so-called “new barbarism” which is exactly what, two centuries after, attacks the civil-democratic order which the Revolution had established.² This “new kind of barbarism” established by the French Revolution and the Enlightenment with their extreme interpretation of politics and man, was astutely recognized by Horkheimer and Adorno.³ We can therefore say that the importance of the French Revolution, even though its context was outdated a long time ago, can be seen in the fact that it helped establish civil order

1 When we talk about “barbarism” and “barbarians”, we do that quite conditionally, without connotations of value, not wanting at any moment to suggest that they are some wild, evil and bloodthirsty “uncivilized” groups. These terms are used simply to denote a particular mode of existence of the groups from the margins of society, which differ from the existence of “civilized” civil society. However, these two modes of existence are immeasurable from the ethic, i.e. moral point of view, because both of them have their own truths, their systems of value and their moral patterns. To put it simply, it is a matter of different worldviews, rather than of a conflict between “the good” and “the bad guys”, because both parties have a specific process of self-legitimation for which they are convinced to be correct and unquestionable. It is exactly this process of self-legitimation, as we will see later on in this paper, that has turned organized crime and terrorism into specific para-political forms.

2 More about this specific dialectic which has evolved from the French Revolution in the book by N. Cvetićanin, *Epoha s' one strane levice i desnice; O levici, desnici i centru u političkom polju Evrope, o građanskom i antgrađanskom shvatanju politike, o postideološkoj politici u 21. veku* [The epoch beyond the Left and the Right; about the Left, the Right and the center in the political field of Europe, about civic and anti-civic understanding of politics, about post-ideological politics in the 21. century], Službeni Glasnik-Institut društvenih nauka, Belgrade, 2008, p. 47-72.

3 M. Horkheimer, T. Adorno, *Dijalektika prosvetiteljstva* [Dialectic of Enlightenment], Veselin Masleša, Sarajevo, 1989, p. 7

(and post-civil order arising from that classical-civil order)⁴ equally anticipating anti-civic types of resistance to it coming from the political margins. Therein lies the greatness of Jean Jacques Rousseau, the main theorist who defined the French revolution, who bequeathed the idea of democracy to the order we live in today, anticipating, at the same time, with his anarcho-archaic aspect, all forms of “barbaric” resistance to the democratic order.⁵ We should also remember Alexis de Tocqueville, who brilliantly noticed that the brave new democratic world lives in constant tension and contradiction between institutionalism and barbarism, order and anarchy.⁶ A democratic society is dynamic, which is the most visible in the contemporary global situation, where on one side we have the outlines of global democracy, with its variety of institutions (the EU being certainly the most important in the context of our paper), whereas on the other side we have groups of so-called “new barbarians” who stand at the gates of that democratic world. The thesis which we will try to prove in our paper is that “new barbarism” would not be possible in some authoritarian and totalitarian regime that would fully and forcefully pacify and suppress every sign of political resistance, and that these “barbaric” types of resistance to global democracy (i.e. the possibility that they emerge) are a good evidence that this very democracy exists and that it is not totalitarian.⁷ Consequently, we can say that the global democratic *open society* produces its enemies itself, exactly by being open as it is, and that the enemies of such society are the best witnesses of its openness, since an authoritarian and totalitarian regime would eradicate them from the start. With this in mind we again come to the inevitable dialectic of liberal-democratic civil order and anti-civic “barbaric” margins, which not only have the same place of origin, but also need each other so they could form a political identity.⁸ The “democrats” would need the “barbarians” as a proof that the political field is not totalitarian, static and uniform. Moreover, they could always say that the “barbarians” are a product of their own “lenience” and “tolerance”. On the other hand, the “barbarians” also need the “democrats” so they could have an *enemy* required by their *metaphysics of struggle*, which is at the core of their system of values, or, in other words, their *political theology*. All this confirms the famous Schmitt’s thesis on the significance of the figure of *apolitical enemy* for the political field and its dynamics¹⁰, as well as the fact that political groups do not acquire their identity themselves but in relation to their own “political competition” (let us avoid the unpopular term “enemy” and use this expression not as strict as that of Schmitt). Be that as it may, in the following text we will deal with the various forms of the aforementioned *new barbarism* that opposes global, mostly liberal-democratic order. Also, we will rather sketch those shapes recognizing their respective

