Nešić, Janko (2013) Dispositional explanations in dualism. Filozofija i društvo, 24 (4). pp. 218-241. ISSN 0353-5738 eISSN 2334-8577
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Abstract
In order to defend mental explanations dualists may appeal to dispositions (powers). By accepting a powers theory of causation, a dualist can more plausibly defend mental explanations that are given independently of physical explanations. Accepting a power-based theory still comes with a price. Absences and double preventers are not causes in a powers theory, and solutions based on them can only defend their explanatory relevance in mental explanations. There is still a chance that such mental explanations can be causal explanations, though they do not refer to real causes.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | dispositions, powers, causal explanation, dualism, absences, double prevention, mental explanation, dispozicije, moći, kauzalna objašnjenja, dualizam, nedostaci, dvostruko onemogućavanje, mentalna objašnjenja. |
| Institutional centre: | Centre for philosophy |
| Depositing User: | Vesna Jovanović |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Oct 2022 13:29 |
| Last Modified: | 19 Oct 2022 13:29 |
| URI: | http://iriss.idn.org.rs/id/eprint/1084 |
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