4 More about how classical civil order evolves into so-called post-civil order in the 21. century in the book N. Cvetičanin, *Epoha s one strane levice i desnice; O levici, desnici i centru u političkom polju Evrope, o građanskom i antigrađanskom shvatanju politike, o postideološkoj politici u 21. veku* [*The epoch beyond the Left and the Right; about the Left, the Right and the center in the political field of Europe, about civic and anti-civic understanding of politics, about post-ideological politics in the 21. century*], Službeni Glasnik-Institut društvenih nauka, Belgrade, 2008, p. 547-587.

5 Fukuyama notices well that Rousseau simultaneously talks of both the foundations of the new democratic world and its inner destruction as “an attack on the civilized man.” F. Fukuyama, *Kraj istorije i poslednji čovek* [*The End of History and the Last Man*], CID, Podgorica, 1997, p. 107/108, 203 (footnote 63)

6 Alexis de Tocqueville, *O demokratiji u Americi* [*Democracy in America*], Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, Sremski Karlovci, CID, Podgorica, 1990.

7 In this fashion Laqueur brilliantly concludes that, e.g. terrorism can occur and sustain only within a democratic regime, as every authoritarian regime cuts it off at its roots. Laqueur, Walter, *Istorija Evrope 1945. – 1992.*, [*Europe in Our Time: A History 1945-1992*], Clio, Belgrade, 1999, p. 546

8 About this dialectic of liberal-democratic civil order and anti-civic “barbarian” margins see the book by N. Cvetičanin, *Epoha s one strane levice i desnice; O levici, desnici i centru u političkom polju Evrope, o građanskom i antigrađanskom shvatanju politike, o postideološkoj politici u 21. veku* [*The epoch beyond the Left and the Right; about the Left, the Right and the center in the political field of Europe, about civic and anti-civic understanding of politics, about post-ideological politics in the 21. century*], Službeni Glasnik-Institut društvenih nauka, Belgrade, 2008, p. 511-587.

9 About more thorough analysis of this “metaphysics of struggle” which has its most explicit expression in Carl Schmitt, a German lawyer who excellently connected the types of extremism of both the left and right, see the book by N. Cvetičanin *Evropska desnica između mača i zakona* [*The European Right between the sword and the law*], Filip Višnjić, Belgrade, 2004, p. 121.-188.

10 About Schmitt’s principle of distinguishing friends and enemies, and particularly and thoroughly about his category of *political enemy* in ibid., p. 121-128., 171-188, 293/294. About Schmitt’s category of *political enemy* also very thoroughly in Gopal Balahrishanan, *The Enemy; An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt*, Verso, London-New York, 2000

specific qualities, than deal with their thorough and extensive structural analysis, for which, regarding the scope of this paper, we simply do not have enough space and time.

MODERN TERRORISM AS A PARA-POLITICAL FORM

Global terrorism is certainly one form of the “new barbarism”, which is the most widespread, the most dangerous and the most uncompromising. The modern terrorism has its origins in the French Revolution where the categories of modern mathematized rationality and irrational violence merged, being that Robespierre’s, Montagnards or counterrevolutionary crusading fundamentalist troops. In other words, the violence now gets its own mathematized methodology which, in view of modern, i.e. contemporary terrorism, distinguishes it from the spontaneous and uncontrolled violence of the past. Therefore, we can recognize the formula of terrorism in the following equation: *violence + mathematics (as a method) = terrorism*. Modern terrorists, regardless of whether they are Islamic fundamentalists or marginal groups of the extreme left or right, are not simply wild and unbridled hordes, but rather very well organized structures, with its combat cells, systems of internal organization and communication, and strategic planning. Beside all that, they very gladly accept all the benefits of modern technology and modern communication systems, thus forming true techno-terrorist squads. This particularly applies to Islamic fundamentalists and terrorist groups of the extreme right, while some anarchist groups still remain at the level of “Molotov cocktails”, whereas some other anarchist groups accepted modern weapons and communication systems. The best evidence that Islamic fundamentalists are just the other side of the coin of the global civil liberal-democratic world compared to which they are not far behind neither in technology, nor in resources and education, is the well-known fact that some of their leaders and activists have attended the world’s most prestigious universities and have mostly gained solid education. All this complicates our classical image of terrorists as squalid, half-wild, uneducated and fanatical fighters. Of course, one could find such people among their ranks as well, but what we could call a “command structure” is as sophisticated as the best security services of influential countries, which is exactly what is responsible for the successful execution of terrorist acts, far behind the backs of those influential security services. The beginning of our millennium was therefore marked by major terrorist attacks which have shaken up the rule of the global liberal-democratic order, and especially its *open society* - starting from nowaday well-known 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001, continuing with the attacks of March 11, 2004 in Madrid, the attacks of July 7, 2005 in London or a series of attacks across Putin’s Russia at the beginning of 21. century. In response to a new global situation, the Russian President, Putin, noticed that today’s terrorism which bears a fundamentalist mark is an ideological heir to Nazism, because it imperils “our unique and peaceful union of civilizations”¹¹. Moreover, after the London attacks he said that he not only sympathized with the British, but also that he was ready to have the fight against terrorism coordinated at the global level, because terrorism is a common enemy both in Chechnya and in London.¹² Putin thus outlines the contours of a global political center that is forced to take a joint action in order to defend itself from attacks coming from the political margins. It is no coincidence that he juxtaposes terrorism and Nazism, because they are both cases of fundamentalist and anti-civic understanding of politics, opposite to the civic, communicative and consensual conception of politics insisted on by the leaders gathered in the so-called Group of Eight (G8), who are precisely a sort of an unofficial global government of civic center. While the great powers lean towards communication and consensus, i.e. towards mutual agreements and harmonization of interests thus forcing the rules upon those ‘small ones’, the small and the marginalized turn their own frustrations into pure violence of terrorist acts. All this determines the dynamics of the political field, and, it is in that fashion that the world we live in changes, *torn in that dialectic of center and margins*¹³. Thus, exposed to the challenge of terrorist attacks, the civil world slowly changes its structure, because due to its defensive

¹¹ A statement by the Russian President quoted from the daily newspaper *Politika*, May 9, 2005

¹² A statement made at the G8 summit in Scotland, on the same day of the London terrorist attacks.

¹³ See footnote no. 8

attitude one may notice that certain civil liberties, which were, as far as yesterday, seen as basic¹⁴, appear to be limited. So would the *open society* become the first victim of global instabilities arising from the postmodern opposites of *center* and *margins*. In addition, tying terrorism to Islamic fundamentalism would also condition the appearance of a cultural distance in Europe towards Islam itself, which is, for example, visible from the fact that after the terrorist attacks in London, attacks on the Muslim community in Britain have become frequent.¹⁵ The riots in Paris in November 2005, which would later spread throughout Europe¹⁶, in which Afro-Asian Muslim immigrants would be the group which would, at one point, break off from the constitutional order and act against it, would also serve as an evidence of cultural animosity that tries to break free from institutional control. To put it simply, due to the pressure caused by Islamic fundamentalism and prejudice against Islam, caused by this entire situation, the Muslim immigrants will at one point find themselves, speaking in football terms, in “offside”, beyond the line of the European liberal-democratic order. All this serves as a testimony that the (post)civil world in Europe is in constant danger of spontaneous “uprisings” of unassimilated immigrant groups from other civilizational circles, who reside within stable European liberal democracies. Such “uprisings” may destabilize European democracies and can have lasting effects, so before finding a political strategy for their prevention it is necessary to make a diagnosis first, or, in other words, to answer the question - do they appear because of socio-economic or religio-cultural reasons?¹⁷ Be that as it may, after this “immigrant” violence, Europe will not remain the same and this will have multiple consequences on the political and institutional development, as the (post)civil order needs to find the right answers to the problem of cultural distance which it faces in the heart of the Old continent. Terrorist attacks and the problem of cultural distance would also yield disagreement within the (post)civil order between the civil left and the civil right, i.e. between the left and the right center, as they would suggest different strategies for dealing with these problems. So would the civil left call for non-participation in the global “crusade” raids against Islamic fundamentalists and the withdrawal of troops from the conflicting areas where different interests and cultural identities clash, whereas the civil right would seek even more drastic confrontation with terrorists and retention of military and political influence in “bordering” areas.¹⁸ On top of that, the left and the right-wing extremists, i.e. the “terrorists” of European origin reflected in the still active neo-Nazi and anarchist groups would “structurally” be on the side of Islamic fundamentalists (even though some of them, especially those belonging

14 In that manner, in the address to the European Parliament on September 7, 2005, the British Foreign Secretary Charles Rodway Clarke, said that “the right to life outweighs concerns about invasion of privacy”, considering that a balance between the respect of human rights and anti-terrorist measures should be made. At the same time, he added that the old balance of rights and duties established by the European *Convention on Human Rights* no longer corresponds to the current circumstances in which terrorist attacks have become a real threat, not just one of the possibilities. *Ograničenje sloboda [Restriction of liberties]*, article, *Politika*, September 8, 2005

15 TV news of RTS (Radio Television of Serbia) of July 17, 2005 reports of three mosques set on fire, whereas the news of BKT V of July 17, 2005 reports more than one hundred incidents and attacks on Muslim communities since the London tragedy. However, it is important to point out that all the incidents occurred spontaneously and that neither institutions participated in them nor were they incited by officials. Nevertheless, the fact that the institutions proved to be incapable of preventing such incidents is quite important.

16 *Gori li Pariz? [Is Paris burning?]*, article, *Politika*, November 4, 2005

17 It is very difficult to get into the motives of violence in Paris in 2005, and say whether the primary role was played by socio-economic or religious-cultural factor. However, it is more likely that both of them were related, with the second factor being more dominant after all, because it is interesting that the French of non-Muslim origin who also belonged to the lower social strata did not join immigrants in violence. If they do join them in any future violence, then we could talk about purely social motives of the uprising.

18 However, according to this issue, the civil right and the civil left would not be coherent and uniform, because we have those civil right leaders such as former French President Chirac, who would be against the latest “crusades”, as well as those leaders of the civil left, such as the former British Prime Minister Blair, who would be for them, which, in total, relativizes the division into the left and the right and shows how intermixed they are within the (post)civil order. About the difference between the civil left and the civil right see N. Cvetičanin *Epoha s one strane levice i desnice; O levici, desnici i centru u političkom polju Evrope, o građanskom i antigrađanskom shvatanju politike, o postideološkoj politici u 21. veku [The epoch beyond the Left and the Right; about the Left, the Right and the center in the political field of Europe, about civic and anti-civic understanding of politics, about post-ideological politics in the 21. century]*, Službeni Glasnik-Institut društvenih nauka, Belgrade, 2008, p. 162-179., 267-285., 447-510.

to the extreme right, could seek confrontation with Islamic fundamentalists), since according to their methods of action they should place themselves in the same discourse to which Islamic fundamentalists belong, because their political narratives also have their origins in *metaphysics of struggle, technization of violence and political theology*, which all stem from the French Revolution and its counter-revolutionary resistance.

ORGANIZED CRIME AS A PARA-POLITICAL FORM

In addition to terrorism, no less important form of “new barbarism” is *organized crime*. Similarly to terrorism, here we cannot talk about an uncontrolled phenomenon that appears chaotically and spontaneously, as it would again be organized, institutionalized, “para-political” structure that not only manages its systems of internal organization and communication, as well as the latest technical and technological means, but is a coherent system of values as well. When considering organized crime, people make mistakes when they observe this phenomenon solely as a form of outlaw behavior that, because it remains outside of any type of positive-legal norms, civilization standards and established ethical system, is considered to be beyond any type of ethics and systems of value. The furthest realization one usually reaches is that organized crime disposes of its operational network and its internal pseudo-institutions, which explains why it got labeled as “organized”, as opposed to profane. However, analyses very rarely point out to an entire system of values and an implicit (pseudo)ethics to which the success of organized crime can be equally thankful as to their specific operational-technical organization. To put it simply, organized crime is not just a specific network of criminals who operate on the far side of the positive-judicial legislation, but it rather represents a whole new worldview that has its own laws, canons and principles, which derive from its power. For example, well-known laws are those of Italian Mafia i.e. Cosa Nostra embodied in two basic laws - the law of silence (*omerta*) and the law of blood feud (*vendetta*). Moreover, we can assume that other criminal organizations such as the Chinese triads, the Japanese Yakuza, the Colombian cartels, the Russian and the Albanian mafia have their own unwritten and, even sometimes, clearly written law-like rules.

In this sense, the most interesting is the discovery of so-called *carte constitutionale* as a specific example of mafia constitution that was found a few years ago when a significant mafia boss Salvatore Lo Piccolo¹⁹ was arrested. In this completely official and written mafia constitution we have strict and precise rules that must be obeyed by every member of the organization, and which in turn represents an amalgam of primitive positive law and implicit ethics with strict moral norms that have a pragmatic-cohesive effect. Accordingly, the first article of this “Mafia’s Constitution” is in fact an oath of allegiance to the organization, which is the element that structurally indicates that it is an organization which represents an explicit para-political form, because an oath to this organization directly excludes all other possibly given oaths (to the state, court, church, etc.), which establishes a specific category of *political sovereignty and subjectivity*. In this case, it is less important that this document is in minimal domain and range, as it is in its full intensity of commitment. The first article of this criminal pseudo-constitution brings, in the form of an oath of allegiance, a legitimate foundation for the activities of organized crime, without which it would only be an uncontrolled gathering into some kind of unstable pack in purpose of casual “common hunting” for lucrative purposes. This is how the organization gets its legitimacy, coherence and not only specific, but also a symbolic connection. The second article of this specific criminal pseudo-constitution states that it is forbidden for the members of the organization to look at the wives of their friends - a pragmatic policy which primary aim is not a moralistic monogamy, but rather a pragmatic prevention of possible conflicts within the organization because of women, which could be fatal for men under arms. Also, the third article of this criminal pseudo-constitution states that the members of the organization should treat their wives with respect and should also exclude from the Mafia everyone “who does not hold to moral values”. This rule as well has a pragmatic and stabilizing effect, because, on one hand, it defines

¹⁹ About this *carte constitutionale* and the arrest of Lo Piccolo newspapers were reporting at the end of 2007. Pronađeno “deset zapovesti” Koza Nostre [“Ten commandments” of Cosa Nostra discovered], *Politika*, November 9, 2007; *Cosa Nostra collects 75 billion euros*, *Blic*, November 11, 2007.

the ethics, i.e. the "moral" of organized crime as an impermeable barrier through which those "who does not hold to moral values" cannot pass, while, on the other hand, the rule to treat wives with respect pragmatically socializes and stabilizes those who are, by the logic of their business, permanently exposed to exceptional circumstances. Hence this rule which, in such circumstances, does not recommend additional conflicts on personal level. Furthermore, article seven of this pseudo-constitution requires that the members of the organization tell the truth to their superiors, without which it could not be possible to establish a circle of trust and accountability chain, and again, without which there would be no effective command of the organization's structure. Therefore, this is also a pragmatic-cohesive rule. Article eight of this pseudo-constitution of organized crime obliges all the members of the organization not to steal from the Mafia families, which further strengthens the sovereignty and subjectivity of organization, because it "protects" all those within the circle of the organization's sovereignty, whereas outsiders, to whom the organization possesses no obligations, are left to its mercy. Finally, the most interesting is article ten of this pseudo-constitution, which states that "a man who was cheated on by a woman is not suitable to be a member of the Mafia"²⁰. Contrary to what would first come to mind, this is less about honor and expulsion of "cuckolds cheated on by women", and more about a pragmatic concern that relevant information regarding the organization do not go along with those estranged women, since they could be potentially dangerous witnesses. In that manner, infidelity to a man is interpreted as disloyalty to organization, which could cause that not only men and "fighters" perish in mutual confrontation, but also their partners as potentially dangerous witnesses. At the very end of the analysis of this specific constitution of organized crime, we can conclude that the rules are clear and that each of them has both a symbolic-legitimizing value and simple practical and operational function, together ensuring seamless operation of the organization. Thus is the oath of allegiance to the organization symbolic, having, at the same time, a pragmatic influence and specific sanctions if it be broken as evidenced by the words of the curse: "Should you *betray Cosa Nostra*, your flesh will burn." As we said, the articles that state that one should not look at his friends' wives and that a member of the organization cannot be someone who has been cheated on by a woman, represent practical guidelines²¹ rather than an explicit ethics, although we can also recognize here some values, mostly traditionalistic. Actually, the truth is that every moral, regardless of being official civil or the Mafia-underground, is actually functional, because it sets clear rules for relations between people stabilizing their mutual connections, regardless of whether the connection is established for good or bad causes. A particular evidence of this can be found in an article of *carte constitutionale* that states that the members of the organization should tell the truth to their superiors, without which the organization would not be able to function, or an article that states that one must not steal from the Mafia families, without which again it would not be possible to maintain peace and stability within the organization. All in all, organized crime proves to be a particular para-political form, i.e. a "state within a state" with its own laws, moral and principles, which makes it a complete worldview, rather than an uncontrolled phenomenon.

If we return to the context of our topic, we can actually say that organized crime, as well as terrorism, essentially represents an entire "politics" opposed to that of the official civil democratic politics practiced by official civic institutions in the country. That organized crime represents not only a simple and deviant form of social behavior, but also an explicit "politics", i.e. an explicit para-political form, is proven by the fact that it has its own pseudo-political institutions. Furthermore, it is well known that in the "golden age" of American organized crime from the thirties to the fifties of the 20th century, there existed the famous *Commission* as an unofficial executive government of organized crime in which different families and clans shared territory and common interests for their activities. Some of the most memorable characters of

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ In order to avoid, in the first case, as we have already said, internal conflicts about women in the organization, if anyone looked at the "wives of their friends" which could be quite possible in the situation where all men are armed, and when they are already accustomed to using their weapons. In the second case, where those men who are cheated on by their woman are not suitable to be members of the Mafia, it is a case of self-protection of the system before a possible crack, because it is assumed that a woman could carry away a secret of the organization to somebody else's bed. Therefore, this is not only a matter of lost honor (which is also in the game), but it is also a matter of imposing the organization to a risk that an outsider learns some of its secrets.

American underground of that time would be active in *the Commission*, as specific “ministers” of organized crime: Joseph Bonano, Charles “Lucky” Luciano, Meyer Lansky and others, while one of them, Frank Costello, would even earn the unofficial nickname “Prime Minister” which shows how much this was a para-political order, with its institutions and officials.²² *The Commission* would hold its summits and conferences²³, just as a legitimate political organization would do, with the difference that here, of course, it was not a matter of civic conception of politics based on democratic procedures, but rather of anti-civic understanding of politics which combines violent behavior and pragmatism, where weapons would not only be the main method of legitimacy, but also that of selection, which, as we have said, is in turn again based on a particular form of *metaphysics of struggle*.²⁴ Organized crime has remained similar to the present day when, for the reason of being not only organized, but also value-based, it has become one of the specific ways of *anti-civic understanding of politics* as evidenced by international actions it carries out. Just as the global liberal-democratic center makes its strategic decisions in organizations such as the G8, the United Nations, the European Union, etc, so does organized crime transcend national borders causing a formation of international “underground” criminal association evident primarily in the trade of weapons, drugs and human trafficking which has become less local and more global. We can assume that there are certainly some points where these two worlds—“above-ground” and “underground” meet, because due to its democratic nature and its *open society*, the global order leaves room for various porous cavities through which criminal structures can squeeze through. Simply stated, organized crime, as well as terrorism, testifies about the democratic organization of the order within which it occurs, as it would not be possible for it to emerge in a totalitarian and autocratic regime that would cut it off at its roots, as evidenced by the fact that totalitarian regimes such as those of Stalin and Hitler were without organized crime. The emergence of organized crime within these regimes would be impossible simply because they represent specific forms of “criminalized” state, which possesses a selective right to determine life and death independently of any universal principle, being that of natural-justice or of positive-legal origin. Therefore, we have a situation that democracy (and the concept of *open society*) and organized crime would be in fact sociologically connected (because democratic order is suitable for emergence of organized crime²⁵), although structurally opposed (since the democratic order fights against organized crime and operates according to different internal “rules of the game” i.e. it has a different structure), while, on the other side, autocracy and organized crime are in fact opposed in the sociological sense (because it is very difficult for underground structures of organized crime to occur in autocratic regimes), but are very similar in their internal structure, because they are two similar voluntaristic, absolutistic and closed systems that outside of all universal principles have life and death at their disposal. However it may be that, organized crime, as well as terrorism and autocratic (and totalitarian) regimes, contains logic of anti-civic and voluntarist conception of politics that is beyond the civil-democratic procedures, even though it does not lack other forms of organization and internal canon. Nonetheless, these canons in organized crime, as well as in other anti-civic forms occurring on the margins of the political field, would be associated with a *metaphysical struggle*

22 Lauren Carter, *Najveći zlotvori u istoriji: Mafijaši*, [Most Evil Mobsters in History], p.80

23 One of the most famous conference was held in 1946 in Havana at the hotel “National” when heads and “ministers” of the underworld all gathered in person, perhaps for the last time in such a strong lineup—Vito Genovese, Charles “Lucky” Luciano, Joseph Bonanno, Frank Costello, Albert Anastasia, Thomas Lucchese, Joe Adonis and Meyer Lansky, and it was recorded that the singer Frank Sinatra “concelebrated” with them. This conference, just as those real political conferences, had several items on the agenda, making a series of binding and “strategic” decisions, the most important one being that which forbade drug trafficking, deemed as too risky, and that of the status of Benjamin Bugsy Siegel, who due to his destructiveness received a reprimand from the Commission, only to be killed later, Ibid. p. 108/109.

24 See footnote no.9

25 Organized crime in Europe appeared precisely with the expansion of the democratic era, when, in Southern Italy and Sicily, in the early 19th century the first cells of Cosa Nostra, Camorra and other organizations with the purpose of neutralizing the consequences of the Napoleonic conquests, appeared. In other words, they emerged as underground and informal “domestic” organizations since the external institutions had been occupied by “foreigners”. So we had a situation that the Napoleonic conquest spread the French Civil Code throughout Europe as a harbinger of democracy, while, simultaneously, in some parts of Europe, the first cells of organized crime began organizing themselves, in this case the Mafia, which was not only a by-product of democracy, but also a negative and combative reaction to it.

and *political theology* in which core values and “ethics” of organized crime²⁶ are reflected. True, organized crime would, similarly to other sociological structures, evolve, overcoming some of the old and romanticized forms and principles followed by the “old Mafia”, and the new generations of members of organized crime would often be much more unscrupulous and unprincipled than the old ones. However, organized crime would, in its global association, discover new cohesive factors, and it would be aware that if it wished to retain its effectiveness, influence and power, it would have to continue to commit its members to a pseudo-moral system and para-political “command” order, and not just to simple operational groups without any “deeper” connection. Thus, organized crime, as well as terrorism, would become a specific form of *politics*, i.e. a specific para-political form, which would threaten the official civic politics. Organized crime and terrorism would as para-political forms essentially be *modern barbarism* which would be based on the legitimacy of force, while the official civic politics, at least in most countries where it is being practiced, would be based on democratic legitimacy which would be in strict constitutional frames. However, we have seen that terrorism, and especially organized crime, have their own “constitutions”, which ultimately makes them specific para-political forms, and in order to be successfully fought, it is wrong to regard them as mere sociological deviations, but rather one must recognize their internal logic and their way of thinking. In this paper we identified this way of thinking as *anti-civic* according to which organized crime and terrorism represent the dominant para-political and anti-civic forms of power of our time.

²⁶ This system of values, or “ethics” of organized crime has been observed better by the works of art dealing with the portrayal of organized crime than by sociological analysis. The pinnacle could perhaps be *The Godfather*, a cinematographic masterpiece of Francis Ford Coppola, which plastically presents the coordinate ethical system of the Mafia constituted on the existentialist Schmittian categories of friends and enemies in its most radical sense. Watching this film we cannot help but notice that Karl Schmitt, with his sociological analysis, waits at every turn, and that the film, indirectly of course, completely reconstructs his political theology. So at the beginning of the film, Don Vito Corleone, as the boss of the Mafia and as the one deciding about its order, tells a man who asks him how to repay him for services rendered, that he only wants him to be a *friend* to him, after which he ceremonially kisses the godfather’s hand as a reflection of his loyalty, while the godfather in return says that “from now on, your enemies are my enemies”. The man approached the godfather because he could not find justice in the legal institutions of the system (his daughter was beaten, her bullies were set free), and in accordance with Schmittian *protego ergo oblige*, decided to put himself under the protection, and simultaneously, under the jurisdiction of the Mafia. This entire scene suggests us that the legal institutions are unjust, and it is, therefore, necessary to replace the notion of law with the notion of justice, and to establish justice itself through a certain group identity of affiliation to *friends* where it exists only for those inside, and not for those outside who may be a potential target. In addition to the Mafia as an “umbrella” organization of *friends*, a great importance is given to the family, which is almost sacralized as evident from the dialogue between the godfather and the singer Johnny Fontana who also asks him for favor, only to be in return asked by the godfather: “Are you with your family?”, and after getting an affirmative answer replying that “a man who is not with his family is not a real man”. Sacralization of the family is also conducted out of the functional need of secrecy because the business is more safely performed in a close family circle, and also out of basic needs of love and belonging in the world of bare and raw violence. The ethics of the Mafia is also an amalgam of functional and pragmatic family moral and some sort of Old-Testament retaliatory political theology which proves that organized crime is not without its ethics, but it only differs from the civil-democratic, consensual communicative ethics. *Political theology* of the Mafia culminates at the end of the film we used as an example, where, in parallel montage, we see the scene of the young godfather Michael Michele Corleone baptizing his nephew in the church, and the scenes of violence in which his people get revenge against his *enemies*, including, paradoxically, the father of the boy who is just being baptized. Therefore, it is not only baptism with holy water and the Holy Spirit, but also baptism with blood and fire, which we already had in the works of ultra-conservative philosophers such as De Maistre, as well as in those of modern “prophets” of *political theology*. Likewise, *John Gotti*, a film by Robert Harmon, similarly to Coppola’s *Godfather*, interprets organized crime as a certain system of values in which the concepts of “loyalty” and “honor” are important, so this film as well operates with Schmittian categories of *friends* and *enemies* and specific political theology. In addition, this film also shows legal institutions as manipulative and justifies organized crime as a modern version of Robin Hoodism.

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